---
_id: '2831'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of
a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed
product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance
of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose
is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess
the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations
across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive
valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted)
average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation
method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In
addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate
solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly
optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified
Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation
profiles are incomplete.'
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Haake C-J, Skopalik A, Stroh-Maraun N. Disaggregating User Evaluations
Using the Shapley Value. In: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics
of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018). ; 2018:5:1-5:6. doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659'
apa: Feldotto, M., Haake, C.-J., Skopalik, A., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value. In Proceedings of the 13th Workshop
on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) (pp. 5:1-5:6).
Irvine, California, USA. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Haake_Skopalik_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}, DOI={10.1145/3230654.3230659},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems
and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={5:1-5:6}
}'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Claus-Jochen Haake, Alexander Skopalik, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun.
“Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.” In Proceedings of
the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018),
5:1-5:6, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659.
ieee: M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value,” in Proceedings of the 13th Workshop
on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), Irvine,
California, USA, 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley
Value.” Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems
and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6, doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659.
short: 'M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings
of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon
2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.'
conference:
end_date: 2018-06-18
location: Irvine, California, USA
name: The 13th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon
2018)
start_date: 2018-06-18
date_created: 2018-05-22T10:28:51Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:01Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1145/3230654.3230659
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: nmaraun
date_created: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
file_id: '3910'
file_name: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.pdf
file_size: 1450171
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 5:1-5:6
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and
Computation (NetEcon 2018)
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-1-4503-5916-0
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2566'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC)
generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according
to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides
with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism
that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic
behavior.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Stroh-Maraun N. Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal
Preferences. Economics Letters. 2018;170:39-41. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Outcome Equivalence in School
Choice with Reciprocal Preferences. Economics Letters, 170, 39–41.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Outcome Equivalence in School
Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}, volume={170}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033},
journal={Economics Letters}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={39–41} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School
Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” Economics Letters 170 (2018): 39–41.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with
Reciprocal Preferences,” Economics Letters, vol. 170, pp. 39–41, 2018.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Outcome Equivalence in School
Choice with Reciprocal Preferences.” Economics Letters, vol. 170, Elsevier,
2018, pp. 39–41, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033.
short: C.-J. Haake, N. Stroh-Maraun, Economics Letters 170 (2018) 39–41.
date_created: 2018-05-03T07:53:56Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:08:17Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:15:07Z
file_id: '3854'
file_name: 1-s2.0-S016517651830212X-main.pdf
file_size: 261888
relation: main_file
title: Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:15:07Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 170'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 39 - 41
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Economics Letters
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences
type: journal_article
urn: '25669'
user_id: '477'
volume: 170
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2933'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the
maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution
and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which
includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider
a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining
solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique
up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters.
We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash
and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining
theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great
variety of new bargaining solutions.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Cheng-Zhong
full_name: Qin, Cheng-Zhong
last_name: Qin
citation:
ama: 'Haake C-J, Qin C-Z. On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem.
Vol 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
2018.'
apa: 'Haake, C.-J., & Qin, C.-Z. (2018). On unification of solutions to the
bargaining problem (Vol. 113). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University.'
bibtex: '@book{Haake_Qin_2018, place={Paderborn University}, series={Working Papers
CIE}, title={On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}, volume={113},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}, year={2018}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions
to the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113. Working Papers CIE. Paderborn University:
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2018.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and C.-Z. Qin, On unification of solutions to the bargaining
problem, vol. 113. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2018.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Cheng-Zhong Qin. On Unification of Solutions to
the Bargaining Problem. Vol. 113, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2018.
short: C.-J. Haake, C.-Z. Qin, On Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem,
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, Paderborn University, 2018.
date_created: 2018-05-28T07:00:28Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:48Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:15:31Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:52Z
file_id: '3855'
file_name: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem.pdf
file_size: 469001
relation: main_file
title: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:52Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 113'
keyword:
- Bargaining problem
- CES Function
- Normalized CES Function
- Nash solution
- Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
- Egalitarian Solution.
language:
- iso: eng
place: Paderborn University
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem
type: working_paper
urn: '29332'
user_id: '65453'
volume: 113
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '3098'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results\r\nfrom
mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of\r\ntheoretically
established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented.\r\nHurwicz
(2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing\r\nenforcement
of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In\r\nthis
note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu\r\n(1952)
is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution\r\ndesign
is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized\r\ngame
or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a\r\ncompetitive
equilibrium of an economy."
author:
- first_name: Walter
full_name: Trockel, Walter
last_name: Trockel
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: 'Trockel W, Haake C-J. Thoughts on Social Design. In: Laslier J-F, Moulin H,
Sanver R, Zwicker W, eds. Studies in Economic Design. Vol (n.d.). Studies
in Economic Design. Heidelberg: Springer.'
apa: 'Trockel, W., & Haake, C.-J. (n.d.). Thoughts on Social Design. In J.-F.
Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, & W. Zwicker (Eds.), Studies in Economic
Design (Vol. (n.d.)). Heidelberg: Springer.'
bibtex: '@inbook{Trockel_Haake, place={Heidelberg}, series={Studies in Economic
Design}, title={Thoughts on Social Design}, volume={(n.d.)}, booktitle={Studies
in Economic Design}, publisher={Springer}, author={Trockel, Walter and Haake,
Claus-Jochen}, editor={Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi
and Zwicker, WilliamEditors}, collection={Studies in Economic Design} }'
chicago: 'Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.”
In Studies in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier, Herve Moulin,
Remzi Sanver, and William Zwicker, Vol. (n.d.). Studies in Economic Design. Heidelberg:
Springer, n.d.'
ieee: 'W. Trockel and C.-J. Haake, “Thoughts on Social Design,” in Studies in
Economic Design, vol. (n.d.), J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, and W.
Zwicker, Eds. Heidelberg: Springer.'
mla: Trockel, Walter, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Thoughts on Social Design.” Studies
in Economic Design, edited by Jean-Francois Laslier et al., vol. (n.d.), Springer.
short: 'W. Trockel, C.-J. Haake, in: J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, W. Zwicker
(Eds.), Studies in Economic Design, Springer, Heidelberg, n.d.'
date_created: 2018-06-06T17:07:28Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:55Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
editor:
- first_name: Jean-Francois
full_name: Laslier, Jean-Francois
last_name: Laslier
- first_name: Herve
full_name: Moulin, Herve
last_name: Moulin
- first_name: Remzi
full_name: Sanver, Remzi
last_name: Sanver
- first_name: William
full_name: Zwicker, William
last_name: Zwicker
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:36:24Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:11Z
file_id: '3857'
file_name: WP - Thoughts on Social Design.pdf
file_size: 141983
relation: main_file
title: Thoughts on Social Design
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:14:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
place: Heidelberg
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Studies in Economic Design
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 2510-3970
publication_status: accepted
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
series_title: Studies in Economic Design
status: public
title: Thoughts on Social Design
type: book_chapter
urn: '30987'
user_id: '477'
volume: (n.d.)
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '4564'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: " In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n
\ determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n
\ upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n
\ revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative
bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two
divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms
that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or
ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each,
we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether
or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us
to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer
payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining
solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints
are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore,
by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n
\ for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n
\ the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff
between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n"
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation.
2018;27(6):905-932. doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision
and Negotiation, 27(6), 905–932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8},
number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining
Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group
Decision and Negotiation 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer
Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” Group Decision and Negotiation,
vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision
and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.
short: C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932.
date_created: 2018-10-02T07:15:26Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:11Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
file_id: '5107'
file_name: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations
Under Incomplete Information.pdf
file_size: 636521
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T07:43:31Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 27'
issue: '6'
jel:
- C78
language:
- iso: eng
page: 905-932
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Group Decision and Negotiation
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under
Incomplete Information
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 27
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '5330'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact
once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is
particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality
of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness
of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may
make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service
provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate
the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer
is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits
an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation
profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that
the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the
reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive
and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider
optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding
process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign
we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider
deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on
the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices
we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a
good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is
delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality
is chosen until the price increases again."
article_number: e0207172
article_type: review
author:
- first_name: Behnud
full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud
id: '26032'
last_name: Mir Djawadi
orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912
- first_name: Rene
full_name: Fahr, Rene
id: '111'
last_name: Fahr
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
citation:
ama: Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation
when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(11). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
apa: Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE,
13(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
bibtex: '@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={10.1371/journal.pone.0207172},
number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science},
author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker,
Sonja}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining
vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE
13, no. 11 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
ieee: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking
Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” PLoS ONE, vol. 13,
no. 11, 2018.
mla: Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer
Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library
of Science, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.
short: B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018).
date_created: 2018-11-03T11:51:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:50Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0207172
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
file_id: '5542'
file_name: Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf
file_size: 1107189
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-13T20:51:34Z
funded_apc: '1'
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 13'
issue: '11'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: PLoS ONE
publication_identifier:
eissn:
- 1932-6203
publication_status: published
publisher: Public Library of Science
status: public
title: Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 13
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '2527'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: Gries T, Haake C-J. Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War. Peace
Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy. 2016;22(4):377-384. doi:10.1515/peps-2016-0042
apa: Gries, T., & Haake, C.-J. (2016). Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization
War. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 22(4), 377–384.
https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042
bibtex: '@article{Gries_Haake_2016, title={Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization
War}, volume={22}, DOI={10.1515/peps-2016-0042},
number={4}, journal={Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}, publisher={Walter
de Gruyter GmbH}, author={Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2016},
pages={377–384} }'
chicago: 'Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Towards an Economic Theory of
Destabilization War.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
22, no. 4 (2016): 377–84. https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0042.'
ieee: T. Gries and C.-J. Haake, “Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War,”
Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 377–384,
2016.
mla: Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization
War.” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, vol. 22, no. 4,
Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2016, pp. 377–84, doi:10.1515/peps-2016-0042.
short: T. Gries, C.-J. Haake, Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy 22
(2016) 377–384.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:59:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:58Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1515/peps-2016-0042
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T08:56:42Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:19:05Z
file_id: '3864'
file_name: Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War.pdf
file_size: 250706
relation: main_file
title: Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:19:05Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 22'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 377 - 384
publication: Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1554-8597
- 1079-2457
publication_status: published
publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
status: public
title: Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War
type: journal_article
urn: '25277'
user_id: '65453'
volume: 22
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '8836'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: While Islamic State is the most present example, it is a fact that in many
places around the globe, throughout history initially small groups have tried
to challenge and destabilize or even overthrow governments by means of terrorist
and guerrilla strategies. Therefore, we answer two questions. Why does a small
group of insurgents believe it can overthrow the government by turning violent,
even if the government is clearly superior? And how does a conflict develop into
terrorism, a guerilla war, or a major conventional civil war, or is resolved peacefully?
We develop a formal model for rebels and government and derive optimal choices.
Further, we focus on three elements as important ingredients of a "destabilization
war". All three of these - large random events, time preference (which we relate
to ideology), and choice of duration of fight - are rarely considered in formal
conflict theory. We can answer the above two questions using game theory analysis.
First, insurgents rise up because they hope to destabilize through permanent challenging
attacks. In this context, large randomness is an important ally of rebels. While
each individual attack may have a low impact, at some point a large random event
could lead to success. Hence, the duration of activities is a constitutive element
of this kind of armed conflict. Patience (low time preference), which may reflect
rebels' degree of ideological motivation, is crucial. Second, the mode of warfare
or the conflict resolutions that develop are generally path-dependent and conditioned
on the full set of options (including compromise). Various conditions (level of
funding, ease of recruitment, access to weapons) influence different modes of
warfare or a peaceful compromise in a complex way.
author:
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: Gries, Thomas
id: '186'
last_name: Gries
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: Gries T, Haake C-J. An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War.” Vol
95.; 2016.
apa: Gries, T., & Haake, C.-J. (2016). An Economic Theory of “Destabilization
War” (Vol. 95).
bibtex: '@book{Gries_Haake_2016, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={An Economic
Theory of “Destabilization War”}, volume={95}, author={Gries, Thomas and Haake,
Claus-Jochen}, year={2016}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. An Economic Theory of “Destabilization
War.” Vol. 95. Working Papers CIE, 2016.
ieee: T. Gries and C.-J. Haake, An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War,”
vol. 95. 2016.
mla: Gries, Thomas, and Claus-Jochen Haake. An Economic Theory of “Destabilization
War.” Vol. 95, 2016.
short: T. Gries, C.-J. Haake, An Economic Theory of “Destabilization War,” 2016.
date_created: 2019-04-08T06:45:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:04:03Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2019-04-08T06:49:16Z
date_updated: 2019-04-08T06:49:16Z
file_id: '8838'
file_name: WP - An Economic Theory of ’Destabilization War'.pdf
file_size: 516125
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-04-08T06:49:16Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 95'
jel:
- H56
- O10
- D84
- C72
- D74
keyword:
- terrorism
- civil war
- conflict duration
- game theory
- stochastic process
- ideology
language:
- iso: eng
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War'
type: working_paper
user_id: '20801'
volume: 95
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '249'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We analyze the stability of networks when two intermediaries strategically
form costly links to customers. We interpret these links as customer relationships
that enable trade to sell a product. Equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities
on the output as well as on the input market are determined endogenously for a
given network of customer relationships. We investigate in how far the substitutability
of the intermediaries'' products and the costs of link formation influence the
intermediaries'' equilibrium profits and thus have an impact on the incentives
to strategically form relationships to customers. For networks with three customers
we characterize locally stable networks, in particular existence is guaranteed
for any degree of substitutability. Moreover for the special cases of perfect
complements, independent products and perfect substitutes, local stability coincides
with the stronger concept of Nash stability. Additionally, for networks with n
customers we analyze stability regions for selected networks and determine their
limits when n goes to infinity. It turns out that the shape of the stability regions
for those networks does not significantly change compared to a setting with a
small number of customers. '
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Philipp
full_name: Möhlmeier, Philipp
last_name: Möhlmeier
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S, Haake C-J, Möhlmeier P. Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship
Networks. Vol 91. Universität Paderborn; 2015.
apa: Brangewitz, S., Haake, C.-J., & Möhlmeier, P. (2015). Strategic Formation
of Customer Relationship Networks (Vol. 91). Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_Haake_Möhlmeier_2015, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Strategic
Formation of Customer Relationship Networks}, volume={91}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Möhlmeier, Philipp},
year={2015}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Philipp Möhlmeier. Strategic
Formation of Customer Relationship Networks. Vol. 91. Working Papers CIE.
Universität Paderborn, 2015.
ieee: S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, and P. Möhlmeier, Strategic Formation of Customer
Relationship Networks, vol. 91. Universität Paderborn, 2015.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, et al. Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks.
Vol. 91, Universität Paderborn, 2015.
short: S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, P. Möhlmeier, Strategic Formation of Customer
Relationship Networks, Universität Paderborn, 2015.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:40Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:40Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T09:10:34Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:13:36Z
file_id: '3865'
file_name: WP - Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks.pdf
file_size: 908865
relation: main_file
title: Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:13:36Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 91'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Strategic Formation of Customer Relationship Networks
type: working_paper
urn: '2499'
user_id: '65453'
volume: 91
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '382'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: This paper explores how cloud provider competition influences instance pricing
in an IaaS (Infrastructure-as-a-Service) market. When reserved instance pricing
includes an on-demand price component in addition to a reservation fee (two-part
tariffs), different providers might offer different price combinations, where
the client’s choice depends on its load profile. We investigate a duopoly of providers
and analyze stable market prices in two-part tariffs. Further, we study offers
that allow a specified amount of included usage (three-part tariffs). Neither two-part
nor three-part tariffs produce an equilibrium market outcome other than a service
pricing that equals production cost, i.e., complex price structures do not significantly
affect the results from ordinary Bertrand competition.
author:
- first_name: Jörn
full_name: Künsemöller, Jörn
last_name: Künsemöller
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Holger
full_name: Karl, Holger
id: '126'
last_name: Karl
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: 'Künsemöller J, Brangewitz S, Karl H, Haake C-J. Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service.
In: Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing
(SCC). ; 2014:203-210. doi:10.1109/SCC.2014.35'
apa: Künsemöller, J., Brangewitz, S., Karl, H., & Haake, C.-J. (2014). Provider
Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service. In Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE
International Conference on Services Computing (SCC) (pp. 203–210). https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Künsemöller_Brangewitz_Karl_Haake_2014, title={Provider
Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service}, DOI={10.1109/SCC.2014.35},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing
(SCC)}, author={Künsemöller, Jörn and Brangewitz, Sonja and Karl, Holger and Haake,
Claus-Jochen}, year={2014}, pages={203–210} }'
chicago: Künsemöller, Jörn, Sonja Brangewitz, Holger Karl, and Claus-Jochen Haake.
“Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service.” In Proceedings of the
2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC), 203–10, 2014.
https://doi.org/10.1109/SCC.2014.35.
ieee: J. Künsemöller, S. Brangewitz, H. Karl, and C.-J. Haake, “Provider Competition
in Infrastructure-as-a-Service,” in Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International
Conference on Services Computing (SCC), 2014, pp. 203–210.
mla: Künsemöller, Jörn, et al. “Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service.”
Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing
(SCC), 2014, pp. 203–10, doi:10.1109/SCC.2014.35.
short: 'J. Künsemöller, S. Brangewitz, H. Karl, C.-J. Haake, in: Proceedings of
the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing (SCC), 2014, pp.
203–210.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:06Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:37Z
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: '75'
- _id: '205'
doi: 10.1109/SCC.2014.35
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T13:34:46Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T13:34:46Z
file_id: '5250'
file_name: 06930535.pdf
file_size: 228172
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T13:34:46Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 203-210
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '6'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A2
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference on Services Computing
(SCC)
status: public
title: Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '5146'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an
intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining
problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's)
costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private
information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish
that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency
constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining
solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore,
we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem
and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated
transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the
models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S, Haake C-J. Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete
Information. Vol 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2013.
apa: Brangewitz, S., & Haake, C.-J. (2013). Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
under Incomplete Information (Vol. 64). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University.
bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_Haake_2013, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Cooperative
Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={64}, publisher={CIE
Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake,
Claus-Jochen}, year={2013}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. Cooperative Transfer Price
Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Vol. 64. Working Papers CIE. CIE
Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.
ieee: S. Brangewitz and C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
under Incomplete Information, vol. 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2013.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
under Incomplete Information. Vol. 64, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2013.
short: S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under
Incomplete Information, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.
date_created: 2018-10-31T09:20:15Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:39Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
file_id: '5148'
file_name: WP - Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.pdf
file_size: 430826
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 64'
keyword:
- Transfer Pricing
- Negotiation
- Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
- Incomplete Information
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information
type: working_paper
user_id: '477'
volume: 64
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '2519'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Jan Thomas
full_name: Martini, Jan Thomas
last_name: Martini
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Martini JT. Negotiating Transfer Prices. Group Decision and Negotiation.
2012;22(4):657-680. doi:10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Martini, J. T. (2012). Negotiating Transfer Prices. Group
Decision and Negotiation, 22(4), 657–680. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Martini_2012, title={Negotiating Transfer Prices}, volume={22},
DOI={10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6},
number={4}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer Nature},
author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Martini, Jan Thomas}, year={2012}, pages={657–680}
}'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Jan Thomas Martini. “Negotiating Transfer Prices.”
Group Decision and Negotiation 22, no. 4 (2012): 657–80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake and J. T. Martini, “Negotiating Transfer Prices,” Group Decision
and Negotiation, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 657–680, 2012.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Jan Thomas Martini. “Negotiating Transfer Prices.”
Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 22, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2012,
pp. 657–80, doi:10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6.
short: C.-J. Haake, J.T. Martini, Group Decision and Negotiation 22 (2012) 657–680.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:49:51Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:54Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T09:59:39Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:59:39Z
file_id: '3870'
file_name: Negotiating Transfer Prices.pdf
file_size: 407410
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:59:39Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 22'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 657-680
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Group Decision and Negotiation
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0926-2644
- 1572-9907
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Negotiating Transfer Prices
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 22
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '2521'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Tim
full_name: Krieger, Tim
last_name: Krieger
- first_name: Steffen
full_name: Minter, Steffen
last_name: Minter
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Krieger T, Minter S. On the institutional design of burden sharing
when financing external border enforcement in the EU. International Economics
and Economic Policy. 2012;10(4):583-612. doi:10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3
apa: Haake, C.-J., Krieger, T., & Minter, S. (2012). On the institutional design
of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU. International
Economics and Economic Policy, 10(4), 583–612. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Krieger_Minter_2012, title={On the institutional design
of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU}, volume={10},
DOI={10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3},
number={4}, journal={International Economics and Economic Policy}, publisher={Springer
Nature}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Krieger, Tim and Minter, Steffen}, year={2012},
pages={583–612} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Tim Krieger, and Steffen Minter. “On the Institutional
Design of Burden Sharing When Financing External Border Enforcement in the EU.”
International Economics and Economic Policy 10, no. 4 (2012): 583–612.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake, T. Krieger, and S. Minter, “On the institutional design of burden
sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU,” International
Economics and Economic Policy, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 583–612, 2012.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “On the Institutional Design of Burden Sharing
When Financing External Border Enforcement in the EU.” International Economics
and Economic Policy, vol. 10, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2012, pp. 583–612, doi:10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3.
short: C.-J. Haake, T. Krieger, S. Minter, International Economics and Economic
Policy 10 (2012) 583–612.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:51:03Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:55Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T10:01:16Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T10:01:16Z
file_id: '3871'
file_name: On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external
border enforcement in the EU.pdf
file_size: 442955
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T10:01:16Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 10'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 583-612
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: International Economics and Economic Policy
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1612-4804
- 1612-4812
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border
enforcement in the EU
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 10
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '2512'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "In this paper we introduce the concept of an overall power function that
is meant\r\nto combine two sources of a party’s power in a parliament. The first
source is based\r\non the possibilities for the party to be part of a majority
coalition and it is typically\r\nmodeled using a cooperative simple game. The
second source takes into account\r\nparties’ asymmetries outside the cooperative
game and it is displayed by a vector\r\nof exogenously given weights. We adopt
a normative point of view and provide an\r\naxiomatic characterization of a specific
overall power function, in which the weights\r\nenter in a proportional fashion."
author:
- first_name: Dinko
full_name: Dimitrov, Dinko
last_name: Dimitrov
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Proportionality and the power of unequal parties. International
Journal of Economic Theory. 2011;7(2):189-200. doi:10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x
apa: Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C.-J. (2011). Proportionality and the power of unequal
parties. International Journal of Economic Theory, 7(2), 189–200.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x
bibtex: '@article{Dimitrov_Haake_2011, title={Proportionality and the power of unequal
parties}, volume={7}, DOI={10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x},
number={2}, journal={International Journal of Economic Theory}, publisher={Wiley-Blackwell},
author={Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2011}, pages={189–200}
}'
chicago: 'Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Proportionality and the Power
of Unequal Parties.” International Journal of Economic Theory 7, no. 2
(2011): 189–200. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x.'
ieee: D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “Proportionality and the power of unequal parties,”
International Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 189–200, 2011.
mla: Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Proportionality and the Power of
Unequal Parties.” International Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 7, no.
2, Wiley-Blackwell, 2011, pp. 189–200, doi:10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x.
short: D. Dimitrov, C.-J. Haake, International Journal of Economic Theory 7 (2011)
189–200.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:43:43Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:51Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1111/j.1742-7363.2011.00158.x
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-11-07T10:41:24Z
date_updated: 2018-11-07T10:41:24Z
file_id: '5408'
file_name: Proportionality and the power of unequal parties.pdf
file_size: 152349
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-07T10:41:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 7'
issue: '2'
jel:
- C71
- D72
language:
- iso: eng
page: 189-200
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: International Journal of Economic Theory
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1742-7355
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
status: public
title: Proportionality and the power of unequal parties
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 7
year: '2011'
...
---
_id: '2510'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Bettina
full_name: Klaus, Bettina
last_name: Klaus
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Klaus B. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with
couples. Theory and Decision. 2010;69(4):537-554. doi:10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Klaus, B. (2010). Stability and Nash implementation in
matching markets with couples. Theory and Decision, 69(4), 537–554.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Klaus_2010, title={Stability and Nash implementation in
matching markets with couples}, volume={69}, DOI={10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2},
number={4}, journal={Theory and Decision}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Klaus, Bettina}, year={2010}, pages={537–554} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina Klaus. “Stability and Nash Implementation
in Matching Markets with Couples.” Theory and Decision 69, no. 4 (2010):
537–54. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus, “Stability and Nash implementation in matching
markets with couples,” Theory and Decision, vol. 69, no. 4, pp. 537–554,
2010, doi: 10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina Klaus. “Stability and Nash Implementation
in Matching Markets with Couples.” Theory and Decision, vol. 69, no. 4,
Springer Nature, 2010, pp. 537–54, doi:10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2.
short: C.-J. Haake, B. Klaus, Theory and Decision 69 (2010) 537–554.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:42:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:51Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T08:18:39Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:18:39Z
file_id: '5121'
file_name: Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples.pdf
file_size: 243144
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:18:39Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 69'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 537-554
publication: Theory and Decision
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0040-5833
- 1573-7187
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
type: journal_article
user_id: '20801'
volume: 69
year: '2010'
...
---
_id: '2508'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Bettina
full_name: Klaus, Bettina
last_name: Klaus
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Klaus B. Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets
with contracts. Economic Theory. 2009;41(3):393-410. doi:10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Klaus, B. (2009). Monotonicity and Nash implementation
in matching markets with contracts. Economic Theory, 41(3), 393–410.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Klaus_2009, title={Monotonicity and Nash implementation
in matching markets with contracts}, volume={41}, DOI={10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8},
number={3}, journal={Economic Theory}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen and Klaus, Bettina}, year={2009}, pages={393–410} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina Klaus. “Monotonicity and Nash Implementation
in Matching Markets with Contracts.” Economic Theory 41, no. 3 (2009):
393–410. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus, “Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching
markets with contracts,” Economic Theory, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 393–410,
2009, doi: 10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8.'
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Bettina Klaus. “Monotonicity and Nash Implementation
in Matching Markets with Contracts.” Economic Theory, vol. 41, no. 3, Springer
Nature, 2009, pp. 393–410, doi:10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8.
short: C.-J. Haake, B. Klaus, Economic Theory 41 (2009) 393–410.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:38:26Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:50Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T08:17:28Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:17:28Z
file_id: '5120'
file_name: Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts.pdf
file_size: 260275
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:17:28Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 41'
issue: '3'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 393-410
publication: Economic Theory
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0938-2259
- 1432-0479
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
type: journal_article
user_id: '20801'
volume: 41
year: '2009'
...
---
_id: '2531'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects
among\r\nthemselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure.
Depending on the\r\nspecifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining
solutions such as the discrete\r\nRaiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
and the Perles-Maschler solution. The\r\nlatter is axiomatized using the superadditivity
axiom, which in the present context is\r\nreadily interpreted as resolving a specific
source of conflict potential."
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: 'Haake C-J. DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES.
International Game Theory Review. 2009;11(01):15-32. doi:10.1142/s0219198909002121'
apa: 'Haake, C.-J. (2009). DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET
PROCEDURES. International Game Theory Review, 11(01), 15–32. https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121'
bibtex: '@article{Haake_2009, title={DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH
MARKET PROCEDURES}, volume={11}, DOI={10.1142/s0219198909002121},
number={01}, journal={International Game Theory Review}, publisher={World Scientific
Pub Co Pte Lt}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2009}, pages={15–32} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen. “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET
PROCEDURES.” International Game Theory Review 11, no. 01 (2009): 15–32.
https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002121.'
ieee: 'C.-J. Haake, “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES,”
International Game Theory Review, vol. 11, no. 01, pp. 15–32, 2009.'
mla: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen. “DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET
PROCEDURES.” International Game Theory Review, vol. 11, no. 01, World Scientific
Pub Co Pte Lt, 2009, pp. 15–32, doi:10.1142/s0219198909002121.'
short: C.-J. Haake, International Game Theory Review 11 (2009) 15–32.
date_created: 2018-04-26T11:08:41Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:00Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1142/s0219198909002121
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-11-07T10:42:15Z
date_updated: 2018-11-07T10:42:15Z
file_id: '5409'
file_name: Dividing by demanding Object division through market procedures.pdf
file_size: 300474
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-07T10:42:15Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 11'
issue: '01'
jel:
- C73
- C62
- D51
- D63
language:
- iso: eng
page: 15-32
publication: International Game Theory Review
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0219-1989
- 1793-6675
publication_status: published
publisher: World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt
status: public
title: 'DIVIDING BY DEMANDING: OBJECT DIVISION THROUGH MARKET PROCEDURES'
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 11
year: '2009'
...
---
_id: '2502'
author:
- first_name: Dinko
full_name: Dimitrov, Dinko
last_name: Dimitrov
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Stable governments and the semistrict core. Games
and Economic Behavior. 2008;62(2):460-475. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003
apa: Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C.-J. (2008). Stable governments and the semistrict
core. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(2), 460–475. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003
bibtex: '@article{Dimitrov_Haake_2008, title={Stable governments and the semistrict
core}, volume={62}, DOI={10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003},
number={2}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Dimitrov,
Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}, year={2008}, pages={460–475} }'
chicago: 'Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Stable Governments and the Semistrict
Core.” Games and Economic Behavior 62, no. 2 (2008): 460–75. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003.'
ieee: D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “Stable governments and the semistrict core,”
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 460–475, 2008.
mla: Dimitrov, Dinko, and Claus-Jochen Haake. “Stable Governments and the Semistrict
Core.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 62, no. 2, Elsevier BV, 2008,
pp. 460–75, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003.
short: D. Dimitrov, C.-J. Haake, Games and Economic Behavior 62 (2008) 460–475.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:26:50Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:43Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T08:35:54Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:35:54Z
file_id: '5132'
file_name: Stable governments and the semistrict core.pdf
file_size: 183269
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:35:54Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 62'
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 460-475
publication: Games and Economic Behavior
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0899-8256
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier BV
status: public
title: Stable governments and the semistrict core
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 62
year: '2008'
...
---
_id: '2503'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Akemi
full_name: Kashiwada, Akemi
last_name: Kashiwada
- first_name: Francis Edward
full_name: Su, Francis Edward
last_name: Su
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Kashiwada A, Su FE. The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees. Journal
of Mathematical Biology. 2008;56(4):479-497. doi:10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2
apa: Haake, C.-J., Kashiwada, A., & Su, F. E. (2008). The Shapley value of phylogenetic
trees. Journal of Mathematical Biology, 56(4), 479–497. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Kashiwada_Su_2008, title={The Shapley value of phylogenetic
trees}, volume={56}, DOI={10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2},
number={4}, journal={Journal of Mathematical Biology}, publisher={Springer Nature},
author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Kashiwada, Akemi and Su, Francis Edward}, year={2008},
pages={479–497} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Akemi Kashiwada, and Francis Edward Su. “The Shapley
Value of Phylogenetic Trees.” Journal of Mathematical Biology 56, no. 4
(2008): 479–97. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake, A. Kashiwada, and F. E. Su, “The Shapley value of phylogenetic
trees,” Journal of Mathematical Biology, vol. 56, no. 4, pp. 479–497, 2008.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “The Shapley Value of Phylogenetic Trees.” Journal
of Mathematical Biology, vol. 56, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2008, pp. 479–97,
doi:10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2.
short: C.-J. Haake, A. Kashiwada, F.E. Su, Journal of Mathematical Biology 56 (2008)
479–497.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:29:59Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:44Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T08:37:33Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:37:33Z
file_id: '5133'
file_name: The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees.pdf
file_size: 328968
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:37:33Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 56'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 479-497
publication: Journal of Mathematical Biology
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0303-6812
- 1432-1416
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: The Shapley value of phylogenetic trees
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 56
year: '2008'
...
---
_id: '2506'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: Haake C-J. Two support results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution in small
object division markets. Mathematical Social Sciences. 2008;57(2):177-187.
doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004
apa: Haake, C.-J. (2008). Two support results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution
in small object division markets. Mathematical Social Sciences, 57(2),
177–187. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004
bibtex: '@article{Haake_2008, title={Two support results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky
solution in small object division markets}, volume={57}, DOI={10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004},
number={2}, journal={Mathematical Social Sciences}, publisher={Elsevier BV}, author={Haake,
Claus-Jochen}, year={2008}, pages={177–187} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen. “Two Support Results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky Solution
in Small Object Division Markets.” Mathematical Social Sciences 57, no.
2 (2008): 177–87. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake, “Two support results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution in small
object division markets,” Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 57, no. 2,
pp. 177–187, 2008.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen. “Two Support Results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky Solution
in Small Object Division Markets.” Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 57,
no. 2, Elsevier BV, 2008, pp. 177–87, doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004.
short: C.-J. Haake, Mathematical Social Sciences 57 (2008) 177–187.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:35:57Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:48Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T08:29:51Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:29:51Z
file_id: '5127'
file_name: Two support results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution in small object
division markets.pdf
file_size: 575065
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:29:51Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 57'
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 177-187
publication: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0165-4896
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier BV
status: public
title: Two support results for the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution in small object division
markets
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 57
year: '2008'
...