---
_id: '456'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibriain social context
    congestion games. For any given set of allowed costfunctions F, we provide a threshold
    value μ(F), and show that for theclass of social context congestion games with
    cost functions from F, α-Nash dynamics are guaranteed to converge to α-approximate
    pure Nashequilibrium if and only if α > μ(F).Interestingly, μ(F) is related and
    always upper bounded by Roughgarden’sanarchy value [19].
author:
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Gairing, Martin
  last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Grammateia
  full_name: Kotsialou, Grammateia
  last_name: Kotsialou
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Gairing M, Kotsialou G, Skopalik A. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social
    Context Congestion Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
    on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>. LNCS. ; 2014:480-485. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>'
  apa: Gairing, M., Kotsialou, G., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Approximate pure Nash
    equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i> (pp. 480–485). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Gairing_Kotsialou_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Approximate
    pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)}, author={Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou, Grammateia and Skopalik,
    Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={480–485}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: Gairing, Martin, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate
    Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games.” In <i>Proceedings of
    the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 480–85.
    LNCS, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>.
  ieee: M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate pure Nash equilibria
    in Social Context Congestion Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 480–485.
  mla: Gairing, Martin, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context
    Congestion Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web
    and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 480–85, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>.
  short: 'M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 480–485.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:21Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:10Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z
  file_id: '1340'
  file_name: 456-WINE14final.pdf
  file_size: 377378
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 480 - 485
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
  Economics (WINE)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '462'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We discuss a technique to analyze complex infinitely repeated games using
    techniques from the fields of game theory and simulations. Our research is motivated
    by the analysis of electronic markets with thousands of participants and possibly
    complex strategic behavior. We consider an example of a global market of composed
    IT services to demonstrate the use of our simulation technique. We present our
    current work in this area and we want to discuss further approaches for the future.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Skopalik A. A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely
    Repeated Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation
    and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)</i>.
    ; 2014:625-630. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">10.5220/0005110406250630</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). A Simulation Framework for Analyzing
    Complex Infinitely Repeated Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 4th International
    Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications
    (SIMULTECH 2014)</i> (pp. 625–630). <a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Skopalik_2014, title={A Simulation Framework for
    Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">10.5220/0005110406250630</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling
    Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)}, author={Feldotto,
    Matthias and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={625–630} }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for
    Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 4th International
    Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications
    (SIMULTECH 2014)</i>, 625–30, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto and A. Skopalik, “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex
    Infinitely Repeated Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
    on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
    2014)</i>, 2014, pp. 625–630.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing
    Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
    on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
    2014)</i>, 2014, pp. 625–30, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">10.5220/0005110406250630</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
    on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
    2014), 2014, pp. 625–630.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:22Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:15Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.5220/0005110406250630
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
  file_id: '1337'
  file_name: 462-FS2014SIMULTECH.pdf
  file_size: 993721
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 625-630
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
publication: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling
  Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)
status: public
title: A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '395'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improvetheir communication
    costs by connecting to a high-speed network.The n nodes are connected by a static
    network and each node can decideindividually to become a gateway to the high-speed
    network. The goalof a node v is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game)
    ormaximum (MAX-game) of communication distances from v to all othernodes plus
    a fixed price α > 0 if it decides to be a gateway. Between gatewaysthe communication
    distance is 0, and gateways also improve othernodes’ distances by behaving as
    shortcuts. For the SUM-game, we showthat for α ≤ n − 1, the price of anarchy is
    Θ (n/√α) and in this rangeequilibria always exist. In range α ∈ (n−1, n(n−1))
    the price of anarchyis Θ(√α), and for α ≥ n(n − 1) it is constant. For the MAX-game,
    weshow that the price of anarchy is either Θ (1 + n/√α), for α ≥ 1, orelse 1.
    Given a graph with girth of at least 4α, equilibria always exist.Concerning the
    dynamics, both games are not potential games. For theSUM-game, we even show that
    it is not weakly acyclic.
author:
- first_name: Sebastian
  full_name: Abshoff, Sebastian
  last_name: Abshoff
- first_name: Andreas
  full_name: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas
  last_name: Cord-Landwehr
- first_name: Daniel
  full_name: Jung, Daniel
  id: '37827'
  last_name: Jung
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Abshoff S, Cord-Landwehr A, Jung D, Skopalik A. Multilevel Network Games.
    In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
    (WINE)</i>. LNCS. ; 2014:435-440. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>'
  apa: Abshoff, S., Cord-Landwehr, A., Jung, D., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Multilevel
    Network Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and
    Internet Economics (WINE)</i> (pp. 435–440). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Abshoff_Cord-Landwehr_Jung_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS},
    title={Multilevel Network Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)}, author={Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung,
    Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={435–440}, collection={LNCS}
    }'
  chicago: Abshoff, Sebastian, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and Alexander Skopalik.
    “Multilevel Network Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
    on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 435–40. LNCS, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>.
  ieee: S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, and A. Skopalik, “Multilevel Network
    Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 435–440.
  mla: Abshoff, Sebastian, et al. “Multilevel Network Games.” <i>Proceedings of the
    10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014,
    pp. 435–40, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>.
  short: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
    10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp.
    435–440.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:09Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:59Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z
  file_id: '1382'
  file_name: 395-WINE2014ACJS.pdf
  file_size: 161479
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 435-440
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '5'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
  Economics (WINE)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Multilevel Network Games
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
year: '2014'
...