@inproceedings{61506,
  author       = {{Karakaya, Kadiray and Klauke, Jonas and Yigitbas, Enes}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Virtual and Augmented Reality Software Engineering (VARSE) @ ASE 2025 }},
  title        = {{{Toward Static Analysis of Immersive Attacks}}},
  year         = {{2025}},
}

@inbook{53942,
  abstract     = {{<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Since its inception two decades ago, <jats:sc>Soot</jats:sc> has become one of the most widely used open-source static analysis frameworks. Over time it has been extended with the contributions of countless researchers. Yet, at the same time, the requirements for <jats:sc>Soot</jats:sc> have changed over the years and become increasingly at odds with some of the major design decisions that underlie it. In this work, we thus present <jats:sc>SootUp</jats:sc>, a complete reimplementation of <jats:sc>Soot</jats:sc> that seeks to fulfill these requirements with a novel design, while at the same time keeping elements that <jats:sc>Soot</jats:sc> users have grown accustomed to.</jats:p>}},
  author       = {{Karakaya, Kadiray and Schott, Stefan and Klauke, Jonas and Bodden, Eric and Schmidt, Markus and Luo, Linghui and He, Dongjie}},
  booktitle    = {{Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems}},
  isbn         = {{9783031572456}},
  issn         = {{0302-9743}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Nature Switzerland}},
  title        = {{{SootUp: A Redesign of the Soot Static Analysis Framework}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-031-57246-3_13}},
  year         = {{2024}},
}

@inproceedings{57550,
  author       = {{Schott, Stefan and Ponta, Serena Elisa and Fischer, Wolfram and Klauke, Jonas and Bodden, Eric}},
  booktitle    = {{38th European Conference on Object-Oriented Programming (ECOOP 2024)}},
  location     = {{Vienna}},
  title        = {{{Java Bytecode Normalization for Code Similarity Analysis}}},
  doi          = {{10.4230/LIPIcs.ECOOP.2024.37}},
  year         = {{2024}},
}

@inproceedings{58716,
  author       = {{Schott, Stefan and Fischer, Wolfram and Ponta, Serena Elisa and Klauke, Jonas and Bodden, Eric}},
  booktitle    = {{2024 IEEE International Conference on Software Maintenance and Evolution (ICSME)}},
  publisher    = {{IEEE}},
  title        = {{{Compilation of Commit Changes Within Java Source Code Repositories}}},
  doi          = {{10.1109/icsme58944.2024.00038}},
  year         = {{2024}},
}

@article{34402,
  author       = {{Yigitbas, Enes and Klauke, Jonas and Gottschalk, Sebastian and Engels, Gregor}},
  journal      = {{Journal on Computer Languages (COLA) }},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier}},
  title        = {{{End-User Development of Interactive Web-Based Virtual Reality Scenes}}},
  year         = {{2023}},
}

@inproceedings{22482,
  author       = {{Yigitbas, Enes and Klauke, Jonas and Gottschalk, Sebastian and Engels, Gregor}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 2021 IEEE Symposium on Visual Languages and Human-Centric Computing (VL/HCC) }},
  publisher    = {{IEEE}},
  title        = {{{VREUD - An End-User Development Tool to Simplify the Creation of Interactive VR Scenes}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@inproceedings{28997,
  abstract     = {{Modern cryptographic protocols, such as TLS 1.3 and QUIC, can send cryptographically protected data in “zero round-trip times (0-RTT)”, that is, without the need for a prior interactive handshake. Such protocols meet the demand for communication with minimal latency, but those currently deployed in practice achieve only rather weak security properties, as they may not achieve forward security for the first transmitted payload message and require additional countermeasures against replay attacks.Recently, 0-RTT protocols with full forward security and replay resilience have been proposed in the academic literature. These are based on puncturable encryption, which uses rather heavy building blocks, such as cryptographic pairings. Some constructions were claimed to have practical efficiency, but it is unclear how they compare concretely to protocols deployed in practice, and we currently do not have any benchmark results that new protocols can be compared with.We provide the first concrete performance analysis of a modern 0-RTT protocol with full forward security, by integrating the Bloom Filter Encryption scheme of Derler et al. (EUROCRYPT 2018) in the Chromium QUIC implementation and comparing it to Google’s original QUIC protocol. We find that for reasonable deployment parameters, the server CPU load increases approximately by a factor of eight and the memory consumption on the server increases significantly, but stays below 400&nbsp;MB even for medium-scale deployments that handle up&nbsp;to 50K connections per day. The difference of the size of handshake messages is small enough that transmission time on the network is identical, and therefore not significant.We conclude that while current 0-RTT protocols with full forward security come with significant computational overhead, their use in practice is feasible, and may be used in applications where the increased CPU and memory load can be tolerated in exchange for full forward security and replay resilience on the cryptographic protocol level. Our results serve as a first benchmark that can be used to assess the efficiency of 0-RTT protocols potentially developed in the future.
}},
  author       = {{Dallmeier, Fynn and Drees, Jan P. and Gellert, Kai and Handirk, Tobias and Jager, Tibor and Klauke, Jonas and Nachtigall, Simon and Renzelmann, Timo and Wolf, Rudi}},
  booktitle    = {{Cryptology and Network Security}},
  isbn         = {{9783030654108}},
  issn         = {{0302-9743}},
  location     = {{Vienna}},
  pages        = {{211--231}},
  publisher    = {{Springer-Verlag}},
  title        = {{{Forward-Secure 0-RTT Goes Live: Implementation and Performance Analysis in QUIC}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-030-65411-5_11}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}