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Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings. <i>Journal of Evolutionary Economics</i>. 1999;9(2):211-224. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s001910050081\">10.1007/s001910050081</a>","chicago":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, Cheng-Zhong Qin, and Charles Stuart. “Economic Natural Selection in Bertrand and Cournot Settings.” <i>Journal of Evolutionary Economics</i> 9, no. 2 (1999): 211–24. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s001910050081\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s001910050081</a>.","bibtex":"@article{Hehenkamp_Qin_Stuart_1999, title={Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings}, volume={9}, DOI={<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s001910050081\">10.1007/s001910050081</a>}, number={2}, journal={Journal of Evolutionary Economics}, publisher={Springer Nature}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Qin, Cheng-Zhong and Stuart, Charles}, year={1999}, pages={211–224} }","mla":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, et al. “Economic Natural Selection in Bertrand and Cournot Settings.” <i>Journal of Evolutionary Economics</i>, vol. 9, no. 2, Springer Nature, 1999, pp. 211–24, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s001910050081\">10.1007/s001910050081</a>.","apa":"Hehenkamp, B., Qin, C.-Z., &#38; Stuart, C. (1999). Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings. <i>Journal of Evolutionary Economics</i>, <i>9</i>(2), 211–224. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/s001910050081\">https://doi.org/10.1007/s001910050081</a>","ieee":"B. Hehenkamp, C.-Z. Qin, and C. Stuart, “Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings,” <i>Journal of Evolutionary Economics</i>, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 211–224, 1999."}}]