

Forecasting IT Security Vulnerabilities - An Empirical Analysis

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Abstract

Today, organizations must deal with a plethora of IT security threats and to ensure smooth and uninterrupted business operations, firms are challenged to predict the volume of IT security vulnerabilities and allocate resources for fixing them. This challenge requires decision makers to assess which system or software packages are prone to vulnerabilities, how many post-release vulnerabilities can be expected to occur during a certain period of time, and what impact exploits might have. Substantial research has been dedicated to techniques that analyze source code and detect security vulnerabilities. However, only limited research has focused on forecasting security vulnerabilities that are detected and reported after the release of software. To address this shortcoming, we apply established methodologies which are capable of forecasting events exhibiting specific time series characteristics of security vulnerabilities, i.e., rareness of occurrence, volatility, non-stationarity, and seasonality. Based on a dataset taken from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), we use the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) to measure the forecasting accuracy of single, double, and triple exponential smoothing methodologies, Croston's methodology, ARIMA, and a neural network-based approach. We analyze the impact of the applied forecasting methodology on the prediction accuracy with regard to its robustness along the dimensions of the examined system and software package "operating systems", "browsers" and "office solutions" and the applied metrics. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the effect of forecasting methodologies and to apply metrics that are suitable in this context. Our results show that the optimal forecasting methodology depends on the software or system package, as some methodologies perform poorly in the context of IT security vulnerabilities, that absolute metrics can cover the actual prediction error precisely, and that the prediction accuracy is robust within the two applied forecasting-error metrics.

Keywords: Security vulnerability, Prediction, Forecasting, Competition setup, Time series

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1. Introduction

The impact of information technology (IT) security vulnerabilities can be substantial: In an industry study, IBM estimates that reputation-related costs resulting from software security vulnerabilities which lead to a disruption of business operations range in the millions of dollars per
5 disruption (IBM Global Study, 2013). The economic consequences of breaches have been examined by FireEye, a network security company. Specifically, their data breach cost report for 2016 revealed that 76 % of respondents would take their business away from a vendor that had demonstrated negligent data handling practices (eWeek, 2016; FireEye, 2016). Similarly, the 2016 Cost of
10 Data Breach report by the Ponemon Institute and IBM Security showed that the average total cost of a breach is US\$4 million, an increase of 29% since 2013, with disruptions in daily operations being the most severe category of impact (Ponemon Institute, 2016). In the aftermath of a breach, firms are challenged to mitigate the long-term financial impact by restoring customer trust. In essence, these reports indicate that vulnerabilities pose permanent risks for firms for which they need to be prepared. These risks are as diverse as they are plentiful, e.g., network attacks (GhasemiGol et al.,
15 2016), loss or theft of personal data, loss or theft of commercially sensitive information, inoperable IT systems (making the business unable to function after being hacked), intellectual property infringement, and extortion, which can lead to serious financial damage (ContractorUK, 2016).

Predictions of the numbers of post-release vulnerabilities are an important input for several managerial decisions in which avoiding aforementioned damages is a critical objective. Such pre-
20 dictions, which are designed without assuming access to proprietary information, such as code structure or software development practices, are needed in a range of situations. First, from the perspective of organizations developing software, established techniques for predicting and detecting bugs are complemented by techniques specifically designed for forecasting post-release vulnerabilities (Walden et al., 2014). In this specific context, vulnerability forecasting methodologies which
25 do not require analyses of (running) software systems are convenient for developers to avoid degrading service quality and to assess vulnerabilities when software systems are not available, e.g., due to maintenance (Venter and Eloff, 2004). Significant managerial decisions include proactively prioritizing and directing resources for security inspection, testing, and patching accordingly (Kim et al., 2007; Shin et al., 2011; Walden et al., 2014; Venter and Eloff, 2004). Predicted numbers of
30 vulnerabilities can also serve as critical input for strategic decisions on when to release a software product (Kim and Kim, 2016). Second, from the perspective of organizations managing their software portfolio, numbers of vulnerabilities expected in external software products inform decisions to acquire, and discontinue (potentially proprietary) software. In this case, forecasting techniques that do not require access to the code or other non-public information are the only viable option

35 to forecast vulnerabilities of proprietary software whose code is not publicly accessible (Roumani et al., 2015). Such assessments of vulnerability offer measures of trustworthiness and security of software products (Kim and Kim, 2016), which are necessary to evaluate the functional characteristics of software products in software portfolio management decisions, including selection and discontinuance decisions (Franch and Carvallo, 2003; Zaidan et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2007). Third, 40 organizations developing apps and extensions must react to vulnerabilities and corresponding security updates of their underlying platform software (Tiwana, 2015), such as browsers and operating systems, extending the relevance of anticipating vulnerability occurrence to resource planning and platform-homing decisions of third-party developers.

Our study focuses on the research challenge of forecasting the number of post-release security 45 vulnerabilities in subsequent periods of time. Time-series analyses can be expected to provide a viable option for vulnerability predictions for two reasons. First, the rolling-release model adopted by many software projects, such as the Linux kernel (approx. every 2-3 months), results in the regular release of revised software that can be subjected to scrutiny and attacked by hackers. Second, annual hacker meetings (e.g., DEFCON and Pwn2Own) create regular spikes in vulnerability 50 searches. Although substantial research on pre-release vulnerability detection has been published (Walden et al., 2014), our sample does not provide evidence for declining post-release vulnerabilities detection rates for software products still under active development. This indicates that despite evolving techniques for pre-release vulnerability detection, the importance of post-release vulnerability forecasting remains intact. To reliably forecast the number of vulnerabilities for a particular 55 system or software package, we contend that forecasting methodologies must account for four fundamental properties of security vulnerabilities (Gegick et al., 2009; Joh and Malaiya, 2009): First, vulnerabilities are rare events (Shin et al., 2011); to be specific, it is not uncommon that no vulnerabilities are reported throughout several months. Second, with respect to those months where vulnerabilities are observed, there are a few periods in which a comparatively high numbers of vulnerabilities are reported. For instance, 19 vulnerabilities (CVE-2012-1126 to CVE-2012-1144) were 60 reported for the Firefox browser in April 2012 (MITRE Corporation, 2017), while there were none in May and June, 2014. Third, time series of vulnerabilities are not necessarily stationary,¹ meaning that they do not have the same expected value and variance at each point in time. One reason for this is the development of software within the version history. While some versions represent 65 minor changes, others include substantial changes in the software. For example, the completely overhauled Firefox implemented in the new Quantum version represented major changes in performance and security. These include a stricter and more confined framework for extensions and additional

¹“A time series is *stationary* if its statistical properties (mean, variance and autocorrelation) are held constant over time” (Ferreiro, 1987, p. 65).

sandboxing (Mozilla, 2017). In our study, we therefore take different versions of each package into account and examine them separately. Finally, the discovery of vulnerabilities may follow seasonal
70 patterns, which is explained by the increasing implementation of time-based software release cycles (Joh and Malaiya, 2009), and which are becoming the dominant development model in open-source and proprietary projects. For instance, the Linux project releases new kernels on a regular basis, while Microsoft follows a time-based model for releasing updates for Windows.

The academic literature dealt with the study of IT security vulnerabilities using regression tech-
75 niques for prediction (Shin and Williams, 2008; Chowdhury and Zulkernine, 2011; Shin et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2011; Shin and Williams, 2013; Walden et al., 2014), machine learning techniques (Neuhaus et al., 2007; Gegick et al., 2009; Nguyen and Tran, 2010; Scandariato et al., 2014), statistical analyses with the help of reliability growth models and vulnerability discovery models (Ozment, 2006; Ozment and Schechter, 2006; Joh, 2011), and time series analysis (Roumani et al., 2015; Last,
80 2016). While an evaluation of these methodologies shows sound performance values, we observe that none of these approaches consider methodologies which account for the unique rareness of occurrence and high volatility of vulnerabilities. Furthermore, only two recent studies (Roumani et al., 2015; Last, 2016) focus on vulnerability forecasting from a time series perspective. While Roumani et al. (2015) implemented ARIMA and exponential smoothing, Last (2016) implemented both regression
85 models (Linear, Quadratic, and Combined) and machine learning techniques to forecast vulnerabilities of browsers, operating systems, and video players. Both studies show an acceptable fit and can be helpful to forecast security vulnerabilities. However, the techniques applied in these studies do not explicitly address the specific properties of security vulnerabilities. Since prediction accuracy depends on the characteristics of the forecasting methodology, we implement methodologies that
90 are particularly suitable for the properties of security vulnerability time-series, such as Croston’s methodology (Croston, 1972).

Furthermore, the particular system or software package under consideration needs attention, as different packages have different release cycles and numbers of vulnerabilities that are not taken into account when not grouped together. It is necessary to differentiate between different versions due to
95 changes within the development history. We therefore argue that the prediction accuracy depends on the system or software packages. For instance, the number of vulnerabilities is related to the market share and the maturity stage of the product: for example, Alhazmi et al. (2007) point out that if a system or software starts to attract attention and users start switching to it, the number of vulnerabilities will increase. Another example is the degree of maturity. A system or software is
100 likely to have more vulnerabilities in its early stages rather than a mature one which has been used and tested for years.

Finally, the usage of suitable accuracy metrics is also a crucial point when examining the forecast quality. The academic literature provides a lot of accuracy metrics (cf. the literature reviews on

accuracy metrics Hyndman and Koehler (2006); Hyndman et al. (2006); Willemain et al. (2004);
105 Willmott et al. (1985)), but not all are suitable when the time series are zero-inflated. For example,
prediction accuracy metrics which compute the percentage error of the forecast and actual vulner-
abilities are not adaptable by definition. These metrics produce infinite / undefined values when
there are no actual vulnerabilities reported for time t .

The aforementioned arguments concerning the methodology, object and metrics of vulnerability
110 prediction result in the research question,

“How accurately can different forecasting methodologies predict IT security vulnerabilities?”,

for which we analyse the accuracy with regard to its robustness along the dimensions of examined
system and software packages and applied metrics. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the
first that analyses the effect of forecasting methodologies which take into account the uniqueness
115 and rareness of vulnerability time series and applies forecasting metrics that are suitable in this
context.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Next, we provide an overview of related
work. In Section 3, we explain our methodology and the data set. In Section 4, we present and
discuss the results of our empirical study. The paper closes with a summary.

120 **2. Research Background**

In this section, we give a short overview of related research by discussing and highlighting current
research streams of IT security vulnerabilities and their forecasting.

2.1. IT Security Vulnerabilities

Currently, there is no standardized definition of the term *security vulnerability*, and answering
125 the question “what is a security vulnerability?” remains a challenge (Microsoft Corporation 2015).
We adopt the terms “vulnerability” and “exposure” of the U.S. MITRE Corporation as “security
vulnerability” for two reasons: First, the “Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures” (CVE) entries
are not only used by many empirical papers (Singh et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2016; Younis et al.,
2016; Chatzipoulidis et al., 2015; Ozment, 2006; Ozment and Schechter, 2006; Joh, 2011; Wang et al.,
130 2008; Last, 2016), but also by numerous information security product and service vendors (Schryen,
2011, 2009) such as Adobe, Apple, IBM or Microsoft (MITRE Corporation, 2017); and second, the
definition of vulnerabilities in the context of the CVE program covers weaknesses in the computa-
tional logic found in software and hardware components that, when exploited, result in a negative
impact on confidentiality, integrity, or availability (MITRE Corporation, 2017). We therefore adopt
135 the CVE system’s definition of an information security vulnerability being “*a mistake in software
that can be directly used by a hacker to gain access to a system or network*” (MITRE Corporation,

2017). Accordingly, vulnerabilities allow attackers to successfully violate security policies by, for example, executing commands as another user, reading or changing data despite such access being restricted, posing as another entity, or conducting a denial of service attack (MITRE Corporation, 2017; Telang and Wattal, 2007). A schematic classification of vulnerabilities is shown in the figure below.




Figure 1: Classification of Vulnerabilities (based on Schryen, 2011).

The status of security vulnerabilities offers a useful perspective for classifying extant research (cf. Figure 1). Since undetected and unreported vulnerabilities cannot be observed, empirical research generally focuses on the rightmost branch of Figure 1. In this branch of research, which is a natural complement to the established research stream on software defect detection, most papers focus on techniques for detecting vulnerabilities within the software development life cycle (cf. Walden et al., 2014). This focus on detecting pre-release security vulnerabilities naturally correlates with internal rather than external reporting. Our work focuses on the incipient research stream dedicated to forecasting post-release and publicly reported security vulnerabilities (e.g., Roumani et al., 2015; Walden et al., 2014; Kim and Kim, 2016). In contrast to traditional detection techniques implemented in internal software project settings, this research stream generally does not assume access to proprietary and confidential information such as software code or developer characteristics.

2.2. IT Security Vulnerability Forecasting

The following table illustrates the IT security vulnerability forecasting literature:

Table 1: IT Security Vulnerability Prediction Models

Article	Applications	Predictors	Technique	Data Source
Regression Techniques				
Shin and Williams (2008)	JavaScript Engine of Firefox	Code Complexity	Logistic Regression	Mozilla Foundation Security Advisories, Bugzilla
Chowdhury and Zulkernine (2011)	Firefox Web Browser	Complexity, Coupling and Cohesion	Naive Bayes, Decision Tree, Random Forest, Logistic Regression	Mozilla Foundation Security Advisories, Bugzilla
Shin et al. (2011)	Firefox Web Browser, Red Hat Linux Kernel	Complexity, Code Churn, Developer Activity	Logistic Regression	Mozilla Foundation Security Advisories, Bugzilla, National Vulnerability Database, Red Hat Security Advisory
Smith and Williams (2011)	WordPress, WikkaWikki	SQL Hotspots	Logistic Regression	WordPress, WikkaWikki Vulnerability Reports
Zhang et al. (2011)	Adobe, Internet Explorer, Linux, Apple, Windows	Period of Time between Vulnerabilities	Linear Regression, Least Mean Square, Multi-Layer Perceptron, RBF Network, SMO Regression, Gaussian Processes	National Vulnerability Database
Shin and Williams (2013)	Firefox Web Browser	Complexity, Code Churn, Prior Faults	Logistic Regression	Mozilla Foundation Security Advisories, Bugzilla
Walden et al. (2014)	PHPMyAdmin, Moodle, Drupal	Complexity, Source Code, Vulnerability Locations	Random Forest	National Vulnerability Database, Project Announcements
Machine Learning				
Neuhaus et al. (2007)	Mozilla Project	Imports and Function Calls	SVM	Mozilla Foundation Security Advisories, Bugzilla
Gegick et al. (2009)	Cisco Software System	Non-Security Failures	Classification and Regression Tree Models	Cisco Fault-Tracking Database

Nguyen and Tran (2010)	JavaScript Engine of Firefox	Component Dependency Graphs	Bayesian Network, Naive Bayes, Neural Networks, Random Forest, SVM	Mozilla Foundation Security Advisories, Bugzilla
Scandariato et al. (2014)	Android Applications	Text Mining of Java Code	Decision Trees, k-Nearest Neighbor, Naive Bayes, Random Forest, SVM	Source Code of Used Applications with Fortify Source Code Analyzer
Statistical Models				
Ozment (2006)	OpenBSD	Number of Failure Data	Reliability Growth Models	OpenBSD Web Page, ICAT, Bugtraq, OSVDB, ISS X-Force
Ozment and Schechter (2006)	OpenBSD	Time between Failures	Statistical Code Analysis, Reliability Growth Models	OpenBSD web page, ICAT, Bugtraq, OSVDB, ISS X-Force
Joh (2011)	Windows XP, OS X 10.6, IE 8, Safari	Number of Vulnerabilities	Vulnerability Discovery Models	NVD, Secunia, OSVDB
Time Series Analysis				
Last (2016)	Different Browsers, Operating Systems, Video Players	Number of Vulnerabilities	Regression Models, Machine Learning	National Vulnerability Database
Roumani et al. (2015)	Chrome, Firefox, IE, Safari, Opera	Number of Vulnerabilities	ARIMA, Exponential Smoothing	National Vulnerability Database

155 The above table shows that the extant literature mainly uses regression techniques for prediction (Shin and Williams, 2008; Chowdhury and Zulkernine, 2011; Shin et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2011; Shin and Williams, 2013; Walden et al., 2014). For instance, Shin and Williams (2008) adopted code complexity that differentiate between vulnerable functions and investigated whether code complexity can be useful for vulnerability detection. The results indicate that complexity can predict vulnera-

160 bilities at a low false positive rate, but at a high false negative rate. In a similar work, Shin et al. (2011) examined whether complexity, code churn, and developer activity can be used to distinguish vulnerable from neutral files, and to forecast vulnerabilities. Shin and Williams (2013) showed that fault and vulnerability prediction models provide good accuracy in forecasting vulnerable code locations across a wide range of classification thresholds. Chowdhury and Zulkernine (2011) developed

165 an approach to automatically predict vulnerabilities based on historical data, complexity, coupling, and cohesion by using four alternative statistical and data mining techniques. The results indicate that structural information from the non-security realm such as complexity, coupling, and cohesion is useful in vulnerability prediction. In their study, they were able to predict approximately 75 % of the vulnerable-prone files. Walden et al. (2014) compared the vulnerability prediction effectiveness

170 based on complexity, source code, and vulnerability locations in the source code for the forecast of

vulnerable files. They showed that text mining provides a high recall for PHPMyAdmin, Moodle, and Drupal code analysis.

Other than approaches using mainly regression techniques, there are alternative predictors and techniques used as well. For example, Smith and Williams (2011) analyzed whether SQL hotspots
175 provide a useful heuristic for the prediction of web application vulnerabilities. Their analysis reveals that the more SQL hotspots a file contains per line of code, the higher the probability that this file will contain vulnerabilities. Neuhaus et al. (2007) introduced a support vector machine (SVM) based tool that achieved high accuracy in predicting vulnerable components in software code based on imports and function calls. Furthermore, Gegick et al. (2009) created a classification and regression
180 tree model to determine the probability of a component having at least one vulnerability. The evaluation shows that non-security failures provide useful information as input variables for security-related prediction models. Nguyen and Tran (2010) demonstrated that dependency graphs are another viable option to predict vulnerable components, while Scandariato et al. (2014) used the source code of Android applications as input for text mining approaches, statistical methodologies,
185 and artificial intelligence techniques to determine which components of a project are likely to contain vulnerabilities. After validating their approach by applying it to various Android applications, they determined that a dependable prediction model can be built.

Statistical models were also used to examine vulnerability predictions. For instance, (Ozment, 2006; Ozment and Schechter, 2006) used reliability growth models, and statistical analyses showed
190 that these have acceptable one-step-ahead predictive accuracy for the set of independent data points. Joh (2011) applied vulnerability discovery processes in major web servers and browsers: The analyses show reasonable prediction capabilities for both time-based and effort-based models for datasets from Web servers and browsers.

More recently, time series analysis has also been used to forecast the number of vulnerabilities.
195 For example, Roumani et al. (2015) considered time series models (ARIMA, exponential smoothing) for the prediction of security vulnerabilities. The results reveal that time series models provide a good fit and can be helpful to predict vulnerabilities. Last (2016) analyzed the forecast of vulnerabilities from different browsers, operating systems, and video players using both regression models (Linear, Quadratic, and Combined) and machine learning techniques. The evaluation of these
200 methodologies indicates significant predictive performance in forecasting zero-day vulnerabilities.

However, a more detailed analysis of these approaches uncovers three issues: First, the literature on predicting the number of IT security vulnerabilities from a time series approach is rather sparse; second, predictions on which software components are more likely to be vulnerable do not provide insights into the volume of vulnerabilities that will occur; and third, none of these research foci
205 address the uniqueness of vulnerabilities, namely, rareness of their occurrence and high volatility (as noted in Section 1). We therefore concentrate on predicting the number of IT security vulnerabilities

from a time series perspective, taking into account methodologies and accuracy metrics that are suitable for these two properties inter alia. The next section explains the different methodologies and accuracy metrics used in this study.

210 **3. Methodology and Data**

In this section, we motivate and outline the forecast methodologies implemented in our study and introduce a consistent notation (Subsection 3.1), presenting accuracy metrics to compare the different forecast approaches which are suitable in the context of security vulnerability forecasting (Subsection 3.2). Finally, we describe the data set in terms of analyzed software systems (Subsection 215 3.3).

3.1. Forecasting Methodology

In line with the study of Nikolopoulos et al. (2016), we implement a multiple forecasting approach, in which we compare several forecasting methodologies and evaluate their performance in terms of forecasting accuracy.

220 We forecast time series of monthly security vulnerabilities using the forecasting horizons of one, two, and three months. We then evaluate the results against a test set of held out security vulnerability data. Time-series forecasting approaches are organized in five main research streams: (Exponential) Smoothing methodologies, regression methodologies, (advanced) statistical models, neural networks, and (other) data mining algorithms (Wang et al., 2009). We refer to Chatfield 225 (2000), who identifies key aspects which need to be considered when choosing a forecasting methodology. These include the properties of the time series being forecasted and the forecast accuracy of the method.

In our study, we use two types of forecasting methodologies. The first group of forecasting methodologies we use are not specifically designed for the purpose of zero-inflated time series.² 230 However, these methodologies are used widely in both practice and academic literature, and very recently for predicting the number of IT security vulnerabilities (Roumani et al., 2015). These forecasting methodologies within this first group comprise single, double, and triple exponential smoothing methodologies (SES, DES, and TES), which are also referred to as single exponential, Holt’s linear trend method, and Holt-Winter’s method. In addition, we implement an ARIMA based 235 approach, which is an advanced statistical model.

Regarding our context, time series of IT security vulnerabilities differ from conventional series in the respect that they have multiple periods of zero values. Forecasting methodologies that are

²Zero-inflated time series are time series which contain a lot of zero values and show a high volatility when a value occurs.

appropriate for zero-inflated time series are thus especially suitable in our context (Ogcu Kaya and Demirel, 2015). Such time series with a lot of zero values are well-known in intermittent demand
240 analysis: Many scholars have recognized and contributed to the problems of predicting infrequent and irregular demand patterns, i.e., the observed demand during many periods is zero, interspersed by occasional periods with irregular non-zero demand (Johnston and Boylan, 1996).

We therefore use a second group of forecasting methodologies that are designed for the purpose of handling such time series. In particular, we apply Croston’s methodology and a Neural Net-
245 work based approach. Croston (1972) highlighted the inadequacies of common methodologies for intermittent demand forecasting and developed a method, which is one of the widely used forecasting methodologies for intermittent demand (Shenstone and Hyndman, 2005; Syntetos et al., 2015). From a methodological point of view, it is built upon the estimation from the demand size and inter-arrival rate: The original time series is decomposed into a time series without zero values and
250 a second one that captures durations of zero valued intervals (Herbst et al., 2014). In addition, we want to shed light on the following methodological association with Croston’s methodology and SES: When data is aggregated, i.e., if in our case we had grouped the different versions together, the zero-inflation of the data would have been decreased. In the academic literature, it is discussed that such an aggregation could lead to time series containing no zero values for the higher aggrega-
255 tion levels (where the mean intermittent demand interval will be equal to unity) (Petropoulos and Kourentzes, 2015). In this particular case, Croston’s methodology is equivalent to SES in the case where all periods have non-zero demands and the literature suggests using SES instead (Petropoulos and Kourentzes, 2015). However, as we separated different versions of software and system packages, this is not the case for our data. We therefore include Croston’s methodology. Furthermore,
260 the suitability of Croston’s methodology for such time series has been empirically shown. It performs more effectively in forecasting zero-inflated and intermittent demand time series data (e.g., Kourentzes (2013); Gutierrez et al. (2008)). For example, Willemain et al. (1994) have demonstrated that Croston’s methodology gives superior forecasts to some competing methodologies when predicting zero-inflated time series.

Besides Croston’s methodology, we use a Neural Network-based approach that “*are used to
265 provide dynamic demand rate forecasts, which do not assume constant demand rate in the future and can capture interactions between the non-zero demand and the inter-arrival rate of demand events*” (Kourentzes, 2013, p. 198). Kourentzes (2013) have shown evidence for the applicability of neural network approaches in predicting zero-inflated time series. We therefore include both Cros-
270 ton’s methodology and artificial neural networks, which better address the specific characteristics of security vulnerability time series data.

The predicted outcome variable $\hat{y}_{t+h|t}$, used throughout the paper, is defined as the forecasted value \hat{y} at time $(t + h)$, where t is the starting time and h the proposed forecast horizon. In our

study, we test three different forecasting horizons covering short (one month, $h = 1$), medium (two
 275 months, $h = 2$), and long (three months, $h = 3$) time frames.

3.1.1. Exponential Smoothing Methodologies

Single Exponential Smoothing

The idea behind SES is to weigh the most recent observations against the observations from the
 more distant past using the parameter α . Forecasts are calculated using weighted averages where
 280 the weights decrease exponentially as observations lie further in the past. In other words, smaller
 weights are associated with older observations. SES only depends on the linear parameter l_t , which
 denotes the level of the series at time t . Due to this definition, SES predicts every value into the
 future with the same value, derived from the last observed level. Our outcome variable can in this
 case be described as $\hat{y}_{t+h|t}$. For smaller values of α more weight is given to the observations from
 285 the more distant past. The equation for single exponential smoothing is listed as the following:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{y}_{t+h|t} &= \hat{y}_{t+1|t} = l_t \\ l_t &= \alpha y_t + (1 - \alpha)l_{t-1}\end{aligned}\tag{1}$$

Double Exponential Smoothing

Single exponential smoothing can be extended to allow forecasting of data with a linear trend,
 which is called the double exponential smoothing method. This was carried out by Charles C. Holt
 in 1957. This method is slightly more complicated than the original one without trend. In order to
 add the trend component to the outcome variable $\hat{y}_{t+h|t}$ the term b_t , which denotes the slope of the
 time series at time t :

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{y}_{t+h|t} &= l_t + hb_t \\ l_t &= \alpha y_t + (1 - \alpha)(l_{t-1} + b_{t-1}) \\ b_t &= \beta(l_t - l_{t-1}) + (1 - \beta)b_{t-1}\end{aligned}\tag{2}$$

While Parameter l_t still denotes the level, b_t represents the slope of the time series. The weight
 β is used to weigh the slope between the two most recent observations against the observations from
 the more distant past using the parameter α .

290 Triple Exponential Smoothing

This approach is an extension of DES, with added seasonality often referred as triple exponential
 smoothing (TES). There are three components in this model (cf. Equation 3). As in the previous
 model, the first denotes the level while the second represents the trend component. In TES, the

third term s_t denotes the seasonality component. The outcome variable $\hat{y}_{t+1|t}$ can thus be defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{y}_{t+h|t} &= l_t + hb_t + s_{t+h_m-m} & (3) \\ l_t &= \alpha(y_t - s_{t-m}) + (1 - \alpha)(l_{t-1} + b_{t-1}) \\ b_t &= \beta(l_t - l_{t-1}) + (1 - \beta)b_{t-1} \\ s_t &= \gamma(y_t - l_{t-1} - b_{t-1}) + (1 - \gamma)s_{t-m}\end{aligned}$$

Where $h_m = [(h - 1) \bmod m] + 1$, which ensures that the estimates of the seasonal parameters came from the correct season.

While Parameter l_t and b_t are analogously defined as SES and DES, the weight γ is introduced to weigh the seasonality component over the m most recent time periods.

295 3.1.2. ARIMA

In an Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model, the future value of a variable is assumed to be a linear function of several past observations and random errors. ARIMA models combine differencing with auto-regression and a moving average model. We used the ARIMA(p, d, q) model where p is the order of the autoregressive part, d is the degree of first differencing involved, and q is the order of the moving average part. The general equation of an ARIMA(p, d, q) model is the following (Der Voort et al., 1996):

$$\hat{y}'_{t+h|t} = c + \Phi_1 y'_t + \Phi_2 y'_{t-1} + \dots + \Phi_p y'_{t-p} + \theta_1 e_{t-1} + \theta_2 e_{t-2} + \dots + \theta_q e_{t-q} + e_t \quad (4)$$

where y_t denotes the number of vulnerabilities at time t , $\hat{y}_{t+h|t}$ is the forecast of the time series y . c is a constant and Φ_p are the coefficients (to be determined by the model) of the autoregressive model. e_t is a zero mean white noise error factor, and together with the coefficients, θ_q forms the moving average terms. Since stationarity is a requirement for ARIMA forecasting models and security vulnerabilities have been found to be non-stationary (Arora et al., 2006, 2010), we appropriately transformed the data using differentiation. With this, $\hat{y}'_{t+h|t}$ and y'_t are the differenced series (degree of differentiation depending on d).
300

3.1.3. Croston's Methodology

In order to account for the characteristic properties of security vulnerability time series data, we chose Croston's methodology as an additional forecasting methodology, specifically the bias adjusted version of Croston's methodology developed by Syntetos and Boylan (1999). The method of Croston (1972) separately forecasts the non-zero periods' magnitudes and the inter-arrival time between successive non-zero periods using SES. $\hat{y}_{t+h|t}$ is then defined as the forecasted mean of security vulnerabilities. This method basically decomposes the intermittent vulnerabilities into two

parts: the number of non-zero vulnerabilities $\hat{z}_{t+h|t}$ and the time interval between those vulnerability periods $\hat{v}_{t+h|t}$, and then applies the single exponential smoothing on both parts. Croston's methodology uses only one weight parameter α for both SES parts; therefore, $\hat{y}_{t+h|t}$, the estimate of mean non-zero vulnerabilities at time t , is defined as follows:

$$\hat{y}_{t+h|t} = \frac{\hat{z}_{t+h|t}}{\hat{v}_{t+h|t}} \quad (5)$$

$$\hat{z}_{t+h|t} = \begin{cases} z_t & \text{if } y_t = 0 \\ \alpha y_t + (1 - \alpha)z_t & \text{if } y_t \neq 0 \end{cases}$$

$$\hat{v}_{t+h|t} = \begin{cases} v_t & \text{if } y_t = 0 \\ \alpha y_t + (1 - \alpha)\hat{y}_t & \text{if } y_t \neq 0 \end{cases}$$

Croston's methodology is widely used in the intermittent demand forecasting. Furthermore "*the standard method to be used in the industry nowadays, being implemented in many ERP systems and dedicated forecasting software*" (Petropoulos et al., 2016).

3.1.4. Neural Network

The last method, which makes use of neural networks (Nnet), is also particularly useful when dealing with zero-inflated time series. It has been used extensively to predict lumpy and intermittent demand and has shown good accuracy (Gutierrez et al., 2008; Kourentzes, 2013; Amin-Naseri and Tabar, 2008). We applied a feed-forward neural network with a single hidden layer. While J denotes the number of time series observations used as input p_j for the neural network, the number of forecasted security vulnerabilities $\hat{y}_{t+h|t}$ are defined as follows:

$$\hat{y}_{t+h|t} = \beta_0 + \sum_{i=1}^I \beta_i g \left(\gamma_{0j} + \sum_{j=1}^J \gamma_{ij} p_j \right) \quad (6)$$

where $\mathbf{w} = (\boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma})$ are the weights of the network with $\boldsymbol{\beta} = [\beta_1, \dots, \beta_I]$ and $\boldsymbol{\gamma} = [\gamma_{11}, \dots, \gamma_{IJ}]$ for the output and the hidden layers respectively. The β_0 and γ_{0j} are the biases of each neuron, which function as the intercept in a regression for each neuron. I is the number of hidden nodes in the network and $g(\cdot)$ is a non-linear transfer function, which in our case is the sigmoid logistic function and provides the nonlinear capabilities to the model.

3.2. Accuracy Metrics

The literature on accuracy metrics can be divided into four types of forecasting error metrics³ (Hyndman et al., 2006): *Absolute metrics* such as the mean absolute error (MAE) or root mean

³Note that we cannot determine true/false positive rates, since the number of vulnerabilities per month is not a binary outcome.

square error (RMSE), *percentage-error metrics* such as the mean absolute percent error (MAPE) or mean arctangent absolute percentage error (MAAPE), *relative-error metrics*, which average the ratios of the errors from a designated method to the errors of a naive method (e.g., Median Relative Absolute Error (MdRAE)), and *scale-free error metrics*, which express each error as a ratio to an average error from a baseline method (Mean Absolute Scaled Error (MASE)).

From the above-mentioned accuracy metrics, percentage-error metrics, relative-error metrics, and the mean absolute scaled error are not suitable for the following reasons: As we deal with zero-inflated time series, percentage-error metrics such as the MAPE are not well-defined, i.e., MAPE has the significant disadvantage of producing infinite or undefined values for zero or close-to-zero actual values (Kim and Kim, 2016). Other percentage-error metrics which were developed for zero-inflated time series have other drawbacks. For instance, although MAAPE is being designed for the purpose of intermittent demand forecasting (Kim and Kim, 2016), it is in itself not sufficient for interpreting the forecasting accuracy due to its definition drawback: Regardless of the prediction, it maps every value to the worst value of $\frac{\pi}{2}$ when the actual value is zero ($y_t = 0$).

Relative-error metrics have similar shortcomings because it would involve division by zero and therefore is not adaptable to zero-inflated time series as well (Hyndman et al., 2006). The fourth group of metrics, the mean absolute scaled error, is also not suitable in our context, as we applied a rolling origin forecasting evaluation. Due to this, it is not usable in our context as the denominator becomes indefinite. To sum up, neither of these metrics is appropriate for zero-inflated time series because zero observations may yield division by zero problems (Syntetos and Boylan, 2005).

Therefore and in line with other studies (e.g., Arora and Taylor (2016); Taylor and Snyder (2012); Zhao et al. (2014)), in this study we use absolute forecast accuracy metrics due to the following reasons: First, both the mean absolute error (MAE) and the root mean square error (RMSE) can reflect the prediction accuracy of zero-inflated time series. Second, both accuracy metrics are widely used in the forecasting literature, and third, absolute error metrics are calculated as a function of the forecast errors so that we can interpret the deviation in alignment with the structure of the time series. In the academic literature, a combination of metrics of MAE and RMSE is suggested to assess the model performance (Chai and Draxler, 2014). In the next subsection, we explain the MAE and the RMSE, and in Subsection 3.2.3, we associate the accuracy metrics and time series structure in order to interpret the MAE and RMSE values.

3.2.1. Accuracy Metric: Mean Absolute Error

In order to capture the absolute forecasting error and to interpret our results, we assessed the Mean Absolute Error (MAE). The MAE is one of the most commonly used metric for evaluating the absolute error, defined as the average of the absolute errors between the measured and predicted values (Gospodinov et al., 2006):

$$\text{MAE} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{t=1}^N (|y_t - \hat{y}_t|). \quad (7)$$

The MAE is a scale-dependent accuracy metric and uses the same scale as the data being measured (Hyndman et al., 2006). As our datasets contain only IT security vulnerabilities, we can compare the absolute forecast errors between the different versions of software and system application packages.

A value of 0 means a perfect forecast accuracy: All predicted values are equal to the real values. To give a sense for interpretability, we want to provide some examples for MAE as well with the same examples we used previously for explaining MAE's values.

Let us assume that the number of actually published security vulnerabilities during a period t equals $y_t = 10$. Let us further assume that the number of predicted vulnerabilities equals $\hat{y}_t = 11$. As we have only one observation, the value of MAE would get a value of 1, which is close to its theoretical minimum of 0.

Let us now assume that the number of actually published security vulnerabilities during a period t equals $y_t = 5$. Let us further assume that the number of predicted vulnerabilities equals 100, i.e., $\hat{y}_t = 100$. As we have only one observation, the value of MAE would get a value of 95. However, regarding MAE, the value of 95 is not enough to solely explain the interpretability of MAE, which we want to highlight with the following example: If the actually published security vulnerabilities during a period t had been $y_t = 10000$ and the predicted vulnerabilities equaled 10095, the MAE would still have been 95 but on a reasonable fit as we had only an overestimation of 0.95%, while in the first scenario we had an overestimation of 95%. These examples show that for the interpretability of MAE, we must associate the MAE value with the actual published security vulnerabilities as MAE is a sum of error terms $e_t: \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ for $t \in \mathbb{N}$ with $e_t: (|y_t - \hat{y}_t|)$.

3.2.2. Accuracy Metric: Root Mean Square Error

We further assessed the Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) in order to capture the absolute forecasting error and to interpret our results. The RSME is also one of the most commonly used metric for evaluating the absolute error and is defined as

$$\text{RMSE} = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{t=1}^N (y_t - \hat{y}_t)^2}{N}}. \quad (8)$$

The RMSE is similar to the MAE a scale-dependent accuracy metric and uses the same scale as the data being measured (Hyndman et al., 2006). A value of 0 means a perfect forecast accuracy: All predicted values are equal to the real values. Mathematically spoken, RMSE is a mapping of error terms $e_t: \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ for $t \in \mathbb{N}$ with $e_t: (y_t - \hat{y}_t)^2$.

3.2.3. Accuracy Metrics and Time Series Structure

We explained in the Subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 how MAE and RMSE are defined. Comparing both metrics, MAE is less sensitive to extreme values than RMSE (Li and Heap, 2011; Willmott, 1982; Willemain et al., 2004). When the differences between the MAE and RMSE are close to each other, it means that very large errors are unlikely to have occurred (Li and Shi, 2010). The academic literature does not provide exact ranges for both the MAE and RMSE, as acceptable values depend on the underlying context (Willmott and Matsuura, 2005). However, in general, low values close to the theoretical minimum of zero are considered to be good (Chaplot et al., 2000). We can use both the MAE and RMSE to give a sense of the interpretability and the relation of both accuracy metrics regarding the predicted and the actual values. Consider the following exemplary time series of vulnerabilities by assuming y the actual published and \hat{y} the predicted vulnerabilities in the time frame $\{t = 1 \dots 6\}$:

Table 2: Example of Actual Published and Predicted Vulnerabilities.

t	$t = 1$	$t = 2$	$t = 3$	$t = 4$	$t = 5$	$t = 6$
y	0	0	1	0	5	0
\hat{y}	0	0	0	2	5	0

A closer look at the predicted values in this example reveals that only in $t = 3$ and $t = 4$ we have a slight mismatch between the actual and the predicted values with one being underestimated ($y_3 = 1$ and $\hat{y}_3 = 0$) and an overestimation in t_4 with $y_4 = 0$ and $\hat{y}_4 = 2$. All in all, the forecasted values are good, which is reflected in the value of MAE and RMSE. The computation shows that MAE is rather low with 0.5 and is close to its theoretical minimum. The RMSE's value is 0.91 and is very low as well, and is close to its theoretical minimum. In this example, the mean of the actual published vulnerabilities is 1.0 and the mean of the predicted vulnerabilities is 1.17. Comparing the means with the MAE and RMSE values, it shows that there is a good fit of the predicted vulnerabilities.

We can state that a low mean of actual published vulnerabilities over a wide time frame (e.g., 5 years) indicates that the time series contains a lot of zero values. Using MAE and RMSE ensures that we reflect upon the prediction accuracy in a meaningful manner. A low MAE and RMSE close to the mean of the actual vulnerabilities shows that there is a good fit of the prediction method. On the other hand, a high MAE and RMSE, which means that they are greater than the mean of the actual vulnerabilities, indicates that the deviation of the predicted vulnerabilities is high and the prediction accuracy rather poor.

3.3. Dataset: National Vulnerability Database

415 We select a dataset from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD),⁴ which provides a comprehensive list of unique vulnerability and exposure data and maps it to corresponding system or software package (Martin, 2001). The NVD is a freely available US government data source maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Since its launch in 1997, it has reported standardized information about almost 80,000 software vulnerabilities. Although other security vulnerability databases do exist, which are often community projects, such as 420 Vulners (www.vulners.com), The Exploit Database (www.exploit-db.com), or Packet Storm’s Vulnerability Database (www.packetstormsecurity.com), the NVD database still remains widely used and the most exhaustive resource for security vulnerability data. The dataset has been shown to be particularly useful for “*understanding trends and patterns in software vulnerabilities, so that one can* 425 *better manage the security of computer systems that are pestered by the ubiquitous software security flaws*” (Zhang et al., 2011).

Table 3 shows a description of the application domains⁵ and corresponding software and system packages covered in our analysis. Within these application domains, we analyze a balanced mix of closed source and open source software packages comprising the most prevalent software solutions 430 in terms of market share. Our dataset covers the time period from January 2002 to June 2016. We further distinguish the system and software packages along their major version releases, since a package’s version can serve as a reliable predictor for its vulnerability discovery rate (Alhazmi et al., 2005). We use the version numbers provided by the NVD database for each security vulnerability and group them by their major releases. Since the objective of our paper is to forecast recently appearing 435 security vulnerabilities we focus on the root version of the software product where the vulnerability first appeared. Some vulnerabilities remain unpatched over multiple software versions and are therefore listed under multiple versions in the NVD dataset. Despite the fact that this total number, as reported on the NVD website, accurately reflects the number of vulnerabilities present in a specific software product and version, we filter for the number of uniquely originating vulnerabilities. 440 Although this approach results in different sample sizes, we avoid aggregating multiple versions of a particular package to account for the individual vulnerability characteristics of each major version.⁶ Finally, the vulnerabilities were aggregated *per month* to generate an adequate dataset for our analysis.

⁴The NVD-XML-Files are available at <https://nvd.nist.gov/download.cfm>.

⁵Note that we do not use the application domains to predict or explain vulnerabilities. Instead, the grouping should allow for more convenient comparisons of related software products.

⁶An exception to this are the Firefox versions starting from version 7 and Thunderbird versions since the versioning of these products does not reflect major changes in steps from one version to another. We labeled these as “rolling versions”.

Table 3: Description of the Software and System Package

Application Domain	Software / System Package	Release Date	Open Source
Browser	Mozilla Firefox	2002	Yes
Browser	Google Chrome	2008	Partially
Browser	Internet Explorer	1995	No
Browser	Safari	2003	No
Office	Microsoft Office	1990	No
Office	Thunderbird	2004	Yes
OS	Mac OS X	2001	No
OS	Ubuntu	2004	Yes
OS	Microsoft Windows	1985	No

Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the used software and system packages.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics

Software / System Package	Version	Time Frame	Vulnerabilities	Monthly Average
Firefox	v0	01/08/04 - 01/06/16	74	0.52
	v1	01/12/04 - 01/06/16	119	0.86
	v2	01/08/05 - 01/06/16	61	0.47
	v3	01/12/06 - 01/06/16	117	1.026
	v7	01/11/11 - 01/06/16	110	2
	v8 rolling	01/12/11 - 01/06/16	196	3.63
Google Chrome	v1	01/09/08 - 01/06/16	86	0.92
	v2	01/05/10 - 01/06/16	458	6.27
	v3	01/05/11 - 01/06/16	499	8.18
	v4	01/04/15 - 01/06/16	168	12
Internet Explorer	v5	01/03/99 - 01/06/16	157	0.76
	v6	01/04/98 - 01/06/16	373	1.71
	v7	01/12/05 - 01/06/16	31	0.25
	v8	01/05/08 - 01/06/16	99	1.02
	v9	01/06/11 - 01/06/16	288	4.8
	v10	01/03/13 - 01/06/16	77	1.97
Mac OS X	v11	01/12/13 - 01/06/16	152	5.07
	v0	01/07/01 - 01/06/16	174	4.83
	v2	01/12/02 - 01/06/16	36	0.22
	v3	01/11/03 - 01/06/16	53	0.35

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics

Software / System Package	Version	Time Frame	Vulnerabilities	Monthly Average
	v4	01/06/05 - 01/06/16	137	0.79
	v5	01/11/07 - 01/06/16	130	1.26
	v6	01/03/10 - 01/06/16	22	0.29
	v8	01/03/13 - 01/06/16	82	2.10
	v9	01/11/13 - 01/06/16	50	1.61
	v10	01/11/14 - 01/06/16	51	0.25
	v11	01/09/15 - 01/06/16	140	15.56
MS Office	2001	01/12/99 - 01/06/16	16	0.08
	2003	01/03/06 - 01/06/16	136	1.11
	2010	01/11/10 - 01/06/16	34	0.51
Safari	v1	01/06/03 - 01/06/16	20	0.13
	v2	01/07/05 - 01/06/16	20	0.15
	v3	01/06/07 - 01/06/16	214	1.98
	v4	01/02/09 - 01/06/16	91	1.03
	v6	01/06/13 - 01/06/16	27	0.75
	v7	01/03/14 - 01/06/16	71	2.63
	v8	01/11/14 - 01/06/16	78	4.11
	v9	01/12/15 - 01/06/16	17	2.83
Thunderbird	rolling	01/08/04 - 01/06/16	116	0.82
Ubuntu	v11.04	01/09/08 - 01/06/16	17	0.18
	v12.04	01/05/12 - 01/06/16	94	1.92
	v14.04	01/05/14 - 01/06/16	54	2.16
Windows	XP	01/11/01 - 01/06/16	166	0.95
	Vista	01/02/07 - 01/06/16	40	0.36
	7	01/06/07 - 01/06/16	105	0.97

445 4. Empirical Results and Discussion

We predicted the number of IT security vulnerabilities based on the forecasting methodologies implemented in the R package “forecast” (Hyndman, 2017).

4.1. Results

Since forecasting research has shown that long-term forecasts are generally limited in their predictive accuracy, we evaluated our methodologies on relatively short time frames forecasting one, 450

two, and three months ahead into the future (Leitch and Ernesttanner, 1995; Öller and Barot, 2000). We could not find any substantial differences in forecasting accuracy between the shorter forecasting horizons of one or two months in comparison to the longer one of three months. Apart from the findings of prior research and the results of our own analysis, we consider a three-month forecasting horizon to strike a reasonable balance between having enough time to react and having accurate prediction accuracies for decision makers. Throughout the paper, forecasting accuracy (MAE and RMSE) is therefore reported for the entire time frame available (cf. Table 4). Figures 2 to 18 present the overall prediction accuracy (MAE and RMSE) for the analyzed software and system packages. The figures are grouped according to application domains to facilitate comparisons between related software products. We show data that is subdivided into the major versions (x-axis) for the forecasting horizon of three months.⁷ The absolute metrics' scores are aggregated for the whole time frame as described in Table 4. The performance for the forecasting methodologies and the different versions of the system and software packages is provided in Table 5, 6, and 7.




Figure 2: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Browsers, h=1 (month)

⁷Note that the time frame of *three months* (h=3) means that vulnerabilities were summed up quarterly. The prediction pertains to the next quarter.




Figure 3: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Browsers, $h=1$ (month)




Figure 4: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Office Solutions, $h=1$ (month)




Figure 5: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Operating Systems, h=1 (month)




Figure 6: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Operating Systems, h=1 (month)




Figure 7: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Browsers, h=2 (months)




Figure 8: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Browsers, h=2 (months)




Figure 9: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Office Solutions, h=2 (months)




Figure 10: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Office Solutions, $h=2$ (months)




Figure 11: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Operating Systems, $h=2$ (months)




Figure 12: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Operating Systems, $h=2$ (months)




Figure 13: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Browsers, h=3 (months)




Figure 14: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Browsers, $h=3$ (months)




Figure 15: MAE for Office Solutions, $h=3$ (months)




Figure 16: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Office Solutions, $h=3$ (months)




Figure 17: Prediction Accuracy (MAE) for Operating Systems, $h=3$ (months)




Figure 18: Prediction Accuracy (RMSE) for Operating Systems, $h=3$ (months)

Table 5: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 1 Month Forecasting Horizon

Method	SES	DES	TES	Arima	Croston	NNet
Firefox Versions						
v0	(0.92 / 1.27)	(0.75 / 1.28)	(0.73 / 1.23)	(0.72 / 1.2)	(0.63 / 1.14)	(1.35 / 1.54)
v1	(1.66 / 1.7)	(1.05 / 1.79)	(0.96 / 1.62)	(1.01 / 1.68)	(0.91 / 1.65)	(3.61 / 4.1)
v2	(0.72 / 1.12)	(0.69 / 1.19)	(0.62 / 1.04)	(0.61 / 1.02)	(0.56 / 1.02)	(1.56 / 1.77)
v3	(0.93 / 1.27)	(1.95 / 3.34)	(0.7 / 1.17)	(0.74 / 1.23)	(0.64 / 1.16)	(1.64 / 1.86)
v7	(15.81 / 5.25)	(3.2 / 5.47)	(2.87 / 4.83)	(2.98 / 4.98)	(2.39 / 4.33)	(9.37 / 10.64)
v8 rolling	(14.86 / 5.09)	(3.43 / 5.88)	(2.62 / 4.4)	(2.95 / 4.92)	(2.81 / 5.1)	(4.91 / 5.57)
Google Chrome Versions						
v1	(0.58 / 0.94)	(0.75 / 1)	(0.75 / 0.88)	(0.82 / 0.94)	(0.62 / 0.95)	(1.15 / 1.78)
v2	(32.52 / 7.01)	(5.63 / 7.49)	(5.6 / 6.56)	(6.05 / 6.91)	(3.97 / 6.09)	(7.3 / 11.25)
v3	(37.48 / 7.53)	(5.77 / 7.67)	(5.75 / 6.73)	(6.56 / 7.49)	(5.33 / 8.18)	(8.75 / 13.5)
v4	(61.42 / 9.63)	(7.01 / 9.32)	(12.53 / 14.66)	(7.2 / 8.22)	(5.08 / 7.8)	(10.24 / 15.79)
Internet Explorer Versions						
v5	(0.44 / 0.79)	(0.78 / 1.1)	(0.54 / 0.75)	(0.63 / 0.88)	(0.51 / 0.75)	(1.6 / 2.13)
v6	(1.59 / 2.64)	(1.89 / 2.66)	(1.78 / 2.5)	(1.77 / 2.46)	(1.99 / 2.92)	(2.35 / 3.14)
v7	(0.29 / 0.65)	(0.48 / 0.68)	(0.45 / 0.63)	(0.47 / 0.66)	(0.41 / 0.61)	(0.67 / 0.89)
v8	(1.13 / 1.68)	(1.25 / 1.76)	(1.06 / 1.49)	(1.11 / 1.54)	(1.12 / 1.65)	(1.57 / 2.1)
v9	(2.95 / 4.07)	(2.91 / 4.11)	(2.35 / 3.29)	(2.94 / 4.08)	(2.63 / 3.86)	(3.51 / 4.69)
v10	(1.14 / 3.19)	(2.05 / 2.89)	(1.99 / 2.79)	(1.7 / 2.35)	(2.29 / 3.37)	(2.48 / 3.31)
v11	(3.39 / 4.84)	(3.81 / 5.37)	(3.33 / 4.66)	(3.25 / 4.5)	(2.86 / 4.21)	(4.9 / 6.55)
Mac OS X Versions						
v0	(0.5 / 1.65)	(0.63 / 1.67)	(0.75 / 1.61)	(0.77 / 1.64)	(0.4 / 1.54)	(1.12 / 1.78)
v2	(0.25 / 0.81)	(0.32 / 0.84)	(0.36 / 0.77)	(0.38 / 0.8)	(0.2 / 0.79)	(0.92 / 1.46)
v3	(0.31 / 1)	(2.49 / 6.63)	(0.44 / 0.94)	(0.47 / 1)	(0.23 / 0.88)	(0.89 / 1.4)
v4	(0.4 / 1.31)	(0.59 / 1.57)	(0.59 / 1.28)	(0.58 / 1.24)	(0.28 / 1.09)	(1.27 / 2.01)
v5	(0.79 / 2.6)	(2.17 / 5.77)	(1.07 / 2.32)	(0.82 / 1.75)	(0.59 / 2.32)	(2.34 / 3.7)
v6	(0.65 / 2.12)	(0.87 / 2.32)	(0.86 / 1.85)	(0.96 / 2.04)	(0.46 / 1.8)	(1.83 / 2.9)
v8	(1.48 / 4.84)	(1.92 / 5.11)	(2.02 / 4.36)	(2.21 / 4.72)	(1.18 / 4.58)	(10.11 / 16.01)
v9	(0.54 / 1.75)	(0.85 / 2.26)	(0.77 / 1.66)	(0.77 / 1.64)	(0.41 / 1.59)	(1.21 / 1.91)
v10	(5.04 / 16.5)	(6.71 / 17.85)	(4.01 / 8.66)	(7.3 / 15.56)	(3.7 / 14.4)	(14.1 / 22.34)
v11	(7.63 / 24.98)	(33.42 / 88.88)	(9.41 / 20.32)	(10.54 / 22.49)	(5.37 / 20.93)	(11.66 / 18.47)
Microsoft Office Versions						
v2001	(0.3 / 0.43)	(0.31 / 0.44)	(0.3 / 0.42)	(0.3 / 0.42)	(0.28 / 0.41)	(0.5 / 0.67)
v2003	(1.25 / 1.78)	(1.28 / 1.8)	(1.24 / 1.74)	(1.26 / 1.75)	(1 / 1.48)	(1.62 / 2.16)
v2010	(0.57 / 0.81)	(0.57 / 0.81)	(0.52 / 0.72)	(0.59 / 0.81)	(0.53 / 0.79)	(0.75 / 1)
Safari Versions						
v1	(0.05 / 0.4)	(0.34 / 0.89)	(0.18 / 0.38)	(0.18 / 0.39)	(0.09 / 0.35)	(0.33 / 0.53)
v2	(0.11 / 0.61)	(0.24 / 0.65)	(0.26 / 0.57)	(0.29 / 0.61)	(0.17 / 0.66)	(0.76 / 1.2)
v3	(21.19 / 8.33)	(3.22 / 8.56)	(3.51 / 7.59)	(3.87 / 8.25)	(1.86 / 7.24)	(9.73 / 15.41)
v4	(8.6 / 5.31)	(2.32 / 6.18)	(2.2 / 4.74)	(2.31 / 4.93)	(1.23 / 4.79)	(10.48 / 16.6)

Table 5: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 1 Month Forecasting Horizon

Method	SES	DES	TES	Arima	Croston	NNet
v6	(1.91 / 2.5)	(1.01 / 2.68)	(1.04 / 2.25)	(1.14 / 2.43)	(0.74 / 2.89)	(2.68 / 4.25)
v7	(8.15 / 5.17)	(2.1 / 5.58)	(2.46 / 5.32)	(2.31 / 4.92)	(1.06 / 4.15)	(4.8 / 7.61)
v8	(44.23 / 12.04)	(4.76 / 12.66)	(1.22 / 2.63)	(4.78 / 10.2)	(2.55 / 9.93)	(7.78 / 12.32)
v9	(4.91 / 4.01)	(1.64 / 4.36)	(1.46 / 3.16)	(2.04 / 4.36)	(0.87 / 3.39)	(2.23 / 3.53)
Thunderbird Versions						
rolling	(0.82 / 1.43)	(1.18 / 2.03)	(0.8 / 1.34)	(0.84 / 1.4)	(0.78 / 1.42)	(2.91 / 3.3)
Ubuntu Versions						
v11.04	(0.39 / 0.67)	(0.41 / 0.71)	(0.37 / 0.62)	(0.38 / 0.64)	(0.35 / 0.63)	(0.89 / 1.02)
v12.04	(1.76 / 3.08)	(2.31 / 3.96)	(1.66 / 2.78)	(1.82 / 3.03)	(1.58 / 2.87)	(3.66 / 4.16)
v14.04	(1.07 / 1.86)	(3.99 / 6.84)	(1.37 / 2.3)	(1.14 / 1.91)	(1.02 / 1.84)	(2.46 / 2.79)
Windows Versions						
XP	(1.09 / 1.54)	(1.12 / 1.59)	(1.04 / 1.45)	(1.08 / 1.52)	(0.99 / 1.45)	(1.56 / 2.08)
Vista	(0.44 / 0.62)	(0.48 / 0.68)	(0.4 / 0.56)	(0.43 / 0.6)	(0.39 / 0.57)	(0.62 / 0.83)
Version 7	(0.85 / 1.21)	(3.6 / 5.08)	(0.75 / 1.05)	(0.81 / 1.12)	(0.76 / 1.12)	(1.45 / 1.94)

Table 6: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 2 Month Forecasting Horizon

Method	SES	DES	TES	Arima	Croston	NNet
Firefox Versions						
v0	(0.95 / 1.29)	(0.76 / 1.3)	(0.74 / 1.25)	(0.72 / 1.21)	(0.64 / 1.16)	(1.35 / 1.52)
v1	(1.65 / 1.7)	(1.04 / 1.79)	(0.96 / 1.62)	(1.02 / 1.69)	(0.91 / 1.66)	(3.56 / 4.02)
v2	(0.72 / 1.13)	(0.7 / 1.21)	(0.61 / 1.04)	(0.62 / 1.02)	(0.57 / 1.04)	(1.59 / 1.79)
v3	(0.95 / 1.29)	(2.09 / 3.6)	(0.69 / 1.18)	(0.75 / 1.25)	(0.67 / 1.22)	(1.64 / 1.85)
v7	(16.79 / 5.42)	(3.33 / 5.73)	(2.92 / 4.94)	(3.06 / 5.09)	(2.5 / 4.55)	(8.98 / 10.13)
v8 rolling	(15.15 / 5.15)	(3.54 / 6.09)	(2.6 / 4.4)	(2.98 / 4.95)	(2.73 / 4.96)	(5.51 / 6.21)
Google Chrome Versions						
v1	(0.6 / 0.95)	(0.77 / 1.02)	(0.78 / 0.89)	(0.84 / 0.95)	(0.6 / 0.93)	(1.32 / 1.71)
v2	(36.55 / 7.45)	(6.3 / 8.29)	(6.14 / 7.02)	(6.48 / 7.35)	(4.06 / 6.27)	(9.53 / 12.34)
v3	(38.57 / 7.65)	(5.93 / 7.81)	(5.96 / 6.82)	(6.7 / 7.61)	(5.18 / 8.01)	(10.55 / 13.65)
v4	(61.7 / 9.68)	(6.92 / 9.12)	(15.83 / 18.1)	(7.41 / 8.42)	(5.29 / 8.17)	(10.67 / 13.81)
Internet Explorer Versions						
v5	(0.44 / 0.79)	(0.84 / 1.17)	(0.54 / 0.75)	(0.64 / 0.88)	(0.51 / 0.76)	(1.58 / 2.14)
v6	(1.61 / 2.68)	(1.93 / 2.71)	(1.83 / 2.55)	(1.84 / 2.54)	(2.07 / 3.06)	(2.61 / 3.53)
v7	(0.30 / 0.66)	(0.49 / 0.69)	(0.46 / 0.64)	(0.48 / 0.66)	(0.41 / 0.61)	(0.63 / 0.85)
v8	(1.11 / 1.66)	(1.24 / 1.74)	(1.05 / 1.46)	(1.13 / 1.56)	(1.11 / 1.65)	(1.53 / 2.08)
v9	(2.97 / 4.12)	(2.96 / 4.15)	(2.4 / 3.34)	(3 / 4.14)	(2.87 / 4.26)	(3.48 / 4.71)
v10	(0.97 / 2.45)	(1.68 / 2.36)	(1.66 / 2.31)	(1.58 / 2.18)	(1.68 / 2.48)	(1.86 / 2.52)
v11	(3.38 / 4.96)	(3.98 / 5.58)	(3.38 / 4.7)	(3.27 / 4.51)	(3.11 / 4.62)	(4.87 / 6.6)
Mac OS X Versions						
v0	(0.5 / 1.65)	(0.65 / 1.68)	(0.79 / 1.61)	(0.83 / 1.64)	(0.4 / 1.57)	(0.98 / 1.76)

Table 6: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 2 Month Forecasting Horizon

Method	SES	DES	TES	Arima	Croston	NNet
v2	(0.25 / 0.81)	(0.32 / 0.84)	(0.38 / 0.77)	(0.4 / 0.8)	(0.21 / 0.81)	(0.77 / 1.39)
v3	(0.3 / 1)	(2.75 / 7.14)	(0.46 / 0.94)	(0.51 / 1.01)	(0.24 / 0.94)	(0.77 / 1.38)
v4	(0.4 / 1.33)	(0.64 / 1.66)	(0.63 / 1.29)	(0.62 / 1.24)	(0.31 / 1.19)	(1.05 / 1.88)
v5	(0.78 / 2.57)	(2.43 / 6.29)	(1.13 / 2.32)	(0.89 / 1.77)	(0.64 / 2.48)	(1.76 / 3.16)
v6	(0.65 / 2.13)	(0.91 / 2.36)	(0.91 / 1.86)	(1.03 / 2.05)	(0.48 / 1.85)	(1.44 / 2.59)
v8	(1.49 / 4.9)	(2 / 5.2)	(2.14 / 4.39)	(2.4 / 4.77)	(1.2 / 4.68)	(8.47 / 15.19)
v9	(0.53 / 1.74)	(0.87 / 2.27)	(0.82 / 1.68)	(0.84 / 1.66)	(0.4 / 1.57)	(1.27 / 2.28)
v10	(5.25 / 17.24)	(7.38 / 19.14)	(4.35 / 8.9)	(8.05 / 15.97)	(3.83 / 14.91)	(11.63 / 20.85)
v11	(6.11 / 20.08)	(35.57 / 92.3)	(9.08 / 18.6)	(9.99 / 19.83)	(4.89 / 19.03)	(12.18 / 21.85)
Microsoft Office Versions						
v2001	(0.3 / 0.43)	(0.31 / 0.44)	(0.3 / 0.42)	(0.3 / 0.42)	(0.28 / 0.42)	(0.53 / 0.72)
v2003	(1.27 / 1.79)	(1.29 / 1.82)	(1.26 / 1.75)	(1.27 / 1.76)	(1.08 / 1.61)	(1.64 / 2.23)
v2010	(0.58 / 0.82)	(0.58 / 0.81)	(0.52 / 0.73)	(0.59 / 0.82)	(0.56 / 0.83)	(0.75 / 1.01)
Safari Versions						
v1	(0.05 / 0.41)	(0.38 / 0.99)	(0.19 / 0.39)	(0.2 / 0.39)	(0.1 / 0.37)	(0.3 / 0.54)
v2	(0.11 / 0.61)	(0.25 / 0.64)	(0.28 / 0.57)	(0.31 / 0.61)	(0.18 / 0.69)	(0.59 / 1.06)
v3	(21.31 / 8.37)	(3.31 / 8.59)	(3.72 / 7.62)	(4.18 / 8.29)	(2.05 / 7.95)	(9.22 / 16.54)
v4	(8.98 / 5.43)	(2.53 / 6.56)	(2.33 / 4.77)	(2.59 / 5.14)	(1.29 / 5.01)	(8.12 / 14.57)
v6	(1.94 / 2.52)	(1.04 / 2.7)	(1.1 / 2.26)	(1.24 / 2.46)	(0.8 / 3.1)	(2.41 / 4.32)
v7	(8.57 / 5.3)	(2.22 / 5.76)	(2.55 / 5.22)	(2.52 / 4.99)	(1.2 / 4.68)	(5.21 / 9.34)
v8	(49.8 / 12.79)	(6.07 / 15.76)	(1.29 / 2.65)	(5.89 / 11.68)	(2.89 / 11.23)	(10.05 / 18.03)
v9	(4.5 / 3.85)	(1.63 / 4.22)	(1.58 / 3.25)	(2.13 / 4.22)	(0.85 / 3.31)	(2.86 / 5.12)
Thunderbird Versions						
rolling	(0.82 / 1.43)	(1.22 / 2.09)	(0.79 / 1.34)	(0.84 / 1.4)	(0.79 / 1.43)	(2.78 / 3.13)
Ubuntu Versions						
v11.04	(0.39 / 0.68)	(0.42 / 0.73)	(0.38 / 0.64)	(0.39 / 0.65)	(0.38 / 0.69)	(0.87 / 0.98)
v12.04	(1.77 / 3.1)	(2.39 / 4.1)	(1.63 / 2.76)	(1.84 / 3.06)	(1.6 / 2.9)	(3.79 / 4.27)
v14.04	(1.17 / 2.04)	(4.78 / 8.22)	(1.37 / 2.33)	(1.24 / 2.07)	(1.07 / 1.95)	(2.16 / 2.44)
Windows Versions						
XP	(1.1 / 1.55)	(1.14 / 1.59)	(1.05 / 1.46)	(1.1 / 1.54)	(1.03 / 1.52)	(1.52 / 2.06)
Vista	(0.44 / 0.62)	(0.51 / 0.71)	(0.4 / 0.56)	(0.44 / 0.61)	(0.41 / 0.6)	(0.62 / 0.85)
Version 7	(0.86 / 1.22)	(4.04 / 5.67)	(0.76 / 1.06)	(0.82 / 1.13)	(0.76 / 1.13)	(1.4 / 1.9)

Table 7: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 3 Month Forecasting Horizon

Method	SES	DES	TES	Arima	Croston	NNet
Firefox Versions						
v0	(0.99 / 1.32)	(0.78 / 1.34)	(0.76 / 1.28)	(0.73 / 1.22)	(0.65 / 1.18)	(1.36 / 1.6)
v1	(1.67 / 1.71)	(1.05 / 1.81)	(0.97 / 1.63)	(1.02 / 1.7)	(0.91 / 1.66)	(3.33 / 3.91)
v2	(0.72 / 1.12)	(0.7 / 1.21)	(0.62 / 1.04)	(0.61 / 1.03)	(0.57 / 1.04)	(1.41 / 1.65)
v3	(0.95 / 1.29)	(2.25 / 3.87)	(0.7 / 1.18)	(0.75 / 1.26)	(0.69 / 1.25)	(1.65 / 1.94)

Table 7: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 3 Month Forecasting Horizon

Method	SES	DES	TES	Arima	Croston	NNet
v7	(17.6 / 5.56)	(3.55 / 6.1)	(3.02 / 5.08)	(3.15 / 5.27)	(2.65 / 4.83)	(8.46 / 9.94)
v8 rolling	(15.33 / 5.19)	(3.65 / 6.27)	(2.64 / 4.43)	(2.97 / 4.98)	(2.75 / 5.01)	(5.32 / 6.25)
Google Chrome Versions						
v1	(0.62 / 0.97)	(0.79 / 1.06)	(0.77 / 0.91)	(0.83 / 0.97)	(0.62 / 0.96)	(1.39 / 1.76)
v2	(38.37 / 7.63)	(6.71 / 8.97)	(6.2 / 7.3)	(6.46 / 7.58)	(4.14 / 6.36)	(9.68 / 12.3)
v3	(40.03 / 7.79)	(5.95 / 7.94)	(5.86 / 6.89)	(6.6 / 7.74)	(5.43 / 8.34)	(10.94 / 13.9)
v4	(55.13 / 9.14)	(6.66 / 8.9)	(20.05 / 23.58)	(7.2 / 8.45)	(5.15 / 7.91)	(11.05 / 14.04)
Internet Explorer Versions						
v5	(0.43 / 0.79)	(0.89 / 1.25)	(0.54 / 0.75)	(0.64 / 0.88)	(0.51 / 0.76)	(1.98 / 2.6)
v6	(1.62 / 2.71)	(1.95 / 2.74)	(1.84 / 2.57)	(1.86 / 2.58)	(2.06 / 3.06)	(2.75 / 3.6)
v7	(0.31 / 0.66)	(0.49 / 0.69)	(0.46 / 0.64)	(0.48 / 0.67)	(0.42 / 0.62)	(0.69 / 0.9)
v8	(1.13 / 1.68)	(1.27 / 1.78)	(1.07 / 1.49)	(1.15 / 1.6)	(1.13 / 1.68)	(1.67 / 2.19)
v9	(2.98 / 4.14)	(2.97 / 4.18)	(2.41 / 3.37)	(3.01 / 4.18)	(2.93 / 4.36)	(3.68 / 4.82)
v10	(0.93 / 2.21)	(1.63 / 2.29)	(1.62 / 2.26)	(1.6 / 2.22)	(1.41 / 2.1)	(1.9 / 2.49)
v11	(3.41 / 5.09)	(4.21 / 5.9)	(3.43 / 4.78)	(3.29 / 4.56)	(3.16 / 4.7)	(4.76 / 6.24)
Mac OS X Versions						
v0	(0.5 / 1.66)	(0.66 / 1.68)	(0.81 / 1.61)	(0.83 / 1.65)	(0.41 / 1.59)	(0.92 / 1.75)
v2	(0.25 / 0.82)	(0.33 / 0.85)	(0.39 / 0.77)	(0.4 / 0.8)	(0.21 / 0.82)	(0.71 / 1.36)
v3	(0.3 / 1)	(2.96 / 7.59)	(0.47 / 0.94)	(0.51 / 1)	(0.25 / 0.96)	(0.72 / 1.38)
v4	(0.4 / 1.32)	(0.68 / 1.75)	(0.64 / 1.28)	(0.62 / 1.24)	(0.32 / 1.23)	(1.02 / 1.95)
v5	(0.77 / 2.52)	(2.68 / 6.87)	(1.16 / 2.32)	(0.9 / 1.79)	(0.63 / 2.43)	(1.55 / 2.96)
v6	(0.65 / 2.15)	(0.94 / 2.4)	(0.94 / 1.87)	(1.04 / 2.06)	(0.49 / 1.89)	(1.4 / 2.67)
v8	(1.5 / 4.95)	(2.06 / 5.27)	(2.23 / 4.44)	(2.42 / 4.81)	(1.23 / 4.76)	(7.74 / 14.74)
v9	(0.52 / 1.7)	(0.97 / 2.5)	(0.86 / 1.71)	(0.83 / 1.65)	(0.39 / 1.52)	(1.18 / 2.24)
v10	(5.42 / 17.82)	(7.91 / 20.26)	(4.41 / 8.78)	(8.25 / 16.4)	(3.96 / 15.35)	(11.39 / 21.7)
v11	(6.63 / 21.8)	(35.66 / 91.34)	(9.07 / 18.08)	(9.73 / 19.36)	(4.96 / 19.22)	(12.82 / 24.43)
Microsoft Office Versions						
v2001	(0.3 / 0.43)	(0.32 / 0.44)	(0.3 / 0.42)	(0.3 / 0.42)	(0.28 / 0.42)	(0.55 / 0.72)
v2003	(1.28 / 1.81)	(1.31 / 1.84)	(1.27 / 1.77)	(1.28 / 1.77)	(1.13 / 1.68)	(1.75 / 2.29)
v2010	(0.58 / 0.82)	(0.58 / 0.81)	(0.52 / 0.73)	(0.59 / 0.82)	(0.56 / 0.83)	(0.75 / 0.98)
Safari Versions						
v1	(0.05 / 0.41)	(0.43 / 1.11)	(0.2 / 0.39)	(0.2 / 0.4)	(0.1 / 0.37)	(0.28 / 0.53)
v2	(0.11 / 0.61)	(0.25 / 0.65)	(0.29 / 0.57)	(0.31 / 0.61)	(0.18 / 0.71)	(0.53 / 1.01)
v3	(21.47 / 8.41)	(3.37 / 8.63)	(3.84 / 7.66)	(4.19 / 8.33)	(2.1 / 8.14)	(8.34 / 15.89)
v4	(9.17 / 5.49)	(2.65 / 6.8)	(2.41 / 4.8)	(2.63 / 5.23)	(1.31 / 5.08)	(7.96 / 15.17)
v6	(1.98 / 2.55)	(1.07 / 2.73)	(1.13 / 2.25)	(1.25 / 2.49)	(0.84 / 3.24)	(2.16 / 4.13)
v7	(8.9 / 5.41)	(2.35 / 6.02)	(2.63 / 5.24)	(2.55 / 5.06)	(1.23 / 4.77)	(5.06 / 9.65)
v8	(53.76 / 13.3)	(6.87 / 17.61)	(1.32 / 2.64)	(6.25 / 12.44)	(2.99 / 11.61)	(10.55 / 20.11)
v9	(5.75 / 4.35)	(1.75 / 4.49)	(1.72 / 3.42)	(2.26 / 4.49)	(0.86 / 3.33)	(2.32 / 4.42)
Thunderbird Versions						
rolling	(0.82 / 1.44)	(1.27 / 2.18)	(0.81 / 1.35)	(0.85 / 1.42)	(0.8 / 1.46)	(2.57 / 3.02)
Ubuntu Versions						

Table 7: Forecasting Results (Mean Absolute Error / Root Mean Squared Error) for all Forecasting Methodologies and Software / System Packages over a 3 Month Forecasting Horizon

Method	SES	DES	TES	Arima	Croston	NNet
v11.04	(0.39 / 0.69)	(0.43 / 0.74)	(0.4 / 0.66)	(0.39 / 0.66)	(0.4 / 0.73)	(0.86 / 1.01)
v12.04	(1.79 / 3.14)	(2.47 / 4.24)	(1.64 / 2.76)	(1.84 / 3.08)	(1.63 / 2.97)	(3.69 / 4.34)
v14.04	(0.97 / 1.7)	(5.61 / 9.63)	(1.3 / 2.18)	(1.09 / 1.83)	(0.88 / 1.6)	(1.8 / 2.11)
Windows Versions						
XP	(1.1 / 1.56)	(1.14 / 1.61)	(1.05 / 1.47)	(1.1 / 1.54)	(1.05 / 1.56)	(1.6 / 2.1)
Vista	(0.44 / 0.63)	(0.52 / 0.73)	(0.4 / 0.56)	(0.44 / 0.61)	(0.41 / 0.61)	(0.64 / 0.83)
Version 7	(0.86 / 1.22)	(4.47 / 6.28)	(0.76 / 1.06)	(0.82 / 1.14)	(0.77 / 1.14)	(1.47 / 1.93)

465 Figures 19 - 21 plot the time series and forecasts for Internet Explorer (v6), Microsoft Office (full), and Windows (XP) for the different forecasting methodologies. As we have a total of 270 different software and system packages and versions, we only provide representative examples here⁸. The three plots serve as exemplary cases for the three application domains displayed in Table 3, which consist of three highly popular and widely used software products. Additionally, we selected three version numbers that covered a sufficiently long time frame of vulnerability data.

⁸The other plots can be obtained from the authors.




Figure 19: Time Series and Forecasts for Internet Explorer (v6)




Figure 20: Time Series and Forecasts for Microsoft Office (full)




Figure 21: Time Series and Forecasts for Windows (XP)

470 *4.2. Discussion*

Regarding the forecast of the expected number of IT security vulnerabilities, our work supports organizations in improving specific aspects of IT security management, helping to protect organizations against costly data breaches that could significantly harm their brand image. This is also backed by a Ponemon Institute study which revealed that an incident caused by insecure software costs businesses an average US\$4 million (Ponemon Institute, 2017). It is also crucial to consider these security aspects when acquiring new software or removing software from the portfolio. For instance, the 2016 Internet Security Threat Report by Symantec revealed that in 2015, the number of zero-day vulnerabilities more than doubled to 54, a 125 percent increase from the year before. A new zero-day vulnerability was found every week (on average) in 2015, and these figures are set to increase in the future (Symantec, 2016). The results of our study help organizations to effectively address the economic threats of security vulnerabilities inherent in software products.

In the following, we therefore want to focus our discussion on how the accuracy of the different forecasting methodologies is affected by the software and system packages, and how robust our results are with regard to different error metrics. Our discussion thereby contributes to the rising stream of literature analyzing IT security vulnerabilities from a time series perspective, and examines how the prediction accuracy of IT security vulnerabilities' time series is impacted by the applied forecasting methodology.

4.2.1. Prediction Accuracy Depending on Software and System Packages

Figures 19 - 21 display the characteristics of the time series with regards to its volatility and rareness of occurrence. The plots further show that depending on the forecasting methodology, the difference between predicted and actual values varies considerably. While Croston's methodology produces smooth predictions with low variability, the other methodologies rapidly adapt to variations of the time series which impacts the prediction accuracy. There is a tendency that the forecasting methodology SES and Neural Network are less suitable (cf. Figures 2 - 18). In the case of Neural Networks, this tendency applies to all software and system packages. The reason for the poor results of SES and Neural Networks lies in the properties of security vulnerability time series data, rareness of occurrence, and a tendency towards outliers. Both characteristics have an impact on the effectiveness of the applied forecasting methodology. In the intermittent demand literature, this phenomenon is widely known. The infrequent demand arrivals, coupled with variable demand sizes whenever demand occurs, render the problem of accurately estimating the demand especially challenging (Petropoulos and Kourentzes, 2015). Translating this to our context, this means that the sudden appearance of vulnerabilities for a few periods results in an overestimation of vulnerabilities in the following periods of time, i.e., vulnerabilities are predicted even if there were none. This explains the poor performance of these two methodologies. Significantly, the result tables reveal

505 that different types of forecasting methodologies lead to different performances. To interpret the measures, we also want to discuss the values of MAE and RMSE at this point. As MAE and RMSE are absolute metrics, “good” and “poor” values depend on the scale of the data. For this, we refer to Table 4, which shows the overall vulnerabilities of the entire analyzed time frame as well as a monthly average as well. We can use the monthly average as a baseline to set this value in relation to MAE and RMSE respectively. For most of the software and system package we observe a monthly vulnerability average between 1 and 4 rounded which we can use as good values for MAE. The reason for this is that MAE takes the absolute value of forecast errors and averages them over the entire time of the forecast time periods. Therefore, the monthly average provides a good basis to examine the MAE values. The results in the Tables 5 - 7 show the following:

- 515 • Croston’s methodology and ARIMA show the best performance and have low MAE values (in terms of MAE values ranging between 1 to 4) for the vast majority of the software and system packages.
- SES, DES and TES and Neural Network perform very volatily and we observe very poor MAE values for the last Safari versions up to an MAE value of 53.76.

520 For practice, it is important to state which method to use in order to guide a good selection of a forecasting methodology that performs properly. A first implication is that Croston’s method and ARIMA can be recommended for predicting IT security vulnerabilities, as they consistently achieve low forecasting errors. The exponential smoothing methods are more susceptible to the time series’ nature of IT security vulnerabilities time, so that their usage is not recommended at all. Regarding Neural Network, we applied a feed-forward neural network with a single hidden layer. However, it turned out that this approach does not perform well in our context. In literature, there are other neural network forecasting approaches such as a back propagation neural network with adaptive differential evolution algorithm for time series forecasting (Wang et al., 2015), wavelet neural network (Doucoure et al., 2016), or combinations of neural network with random walk (Adhikari and Agrawal, 525 2014), to name only a few that might be investigated in this context too.

530 From an intra-related observation between the different software and system packages, it is evident that for some methodologies, the prediction accuracy varies considerably. For example, within browsers, DES together with SES and Neural Networks have achieved significantly poorer prediction accuracies for Mac OS X (cf. Figures 5, 6, 11, 12, 17, 18), or TES with SES and Neural Networks for some versions of Google Chrome (cf. Figures 2, 3, 7, 8, 13, 14). In general, we observe that the accuracy of the forecasting methodologies depends on the applied software and system packages, and further note that approximately more or less the same prediction accuracy is close to its theoretical minimum for both metrics, except for SES and Neural Networks (cf. Figures 2 - 18). These observations have two implications: First, the choice of the optimal forecasting methodology

540 depends on the software or system package as some methodologies are not suitable such as SES and Neural Networks, and second, from a managerial point of view, the tendency of low prediction errors offers decision makers a good choice to use these forecasting methodologies in order to anticipate the development of IT security vulnerabilities of their software and system applications in their organization's portfolio. A closer look at the Tables 5 - 7 reveals the following:

- 545 • Except the first version, Google Chrome is challenging to forecast: The MAE values ranges from 3.97 (Croston's methodology) to 61.7 (SES).
- For Operating Systems, in general the forecasting methodologies are able to predict the amount of vulnerabilities well. The majority of the MAE values are in good ranges within 1 and 4 (rounded).

550 4.2.2. Robustness of Different Measures of Prediction Accuracy

Another issue deserving of attention is the robustness of our results in terms of the used forecasting-error metrics MAE and RMSE. For instance, our discussion in the prior subsection revealed the poor performance of SES and Neural Networks. The crucial question is how to interpret these values and the robustness of the prediction accuracy within the two applied forecasting-error 555 metrics.

We can observe that the poor performance of SES and Neural Networks is independent from the applied metrics MAE and RMSE - both metrics show the same tendency. For most cases, in light of our discussion in the prior subsection, we observe that the values of MAE are close to zero, meaning that the prediction accuracy was good. The actual absolute prediction accuracy for MAE 560 as well as for RMSE was low in most cases (cf. Tables 5 - 7) with the exceptions of SES and Neural Networks for browsers. The tendency of the other methodologies shows that the forecasting methodologies' decomposition of the zero valued intervals is sufficient to capture the high volatility. Important implications from this result are that that the prediction error is independent from the applied metrics, and that the prediction accuracy was good for the forecasting methodologies despite 565 dealing with time series that contain many zero values. This is backed up by Table 4, in which the actual vulnerabilities within the time frame and the monthly averages are shown. Regarding the latter implication, a closer look at Safari v1 reveals that within the time of 13 years, 20 vulnerabilities occurred, implying that this time series contains a lot of zero values and, if vulnerabilities appear, they are volatile.

570 Regarding the robustness of our results, we observe a same tendency for both forecasting error metrics, which suggests that the outcome of the accuracy of a particular forecasting methodology is independent from the choice of the metric. Figures 2 - 18 show only slight variations between MAE and RMSE for the different forecasting methodologies. Based on the analysis shown in the Tables

5 - 7 and as outlined in our discussion above, we observe that our results are robust in terms of performing the same in both MAE and RMSE.

To conclude, we can derive the implications that (1) the metrics MAE and RMSE can measure the actual prediction error accurately in the context of IT security vulnerabilities, and (2) the accuracy results of the forecasting methodologies are robust in terms of the independence from the applied metrics.

580 **5. Conclusion**

This paper addresses the problem of forecasting the number of post-release IT security vulnerabilities of different system and software packages, including operating systems, browsers, and office solutions. The analysis of vulnerabilities with time series methodologies is a rising stream in the literature, to which our study contributes an extensive analysis of forecasting methodologies. We apply six forecasting methodologies that are particularly appropriate for the four properties of vulnerability time series: rareness of occurrence, volatility, non-stationarity, and seasonality. We review the pros and cons of forecasting error metrics and demonstrate the appropriateness of the absolute error forecasting metric. Using the metrics MAE and RMSE, we discussed the forecasting accuracy based on the robustness factors software and system packages, and highlight the independence of the accuracy results from the metrics.

Our study reveals several important implications: First, the selection of a forecasting methodology depends on the software or system package as some methodologies show poor performances (such as SES and Neural Networks). On the other hand, Croston's method and ARIMA can be recommended for forecasting IT security vulnerabilities as they consistently achieve low forecasting errors. Second, our results are relevant to managerial decision makers, as they demonstrate the accuracy of IT security vulnerability forecasts, which can inform critical decisions on organizational software portfolios. Third, we were able to show that absolute metrics overcome disadvantages of others, e.g., percentage-error metrics, and that absolute metrics can cover the actual prediction error precisely in the context of IT security vulnerabilities. Fourth, we show that the accuracy results of the forecasting methodologies are robust in terms of the independence from using absolute metrics.

Our study has a few limitations: Although we followed a structured and accurate search process to identify IT security vulnerabilities from the most extensive database NVD and linked the vulnerabilities uniquely to the corresponding root software and system package, we may have missed vulnerabilities, or missed those not included in the NVD database. A further limitation arises from the limitation of the used methodologies. In our study, we used univariate time series methods, where the prediction of a given variable depends on a model fitted to past observations of the given time series (Chatfield, 1988). This results in the following methodological limitations:

1. The used (univariate) forecasting methodologies cannot include explanatory variables and the projection of the number of vulnerabilities merely do not allow for a more detailed investigation of the properties of the underlying vulnerability (Newbold and Granger, 1974). For example, releasing the software early vs. late in the development process would be an interesting angle of analysis. That would, however, require access to proprietary/confidential data, which is not given in our context. Variables such as characteristics of the source code, the developers, or the internal development methods are not available in such settings and were therefore purposefully omitted. Instead of targeting a comprehensive explanation of the root causes of vulnerabilities, our paper focuses on forecasting the number of post-release security vulnerabilities, treating internals of the software producer, including proprietary and confidential information, as a black box.
2. The concentration on magnitudes (i.e., the number of vulnerabilities) are designed to select point predictions that minimize an expected squared error cost function (i.e., MAE and RMSE in our case) and these forecasting techniques often extrapolate the current trend into the future (Kling, 1987). Existing forecasting methodologies that are designed in particular for the prediction of turning points use signal detection from indicators and stochastic simulation of future events (Kling, 1987). In the case of prediction of vulnerabilities, such indicators might include developer skills, code characteristics and development methodologies and for the stochastic simulation, one might refer to the analysis of vulnerabilities before and after a (major) release in future analysis.

We further want to provide an outlook on how even better forecasting and interpretability can be achieved. To achieve better forecasting accuracy, historical data on vulnerabilities that were found, e.g., by software engineers, and closed but not publicly announced, could be explored. This would increase the number of vulnerabilities and produce less zero values, in turn leading to better forecasting results with those methodologies not designed for the purpose of dealing with zero-inflated time series (e.g., the exponential smoothing methodologies). In this regard, the impact of increasing public awareness, partly sparked by targeted bounty programs, on vulnerability detection might be included in future research. It was shown that monetary incentives significantly correlate with the number of vulnerabilities reported, so that large companies such as Facebook, Github, and PayPal started to collaborate with security researchers or to participate in corresponding programs on third-party bug bounty platforms such as Wooyun, HackerOne, BugCrowd, or Cobalt (Zhao et al., 2015). In our set of software vendors, Google and Mozilla pursue this approach and provide cash rewards for security researchers who identify security vulnerabilities in their products. With the help of such programs, the number of detected vulnerabilities would increase and corresponding data could be included in time series approaches. This, as discussed above, leads in turn to a

decrease in zero values and can further improve the prediction accuracy. Developer skills are a further promising predictor of vulnerabilities. Our paper could therefore be complemented by a
645 broader analysis of software projects advanced by individual developers or small teams, allowing for a better identification of skill-related effects on the occurrence of vulnerabilities.

To conclude, we hope that our study encourages academics to develop suitable forecasting methodologies for post-release IT security vulnerabilities, which could subsequently improve prediction accuracy.

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