@techreport{63835, abstract = {{This article examines the liquidity effects of a wealth tax on residential rental real estate. Using data from a real estate corporation, we simulate the effects of a wealth tax on cash flows from the rental operations. The level of detail of the data enables us to conduct analyses at the annual, regional and year of construction level. A comparison with real estate data from other sources supports external validity. The results of the simulation show that the introduction of a wealth tax can significantly reduce the cash flow from rental operations and lead to liquidity problems. On average over all observations, a wealth tax rate of 2% leads to a negative cash flow after all costs. In general, this finding implies that growth-oriented real estate is more affected by a wealth tax in terms of liquidity than rental yield-oriented real estate. Particularly in large cities with high market values but relatively low rents, the liquidity effects can be more than three times as high as in rural or industrial regions – potentially leading to a relative loss of investment attractiveness. As a wealth tax is decoupled from rental income, the tax burden is very sensitive to market developments, including the interest rate environment. As a result, investments in residential rental real estate are exposed to additional uncertainty. This additional tax uncertainty might impair the willingness to invest and should therefore be taken into account in political discussions on the reintroduction of a wealth tax.}}, author = {{Maiterth, Ralf and Piper, Yuri and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, title = {{{Liquidity Effects of a Wealth Tax on Residential Rental Real Estate}}}, doi = {{10.2139/ssrn.6147767}}, year = {{2026}}, } @misc{64904, author = {{Kombert, Sounia and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, booktitle = {{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}}, number = {{51}}, pages = {{16, Sp. 1--4}}, title = {{{Schocks durch Zölle und Steuern. Handelskonflikte und Abkommen werden zur zentralen Frage für Unternehmen. Wie bewältigen sie die neue Unsicherheit?}}}, year = {{2026}}, } @article{64903, author = {{Hoppe, Thomas and Schanz, Deborah and Sturm, Susann and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, journal = {{Schmalenbach IMPULSE}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{1--12}}, title = {{{Steuerkomplexität: Wie lässt sie sich messen und welche Folgen hat sie?}}}, doi = {{10.54585/IEZK8936}}, year = {{2026}}, } @article{63577, author = {{Eberhartinger, Eva and Speitmann, Raffael and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, journal = {{Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation (JIAAT)}}, title = {{{Banks' tax disclosure, financial secrecy, and tax haven heterogeneity}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2026.100759}}, volume = {{60}}, year = {{2026}}, } @article{56815, abstract = {{This study investigates the determinants of tax complexity in Indonesia, focusing on the perspectives of tax officers and firms, and thus provides a case study relevant to developing countries. Understanding tax complexity in this context is crucial as developing nations frequently encounter legislative, fiscal, and administrative challenges that exacerbate their tax complexity. Complexity can hinder investment, impair tax revenue collection, and impede economic development. The authors adapt a global survey instrument to the Indonesian context and collect responses from Indonesian tax officers and firms. Transfer pricing is perceived as the most complex tax regulation which is consistent with cross-country studies. However, in contrast to the global findings, statutory tax rates and taxes on dividends rank second and third in Indonesia. While Indonesian tax officers emphasize the complexity of transfer pricing regulations, firms are more concerned about the complexity of tax procedures, especially tax guidance and tax audits. Furthermore, comparative analyses show that tax officers perceive tax regulations as being more complex than tax procedures. In contrast, firms perceive the opposite, particularly for tax audits. The findings offer a nuanced picture of tax complexity in a developing country and provide guidance for tax reforms in Indonesia. They also serve as a commencement for further analyses of developing countries.}}, author = {{Schipp, Adrian and Siahaan, Fernando and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, journal = {{Intertax}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{102--122}}, title = {{{Determinants of Tax Complexity: Evidence from a Developing Country}}}, doi = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4924632}}, volume = {{54}}, year = {{2026}}, } @techreport{65737, abstract = {{We examine German individuals' preferences for income and wealth taxation and, importantly, the interplay between these two tax instruments. While prior research often examines wealth tax preferences in isolation, actual tax systems consist of multiple interacting taxes. To capture this dynamic, we elicit preferred tax burdens in a large-scale online experiment with 2,702 participants randomly assigned to one of four treatment groups: respondents state either an unspecified overall tax burden, separate income and wealth tax burdens, an income tax burden only, or a wealth tax burden only. Our baseline estimates reveal average (marginal) tax rates of approximately 17.4% (18.9%) for income and 4.1% (2.3%) for wealth. We find that participants associate wealth with an ability-to-pay taxes: when a wealth tax is not explicitly available, preferred income tax rates are approximately 30% higher. However, when both instruments are available, participants do not treat them as substitutes. Instead, they appear to treat the two taxes as separate mental bins: the standalone income and wealth tax burdens are combined in a notably additive manner, resulting in a significantly higher overall tax burden. Further, respondents apply implicit exemptions for low levels of wealth and favor a wealth tax base focused primarily on financial assets and real estate other than the primary residence.}}, author = {{Maiterth, Ralf and Piper, Yuri and Schneider, Cornelius}}, title = {{{Preferences for Taxing Wealth and Income}}}, doi = {{10.2139/ssrn.6832418}}, year = {{2026}}, } @article{66497, author = {{Kaeser, Christian and Schanz, Deborah and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, journal = {{Schmalenbach IMPULSE}}, number = {{1-4}}, title = {{{Steuern, Standort, Unternehmensstrategie – Wie wettbewerbsfähig sind Deutschlands Steuer-, Zoll- und Investitionspolitik?}}}, doi = {{10.54585/CLIM8326}}, volume = {{6}}, year = {{2026}}, } @article{65315, abstract = {{This study examines the drivers of perceived corporate transfer pricing complexity. Our analysis is based on survey data from multinational firms in the manufacturing sector. We identify three key strategies expected to reduce transfer pricing complexity and associated compliance costs while enhancing tax compliance: standardising transfer pricing documentation, strengthening cooperation between tax authorities, and increasing transparency through expanded information exchange among tax authorities and between tax authorities and firms. The findings provide evidence-based insights for international tax policy aimed at reducing transfer pricing complexity and associated administrative burdens for both firms and tax administrations. }}, author = {{Greil, Stefan and Kaluza-Thiesen, Eleonore and Schulz, Kim Alina and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, journal = {{eJournal of Tax Research}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{1--37}}, title = {{{Navigating Transfer Pricing Complexity: Standardization, Cooperation, Transparency}}}, volume = {{24}}, year = {{2026}}, } @article{66443, author = {{Sureth, Caren}}, journal = {{Betriebs-Berater}}, number = {{29}}, pages = {{I}}, title = {{{Steuersicherheit als Standortfaktor: Planbarkeit statt Investitionshemmnis}}}, volume = {{81}}, year = {{2026}}, } @techreport{60596, author = {{Dyck, Daniel and Hechtner, Frank and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, title = {{{Abschreibungen als Mittel der Investitionsförderung in Deutschland – Möglichkeiten, Grenzen und Perspektiven evidenzbasierter Analysen}}}, doi = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5337276 }}, year = {{2025}}, } @techreport{61491, abstract = {{We examine behavioral frictions in entrepreneurs’ tax planning when choosing between corporate and partnership taxation under a check-the-box rule. Using German tax return data, we show that only a small fraction of entrepreneurs opt for corporate taxation, despite substantial potential tax savings. A pre registered incentivized online experiment demonstrates that complexity aversion, status quo bias, and misperception about the corporate tax burden—arising from the interaction of corporate and deferred dividend taxation—help explain the preference for partnership taxation. We further find that these behavioral frictions heighten liquidity risk under the corporate system, particularly in the face of unexpected cash flow needs. Finally, a survey of German tax advisors indicates that tax advice only partially mitigates these frictions. Some advisors misperceive the benefits of corporate taxation, while others anticipate client biases and therefore refrain from recommending the corporate tax system.}}, author = {{Blaufus, Kay and Maiterth, Ralf and Milde, Michael and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, keywords = {{Check-the-box, Legal Form, Tax Complexity, Tax Misperception, Behavioral Taxation, Tax Advice}}, pages = {{107}}, title = {{{Choosing the Wrong Box? Behavioral Frictions and Limits of Tax Advice in Tax Regime Choice }}}, doi = {{10.2139/ssrn.5378466}}, year = {{2025}}, } @techreport{61490, abstract = {{This study examines the effect of tax complexity on the market value of publicly traded firms. Using firm-level measures of tax complexity, we find that a one standard deviation increase in tax complexity—comparable in magnitude to the rise following the U.S. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act—is associated with a 2.6% decline in Tobin’s Q. The effect is particularly pronounced for complexity arising from anti-avoidance regulations and post-filing procedures. The negative valuation effect is more substantial for firms with limited opportunities for international profit shifting, weak governance, or low internal information quality. Further analyses reveal that tax system complexity is associated with a reduced growth potential of firms and less R&D and thus negative real responses that go beyond negative investment effects. Overall, our findings provide novel evidence of the economic costs of tax complexity and contribute to the debate on the design of efficient and equitable tax systems.}}, author = {{Braun, Anna-Sophie and Koch, Reinald and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, pages = {{48}}, title = {{{Tax Complexity and Firm Value}}}, doi = {{10.2139/ssrn.5378221}}, year = {{2025}}, } @techreport{61508, abstract = {{We investigate how tax authorities use joint tax audits as a coordinated enforcement tool in cross-border transactions of a multinational firm. Joint tax audits aim to resolve potential tax disputes early, before such disputes escalate into costly and time-consuming resolution procedures that may not fully eliminate double taxation. Employing a game-theoretic model, we identify settings in which we expect joint audits to occur and investigate their effect on the firm's expected tax payments and tax audit efficiency. We find that the occurrence of joint audits critically depends on the double taxation risk in the absence of joint audits. Unless tax rules are consistently applied, joint audits can occur more often when this risk is higher. The reason is that the firm changes its income-shifting strategy to reduce its expected tax payments, and thereby also enables tax authorities to better target tax disputes via joint audits that would otherwise escalate. However, we identify conditions under which joint audits are then detrimental to tax audit efficiency, particularly when the firm prefers them most. Our results imply that cost-sharing arrangements for joint audits should be tailored to the level of double taxation risk, with firm involvement having the potential to improve efficiency when this risk is high.}}, author = {{Dyck, Daniel and Kourouxous, Thomas and Lorenz, Johannes}}, keywords = {{joint tax audits, double taxation, dispute prevention, income shifting}}, pages = {{57}}, title = {{{An Economic Analysis of Joint Tax Audits}}}, doi = {{10.2139/ssrn.5398645}}, year = {{2025}}, } @techreport{61502, abstract = {{This study introduces sloppiness---the inaccurate preparation of supporting information during tax disputes---as a neglected but critical factor influencing taxpayer noncompliance. We conceptualize sloppiness as arising both from imperfections in the internal information environment, exacerbated by structural uncertainty over litigation outcomes (factual dimension), and from strategic aversion to compliance effort (strategic dimension). We examine whether and to what extent improved documentation and engaging an internal monitoring expert can mitigate sloppiness and prevent litigation. Using a game-theoretic model, we derive equilibrium strategies for a tax manager's compliance effort, a monitoring expert's dispute resolution effort, and a tax authority's litigation decision. Absent a monitoring expert, we find that improved documentation consistently reduces the litigation probability. However, when a monitoring expert is present, we surprisingly find that improved documentation crowds out compliance effort and can increase the litigation probability. Overall, our results suggest that sloppiness can be overcome either through strong documentation alone or by engaging a monitoring expert when documentation is weak, with the latter approach becoming more attractive as the dispute resolution costs decline.}}, author = {{Dyck, Daniel and Lorenz, Johannes and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, title = {{{Sloppiness in Tax Disputes: How to Prevent Litigation?}}}, year = {{2025}}, } @misc{62175, author = {{Giese, Henning and Schulz, Kim Alina and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, booktitle = {{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}}, number = {{16}}, title = {{{Paragraphen und Künstliche Intelligenz meistern: Welche Steuerprofis Unternehmen suchen. }}}, volume = {{261}}, year = {{2025}}, } @article{62733, author = {{Bornemann, Tobias and Moosmann, Anna-Lena and Novotny-Farkas, Zoltán}}, journal = {{European Accounting Review}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{89--122}}, title = {{{The Consequences of Abandoning the Quarterly Reporting Mandate in the Prime Market Segment}}}, doi = {{10.1080/09638180.2023.2239298}}, volume = {{34}}, year = {{2025}}, } @article{62732, author = {{Bornemann, Tobias and Auer, Sylvia and Eberhartinger, Eva}}, journal = {{Journal of the American Taxation Association}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{7--30}}, title = {{{Does Fair Value Taxation Affect Banks' Investment Portfolio and Risk-Taking?}}}, doi = {{10.2308/JATA-2022-019}}, volume = {{47}}, year = {{2025}}, } @techreport{46047, abstract = {{This study examines the impact of tax certainty through advance tax rulings (ATRs) on firms' risky investments under cash flow and tax uncertainty. Both firms and governments have expressed growing concern about increasing tax uncertainty, due to frequent tax reforms and the difficulty in applying ambiguous tax laws and anticipating audit outcomes. One remedy is the provision of ATRs, which offer upfront clarification of tax issues to reduce tax uncertainty and increase risk-taking. We analyze how these uncertainties, along with different tax rates, loss offset provisions, and ATR fees affect investment strategies. Our results suggest, first, that ATRs encourage riskier investments, particularly in tax regimes with generous loss offsets. We identify optimal ranges of ATR fees that benefit firms and tax authorities. Second, we show that it may be beneficial to design ATRs with a low or negative fee. Third, our study reveals a U-shaped relationship between firms' risk aversion and their willingness to pay for tax certainty, with willingness being higher for firms at low or high levels of risk aversion. In contrast, moderately risk-averse firms are only willing to accept low fees. Overall, our results highlight the importance of low-cost tax certainty combined with generous loss offset provisions to encourage risky investments.}}, author = {{Chen, An and Hieber, Peter and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, title = {{{How Much to Pay for Tax Certainty? The Role of Advance Tax Rulings for Risky Investment under Loss Offset and Tax Uncertainty}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10797-025-09930-8}}, year = {{2025}}, } @techreport{60733, author = {{Gerdes, Kristin and Harst, Simon and Schanz, Deborah and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, publisher = {{TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency}}, title = {{{2024 Global Tax Complexity Survey}}}, doi = {{10.52569/WEMV6812}}, year = {{2025}}, } @techreport{46048, author = {{Dyck, Daniel and Lorenz, Johannes and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}}, title = {{{Tax Disputes - The Role of Technology and Controversy Expertise}}}, doi = {{https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4214449 }}, year = {{2025}}, }