S. Kaiser, Signalisieren und Screening in Arbeitsmärkten - die Experimente von Brandts &; Holt und Kübler et. al. Universität Paderborn, 2014.

Y. Gu and B. Hehenkamp, “Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, vol. 170, no. 2, pp. 225–248, 2014.

K. De Jaegher and B. Hoyer, “Collective action and the common enemy effect,” Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 27, no. 5, pp. 644–664, 2014.

N. Brummel, On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry. Universität Paderborn, 2014.

F. Eusterholz, Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes. Universität Paderborn, 2014.

V. Wemhöner, Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells. Universität Paderborn, 2014.

B. Hoyer and K. De Jaegher, Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect, vol. 12–06. 2012.

B. Hehenkamp and O. Kaarboe, “Paying for Performance in Hospitals,” Economic Analysis and Policy, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 49–70, 2011.

B. Hehenkamp and A. Wambach, “Survival at the center—the stability of minimum differentiation,” Journal of Economic Behavior &; Organization, no. 3, pp. 853--858, 2010.

B. Hehenkamp, A. Possajennikov, and T. Guse, “On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations,” Journal of Economic Behavior &; Organization, vol. 73, no. 2, pp. 254–258, 2010.

J. Angerhausen, C. Bayer, and B. Hehenkamp, “Strategic Unemployment,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), vol. 166, no. 3, pp. 439–461, 2010.

B. Hehenkamp and O. M. Kaarbøe, “Imitators and optimizers in a changing environment,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 32, no. 5, pp. 1357–1380, 2008.

B. Hehenkamp, “Die Grundlagen der Mechanismus-Design-Theorie,” Wirtschaftsdienst, vol. 87, no. 11, pp. 768–772, 2007.

T. Guse and B. Hehenkamp, “The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests,” Public Choice, vol. 129, no. 3–4, pp. 323–352, 2006.

B. Hehenkamp and O. Kaarboe, “When Should the Talented Receive Weaker Incentives? Peer Pressure in Teams,” FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 124–148, 2006.

B. Hehenkamp, W. Leininger, and A. Possajennikov, “Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation,” European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1045–1057, 2004.

B. Hehenkamp, “Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model,” International Game Theory Review, vol. 05, no. 03, pp. 249–262, 2003.

B. Hehenkamp, “Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 44–76, 2002.

B. Hehenkamp and W. Leininger, “A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium,” Journal of Evolutionary Economics, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 367–371, 1999.

B. Hehenkamp, C.-Z. Qin, and C. Stuart, “Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings,” Journal of Evolutionary Economics, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 211–224, 1999.