[{"publication_identifier":{"isbn":["978-1-4503-5916-0"]},"author":[{"id":"14052","orcid":"0000-0003-1348-6516","first_name":"Matthias","last_name":"Feldotto","full_name":"Feldotto, Matthias"},{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","id":"20801"},{"id":"40384","full_name":"Skopalik, Alexander","first_name":"Alexander","last_name":"Skopalik"},{"id":"13264","first_name":"Nadja","last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja"}],"title":"Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value","year":"2018","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:01Z","publication_status":"published","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1145/3230654.3230659","publication":"Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)","abstract":[{"text":"We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2018-05-22T10:28:51Z","file":[{"creator":"nmaraun","date_created":"2018-08-15T07:30:50Z","date_updated":"2018-08-15T07:30:50Z","relation":"main_file","file_size":1450171,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.pdf","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"file_id":"3910"}],"department":[{"_id":"541"},{"_id":"63"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"conference","conference":{"end_date":"2018-06-18","location":"Irvine, California, USA","start_date":"2018-06-18","name":"The 13th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)"},"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","_id":"2831","page":"5:1-5:6","ddc":["040"],"user_id":"14052","citation":{"bibtex":"@inproceedings{Feldotto_Haake_Skopalik_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659\">10.1145/3230654.3230659</a>}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={5:1-5:6} }","chicago":"Feldotto, Matthias, Claus-Jochen Haake, Alexander Skopalik, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.” In <i>Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)</i>, 5:1-5:6, 2018. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659\">https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659</a>.","short":"M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.","ama":"Feldotto M, Haake C-J, Skopalik A, Stroh-Maraun N. Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value. In: <i>Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)</i>. ; 2018:5:1-5:6. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659\">10.1145/3230654.3230659</a>","ieee":"M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value,” in <i>Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)</i>, Irvine, California, USA, 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.","mla":"Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.” <i>Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)</i>, 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659\">10.1145/3230654.3230659</a>.","apa":"Feldotto, M., Haake, C.-J., Skopalik, A., &#38; Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value. In <i>Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)</i> (pp. 5:1-5:6). Irvine, California, USA. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659\">https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659</a>"},"file_date_updated":"2018-08-15T07:30:50Z","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}]},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:09Z","publication_status":"published","intvolume":"       170","title":"Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences","year":"2018","author":[{"last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"},{"full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja","last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","first_name":"Nadja","id":"13264"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior."}],"publication":"Economics Letters","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"205"}],"file":[{"title":"Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences","file_id":"3854","content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:15:07Z","file_name":"1-s2.0-S016517651830212X-main.pdf","file_size":261888,"access_level":"closed","date_created":"2018-08-09T08:08:17Z","creator":"cjhaake"}],"date_created":"2018-05-03T07:53:56Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","ddc":["040"],"user_id":"477","volume":170,"page":"39 - 41","_id":"2566","urn":"25669","publisher":"Elsevier","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:15:07Z","citation":{"mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” <i>Economics Letters</i>, vol. 170, Elsevier, 2018, pp. 39–41, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033\">10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033</a>.","ama":"Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. <i>Economics Letters</i>. 2018;170:39-41. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033\">10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033</a>","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={170}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033\">10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033</a>}, journal={Economics Letters}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={39–41} }","apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. <i>Economics Letters</i>, <i>170</i>, 39–41. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033</a>","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences,” <i>Economics Letters</i>, vol. 170, pp. 39–41, 2018.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” <i>Economics Letters</i> 170 (2018): 39–41. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033</a>.","short":"C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, Economics Letters 170 (2018) 39–41."}},{"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","_id":"2933","urn":"29332","volume":113,"user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"citation":{"ama":"Haake C-J, Qin C-Z. <i>On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem</i>. Vol 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2018.","bibtex":"@book{Haake_Qin_2018, place={Paderborn University}, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}, volume={113}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. <i>On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem</i>. Vol. 113, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","short":"C.-J. Haake, C.-Z. Qin, On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, Paderborn University, 2018.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. <i>On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem</i>. Vol. 113. Working Papers CIE. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Qin, C.-Z. (2018). <i>On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem</i> (Vol. 113). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and C.-Z. Qin, <i>On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem</i>, vol. 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018."},"file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:52Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"place":"Paderborn University","author":[{"id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"},{"full_name":"Qin, Cheng-Zhong","last_name":"Qin","first_name":"Cheng-Zhong"}],"year":"2018","title":"On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem","intvolume":"       113","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:48Z","series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"abstract":[{"text":"We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions.","lang":"eng"}],"date_created":"2018-05-28T07:00:28Z","file":[{"creator":"cjhaake","date_created":"2018-08-09T08:15:31Z","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:52Z","file_name":"On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem.pdf","file_size":469001,"access_level":"closed","title":"On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem","file_id":"3855","content_type":"application/pdf"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"keyword":["Bargaining problem","CES Function","Normalized CES Function","Nash solution","Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution","Egalitarian Solution."],"type":"working_paper"},{"editor":[{"last_name":"Laslier","first_name":"Jean-Francois","full_name":"Laslier, Jean-Francois"},{"first_name":"Herve","last_name":"Moulin","full_name":"Moulin, Herve"},{"full_name":"Sanver, Remzi","last_name":"Sanver","first_name":"Remzi"},{"first_name":"William","last_name":"Zwicker","full_name":"Zwicker, William"}],"volume":"(n.d.)","ddc":["040"],"user_id":"477","_id":"3098","publisher":"Springer","urn":"30987","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","place":"Heidelberg","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"quality_controlled":"1","citation":{"ieee":"W. Trockel and C.-J. Haake, “Thoughts on Social Design,” in <i>Studies in Economic Design</i>, vol. (n.d.), J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W. Zwicker, Eds. Heidelberg: Springer.","apa":"Trockel, W., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (n.d.). Thoughts on Social Design. In J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, &#38; W. Zwicker (Eds.), <i>Studies in Economic Design</i> (Vol. (n.d.)). Heidelberg: Springer.","chicago":"Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” In <i>Studies in Economic Design</i>, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier, Herve Moulin, Remzi Sanver, and William Zwicker, Vol. (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer, n.d.","short":"W. Trockel, C.-J. Haake, in: J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, W. Zwicker (Eds.), Studies in Economic Design, Springer, Heidelberg, n.d.","mla":"Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” <i>Studies in Economic Design</i>, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier et al., vol. (n.d.), Springer.","bibtex":"@inbook{Trockel_Haake, place={Heidelberg}, series={Studies in Economic Design}, title={Thoughts on Social Design}, volume={(n.d.)}, booktitle={Studies in Economic Design}, publisher={Springer}, author={Trockel, Walter and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, editor={Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi and Zwicker, WilliamEditors}, collection={Studies in Economic Design} }","ama":"Trockel W, Haake C-J. Thoughts on Social Design. In: Laslier J-F, Moulin H, Sanver R, Zwicker W, eds. <i>Studies in Economic Design</i>. Vol (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer."},"file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:11Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"Studies in Economic Design","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:58:55Z","publication_status":"accepted","author":[{"first_name":"Walter","last_name":"Trockel","full_name":"Trockel, Walter"},{"id":"20801","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["2510-3970"]},"title":"Thoughts on Social Design","year":"2018","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"book_chapter","date_created":"2018-06-06T17:07:28Z","file":[{"creator":"cjhaake","date_created":"2018-08-09T08:36:24Z","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:14:11Z","file_name":"WP - Thoughts on Social Design.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_size":141983,"title":"Thoughts on Social Design","file_id":"3857","content_type":"application/pdf"}],"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results\r\nfrom mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of\r\ntheoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.\r\nHurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing\r\nenforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In\r\nthis note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu\r\n(1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution\r\ndesign is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized\r\ngame or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a\r\ncompetitive equilibrium of an economy."}],"publication":"Studies in Economic Design"},{"abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"  In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n  determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n  upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n  revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n  cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information.  This means\r\n  that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n  mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n  compatibility and/or ex post efficiency.  Assuming two possible types for\r\n  buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n  regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n  are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n  solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer\r\n  quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to\r\n  balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in\r\n  place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by\r\n  means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n  for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n  the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n  tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n"}],"publication":"Group Decision and Negotiation","issue":"6","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"journal_article","date_created":"2018-10-02T07:15:26Z","file":[{"date_created":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","creator":"stela","file_id":"5107","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"file_name":"The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations Under Incomplete Information.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_size":636521,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z"}],"article_type":"original","intvolume":"        27","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:11Z","author":[{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","id":"20801"},{"full_name":"Recker, Sonja","first_name":"Sonja","last_name":"Recker"}],"year":"2018","title":"The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information","doi":"10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"quality_controlled":"1","citation":{"mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i>, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8\">10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8\">10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8</a>}, number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }","ama":"Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i>. 2018;27(6):905-932. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8\">10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8</a>","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i>, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i>, <i>27</i>(6), 905–932. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8</a>","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i> 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8</a>.","short":"C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932."},"file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","has_accepted_license":"1","jel":["C78"],"status":"public","volume":27,"user_id":"477","ddc":["040"],"_id":"4564","publisher":"Springer","page":"905-932"},{"file_date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>}, number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science}, author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018} }","ama":"Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. <i>PLoS ONE</i>. 2018;13(11). doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>","mla":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” <i>PLoS ONE</i>, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library of Science, 2018, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>.","chicago":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” <i>PLoS ONE</i> 13, no. 11 (2018). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>.","short":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018).","ieee":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” <i>PLoS ONE</i>, vol. 13, no. 11, 2018.","apa":"Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., &#38; Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. <i>PLoS ONE</i>, <i>13</i>(11). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172\">https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172</a>"},"project":[{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"},{"_id":"8","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4"},{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","_id":"5330","funded_apc":"1","publisher":"Public Library of Science","ddc":["330"],"user_id":"477","volume":13,"issue":"11","publication":"PLoS ONE","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality is chosen until the price increases again."}],"file":[{"file_id":"5542","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","file_name":"Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_size":1107189,"date_created":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","creator":"cjhaake"}],"date_created":"2018-11-03T11:51:48Z","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"year":"2018","title":"Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate","author":[{"full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud","last_name":"Mir Djawadi","first_name":"Behnud","orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912","id":"26032"},{"full_name":"Fahr, Rene","last_name":"Fahr","first_name":"Rene","id":"111"},{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"},{"full_name":"Recker, Sonja","last_name":"Recker","first_name":"Sonja"}],"publication_identifier":{"eissn":["1932-6203"]},"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:50Z","publication_status":"published","intvolume":"        13","article_type":"review","article_number":"e0207172","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1371/journal.pone.0207172"},{"citation":{"ama":"Gries T, Haake C-J. Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War. <i>Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy</i>. 2016;22(4):377-384. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042\">10.1515/peps-2016-0042</a>","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Haake_2016, title={Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War}, volume={22}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042\">10.1515/peps-2016-0042</a>}, number={4}, journal={Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, publisher={Walter de Gruyter GmbH}, author={Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2016}, pages={377–384} }","mla":"Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War.” <i>Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy</i>, vol. 22, no. 4, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2016, pp. 377–84, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042\">10.1515/peps-2016-0042</a>.","short":"T. Gries, C.-J. Haake, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 22 (2016) 377–384.","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War.” <i>Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy</i> 22, no. 4 (2016): 377–84. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042\">https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042</a>.","apa":"Gries, T., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2016). Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War. <i>Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy</i>, <i>22</i>(4), 377–384. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042\">https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042</a>","ieee":"T. Gries and C.-J. Haake, “Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War,” <i>Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy</i>, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 377–384, 2016."},"file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:19:05Z","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","urn":"25277","_id":"2527","publisher":"Walter de Gruyter GmbH","page":"377 - 384","volume":22,"ddc":["040"],"user_id":"65453","publication":"Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy","issue":"4","date_created":"2018-04-26T10:59:20Z","file":[{"creator":"cjhaake","date_created":"2018-08-09T08:56:42Z","file_size":250706,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War.pdf","date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:19:05Z","relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"3864","title":"Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"journal_article","publication_identifier":{"issn":["1554-8597","1079-2457"]},"author":[{"first_name":"Thomas","last_name":"Gries","full_name":"Gries, Thomas"},{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"}],"title":"Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War","year":"2016","intvolume":"        22","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:58Z","publication_status":"published","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1515/peps-2016-0042"},{"type":"working_paper","keyword":["terrorism","civil war","conflict duration","game theory","stochastic process","ideology"],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"file":[{"date_created":"2019-04-08T06:49:16Z","creator":"cjhaake","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"8838","date_updated":"2019-04-08T06:49:16Z","relation":"main_file","file_size":516125,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"WP - An Economic Theory of ’Destabilization War'.pdf"}],"date_created":"2019-04-08T06:45:02Z","abstract":[{"text":"While Islamic State is the most present example, it is a fact that in many places around the globe, throughout history initially small groups have tried to challenge and destabilize or even overthrow governments by means of terrorist and guerrilla strategies. Therefore, we answer two questions. Why does a small group of insurgents believe it can overthrow the government by turning violent, even if the government is clearly superior? And how does a conflict develop into terrorism, a guerilla war, or a major conventional civil war, or is resolved peacefully? We develop a formal model for rebels and government and derive optimal choices. Further, we focus on three elements as important ingredients of a \"destabilization war\". All three of these - large random events, time preference (which we relate to ideology), and choice of duration of fight - are rarely considered in formal conflict theory. We can answer the above two questions using game theory analysis. First, insurgents rise up because they hope to destabilize through permanent challenging attacks. In this context, large randomness is an important ally of rebels. While each individual attack may have a low impact, at some point a large random event could lead to success. Hence, the duration of activities is a constitutive element of this kind of armed conflict. Patience (low time preference), which may reflect rebels' degree of ideological motivation, is crucial. Second, the mode of warfare or the conflict resolutions that develop are generally path-dependent and conditioned on the full set of options (including compromise). Various conditions (level of funding, ease of recruitment, access to weapons) influence different modes of warfare or a peaceful compromise in a complex way.","lang":"eng"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:04:03Z","intvolume":"        95","title":"An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War'","year":"2016","author":[{"id":"186","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas","last_name":"Gries"},{"id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"}],"file_date_updated":"2019-04-08T06:49:16Z","citation":{"short":"T. Gries, C.-J. Haake, An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War,” 2016.","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War.”</i> Vol. 95. Working Papers CIE, 2016.","ieee":"T. Gries and C.-J. Haake, <i>An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War,”</i> vol. 95. 2016.","apa":"Gries, T., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2016). <i>An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War”</i> (Vol. 95).","bibtex":"@book{Gries_Haake_2016, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War”}, volume={95}, author={Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2016}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","ama":"Gries T, Haake C-J. <i>An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War.”</i> Vol 95.; 2016.","mla":"Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War.”</i> Vol. 95, 2016."},"user_id":"20801","ddc":["040"],"volume":95,"_id":"8836","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","jel":["H56","O10","D84","C72","D74"]},{"citation":{"ieee":"S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, and P. Möhlmeier, <i>Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks</i>, vol. 91. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","mla":"Brangewitz, Sonja, et al. <i>Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks</i>. Vol. 91, Universität Paderborn, 2015.","apa":"Brangewitz, S., Haake, C.-J., &#38; Möhlmeier, P. (2015). <i>Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks</i> (Vol. 91). Universität Paderborn.","bibtex":"@book{Brangewitz_Haake_Möhlmeier_2015, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks}, volume={91}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Möhlmeier, Philipp}, year={2015}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","chicago":"Brangewitz, Sonja, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Philipp Möhlmeier. <i>Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks</i>. Vol. 91. Working Papers CIE. Universität Paderborn, 2015.","short":"S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, P. Möhlmeier, Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks, Universität Paderborn, 2015.","ama":"Brangewitz S, Haake C-J, Möhlmeier P. <i>Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks</i>. Vol 91. Universität Paderborn; 2015."},"file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:13:36Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3","_id":"7"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"_id":"249","publisher":"Universität Paderborn","urn":"2499","volume":91,"user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:40Z","file":[{"file_name":"WP - Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks.pdf","file_size":908865,"access_level":"closed","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:13:36Z","file_id":"3865","content_type":"application/pdf","title":"Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks","creator":"cjhaake","date_created":"2018-08-09T09:10:34Z"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"working_paper","abstract":[{"text":"We analyze the stability of networks when two intermediaries strategically form costly links to customers. We interpret these links as customer relationships that enable trade to sell a product. Equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities on the output as well as on the input market are determined endogenously for a given network of customer relationships. We investigate in how far the substitutability of the intermediaries' products and the costs of link formation influence the intermediaries' equilibrium profits and thus have an impact on the incentives to strategically form relationships to customers. For networks with three customers we characterize locally stable networks, in particular existence is guaranteed for any degree of substitutability. Moreover for the special cases of perfect complements, independent products and perfect substitutes, local stability coincides with the stronger concept of Nash stability. Additionally, for networks with n customers we analyze stability regions for selected networks and determine their limits when n goes to infinity. It turns out that the shape of the stability regions for those networks does not significantly change compared to a setting with a small number of customers. ","lang":"eng"}],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","author":[{"full_name":"Brangewitz, Sonja","first_name":"Sonja","last_name":"Brangewitz"},{"id":"20801","last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"},{"first_name":"Philipp","last_name":"Möhlmeier","full_name":"Möhlmeier, Philipp"}],"year":"2015","title":"Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks","intvolume":"        91","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:40Z"},{"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"6","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"citation":{"bibtex":"@inproceedings{Künsemöller_Brangewitz_Karl_Haake_2014, title={Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35\">10.1109/SCC.2014.35</a>}, booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC)}, author={Künsemöller, Jörn and Brangewitz, Sonja and Karl, Holger and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2014}, pages={203–210} }","ama":"Künsemöller J, Brangewitz S, Karl H, Haake C-J. Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service. In: <i>Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC)</i>. ; 2014:203-210. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35\">10.1109/SCC.2014.35</a>","short":"J. Künsemöller, S. Brangewitz, H. Karl, C.-J. Haake, in: Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC), 2014, pp. 203–210.","chicago":"Künsemöller, Jörn, Sonja Brangewitz, Holger Karl, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service.” In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC)</i>, 203–10, 2014. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35\">https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35</a>.","ieee":"J. Künsemöller, S. Brangewitz, H. Karl, and C.-J. Haake, “Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service,” in <i>Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC)</i>, 2014, pp. 203–210.","apa":"Künsemöller, J., Brangewitz, S., Karl, H., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2014). Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service. In <i>Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC)</i> (pp. 203–210). <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35\">https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35</a>","mla":"Künsemöller, Jörn, et al. “Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service.” <i>Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC)</i>, 2014, pp. 203–10, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35\">10.1109/SCC.2014.35</a>."},"file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T13:34:46Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","ddc":["004"],"user_id":"477","_id":"382","page":"203-210","abstract":[{"text":"This paper explores how cloud provider competition influences instance pricing in an IaaS (Infrastructure-as-a-Service) market. When reserved instance pricing includes an on-demand price component in addition to a reservation fee (two-part tariffs), different providers might offer different price combinations, where the client’s choice depends on its load profile. We investigate a duopoly of providers and analyze stable market prices in two-part tariffs. Further, we study offers that allow a specified amount of included usage (three-part tariffs). Neither two-part nor three-part tariffs produce an equilibrium market outcome other than a service pricing that equals production cost, i.e., complex price structures do not significantly affect the results from ordinary Bertrand competition.","lang":"eng"}],"publication":"Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC)","department":[{"_id":"75"},{"_id":"205"}],"type":"conference","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:42:06Z","file":[{"creator":"ups","date_created":"2018-11-02T13:34:46Z","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-11-02T13:34:46Z","file_name":"06930535.pdf","file_size":228172,"access_level":"closed","file_id":"5250","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:59:37Z","author":[{"first_name":"Jörn","last_name":"Künsemöller","full_name":"Künsemöller, Jörn"},{"first_name":"Sonja","last_name":"Brangewitz","full_name":"Brangewitz, Sonja"},{"full_name":"Karl, Holger","first_name":"Holger","last_name":"Karl","id":"126"},{"last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"}],"title":"Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service","year":"2014","doi":"10.1109/SCC.2014.35","language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"citation":{"mla":"Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>. Vol. 64, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.","bibtex":"@book{Brangewitz_Haake_2013, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={64}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2013}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }","ama":"Brangewitz S, Haake C-J. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>. Vol 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2013.","ieee":"S. Brangewitz and C.-J. Haake, <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>, vol. 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.","apa":"Brangewitz, S., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2013). <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i> (Vol. 64). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.","chicago":"Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. <i>Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information</i>. Vol. 64. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.","short":"S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013."},"file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T09:22:19Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"_id":"5146","publisher":"CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University","volume":64,"user_id":"477","ddc":["040"],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2018-10-31T09:20:15Z","file":[{"file_name":"WP - Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.pdf","file_size":430826,"access_level":"closed","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-10-31T09:22:19Z","file_id":"5148","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"creator":"stela","date_created":"2018-10-31T09:22:19Z"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"keyword":["Transfer Pricing","Negotiation","Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution","Incomplete Information"],"type":"working_paper","abstract":[{"text":"In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore, we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).","lang":"eng"}],"series_title":"Working Papers CIE","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"author":[{"last_name":"Brangewitz","first_name":"Sonja","full_name":"Brangewitz, Sonja"},{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"}],"title":"Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information","year":"2013","intvolume":"        64","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:39Z"},{"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","page":"657-680","publisher":"Springer Nature","_id":"2519","ddc":["040"],"user_id":"65453","volume":22,"file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:59:39Z","citation":{"mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Jan Thomas Martini. “Negotiating Transfer Prices.” <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i>, vol. 22, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2012, pp. 657–80, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6\">10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6</a>.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Martini, J. T. (2012). Negotiating Transfer Prices. <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i>, <i>22</i>(4), 657–680. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6</a>","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and J. T. Martini, “Negotiating Transfer Prices,” <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i>, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 657–680, 2012.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Jan Thomas Martini. “Negotiating Transfer Prices.” <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i> 22, no. 4 (2012): 657–80. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6</a>.","short":"C.-J. Haake, J.T. Martini, Group Decision and Negotiation 22 (2012) 657–680.","ama":"Haake C-J, Martini JT. Negotiating Transfer Prices. <i>Group Decision and Negotiation</i>. 2012;22(4):657-680. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6\">10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6</a>","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Martini_2012, title={Negotiating Transfer Prices}, volume={22}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6\">10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6</a>}, number={4}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Martini, Jan Thomas}, year={2012}, pages={657–680} }"},"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"title":"Negotiating Transfer Prices","year":"2012","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0926-2644","1572-9907"]},"author":[{"id":"20801","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake"},{"full_name":"Martini, Jan Thomas","first_name":"Jan Thomas","last_name":"Martini"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:54Z","publication_status":"published","intvolume":"        22","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6","publication":"Group Decision and Negotiation","issue":"4","file":[{"success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"3870","file_size":407410,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"Negotiating Transfer Prices.pdf","date_updated":"2018-08-09T09:59:39Z","relation":"main_file","date_created":"2018-08-09T09:59:39Z","creator":"cjhaake"}],"date_created":"2018-04-26T10:49:51Z","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}]},{"file_date_updated":"2018-08-09T10:01:16Z","citation":{"apa":"Haake, C.-J., Krieger, T., &#38; Minter, S. (2012). On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU. <i>International Economics and Economic Policy</i>, <i>10</i>(4), 583–612. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3</a>","ieee":"C.-J. Haake, T. Krieger, and S. Minter, “On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU,” <i>International Economics and Economic Policy</i>, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 583–612, 2012.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, Tim Krieger, and Steffen Minter. “On the Institutional Design of Burden Sharing When Financing External Border Enforcement in the EU.” <i>International Economics and Economic Policy</i> 10, no. 4 (2012): 583–612. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3</a>.","short":"C.-J. Haake, T. Krieger, S. Minter, International Economics and Economic Policy 10 (2012) 583–612.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “On the Institutional Design of Burden Sharing When Financing External Border Enforcement in the EU.” <i>International Economics and Economic Policy</i>, vol. 10, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2012, pp. 583–612, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3\">10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3</a>.","ama":"Haake C-J, Krieger T, Minter S. On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU. <i>International Economics and Economic Policy</i>. 2012;10(4):583-612. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3\">10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3</a>","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Krieger_Minter_2012, title={On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU}, volume={10}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3\">10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3</a>}, number={4}, journal={International Economics and Economic Policy}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Krieger, Tim and Minter, Steffen}, year={2012}, pages={583–612} }"},"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"page":"583-612","_id":"2521","publisher":"Springer Nature","user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"volume":10,"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","file":[{"file_name":"On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU.pdf","access_level":"closed","file_size":442955,"relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-08-09T10:01:16Z","file_id":"3871","content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"creator":"cjhaake","date_created":"2018-08-09T10:01:16Z"}],"date_created":"2018-04-26T10:51:03Z","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication":"International Economics and Economic Policy","issue":"4","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3","year":"2012","title":"On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU","author":[{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"},{"first_name":"Tim","last_name":"Krieger","full_name":"Krieger, Tim"},{"full_name":"Minter, Steffen","last_name":"Minter","first_name":"Steffen"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["1612-4804","1612-4812"]},"publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:55Z","intvolume":"        10"},{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x","year":"2011","title":"Proportionality and the power of unequal parties","publication_identifier":{"issn":["1742-7355"]},"author":[{"last_name":"Dimitrov","first_name":"Dinko","full_name":"Dimitrov, Dinko"},{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:51Z","publication_status":"published","intvolume":"         7","file":[{"date_created":"2018-11-07T10:41:24Z","creator":"stela","file_id":"5408","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","date_updated":"2018-11-07T10:41:24Z","file_name":"Proportionality and the power of unequal parties.pdf","file_size":152349,"access_level":"closed"}],"date_created":"2018-04-26T10:43:43Z","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"issue":"2","publication":"International Journal of Economic Theory","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"In this paper we introduce the concept of an overall power function that is meant\r\nto combine two sources of a party’s power in a parliament. The first source is based\r\non the possibilities for the party to be part of a majority coalition and it is typically\r\nmodeled using a cooperative simple game. The second source takes into account\r\nparties’ asymmetries outside the cooperative game and it is displayed by a vector\r\nof exogenously given weights. We adopt a normative point of view and provide an\r\naxiomatic characterization of a specific overall power function, in which the weights\r\nenter in a proportional fashion."}],"page":"189-200","publisher":"Wiley-Blackwell","_id":"2512","ddc":["040"],"user_id":"65453","volume":7,"status":"public","jel":["C71","D72"],"has_accepted_license":"1","file_date_updated":"2018-11-07T10:41:24Z","citation":{"ieee":"D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “Proportionality and the power of unequal parties,” <i>International Journal of Economic Theory</i>, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 189–200, 2011.","apa":"Dimitrov, D., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2011). Proportionality and the power of unequal parties. <i>International Journal of Economic Theory</i>, <i>7</i>(2), 189–200. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x\">https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x</a>","chicago":"Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Proportionality and the Power of Unequal Parties.” <i>International Journal of Economic Theory</i> 7, no. 2 (2011): 189–200. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x\">https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x</a>.","short":"D. Dimitrov, C.-J. Haake, International Journal of Economic Theory 7 (2011) 189–200.","mla":"Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Proportionality and the Power of Unequal Parties.” <i>International Journal of Economic Theory</i>, vol. 7, no. 2, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, pp. 189–200, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x\">10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Dimitrov_Haake_2011, title={Proportionality and the power of unequal parties}, volume={7}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x\">10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x</a>}, number={2}, journal={International Journal of Economic Theory}, publisher={Wiley-Blackwell}, author={Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2011}, pages={189–200} }","ama":"Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Proportionality and the power of unequal parties. <i>International Journal of Economic Theory</i>. 2011;7(2):189-200. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x\">10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x</a>"},"project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}]},{"file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:18:39Z","citation":{"ama":"Haake C-J, Klaus B. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. <i>Theory and Decision</i>. 2010;69(4):537-554. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2\">10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2</a>","short":"C.-J. Haake, B. Klaus, Theory and Decision 69 (2010) 537–554.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina Klaus. “Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples.” <i>Theory and Decision</i> 69, no. 4 (2010): 537–54. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Klaus_2010, title={Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples}, volume={69}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2\">10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2</a>}, number={4}, journal={Theory and Decision}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Klaus, Bettina}, year={2010}, pages={537–554} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina Klaus. “Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples.” <i>Theory and Decision</i>, vol. 69, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2010, pp. 537–54, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2\">10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2</a>.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Klaus, B. (2010). Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. <i>Theory and Decision</i>, <i>69</i>(4), 537–554. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2</a>","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus, “Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples,” <i>Theory and Decision</i>, vol. 69, no. 4, pp. 537–554, 2010, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2\">10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2</a>."},"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","page":"537-554","publisher":"Springer Nature","_id":"2510","ddc":["040"],"user_id":"20801","volume":69,"publication":"Theory and Decision","issue":"4","file":[{"date_created":"2018-10-31T08:18:39Z","creator":"stela","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"5121","file_size":243144,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples.pdf","date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:18:39Z","relation":"main_file"}],"date_created":"2018-04-26T10:42:08Z","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"year":"2010","title":"Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples","author":[{"id":"20801","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"},{"full_name":"Klaus, Bettina","last_name":"Klaus","first_name":"Bettina"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0040-5833","1573-7187"]},"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:51Z","publication_status":"published","intvolume":"        69","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2"},{"date_created":"2018-04-26T10:38:26Z","file":[{"success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"5120","file_size":260275,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts.pdf","date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:17:28Z","relation":"main_file","date_created":"2018-10-31T08:17:28Z","creator":"stela"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"journal_article","issue":"3","publication":"Economic Theory","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0938-2259","1432-0479"]},"author":[{"id":"20801","last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen"},{"last_name":"Klaus","first_name":"Bettina","full_name":"Klaus, Bettina"}],"year":"2009","title":"Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts","intvolume":"        41","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:50Z","citation":{"mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina Klaus. “Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts.” <i>Economic Theory</i>, vol. 41, no. 3, Springer Nature, 2009, pp. 393–410, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8\">10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8</a>.","ama":"Haake C-J, Klaus B. Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts. <i>Economic Theory</i>. 2009;41(3):393-410. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8\">10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8</a>","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Klaus_2009, title={Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts}, volume={41}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8\">10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8</a>}, number={3}, journal={Economic Theory}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Klaus, Bettina}, year={2009}, pages={393–410} }","apa":"Haake, C.-J., &#38; Klaus, B. (2009). Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts. <i>Economic Theory</i>, <i>41</i>(3), 393–410. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8</a>","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus, “Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts,” <i>Economic Theory</i>, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 393–410, 2009, doi: <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8\">10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8</a>.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina Klaus. “Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts.” <i>Economic Theory</i> 41, no. 3 (2009): 393–410. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8</a>.","short":"C.-J. Haake, B. Klaus, Economic Theory 41 (2009) 393–410."},"file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:17:28Z","publisher":"Springer Nature","_id":"2508","page":"393-410","volume":41,"user_id":"20801","ddc":["040"],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1"},{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1142/s0219198909002121","author":[{"last_name":"Haake","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0219-1989","1793-6675"]},"title":"DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES","year":"2009","intvolume":"        11","publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:00Z","date_created":"2018-04-26T11:08:41Z","file":[{"content_type":"application/pdf","success":1,"file_id":"5409","date_updated":"2018-11-07T10:42:15Z","relation":"main_file","access_level":"closed","file_size":300474,"file_name":"Dividing by demanding Object division through market procedures.pdf","date_created":"2018-11-07T10:42:15Z","creator":"stela"}],"department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"type":"journal_article","issue":"01","publication":"International Game Theory Review","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among\r\nthemselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the\r\nspecifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining solutions such as the discrete\r\nRaiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The\r\nlatter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is\r\nreadily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential."}],"publisher":"World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt","_id":"2531","page":"15-32","volume":11,"user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"jel":["C73","C62","D51","D63"],"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","citation":{"ieee":"C.-J. Haake, “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES,” <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, vol. 11, no. 01, pp. 15–32, 2009.","apa":"Haake, C.-J. (2009). DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES. <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, <i>11</i>(01), 15–32. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen. “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES.” <i>International Game Theory Review</i> 11, no. 01 (2009): 15–32. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>.","short":"C.-J. Haake, International Game Theory Review 11 (2009) 15–32.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen. “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES.” <i>International Game Theory Review</i>, vol. 11, no. 01, World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt, 2009, pp. 15–32, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Haake_2009, title={DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES}, volume={11}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>}, number={01}, journal={International Game Theory Review}, publisher={World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2009}, pages={15–32} }","ama":"Haake C-J. DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES. <i>International Game Theory Review</i>. 2009;11(01):15-32. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121\">10.1142/s0219198909002121</a>"},"file_date_updated":"2018-11-07T10:42:15Z"},{"file":[{"access_level":"closed","file_size":183269,"file_name":"Stable governments and the semistrict core.pdf","date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:35:54Z","relation":"main_file","success":1,"content_type":"application/pdf","file_id":"5132","creator":"stela","date_created":"2018-10-31T08:35:54Z"}],"date_created":"2018-04-26T10:26:50Z","type":"journal_article","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication":"Games and Economic Behavior","issue":"2","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003","year":"2008","title":"Stable governments and the semistrict core","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0899-8256"]},"author":[{"full_name":"Dimitrov, Dinko","first_name":"Dinko","last_name":"Dimitrov"},{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","id":"20801"}],"publication_status":"published","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:56:43Z","intvolume":"        62","file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:35:54Z","citation":{"apa":"Dimitrov, D., &#38; Haake, C.-J. (2008). Stable governments and the semistrict core. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, <i>62</i>(2), 460–475. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003</a>","ieee":"D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “Stable governments and the semistrict core,” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 460–475, 2008.","short":"D. Dimitrov, C.-J. Haake, Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2008) 460–475.","chicago":"Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Stable Governments and the Semistrict Core.” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> 62, no. 2 (2008): 460–75. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003</a>.","mla":"Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Stable Governments and the Semistrict Core.” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, vol. 62, no. 2, Elsevier BV, 2008, pp. 460–75, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003\">10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003</a>.","ama":"Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Stable governments and the semistrict core. <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>. 2008;62(2):460-475. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003\">10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003</a>","bibtex":"@article{Dimitrov_Haake_2008, title={Stable governments and the semistrict core}, volume={62}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003\">10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003</a>}, number={2}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2008}, pages={460–475} }"},"page":"460-475","publisher":"Elsevier BV","_id":"2502","user_id":"65453","ddc":["040"],"volume":62,"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1"},{"page":"479-497","publisher":"Springer Nature","_id":"2503","ddc":["040"],"user_id":"65453","volume":56,"status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:37:33Z","citation":{"ama":"Haake C-J, Kashiwada A, Su FE. The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees. <i>Journal of Mathematical Biology</i>. 2008;56(4):479-497. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2\">10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2</a>","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Kashiwada_Su_2008, title={The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees}, volume={56}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2\">10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2</a>}, number={4}, journal={Journal of Mathematical Biology}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Kashiwada, Akemi and Su, Francis Edward}, year={2008}, pages={479–497} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “The Shapley Value of Phylogenetic Trees.” <i>Journal of Mathematical Biology</i>, vol. 56, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2008, pp. 479–97, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2\">10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2</a>.","short":"C.-J. Haake, A. Kashiwada, F.E. Su, Journal of Mathematical Biology 56 (2008) 479–497.","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, Akemi Kashiwada, and Francis Edward Su. “The Shapley Value of Phylogenetic Trees.” <i>Journal of Mathematical Biology</i> 56, no. 4 (2008): 479–97. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2</a>.","apa":"Haake, C.-J., Kashiwada, A., &#38; Su, F. E. (2008). The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees. <i>Journal of Mathematical Biology</i>, <i>56</i>(4), 479–497. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2</a>","ieee":"C.-J. Haake, A. Kashiwada, and F. E. 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Two support results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i>, <i>57</i>(2), 177–187. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004</a>","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen. “Two Support Results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky Solution in Small Object Division Markets.” <i>Mathematical Social Sciences</i> 57, no. 2 (2008): 177–87. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004\">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004</a>.","short":"C.-J. Haake, Mathematical Social Sciences 57 (2008) 177–187."},"file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T08:29:51Z"}]