@inproceedings{456,
  abstract     = {{We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibriain social context congestion games. For any given set of allowed costfunctions F, we provide a threshold value μ(F), and show that for theclass of social context congestion games with cost functions from F, α-Nash dynamics are guaranteed to converge to α-approximate pure Nashequilibrium if and only if α > μ(F).Interestingly, μ(F) is related and always upper bounded by Roughgarden’sanarchy value [19].}},
  author       = {{Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou, Grammateia and Skopalik, Alexander}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}},
  pages        = {{480 -- 485}},
  title        = {{{Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@inproceedings{462,
  abstract     = {{We discuss a technique to analyze complex infinitely repeated games using techniques from the fields of game theory and simulations. Our research is motivated by the analysis of electronic markets with thousands of participants and possibly complex strategic behavior. We consider an example of a global market of composed IT services to demonstrate the use of our simulation technique. We present our current work in this area and we want to discuss further approaches for the future.}},
  author       = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Skopalik, Alexander}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)}},
  pages        = {{625--630}},
  title        = {{{A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games}}},
  doi          = {{10.5220/0005110406250630}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}

@inproceedings{395,
  abstract     = {{We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improvetheir communication costs by connecting to a high-speed network.The n nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decideindividually to become a gateway to the high-speed network. The goalof a node v is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game) ormaximum (MAX-game) of communication distances from v to all othernodes plus a fixed price α > 0 if it decides to be a gateway. Between gatewaysthe communication distance is 0, and gateways also improve othernodes’ distances by behaving as shortcuts. For the SUM-game, we showthat for α ≤ n − 1, the price of anarchy is Θ (n/√α) and in this rangeequilibria always exist. In range α ∈ (n−1, n(n−1)) the price of anarchyis Θ(√α), and for α ≥ n(n − 1) it is constant. For the MAX-game, weshow that the price of anarchy is either Θ (1 + n/√α), for α ≥ 1, orelse 1. Given a graph with girth of at least 4α, equilibria always exist.Concerning the dynamics, both games are not potential games. For theSUM-game, we even show that it is not weakly acyclic.}},
  author       = {{Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}},
  pages        = {{435--440}},
  title        = {{{Multilevel Network Games}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36}},
  year         = {{2014}},
}