PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive games
F. Aslan, P. Duman, W. Trockel, Economics Bulletin (n.d.).

Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining
C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125 (2022) 403–440.

Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story
P. Duman, Games 11 (2020).

Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira
P. Duman, W. Trockel, Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira, n.d.

The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets
C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.

On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game
P. Duman, W. Trockel, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 1 (2016) 83–106.