@article{58806, abstract = {{The present paper has two objectives. First, it explicates the story, initially portrayed by Eckart Förster, that philosophy allegedly started with publishing of Kant’s CPR and ended a quarter century later when Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind appeared. We address the questions in what sense this happened and how is this development to be interpreted? Secondly, we demonstrate that similar radical transition from new, “true” beginning of philosophy to its apparent finishing took place in two other, high profile occasions in the history of Western philosophy, in two key points of its development: in the years 390-365 bc, between the early and the late Plato, and between 1898 and 1922, between Russell and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. These three short-lived, spectacular transitions from philosophy’s alleged start to its alleged ultimate accomplishment give us good reason to speak about a specific 25-years principle in philosophy. In a peculiar way, this principle reveals philosophy’s true nature.}}, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, issn = {{2576-2435}}, journal = {{Journal of Research in Philosophy and History}}, keywords = {{Aristotle, Hegel, Kant, Plato, Russell, Wittgenstein}}, location = {{Rome, Italy}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{36--43}}, publisher = {{SCHOLINK INC.}}, title = {{{Philosophy’s 25-Years Principle: Philosophy between Intuitive Understanding and Discursive Reasoning}}}, doi = {{10.22158/jrph.v8n1p36}}, volume = {{8}}, year = {{2025}}, } @inbook{58818, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, booktitle = {{Susan Stebbing: Analysis, Common Sense, and Public Philosophy}}, editor = {{Coliva, Annalisa and Doulas, Luis}}, publisher = {{Oxford University Press}}, title = {{{Susan Stebbing and Some Poorly Explored Venues of Analytic Philosophy}}}, year = {{2025}}, } @inbook{58822, abstract = {{In 1921, John Wisdom (1904–1993) became a member of Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge, where he read philosophy and attended lectures by G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad, and J. E. McTaggart. He received his BA in 1924, after which he worked for five years at the National Institute of Industrial Psychology. From 1929 to 1934, Wisdom was a Lecturer in the department of logic and metaphysics at the University of St Andrews and a colleague of G. F. Stout. After the publication of his book Interpretation and Analysis (1931) and five articles on “Logical Constructions” in Mind (1931–3), Wisdom became a Lecturer in Moral Sciences in Cambridge and a Fellow of Trinity College. This gave him the opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Since nothing by Wittgenstein but Tractatus appeared in print for decades, Wisdom’s publications of these years were—mistakenly—read as portents of the new ideas of Wittgenstein himself. The publication of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in 1953 brought with it, among other things, the fall of Wisdom’s popularity. }}, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, booktitle = {{Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers: His Influence on Historical and Contemporary Analytic Philosophers, 2 vol., Volume II}}, editor = {{Khani , Ali Hossein and Kemp , Gary }}, keywords = {{elucidation, facts, Frege, language, metaphysics, G. E. Moore, Russell, Stebbing, John Wisdom, Wittgenstein}}, publisher = {{Routledge}}, title = {{{Wisdom's Wittgenstein}}}, year = {{2025}}, } @inbook{58821, abstract = {{Susan Stebbing wrote only once on Wittgenstein, in her paper ‘Logical Positivism and Analysis’ (1933). The paper was unusually critical of Wittgenstein. It put the Cambridge analytic philosophy of Moore and Russell in a sharp opposition to the positivist philosophy of the Vienna Circle, in which Stebbing included Wittgenstein. Whereas the positivists were interested in analysing language, the Cambridge realists were analysing facts. To be more explicit, the analytic philosophers were engaged in directional analysis, which seeks to illuminate (to elucidate) the multiplicity of the analysed facts. In contrast, positivists aimed at a final analysis that proves that there are simples. Stebbing’s sympathies were clearly on the side of the Cambridge realists. The important implication of Stebbing’s paper was that it urged Wittgenstein to change the style of his philosophy, abandoning those points which allegedly connected him with the Vienna Circle.}}, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, booktitle = {{Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers: His Influence on Historical and Contemporary Analytic Philosophers, vol. II}}, editor = {{Khani , Ali Hossein and Kemp , Gary }}, keywords = {{directional analysis, elucidation, facts, metaphysics, G. E. Moore, Russell, Stebbing, John Wisdom, Wittgenstein}}, publisher = {{Routledge}}, title = {{{Stebbing's Wittgenstein}}}, year = {{2025}}, } @article{58808, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, isbn = {{0036-0163}}, journal = {{Russell: th Journal for Bertrand Russell Studies}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{114--119}}, publisher = {{The Johns Hopkins University Press}}, title = {{{Whitehead and Russell: Odd Couple? Review of Whitehead und Russell: Perspektiven, Konvergenzen, Dissonanzen, hg. von Ch. Kann und D. Sölch}}}, doi = {{10.1353/rss.2024.a929934}}, volume = {{44}}, year = {{2024}}, } @inbook{58809, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, booktitle = {{Autobiographisches Philosophieren}}, editor = {{Albus, Vanessa and Haase, Volker}}, isbn = {{978-3-643-14970-1}}, pages = {{76--92}}, publisher = {{LIT-Verlag}}, title = {{{Philosophie lernen in sieben Länder: Stücke einer philosophischen Autobiographie}}}, year = {{2024}}, } @article{55237, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, journal = {{Philosophy Study }}, number = {{10}}, pages = {{449--461}}, title = {{{The History of the Concept of Truth-making}}}, doi = {{10.17265/2159-5313/2023.0X.005}}, volume = {{13}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{54996, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, journal = {{Philosophy Study }}, number = {{10}}, pages = {{449--461}}, title = {{{The History of the Concept of Truth-making}}}, doi = {{10.17265/2159-5313/2023.0X.005}}, volume = {{13}}, year = {{2023}}, } @book{55204, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, isbn = {{983-3-11-072681-7 }}, pages = {{205}}, publisher = {{De Gruyter Berlin New York}}, title = {{{Hermann Lotze’s Influence on the Twentieth Century Philosophy}}}, doi = {{10.1515/9783110726282}}, volume = {{12}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{55236, abstract = {{From 1901 to 1919, Russell persistently maintained that there were two kinds of logic and distinguished between one and the other as mathematical logic and philosophical logic. In this paper, we discuss the concept of philosophical logic, as used by Russell. This was only a tentative program that Russell did not clarify in detail; therefore, our task will be to make it explicit. We shall show that there are three (-and-a-half) kinds of Russellian philosophical logic: (i) “pure logic”; (ii) philosophical logic investigating the logical forms of propositions; (iii) philosophical logic exploring the logical forms of facts: in epistemology and in the external world. In particular, Russell’s program or philosophical logic of the facts of the external world remained less than sketchily outlined. }}, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, journal = {{Athens Journal of Philosophy}}, keywords = {{Russell, mathematical logic, philosophical logic, Wittgenstein}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{193--209}}, title = {{{Bertrand Russell’s Philosophical Logic and its Logical Forms}}}, doi = {{10.30958/ajphil.2-3-3}}, volume = {{2}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{55249, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, journal = {{Nordic Wittgenstein Review }}, title = {{{Mauro Luiz Engelmann: Reading Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021}}}, doi = {{00.0000/nwr.v11i0.3637}}, volume = {{11}}, year = {{2022}}, } @inbook{56312, abstract = {{In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the philosopher Hans Reichenbach led a group of like-minded colleagues in Berlin that must count as an independent point of origin of the movement of logical empiricism. Like the Vienna Circle with whom they cooperated on numerous occasions, their concern was to develop a philosophy of science adequate to the latest advances in science itself. Differences of philosophical background and interests, however, resulted in putting different accents by justifying scientific knowledge. }}, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, booktitle = {{The Routledge Handbook of Logical Empiricism}}, editor = {{Uebel, Thomas}}, keywords = {{Reichenbach, Dubislav, Grelling, Hempel, Berlin Group}}, pages = {{118--126}}, publisher = {{Routledge}}, title = {{{The Berlin Group and the Society for Scientific Philosophy}}}, doi = {{10.4324/9781315650647}}, year = {{2021}}, } @inbook{58766, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, booktitle = {{Logical Empiricism and the Physical Science}}, editor = {{Lutz, Sebastian}}, isbn = {{9781138367357}}, keywords = {{Berlin Group, Grelling, Logical Empiricism, Reichenbach}}, pages = {{64--83}}, publisher = {{Routledge}}, title = {{{Kurt Grelling and the Idiosyncrasy of the Berlin Logical Empiricism}}}, doi = {{10.4324/9780429429835-4}}, year = {{2021}}, } @book{55203, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, isbn = {{9781350086432}}, publisher = {{Bloomsbury Academic}}, title = {{{Early Analytic Philosophy and the German Philosophical Tradition}}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{55235, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, journal = {{Russell}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{53--56}}, title = {{{Introduction to Bertrand Russell’s Conspectus of J. E. McTaggart’s Lectures on Hermann Lotze (Jan–Feb. 1898)}}}, volume = {{40}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{55234, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, journal = {{An Anthology of Philosophical Studies}}, pages = {{117--128}}, title = {{{Russell’s Conception of Propositional Attitudes in Relation to Pragmatism}}}, volume = {{14}}, year = {{2020}}, } @inbook{58767, abstract = {{ Since the Tractarian ontology was only a formal presentation of our language and thinking (of everything intelligible), not metaphysics, its claims that the propositions are constructed (4.5), and that “a proposition constructs a world” (4.023) indicate the legitimacy of its reconstruction we are going to make in the present chapter. It discusses Wittgenstein’s constructivist ontology of ways. Wittgenstein’s ways are different both from modi and from tropes. In short, his ontology of ways explores the manners in which the elements of one basic ontological system can arranged to produce ontological systems of higher order. The advantage of this ontology is that it suggests an elegant solution to the problem of constructing ontological systems of new order, such as states of affairs, thinking, language, logic and works of art. }}, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, booktitle = {{Wittgensteinian : Looking at the World From the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein's Philosophy}}, editor = {{Da Costa, Newton }}, isbn = {{978-3-030-27568-6}}, keywords = {{Construction, Emergence, Modality, Tractatus, Ways, Wittgenstein}}, pages = {{7--19}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Wittgenstein's Ways}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-030-27569-3_2}}, year = {{2020}}, } @inbook{58771, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, booktitle = {{ WITTGENSTEINIAN (adj.) }}, editor = {{Da Costa, Newton}}, isbn = {{978-3-030-27568-6}}, pages = {{473--486}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Essay in Formal Biology}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-030-27569-3_25}}, year = {{2020}}, } @inbook{58776, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, booktitle = {{WITTGENSTEINIAN (adj.)}}, editor = {{Da Costa, Newton}}, isbn = {{978-3-030-27568-6}}, pages = {{505--518}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Aesthetic Gestures: Elements of a Philosophy of Art in Frege and Wittgenstein}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-030-27569-3_27}}, year = {{2020}}, } @misc{58884, author = {{Milkov, Nikolay}}, booktitle = {{Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Philosophers}}, editor = {{Adair-Toteff, Chrostopher}}, keywords = {{Frege}}, publisher = {{Bloomsbury}}, title = {{{Frege, Gottlob (1848–1925)}}}, doi = {{10.5040/9781350994997.0008}}, year = {{2020}}, }