T. Gries and C.-J. Haake, An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War,” vol. 95. 2016.

S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, and P. Möhlmeier, Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks, vol. 91. Universität Paderborn, 2015.

J. Künsemöller, S. Brangewitz, H. Karl, and C.-J. Haake, “Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service,” in Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC), 2014, pp. 203–210.

S. Brangewitz and C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information, vol. 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.

C.-J. Haake and J. T. Martini, “Negotiating Transfer Prices,” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 657–680, 2012.

C.-J. Haake, T. Krieger, and S. Minter, “On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU,” International Economics and Economic Policy, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 583–612, 2012.

D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “Proportionality and the power of unequal parties,” International Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 189–200, 2011.

C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus, “Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples,”10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2__Theory and Decision, vol. 69, no. 4, pp. 537–554, 2010, doi:10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2 .

C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus, “Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts,”10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8__Economic Theory, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 393–410, 2009, doi:10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8 .

C.-J. Haake, “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES,” International Game Theory Review, vol. 11, no. 01, pp. 15–32, 2009.

D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “Stable governments and the semistrict core,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 460–475, 2008.

C.-J. Haake, A. Kashiwada, and F. E. Su, “The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees,” Journal of Mathematical Biology, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 479–497, 2008.

C.-J. Haake, “Two support results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets,” Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 177–187, 2008.

C.-J. Haake and W. Trockel, “On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules,” Review of Economic Design, vol. 14, no. 1–2, pp. 17–25, 2008.

C.-J. Haake, “Comments on: Transversality of the Shapley value,” TOP, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 48–50, 2008.

D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions,” Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30, no. 4, pp. 571–579, 2007.

C.-J. Haake, B. Klaus, and D. Dimitrov, “Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods,” Economics Letters , vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 106–110, 2006.

D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?,” Journal of Economics, vol. 89, no. 2, pp. 115–128, 2006.

C.-J. Haake and U. Ervig, “Trading bargaining weights,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 41, no. 8, pp. 983–993, 2005.

C.-J. Haake, M. Raith, and F. E. Su, “Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems,” Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 723–749, 2002.