@article{2509,
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}},
  issn         = {{1434-4742}},
  journal      = {{Review of Economic Design}},
  number       = {{1-2}},
  pages        = {{17--25}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Nature}},
  title        = {{{On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s10058-008-0062-7}},
  volume       = {{14}},
  year         = {{2008}},
}

@article{2530,
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen}},
  issn         = {{1134-5764}},
  journal      = {{TOP}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{48--50}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Nature}},
  title        = {{{Comments on: Transversality of the Shapley value}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s11750-008-0047-2}},
  volume       = {{16}},
  year         = {{2008}},
}

@article{2496,
  author       = {{Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}},
  issn         = {{0176-1714}},
  journal      = {{Social Choice and Welfare}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{571--579}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Nature}},
  title        = {{{A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8}},
  volume       = {{30}},
  year         = {{2007}},
}

@article{2498,
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Klaus, Bettina and Dimitrov, Dinko}},
  journal      = {{Economics Letters }},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{106--110}},
  title        = {{{Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods}}},
  volume       = {{93}},
  year         = {{2006}},
}

@article{2500,
  author       = {{Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}},
  issn         = {{0931-8658}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economics}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{115--128}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Nature}},
  title        = {{{Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s00712-006-0207-5}},
  volume       = {{89}},
  year         = {{2006}},
}

@article{2499,
  abstract     = {{We consider a model, in which two agents are engaged in two separate bargaining problems. We
introduce a notion of bargaining weights (bargaining power), which is basically given by asymmetric
versions of the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution. Thereby, we view bargaining power as ordinary
goods that can be traded in an exchange economy.With equal initial endowment of bargaining power
there exists aWalrasian equilibrium in this exchange economy such that the utility allocation in equilibrium
coincides with the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution of the aggregate bargaining problem.
Equilibrium prices are given by the primitives of the two bargaining problems.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Ervig, Ulrike}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Mathematical Economics}},
  number       = {{8}},
  pages        = {{983--993}},
  title        = {{{Trading bargaining weights}}},
  volume       = {{41}},
  year         = {{2005}},
}

@article{2497,
  abstract     = {{We develop a procedure for implementing an efficient and envy-free
allocation of m objects among n individuals with the possibility of monetary
side-payments,assuming that players have quasi–linear utility functions. The
procedure eliminates envy by compensating envious players. It is fully descriptive
and says explicitly which compensations should be made,and in what
order. Moreover,it is simple enough to be carried out without computer support.
We formally characterize the properties of the procedure,show how it
establishes envy-freeness with minimal resources,and demonstrate its application
to a wide class of fair-division problems.}},
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Raith, Matthias and Su, Francis Edward}},
  issn         = {{0176-1714}},
  journal      = {{Social Choice and Welfare}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{723--749}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  title        = {{{Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems}}},
  volume       = {{19}},
  year         = {{2002}},
}