---
_id: '5471'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC),
strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms
for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single
buyer and a single seller who holds a finite number k of identical items. The
mechanism has to decide how many units of the item are transferred from the seller
to the buyer and how much money is transferred from the buyer to the seller. We
consider two classes of valuation functions for the buyer and seller: Valuations
that are increasing in the number of units in possession, and the more specific
class of valuations that are increasing and submodular. \r\nFurthermore, we present
some approximation results about the performance of certain such mechanisms, in
terms of social welfare: For increasing submodular valuation functions, we show
the existence of a deterministic 2-approximation mechanism and a randomised e/(1-e)
approximation mechanism, matching the best known bounds for the single-item setting."
author:
- first_name: Philip
full_name: Lazos, Philip
last_name: Lazos
- first_name: Paul
full_name: Goldberg, Paul
last_name: Goldberg
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Gerstgrasser, Matthias
last_name: Gerstgrasser
- first_name: Bart
full_name: de Keijzer, Bart
last_name: de Keijzer
citation:
ama: 'Lazos P, Goldberg P, Skopalik A, Gerstgrasser M, de Keijzer B. Multi-unit
Bilateral Trade. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI). ; 2019. doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973'
apa: Lazos, P., Goldberg, P., Skopalik, A., Gerstgrasser, M., & de Keijzer,
B. (2019). Multi-unit Bilateral Trade. Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). Thirty-Third AAAI Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Lazos_Goldberg_Skopalik_Gerstgrasser_de Keijzer_2019, title={
Multi-unit Bilateral Trade}, DOI={10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973},
booktitle={Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI)}, author={Lazos, Philip and Goldberg, Paul and Skopalik, Alexander and
Gerstgrasser, Matthias and de Keijzer, Bart}, year={2019} }'
chicago: Lazos, Philip, Paul Goldberg, Alexander Skopalik, Matthias Gerstgrasser,
and Bart de Keijzer. “ Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade.” In Proceedings of the Thirty-Third
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.
ieee: 'P. Lazos, P. Goldberg, A. Skopalik, M. Gerstgrasser, and B. de Keijzer, “
Multi-unit Bilateral Trade,” presented at the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, 2019, doi: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.'
mla: Lazos, Philip, et al. “ Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade.” Proceedings of the
Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2019, doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.
short: 'P. Lazos, P. Goldberg, A. Skopalik, M. Gerstgrasser, B. de Keijzer, in:
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI),
2019.'
conference:
end_date: 2019-02-01
location: Honolulu, Hawaii, USA
name: Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)
start_date: 2019-01-27
date_created: 2018-11-12T09:38:16Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:55Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-12-06T13:57:51Z
date_updated: 2018-12-06T13:57:51Z
file_id: '6018'
file_name: 1811.05130.pdf
file_size: 315877
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-12-06T13:57:51Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI)
publication_status: published
status: public
title: ' Multi-unit Bilateral Trade'
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '10281'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Competing firms tend to select similar locations for their stores. This phenomenon,
called the principle of minimum differentiation, was captured by Hotelling with
a landmark model of spatial competition but is still the object of an ongoing
scientific debate. Although consistently observed in practice, many more realistic
variants of Hotelling''s model fail to support minimum differentiation or do not
have pure equilibria at all. In particular, it was recently proven for a generalized
model which incorporates negative network externalities and which contains Hotelling''s
model and classical selfish load balancing as special cases, that the unique equilibria
do not adhere to minimum differentiation. Furthermore, it was shown that for a
significant parameter range pure equilibria do not exist. We derive a sharp contrast
to these previous results by investigating Hotelling''s model with negative network
externalities from an entirely new angle: approximate pure subgame perfect equilibria.
This approach allows us to prove analytically and via agent-based simulations
that approximate equilibria having good approximation guarantees and that adhere
to minimum differentiation exist for the full parameter range of the model. Moreover,
we show that the obtained approximate equilibria have high social welfare.'
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: 'Pascal '
full_name: 'Lenzner, Pascal '
last_name: Lenzner
- first_name: Louise
full_name: Molitor, Louise
last_name: Molitor
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Lenzner P, Molitor L, Skopalik A. From Hotelling to Load Balancing:
Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation. In: Proceedings
of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems.
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2019:1949--1951.'
apa: 'Feldotto, M., Lenzner, P., Molitor, L., & Skopalik, A. (2019). From Hotelling
to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation.
In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
MultiAgent Systems (pp. 1949--1951). Montreal QC, Canada: International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Lenzner_Molitor_Skopalik_2019, title={ From Hotelling
to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and MultiAgent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Lenzner, Pascal and Molitor,
Louise and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2019}, pages={1949--1951} }'
chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor, and Alexander Skopalik.
“ From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum
Differentiation.” In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 1949--1951. International Foundation for Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019.'
ieee: 'M. Feldotto, P. Lenzner, L. Molitor, and A. Skopalik, “ From Hotelling to
Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation,” in
Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
Systems, Montreal QC, Canada, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.'
mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “ From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation
and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation.” Proceedings of the 18th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.'
short: 'M. Feldotto, P. Lenzner, L. Molitor, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.'
conference:
location: Montreal QC, Canada
name: 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
date_created: 2019-06-20T14:46:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:33Z
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z
date_updated: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z
file_id: '12962'
file_name: 1903.04265.pdf
file_size: 698599
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3331973
page: 1949--1951
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and MultiAgent Systems
publication_status: published
publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
status: public
title: ' From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum
Differentiation'
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2831'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of
a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed
product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance
of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose
is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess
the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations
across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive
valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted)
average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation
method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In
addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate
solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly
optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified
Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation
profiles are incomplete.'
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Haake C-J, Skopalik A, Stroh-Maraun N. Disaggregating User Evaluations
Using the Shapley Value. In: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics
of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018). ; 2018:5:1-5:6. doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659'
apa: Feldotto, M., Haake, C.-J., Skopalik, A., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2018). Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value. In Proceedings of the 13th Workshop
on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018) (pp. 5:1-5:6).
Irvine, California, USA. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Haake_Skopalik_Stroh-Maraun_2018, title={Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}, DOI={10.1145/3230654.3230659},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems
and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2018}, pages={5:1-5:6}
}'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Claus-Jochen Haake, Alexander Skopalik, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun.
“Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.” In Proceedings of
the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018),
5:1-5:6, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3230654.3230659.
ieee: M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Disaggregating
User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value,” in Proceedings of the 13th Workshop
on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018), Irvine,
California, USA, 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley
Value.” Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems
and Computation (NetEcon 2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6, doi:10.1145/3230654.3230659.
short: 'M. Feldotto, C.-J. Haake, A. Skopalik, N. Stroh-Maraun, in: Proceedings
of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon
2018), 2018, pp. 5:1-5:6.'
conference:
end_date: 2018-06-18
location: Irvine, California, USA
name: The 13th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon
2018)
start_date: 2018-06-18
date_created: 2018-05-22T10:28:51Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:58:01Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1145/3230654.3230659
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: nmaraun
date_created: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
file_id: '3910'
file_name: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value.pdf
file_size: 1450171
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-15T07:30:50Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 5:1-5:6
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and
Computation (NetEcon 2018)
publication_identifier:
isbn:
- 978-1-4503-5916-0
publication_status: published
status: public
title: Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '669'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games andits bottleneck
variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to modelnetwork scenarios
in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.We characterize
the (non-)existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE), the convergenceof improvement
dynamics, the quality of equilibria and show the complexity of thedecision problem.
For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approx-imation ratio of
approximate pure Nash equilibria.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Lennart
full_name: Leder, Lennart
last_name: Leder
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion games with mixed objectives. Journal
of Combinatorial Optimization. 2018;36(4):1145-1167. doi:10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y
apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., & Skopalik, A. (2018). Congestion games with mixed
objectives. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 36(4), 1145–1167.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y
bibtex: '@article{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2018, title={Congestion games with mixed
objectives}, volume={36}, DOI={10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y},
number={4}, journal={Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}, publisher={Springer
Nature}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander},
year={2018}, pages={1145–1167} }'
chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion
Games with Mixed Objectives.” Journal of Combinatorial Optimization 36,
no. 4 (2018): 1145–67. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y.'
ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion games with mixed objectives,”
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 1145–1167, 2018.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” Journal
of Combinatorial Optimization, vol. 36, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2018, pp.
1145–67, doi:10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y.
short: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
36 (2018) 1145–1167.
date_created: 2017-10-26T14:11:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:15Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1607.05143'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z
file_id: '5226'
file_name: Feldotto2018_Article_CongestionGamesWithMixedObject.pdf
file_size: 605207
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:57:32Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 36'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 1145-1167
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1382-6905
- 1573-2886
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Congestion games with mixed objectives
type: journal_article
user_id: '14052'
volume: 36
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '1369'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every
resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset
of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the
utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the
budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE)
do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of
singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for
each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential
function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which
depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual
player.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Pure Nash equilibria in restricted
budget games. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization. 2018. doi:10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7
apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2018). Pure Nash
equilibria in restricted budget games. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7
bibtex: '@article{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2018, title={Pure Nash equilibria
in restricted budget games}, DOI={10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7},
journal={Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}, publisher={Springer Nature},
author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik,
Alexander}, year={2018} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” Journal of Combinatorial
Optimization, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7.
ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Pure Nash equilibria
in restricted budget games,” Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2018.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.”
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer Nature, 2018, doi:10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7.
short: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, Journal of Combinatorial
Optimization (2018).
date_created: 2018-03-18T11:12:49Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:42Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z
file_id: '5225'
file_name: Drees2018_Article_PureNashEquilibriaInRestricted.pdf
file_size: 561187
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:56:13Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
publication: Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1382-6905
- 1573-2886
publication_status: epub_ahead
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games
type: journal_article
user_id: '14052'
year: '2018'
...
---
_id: '112'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate
dependencies among resources as they exist in in modern networked environments.
Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) which is a well-studied model in economics. We consider congestion games
with different aggregation functions. In particular, we study $L_p$ norms and
analyze the existence and complexity of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria. Additionally,
we give an almost tight characterization based on monotonicity properties to describe
the set of aggregation functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Lennart
full_name: Leder, Lennart
last_name: Leder
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion Games with Complementarities.
In: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
(CIAC). LNCS. ; 2017:222--233. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19'
apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Congestion Games with Complementarities.
In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
(CIAC) (pp. 222--233). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Congestion
Games with Complementarities}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and
Complexity (CIAC)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik,
Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={222--233}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion
Games with Complementarities.” In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), 222--233. LNCS, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19.
ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion Games with Complementarities,”
in Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
(CIAC), 2017, pp. 222--233.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Complementarities.” Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC),
2017, pp. 222--233, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19.
short: 'M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), 2017, pp. 222--233.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:13Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:58Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1701.07304'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
file_id: '1566'
file_name: 112-FeldottoLederSkopalik2017.pdf
file_size: 264089
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 222--233
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
(CIAC)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Congestion Games with Complementarities
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '113'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value
(SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers
weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to
proportional shares) for distributing the total cost of each resource among its
users. We focus on the interesting subclass of such games with polynomial resource
cost functions and present an algorithm that computes approximate pure Nash equilibria
with a polynomial number of strategy updates. Since computing a single strategy
update is hard, we apply sampling techniques which allow us to achieve polynomial
running time. The algorithm builds on the algorithmic ideas of [7], however, to
the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithmic result on computation
of approximate equilibria using other than proportional shares as player costs
in this setting. We present a novel relation that approximates the Shapley value
of a player by her proportional share and vice versa. As side results, we upper
bound the approximate price of anarchy of such games and significantly improve
the best known factor for computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted
congestion games of [7].
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Gairing, Martin
last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Grammateia
full_name: Kotsialou, Grammateia
last_name: Kotsialou
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Gairing M, Kotsialou G, Skopalik A. Computing Approximate Pure
Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games. In: Proceedings
of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE).
; 2017. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14'
apa: Feldotto, M., Gairing, M., Kotsialou, G., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Computing
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games. In
Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
(WINE). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Gairing_Kotsialou_Skopalik_2017, title={Computing
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games},
DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou,
Grammateia and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017} }'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Martin Gairing, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Alexander
Skopalik. “Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted
Congestion Games.” In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web
and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14.
ieee: M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, and A. Skopalik, “Computing Approximate
Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games,” in Proceedings
of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE),
2017.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley
Value Weighted Congestion Games.” Proceedings of the 13th International Conference
on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14.
short: 'M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:13Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:59Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1710.01634'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
file_id: '5231'
file_name: Feldotto2017_Chapter_ComputingApproximatePureNashEq.pdf
file_size: 279055
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)
status: public
title: Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion
Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '59'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We consider a scheduling problem on $m$ identical processors sharing an arbitrarily
divisible resource. In addition to assigning jobs to processors, the scheduler
must distribute the resource among the processors (e.g., for three processors
in shares of 20\%, 15\%, and 65\%) and adjust this distribution over time. Each
job $j$ comes with a size $p_j \in \mathbb{R}$ and a resource requirement $r_j
> 0$. Jobs do not benefit when receiving a share larger than $r_j$ of the resource.
But providing them with a fraction of the resource requirement causes a linear
decrease in the processing efficiency. We seek a (non-preemptive) job and resource
assignment minimizing the makespan.Our main result is an efficient approximation
algorithm which achieves an approximation ratio of $2 + 1/(m-2)$. It can be improved
to an (asymptotic) ratio of $1 + 1/(m-1)$ if all jobs have unit size. Our algorithms
also imply new results for a well-known bin packing problem with splittable items
and a restricted number of allowed item parts per bin.Based upon the above solution,
we also derive an approximation algorithm with similar guarantees for a setting
in which we introduce so-called tasks each containing several jobs and where we
are interested in the average completion time of tasks (a task is completed when
all its jobs are completed).
author:
- first_name: Peter
full_name: Kling, Peter
last_name: Kling
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Mäcker, Alexander
id: '13536'
last_name: Mäcker
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Kling P, Mäcker A, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor
Scheduling with a Sharable Resource. In: Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium
on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA). ; 2017:123--132. doi:10.1145/3087556.3087578'
apa: 'Kling, P., Mäcker, A., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Sharing is
Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource. In Proceedings
of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)
(pp. 123--132). https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Kling_Mäcker_Riechers_Skopalik_2017, title={Sharing is Caring:
Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource}, DOI={10.1145/3087556.3087578},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms
and Architectures (SPAA)}, author={Kling, Peter and Mäcker, Alexander and Riechers,
Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={123--132} }'
chicago: 'Kling, Peter, Alexander Mäcker, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Sharing Is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource.” In Proceedings
of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA),
123--132, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578.'
ieee: 'P. Kling, A. Mäcker, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor
Scheduling with a Sharable Resource,” in Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium
on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp. 123--132.'
mla: 'Kling, Peter, et al. “Sharing Is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a
Sharable Resource.” Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in
Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp. 123--132, doi:10.1145/3087556.3087578.'
short: 'P. Kling, A. Mäcker, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 29th
ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp.
123--132.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:46Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1145/3087556.3087578
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
file_id: '1578'
file_name: 59-progress.pdf
file_size: 784867
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 123--132
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and
Architectures (SPAA)
status: public
title: 'Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource'
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '66'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every
resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset
of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the
utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the
budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE)
do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of
singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for
each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential
function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which
depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual
player.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted
Budget Games. In: Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics
Conference (COCOON). LNCS. ; 2017:175--187. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15'
apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2017). Pure Nash
Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games. In Proceedings of the 23rd International
Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON) (pp. 175--187). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Pure
Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
(COCOON)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören
and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={175--187}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” In Proceedings of the 23rd
International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 175--187. LNCS,
2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15.
ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Pure Nash Equilibria
in Restricted Budget Games,” in Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing
and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 2017, pp. 175--187.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.”
Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
(COCOON), 2017, pp. 175--187, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15.
short: 'M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 2017, pp.
175--187.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:13Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
file_id: '5228'
file_name: Drees2017_Chapter_PureNashEquilibriaInRestricted.pdf
file_size: 346390
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 175--187
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
publication: Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
(COCOON)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1094'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Many university students struggle with motivational problems, and gamification
has the potential to address these problems. However, gamification is hardly used
in education, because current approaches to gamification require instructors to
engage in the time-consuming preparation of their course contents for use in quizzes,
mini-games and the like. Drawing on research on limited attention and present
bias, we propose a "lean" approach to gamification, which relies on gamifying
learning activities (rather than learning contents) and increasing their salience.
In this paper, we present the app StudyNow that implements such a lean gamification
approach. With this app, we aim to enable more students and instructors to benefit
from the advantages of gamification.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Thomas
full_name: John, Thomas
id: '3952'
last_name: John
- first_name: Dennis
full_name: Kundisch, Dennis
id: '21117'
last_name: Kundisch
- first_name: Paul
full_name: Hemsen, Paul
id: '22546'
last_name: Hemsen
- first_name: Katrin
full_name: Klingsieck, Katrin
last_name: Klingsieck
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, John T, Kundisch D, Hemsen P, Klingsieck K, Skopalik A. Making
Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow
Mobile App. In: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design
Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST). LNCS. ;
2017:462-467. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32'
apa: 'Feldotto, M., John, T., Kundisch, D., Hemsen, P., Klingsieck, K., & Skopalik,
A. (2017). Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content
with the StudyNow Mobile App. In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference
on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)
(pp. 462–467). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_John_Kundisch_Hemsen_Klingsieck_Skopalik_2017,
series={LNCS}, title={Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game
and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science
Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias
and John, Thomas and Kundisch, Dennis and Hemsen, Paul and Klingsieck, Katrin
and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={462–467}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Thomas John, Dennis Kundisch, Paul Hemsen, Katrin
Klingsieck, and Alexander Skopalik. “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor:
Decoupling Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App.” In Proceedings of
the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems
and Technology (DESRIST), 462–67. LNCS, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32.'
ieee: 'M. Feldotto, T. John, D. Kundisch, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, and A. Skopalik,
“Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with
the StudyNow Mobile App,” in Proceedings of the 12th International Conference
on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST),
2017, pp. 462–467.'
mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling
Game and Content with the StudyNow Mobile App.” Proceedings of the 12th International
Conference on Design Science Research in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST),
2017, pp. 462–67, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32.'
short: 'M. Feldotto, T. John, D. Kundisch, P. Hemsen, K. Klingsieck, A. Skopalik,
in: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research
in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST), 2017, pp. 462–467.'
date_created: 2018-01-05T08:37:52Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:53Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
- _id: '276'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-59144-5_32
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
file_id: '5230'
file_name: Feldotto2017_Chapter_MakingGamificationEasyForThePr.pdf
file_size: 1576363
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:09Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 462-467
publication: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Design Science Research
in Information Systems and Technology (DESRIST)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: 'Making Gamification Easy for the Professor: Decoupling Game and Content with
the StudyNow Mobile App'
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '209'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck
variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network
scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.
We characterize the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) and the convergence
of improvement dynamics. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the
approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Lennart
full_name: Leder, Lennart
last_name: Leder
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives. In:
Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization
and Applications (COCOA). LNCS. ; 2016:655--669. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47'
apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., & Skopalik, A. (2016). Congestion Games with Mixed
Objectives. In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA) (pp. 655--669). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2016, series={LNCS}, title={Congestion
Games with Mixed Objectives}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder,
Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={655--669}, collection={LNCS}
}'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion
Games with Mixed Objectives.” In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International
Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 655--669.
LNCS, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47.
ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives,”
in Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives.” Proceedings
of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and
Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47.
short: 'M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International
Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 655--669.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:32Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:54:41Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1607.05143'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z
file_id: '5233'
file_name: Feldotto2016_Chapter_CongestionGamesWithMixedObject.pdf
file_size: 235739
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:03:44Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 655--669
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '159'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Abstract—Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approachto a fair allocation
of bandwidth to each of the usersin a network. This allocation can be computed
by uniformlyraising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacityconstraints.
We consider an extension of these allocations byraising the bandwidth with arbitrary
and not necessarily uniformtime-depending velocities (allocation rates). These
allocationsare used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, whichwe formalize
in progressive filling games (PFGs). We present avariety of results for equilibria
in PFGs. We show that these gamespossess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While
computation ingeneral is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms forprominent
classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), includingthe case when all users have the
same source-destination pair.We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for
pure Nashand strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players havedifferent or
the same source-destination pairs. In addition, weshow that when a designer can
adjust allocation rates, it is possibleto design games with optimal strong equilibria.
Some initial resultson polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived.
author:
- first_name: Tobias
full_name: Harks, Tobias
last_name: Harks
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Höfer, Martin
last_name: Höfer
- first_name: Kevin
full_name: Schewior, Kevin
last_name: Schewior
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: Harks T, Höfer M, Schewior K, Skopalik A. Routing Games With Progressive Filling.
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking. 2016;(4):2553-2562. doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
apa: Harks, T., Höfer, M., Schewior, K., & Skopalik, A. (2016). Routing Games
With Progressive Filling. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, (4), 2553–2562.
https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
bibtex: '@article{Harks_Höfer_Schewior_Skopalik_2016, title={Routing Games With
Progressive Filling}, DOI={10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571},
number={4}, journal={IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking}, publisher={IEEE}, author={Harks,
Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior, Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016},
pages={2553–2562} }'
chicago: 'Harks, Tobias, Martin Höfer, Kevin Schewior, and Alexander Skopalik. “Routing
Games With Progressive Filling.” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, no.
4 (2016): 2553–62. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571.'
ieee: T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, and A. Skopalik, “Routing Games With Progressive
Filling,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, no. 4, pp. 2553–2562, 2016.
mla: Harks, Tobias, et al. “Routing Games With Progressive Filling.” IEEE/ACM
Transactions on Networking, no. 4, IEEE, 2016, pp. 2553–62, doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571.
short: T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, A. Skopalik, IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
(2016) 2553–2562.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:23Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:40Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T12:48:02Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:48:02Z
file_id: '1547'
file_name: 159-Harks-Hoefer-Schewior-Skopalik2016.pdf
file_size: 1655309
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:48:02Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 2553 - 2562
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
publisher: IEEE
status: public
title: Routing Games With Progressive Filling
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '149'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'In this paper we consider a strategic variant of the online facility location
problem. Given is a graph in which each node serves two roles: it is a strategic
client stating requests as well as a potential location for a facility. In each
time step one client states a request which induces private costs equal to the
distance to the closest facility. Before serving, the clients may collectively
decide to open new facilities, sharing the corresponding price. Instead of optimizing
the global costs, each client acts selfishly. The prices of new facilities vary
between nodes and also change over time, but are always bounded by some fixed
value α. Both the requests as well as the facility prices are given by an online
sequence and are not known in advance.We characterize the optimal strategies of
the clients and analyze their overall performance in comparison to a centralized
offline solution. If all players optimize their own competitiveness, the global
performance of the system is O(√α⋅α) times worse than the offline optimum. A restriction
to a natural subclass of strategies improves this result to O(α). We also show
that for fixed facility costs, we can find strategies such that this bound further
improves to O(√α).'
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Björn
full_name: Feldkord, Björn
id: '22704'
last_name: Feldkord
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Drees M, Feldkord B, Skopalik A. Strategic Online Facility Location. In: Proceedings
of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and
Applications (COCOA). LNCS. ; 2016:593--607. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43'
apa: Drees, M., Feldkord, B., & Skopalik, A. (2016). Strategic Online Facility
Location. In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA) (pp. 593--607). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldkord_Skopalik_2016, series={LNCS}, title={Strategic
Online Facility Location}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldkord,
Björn and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2016}, pages={593--607}, collection={LNCS}
}'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Björn Feldkord, and Alexander Skopalik. “Strategic Online
Facility Location.” In Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference
on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 593--607. LNCS, 2016.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43.
ieee: M. Drees, B. Feldkord, and A. Skopalik, “Strategic Online Facility Location,”
in Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 593--607.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Strategic Online Facility Location.” Proceedings
of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and
Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 593--607, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43.
short: 'M. Drees, B. Feldkord, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International
Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA), 2016, pp. 593--607.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:21Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:10Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_43
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T12:55:43Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:55:43Z
file_id: '1553'
file_name: 149-chp_3A10.1007_2F978-3-319-48749-6_43.pdf
file_size: 236253
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T12:55:43Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 593--607
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '5'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial
Optimization and Applications (COCOA)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Strategic Online Facility Location
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2016'
...
---
_id: '320'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics
of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency
functions, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed by a potential
function argument. Unfortunately, this proof of existence is inefficient and computing
pure Nash equilibria in such games is a PLS-hard problem even when all players
have unit weights. The situation gets worse when superlinear (e.g., quadratic)
latency functions come into play; in this case, the Nash dynamics of the game
may contain cycles and pure Nash equilibria may not even exist. Given these obstacles,
we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria as alternative solution concepts.
A ρ--approximate pure Nash equilibrium is a state of a (weighted congestion) game
from which no player has any incentive to deviate in order to improve her cost
by a multiplicative factor higher than ρ. Do such equilibria exist for small values
of ρ? And if so, can we compute them efficiently?We provide positive answers to
both questions for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions
by exploiting an “approximation” of such games by a new class of potential games
that we call Ψ-games. This allows us to show that these games have d!-approximate
pure Nash equilibria, where d is the maximum degree of the latency functions.
Our main technical contribution is an efficient algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate
pure Nash equilibria when d is a constant. For games with linear latency functions,
the approximation guarantee is 3+√5/2 + Oγ for arbitrarily small γ > 0; for latency
functions with maximum degree d≥ 2, it is d2d+o(d). The running time is polynomial
in the number of bits in the representation of the game and 1/γ. As a byproduct
of our techniques, we also show the following interesting structural statement
for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree
d ≥ 2: polynomially-long sequences of best-response moves from any initial state
to a dO(d2)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium exist and can be efficiently identified
in such games as long as d is a constant.To the best of our knowledge, these are
the first positive algorithmic results for approximate pure Nash equilibria in
weighted congestion games. Our techniques significantly extend our recent work
on unweighted congestion games through the use of Ψ-games. The concept of approximating
nonpotential games by potential ones is interesting in itself and might have further
applications.'
article_number: '2'
author:
- first_name: Ioannis
full_name: Caragiannis, Ioannis
last_name: Caragiannis
- first_name: Angelo
full_name: Fanelli, Angelo
last_name: Fanelli
- first_name: Nick
full_name: Gravin, Nick
last_name: Gravin
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Caragiannis I, Fanelli A, Gravin N, Skopalik A. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria
in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure.
Transactions on Economics and Computation. 2015;3(1). doi:10.1145/2614687'
apa: 'Caragiannis, I., Fanelli, A., Gravin, N., & Skopalik, A. (2015). Approximate
Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation,
and Structure. Transactions on Economics and Computation, 3(1).
https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687'
bibtex: '@article{Caragiannis_Fanelli_Gravin_Skopalik_2015, title={Approximate Pure
Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation,
and Structure}, volume={3}, DOI={10.1145/2614687},
number={12}, journal={Transactions on Economics and Computation}, publisher={ACM},
author={Caragiannis, Ioannis and Fanelli, Angelo and Gravin, Nick and Skopalik,
Alexander}, year={2015} }'
chicago: 'Caragiannis, Ioannis, Angelo Fanelli, Nick Gravin, and Alexander Skopalik.
“Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient
Computation, and Structure.” Transactions on Economics and Computation
3, no. 1 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1145/2614687.'
ieee: 'I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate Pure
Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation,
and Structure,” Transactions on Economics and Computation, vol. 3, no.
1, 2015.'
mla: 'Caragiannis, Ioannis, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted
Congestion Games: Existence, Efficient Computation, and Structure.” Transactions
on Economics and Computation, vol. 3, no. 1, 2, ACM, 2015, doi:10.1145/2614687.'
short: I. Caragiannis, A. Fanelli, N. Gravin, A. Skopalik, Transactions on Economics
and Computation 3 (2015).
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:54Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:04Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1145/2614687
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-20T07:40:55Z
date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:40:55Z
file_id: '1433'
file_name: 320-a2-caragiannis.pdf
file_size: 260503
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:40:55Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 3'
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Transactions on Economics and Computation
publisher: ACM
status: public
title: 'Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games: Existence,
Efficient Computation, and Structure'
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 3
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '271'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists
of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the
sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a
limited capacity and if it is exceeded by the total demand, it has to be split
between the players. Since these games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria,
we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve her
utility by more than some fixed factor $\alpha$ through unilateral strategy changes.
There is a threshold $\alpha_\delta$ (where $\delta$ is a parameter that limits
the demand of each player on a specific resource) such that $\alpha$-approximate
pure Nash equilibria always exist for $\alpha \geq \alpha_\delta$, but not for
$\alpha < \alpha_\delta$. We give both upper and lower bounds on this threshold
$\alpha_\delta$ and show that the corresponding decision problem is ${\sf NP}$-hard.
We also show that the $\alpha$-approximate price of anarchy for BAGs is $\alpha+1$.
For a restricted version of the game, where demands of players only differ slightly
from each other (e.g. symmetric games), we show that approximate Nash equilibria
can be reached (and thus also be computed) in polynomial time using the best-response
dynamic. Finally, we show that a broader class of utility-maximization games (which
includes BAGs) converges quickly towards states whose social welfare is close
to the optimum.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. On Existence and Properties of
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games. In: Proceedings
of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. ; 2015:178-189. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14'
apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2015). On Existence
and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games.
In Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT) (pp. 178–189). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2015, series={Lecture Notes
in Computer Science}, title={On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash
Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
Theory (SAGT)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers,
Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2015}, pages={178–189}, collection={Lecture
Notes in Computer Science} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
“On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth
Allocation Games.” In Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), 178–89. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14.
ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “On Existence and Properties
of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games,” in Proceedings
of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015,
pp. 178–189.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure
Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games.” Proceedings of the 8th International
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015, pp. 178–89, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14.
short: 'M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2015, pp. 178–189.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:45Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:34Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14
external_id:
arxiv:
- '1507.02908'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z
date_updated: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z
file_id: '1475'
file_name: 271-chp_3A10.1007_2F978-3-662-48433-3_14.pdf
file_size: 256718
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T09:29:34Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 178-189
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
publication: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT)
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth
Allocation Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2015'
...
---
_id: '370'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approach to a fair allocation of
bandwidth to each of the users in a network. This allocation can be computed by
uniformly raising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacity constraints.
We consider an extension of these allocations by raising the bandwidth with arbitrary
and not necessarily uniform time-depending velocities (allocation rates). These
allocations are used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, which we
formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs).We present a variety of results
for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these games possess pure Nash and strong
equilibria. While computation in general is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time
algorithms for prominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), including the case
when all users have the same source-destination pair. We characterize prices of
anarchy and stability for pure Nash and strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when
players have different or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, we show
that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possible to design games
with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial results on polynomial-time algorithms
in this direction are also derived. '
author:
- first_name: Tobias
full_name: Harks, Tobias
last_name: Harks
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Höfer, Martin
last_name: Höfer
- first_name: Kevin
full_name: Schewior, Kevin
last_name: Schewior
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Harks T, Höfer M, Schewior K, Skopalik A. Routing Games with Progressive Filling.
In: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications (INFOCOM’14). ; 2014:352-360. doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571'
apa: Harks, T., Höfer, M., Schewior, K., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Routing Games
with Progressive Filling. In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International
Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14) (pp. 352–360). https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Harks_Höfer_Schewior_Skopalik_2014, title={Routing Games
with Progressive Filling}, DOI={10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications (INFOCOM’14)}, author={Harks, Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior,
Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={352–360} }'
chicago: Harks, Tobias, Martin Höfer, Kevin Schewior, and Alexander Skopalik. “Routing
Games with Progressive Filling.” In Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International
Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), 352–60, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571.
ieee: T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, and A. Skopalik, “Routing Games with Progressive
Filling,” in Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on
Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14), 2014, pp. 352–360.
mla: Harks, Tobias, et al. “Routing Games with Progressive Filling.” Proceedings
of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14),
2014, pp. 352–60, doi:10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571.
short: 'T. Harks, M. Höfer, K. Schewior, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 33rd
Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM’14),
2014, pp. 352–360.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:30Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z
date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z
file_id: '1402'
file_name: 370-HHSS14.pdf
file_size: 179583
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T07:17:04Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 352-360
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 33rd Annual IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications (INFOCOM'14)
status: public
title: Routing Games with Progressive Filling
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '451'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and
each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has
a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has
to be shared between the tasks. We study strategic budget games, where the budget
is shared proportionally. We also consider a variant in which the order of the
strategic decisions influences the distribution of the budgets. The complexity
of the optimal solution as well as existence, complexity and quality of equilibria
are analysed. Finally, we show that the time an ordered budget game needs to convergence
towards an equilibrium may be exponential.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
full_name: Drees, Maximilian
last_name: Drees
- first_name: Sören
full_name: Riechers, Sören
last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Drees M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Budget-restricted utility games with ordered
strategic decisions. In: Lavi R, ed. Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium
on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). Lecture Notes in Computer Science. ; 2014:110-121.
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10'
apa: Drees, M., Riechers, S., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Budget-restricted utility
games with ordered strategic decisions. In R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings of the
7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (pp. 110–121).
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Riechers_Skopalik_2014, series={Lecture Notes in Computer
Science}, title={Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions},
DOI={10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
Theory (SAGT)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander},
editor={Lavi, RonEditor}, year={2014}, pages={110–121}, collection={Lecture Notes
in Computer Science} }'
chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik. “Budget-Restricted
Utility Games with Ordered Strategic Decisions.” In Proceedings of the 7th
International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi,
110–21. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10.
ieee: M. Drees, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Budget-restricted utility games with
ordered strategic decisions,” in Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium
on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, pp. 110–121.
mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Budget-Restricted Utility Games with Ordered Strategic
Decisions.” Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi, 2014, pp. 110–21, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10.
short: 'M. Drees, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings of the
7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, pp. 110–121.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:07Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-44803-8_10
editor:
- first_name: Ron
full_name: Lavi, Ron
last_name: Lavi
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z
file_id: '1344'
file_name: 451-DRS14.pdf
file_size: 283266
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:25:10Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 110-121
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '14'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C2
- _id: '16'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
publication: Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT)
series_title: Lecture Notes in Computer Science
status: public
title: Budget-restricted utility games with ordered strategic decisions
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '452'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: Today's networks, like the Internet, do not consist of one but a mixture of
several interconnected networks. Each has individual qualities and hence the performance
of a network node results from the networks' interplay.We introduce a new game
theoretic model capturing the interplay between a high-speed backbone network
and a low-speed general purpose network. In our model, n nodes are connected by
a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway node.
A gateway node pays a fixed price for its connection to the high-speed network,
but can utilize the high-speed network to gain communication distance 0 to all
other gateways. Communication distances in the low-speed network are given by
the hop distances. The effective communication distance between any two nodes
then is given by the shortest path, which is possibly improved by using gateways
as shortcuts.Every node v has the objective to minimize its communication costs,
given by the sum (SUM-game) or maximum (MAX-game) of the effective communication
distances from v to all other nodes plus a fixed price \alpha > 0, if it decides
to be a gateway. For both games and different ranges of \alpha, we study the existence
of equilibria, the price of anarchy, and convergence properties of best-response
dynamics.
author:
- first_name: Sebastian
full_name: Abshoff, Sebastian
last_name: Abshoff
- first_name: Andreas
full_name: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas
last_name: Cord-Landwehr
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Jung, Daniel
id: '37827'
last_name: Jung
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Abshoff S, Cord-Landwehr A, Jung D, Skopalik A. Brief Announcement: A Model
for Multilevel Network Games. In: Lavi R, ed. Proceedings of the 7th International
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). LNCS. ; 2014:294.'
apa: 'Abshoff, S., Cord-Landwehr, A., Jung, D., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Brief
Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games. In R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings
of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (p. 294).'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Abshoff_Cord-Landwehr_Jung_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS},
title={Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games}, booktitle={Proceedings
of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, author={Abshoff,
Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander},
editor={Lavi, RonEditor}, year={2014}, pages={294}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: 'Abshoff, Sebastian, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and Alexander
Skopalik. “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games.” In Proceedings
of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), edited
by Ron Lavi, 294. LNCS, 2014.'
ieee: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, and A. Skopalik, “Brief Announcement:
A Model for Multilevel Network Games,” in Proceedings of the 7th International
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, p. 294.'
mla: 'Abshoff, Sebastian, et al. “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network
Games.” Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
Theory (SAGT), edited by Ron Lavi, 2014, p. 294.'
short: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, A. Skopalik, in: R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings
of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, p.
294.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:08Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
editor:
- first_name: Ron
full_name: Lavi, Ron
last_name: Lavi
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z
file_id: '1343'
file_name: 452-title_multilevel-sagt.pdf
file_size: 84783
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: '294'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '5'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: 'Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games'
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '453'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In this paper we study the potential function in congestion games. We consider
both games with non-decreasing cost functions as well as games with non-increasing
utility functions. We show that the value of the potential function $\Phi(\sf
s)$ of any outcome $\sf s$ of a congestion game approximates the optimum potential
value $\Phi(\sf s^*)$ by a factor $\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$ which only depends on the
set of cost/utility functions $\mathcal{F}$, and an additive term which is bounded
by the sum of the total possible improvements of the players in the outcome $\sf
s$. The significance of this result is twofold. On the one hand it provides \emph{Price-of-Anarchy}-like
results with respect to the potential function. On the other hand, we show that
these approximations can be used to compute $(1+\varepsilon)\cdot\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$-approximate
pure Nash equilibria for congestion games with non-decreasing cost functions.
For the special case of polynomial cost functions, this significantly improves
the guarantees from Caragiannis et al. [FOCS 2011]. Moreover, our machinery provides
the first guarantees for general latency functions.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Martin
full_name: Gairing, Martin
last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Gairing M, Skopalik A. Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion
Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE). LNCS. ; 2014:30-43. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3'
apa: Feldotto, M., Gairing, M., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Bounding the Potential
Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In Proceedings
of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)
(pp. 30–43). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Gairing_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Bounding
the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria},
DOI={10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Skopalik,
Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={30–43}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Martin Gairing, and Alexander Skopalik. “Bounding the
Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.”
In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
(WINE), 30–43. LNCS, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3.
ieee: M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, and A. Skopalik, “Bounding the Potential Function
in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria,” in Proceedings of
the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014,
pp. 30–43.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games
and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.” Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 30–43, doi:10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3.
short: 'M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 30–43.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
file_id: '1342'
file_name: 453-WINE14FGS.pdf
file_size: 324307
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 30-43
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
Economics (WINE)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash
Equilibria
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '455'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion
games and develop techniques to obtain approximate potential functions that prove
the existence of alpha-approximate pure Nash equilibria and the convergence of
alpha-improvement steps. Specifically, we show how to obtain upper bounds for
approximation factor alpha for a given class of cost functions. For example for
concave cost functions the factor is at most 3/2, for quadratic cost functions
it is at most 4/3, and for polynomial cost functions of maximal degree d it is
at at most d + 1. For games with two players we obtain tight bounds which are
as small as for example 1.054 in the case of quadratic cost functions.
author:
- first_name: Christoph
full_name: Hansknecht, Christoph
last_name: Hansknecht
- first_name: Max
full_name: Klimm, Max
last_name: Klimm
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Hansknecht C, Klimm M, Skopalik A. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted
congestion games. In: Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation
Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX). LIPIcs. ; 2014:242-257.
doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242'
apa: Hansknecht, C., Klimm, M., & Skopalik, A. (2014). Approximate pure Nash
equilibria in weighted congestion games. In Proceedings of the 17th. International
Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)
(pp. 242–257). https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Hansknecht_Klimm_Skopalik_2014, series={LIPIcs}, title={Approximate
pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games}, DOI={10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms
for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)}, author={Hansknecht, Christoph
and Klimm, Max and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={242–257}, collection={LIPIcs}
}'
chicago: Hansknecht, Christoph, Max Klimm, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate
Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games.” In Proceedings of the 17th.
International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization
Problems (APPROX), 242–57. LIPIcs, 2014. https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242.
ieee: C. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate pure Nash equilibria
in weighted congestion games,” in Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop
on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX),
2014, pp. 242–257.
mla: Hansknecht, Christoph, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted
Congestion Games.” Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation
Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX), 2014, pp. 242–57,
doi:10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242.
short: 'C. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 17th. International
Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX),
2014, pp. 242–257.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z
date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z
file_id: '1341'
file_name: 455-HKS14.pdf
file_size: 512712
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 242 - 257
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms
for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)
series_title: LIPIcs
status: public
title: Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...