PEA: core-analogue for non-cohesive games
F. Aslan, P. Duman, W. Trockel, Economics Bulletin (n.d.).
LibreCat: /record/47845

Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining
C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 125 (2022) 403–440.
LibreCat: /record/30940
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518

Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? Experimental Results on Trockel’s Model of Selten’s Chain Store Story
P. Duman, Games 11 (2020).
LibreCat: /record/45561
DOI: 10.3390/g11010009

Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira
P. Duman, W. Trockel, Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H_alpha--Essential Equilibira, n.d.
LibreCat: /record/47846

The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets
C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
LibreCat: /record/15202

On Non-Cooperative Foundation and Implementation of the Nash Solution in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium via Rubinstein's Game
P. Duman, W. Trockel, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design 1 (2016) 83–106.
LibreCat: /record/3106
DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003