@article{1054,
  abstract     = {{We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. }},
  author       = {{Brosig-Koch, Janet and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}},
  journal      = {{Health Economics}},
  number       = {{53}},
  pages        = {{6--20}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  title        = {{{The effects of competition on medical service provision}}},
  doi          = {{10.1002/hec.3583}},
  volume       = {{26}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@techreport{1055,
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@techreport{1056,
  author       = {{Gu, Yiguan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@article{2709,
  abstract     = {{This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer-side market transparency with endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique symmetric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market-structure effect. We show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market-structure effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes increasingly transparent. Consumer-side market transparency can therefore be socially excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand functions is the set of constant demand functions. }},
  author       = {{Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}},
  issn         = {{0932-4569}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{225--248}},
  publisher    = {{Mohr Siebeck}},
  title        = {{{Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency}}},
  doi          = {{10.1628/093245614x13895979380392}},
  volume       = {{170}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@article{4157,
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}},
  issn         = {{0313-5926}},
  journal      = {{Economic Analysis and Policy}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{49--70}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier BV}},
  title        = {{{Paying for Performance in Hospitals}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/s0313-5926(11)50004-9}},
  volume       = {{41}},
  year         = {{2011}},
}

@article{3418,
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Wambach, Achim}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{853----858}},
  title        = {{{Survival at the center—the stability of minimum differentiation}}},
  year         = {{2010}},
}

@article{4154,
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Possajennikov, Alex and Guse, Tobias}},
  issn         = {{0167-2681}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{254--258}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier BV}},
  title        = {{{On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2009.08.011}},
  volume       = {{73}},
  year         = {{2010}},
}

@article{4156,
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.}},
  issn         = {{0165-1889}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}},
  number       = {{5}},
  pages        = {{1357--1380}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier BV}},
  title        = {{{Imitators and optimizers in a changing environment}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jedc.2007.06.001}},
  volume       = {{32}},
  year         = {{2008}},
}

@article{4159,
  author       = {{Guse, T. and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}},
  issn         = {{0048-5829}},
  journal      = {{Public Choice}},
  number       = {{3-4}},
  pages        = {{323--352}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Nature}},
  title        = {{{The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s11127-006-9033-0}},
  volume       = {{129}},
  year         = {{2006}},
}

@article{4163,
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}},
  issn         = {{0015-2218}},
  journal      = {{FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{124--148}},
  publisher    = {{Mohr Siebeck}},
  title        = {{{When Should the Talented Receive Weaker Incentives? Peer Pressure in Teams}}},
  doi          = {{10.1628/001522106776667040}},
  volume       = {{62}},
  year         = {{2006}},
}

@article{4160,
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, W. and Possajennikov, A.}},
  issn         = {{0176-2680}},
  journal      = {{European Journal of Political Economy}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{1045--1057}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier BV}},
  title        = {{{Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.09.002}},
  volume       = {{20}},
  year         = {{2004}},
}

@article{4161,
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard}},
  issn         = {{0219-1989}},
  journal      = {{International Game Theory Review}},
  number       = {{03}},
  pages        = {{249--262}},
  publisher    = {{World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}},
  title        = {{{Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model}}},
  doi          = {{10.1142/s0219198903001045}},
  volume       = {{05}},
  year         = {{2003}},
}

@article{4162,
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard}},
  issn         = {{0899-8256}},
  journal      = {{Games and Economic Behavior}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{44--76}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier BV}},
  title        = {{{Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox}}},
  doi          = {{10.1006/game.2001.0902}},
  volume       = {{40}},
  year         = {{2002}},
}

@article{3410,
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}},
  issn         = {{0936-9937}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Evolutionary Economics}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{367--371}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Nature}},
  title        = {{{A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s001910050087}},
  volume       = {{9}},
  year         = {{1999}},
}

@article{3417,
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Qin, Cheng-Zhong and Stuart, Charles}},
  issn         = {{0936-9937}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Evolutionary Economics}},
  number       = {{2}},
  pages        = {{211--224}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Nature}},
  title        = {{{Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s001910050081}},
  volume       = {{9}},
  year         = {{1999}},
}