@techreport{65379,
  abstract     = {{Diese Studie analysiert die ESEF-Berichterstattung in Deutschland seit der Einführung der iXBRL-basierten Berichtspflicht durch die ESMA im Jahr 2020. Anhand einer Stichprobe von 610 kapitalmarktorientierten Unternehmen der Frankfurter Börse im Zeitraum 2020-2023 wird gezeigt, dass 60,5% der Jahresabschlüsse die ESEF-Anforderungen vollständig erfüllen. Größere Unternehmen haben höhere Konformitätsraten als FSE-Scale und ausländische Unternehmen. Die Untersuchung der Taxonomie-Erweiterungen verdeutlicht, dass größere Unternehmen eher Erweiterungs-Tags nutzen, was mit Theorien freiwilliger Offenlegung übereinstimmt. Die verpflichtende Einführung des Anhang-Taggings im Jahr 2022 führte zu einer erhöhten Tagging-Granularität und verbesserter Offenlegungsqualität. Die Ergebnisse verdeutlichen Herausforderungen bei der ESEF-Umsetzung, wie Zugangsbarrieren und inkonsistente Durchsetzung, und geben Einblicke in unternehmensspezifische Offenlegungspraktiken im Kontext strukturierter Berichterstattung.}},
  author       = {{Hofmann, Philipp and Sievers, Sönke and Li, Reeyarn}},
  pages        = {{251--258}},
  publisher    = {{KoR}},
  title        = {{{ESEF-Berichterstattung in Deutschland: Herausforderungen und Chancen}}},
  doi          = {{KORKOR1476665}},
  volume       = {{Heft 7-8/2025}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}

@techreport{65383,
  abstract     = {{This paper introduces a predictive model for German mergers and acquisitions (M& A) activity leveraging deep feedforward neural networks (DFNN) incorporating well-established traditional variables (also known as features), along with a ChatGPT-based M& A sentiment score (MASS) and unconventional predictors such as beer sales and weather data. We demonstrate that the inclusion of sentiment and non-traditional variables enhances predictive performance. Our findings provide an important empirical foundation for understanding near-term fluctuations in German M& A activity and offer a forecasting tool relevant to both practitioners and researchers.}},
  author       = {{Sievers, Sönke and Li, Reeyarn and Degen, Dominik and Kengelbach, Jens and Pietrogrande, Francesca}},
  issn         = {{1437-8981}},
  pages        = {{302--308}},
  title        = {{{Beer, Cars & Fundamentals: Predicting German M& A activity}}},
  doi          = {{CFCF1480783}},
  volume       = {{Heft 11-12/2025}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}

@techreport{46804,
  abstract     = {{In common law systems, firms’ litigation risk depends both on written laws and how courts interpret these laws. Using 321 U.S. circuit court rulings, we introduce a novel measure capturing courts’ attitudes towards defendants in securities lawsuits. Our results confirm that financial misreporting firms in more defendant-friendly circuits face fewer lawsuits. Consistent with lower expected litigation costs, firms in these circuits face less negative market reactions when misreporting is revealed, invest less in preventing misreporting, and are more likely to engage in aggressive misreporting. We conclude that defendant-friendly precedents reduce firms’ legal liability and worsen their financial reporting quality.

}},
  author       = {{Franke, Benedikt and Huang, Allen and Li, Reeyarn and Wang, Hui}},
  title        = {{{Securities Law Precedents, Legal Liability, and Financial Reporting Quality}}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}

@article{46803,
  abstract     = {{<jats:title>ABSTRACT</jats:title><jats:p>Drawing on the political theory of judicial decision making, our paper proposes a new and parsimonious ex ante litigation risk measure: federal judge ideology. We find that judge ideology complements existing measures of litigation risk based on industry membership and firm characteristics. Firms in liberal circuits (the third quartile in ideology) are 33.5% more likely to be sued in securities class action lawsuits than those in conservative circuits (the first quartile in ideology). This result is stronger after the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the <jats:italic>Tellabs</jats:italic> case. We next show that the effect of judge ideology on litigation risk is greater for firms with more sophisticated shareholders and with higher expected litigation costs. Furthermore, judicial appointments affect litigation risk and the value of firms in the circuit, highlighting the economic consequences of political appointments of judges. Finally, using our new measure, we document that litigation risk deters managers from providing long‐term earnings guidance, a result that existing measures of litigation risk cannot show.</jats:p>}},
  author       = {{HUANG, ALLEN and HUI, KAI WAI and Li, Reeyarn}},
  issn         = {{0021-8456}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Accounting Research}},
  keywords     = {{Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Accounting}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{431--489}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley}},
  title        = {{{Federal Judge Ideology: A New Measure of Ex Ante Litigation Risk}}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/1475-679x.12260}},
  volume       = {{57}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}