@book{35115,
  author       = {{Ruhnke, Klaus and Simons, Dirk and Sievers, Sönke}},
  publisher    = {{Schäffer-Poeschel}},
  title        = {{{Rechnungslegung nach IFRS und HGB: Lehrbuch zur Theorie und Praxis der Unternehmenspublizität mit Beispielen und Übungen}}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@article{35719,
  author       = {{Kengelbach, Jens and Keienburg, Georg and Söllner, Tobias and Wang, Yiran and Sievers, Sönke and Friedmann, Daniel and Nielsen, Jesper}},
  journal      = {{BCG M&A Report 2022}},
  title        = {{{Green Deals Gain Steam }}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@article{35722,
  author       = {{Kengelbach, Jens and Friedman, Daniel and Keienburg, Georg and Degen, Dominik and Söllner, Tobias and Wang, Yiran and Sievers, Sönke}},
  journal      = {{BCG M&A Report 2022}},
  title        = {{{Do Green Deals Create Value? }}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@techreport{34599,
  author       = {{Hartmann, Jochen and Pelster, Matthias and Sievers, Sönke}},
  publisher    = {{TAF Working Paper No. 66/January 2022}},
  title        = {{{Can the market identify prosperous activist engagements? Evidence from announcement and long-term buy-and-hold returns}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@techreport{34634,
  author       = {{Landsman, Wayne R and Liß, Alexander and Sievers, Sönke}},
  publisher    = {{TRR}},
  title        = {{{The pricing of acquired intangibles}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@article{20866,
  author       = {{Sievers, Sönke and Degen, Dominik and Kim, Daniel and Kengelbach, Jens}},
  journal      = {{M&A Review Europe }},
  title        = {{{How Private Equity can leverage downturn M&A for value creation}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{20871,
  abstract     = {{How is merger and acquisition (M&A) success associated with firm internal M&A process organization? The literature thus far acknowledges that unobservable internal firm characteristics are at least as important as observable firm- and deal-specific characteristics in regard to explaining M&A success. Thus, this paper directly asks M&A experts around the globe to shed more light on this important issue. We investigate three indices, capturing the degree of M&A 1) process standardization, 2) process duration, and 3) process attention. Next, we analyze the process participation among four organizational layers, i.e., the functional involvement of the a) top management team, b) headquarters, c) business unit management, and d) business unit functions. We predict and find that all three indices are positively associated with M&A success, while process standardization and attention to deal strategy are of particular importance. Turning to the four organizational layers, a textured analysis shows that, for instance, target valuation should be performed by the headquarters functions but not by the top management team or the business unit. Overall, our findings are important to better understand unexplored M&A success drivers and provide directions for future research. Finally, our results might help practitioners adjust their M&A process organization to further improve their M&A success.}},
  author       = {{Sievers, Sönke and Alexander, Schmitz}},
  keywords     = {{Mergers, Acquisitions, Success, Processes, Organization}},
  pages        = {{73}},
  title        = {{{What matters for organizing M&As successfully?}}},
  doi          = {{10.2139/ssrn.3679155}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{20873,
  author       = {{Sievers, Sönke and Keienburg, Georg and Degen, Dominik and Söllner, Tobias and Kashyrkin, Anton}},
  publisher    = {{The Boston Consulting Group, Inc., M&A Report}},
  title        = {{{Alternative Deals Gain Traction}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{20874,
  author       = {{Sievers, Sönke and Degen, Dominik and Kim, Daniel and Kengelbach, Jens}},
  journal      = {{M&A Review}},
  pages        = {{266--271}},
  title        = {{{Downturn M&A: Die Erfolgsstrategie der Stunde?}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{34595,
  author       = {{Mehring, Oliver and Olsson, Per and Sievers, Sönke and Sofilkanitsch, Christian}},
  publisher    = {{TRR}},
  title        = {{{Co-movement of Price and Intrinsic Value-Does Accounting Information Matter?}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{34636,
  author       = {{Mehring, Oliver and Müller, Jens and Sievers, Sönke and Sofilkanitsch, Christian}},
  publisher    = {{TRR}},
  title        = {{{Does Learning About Low GAAP Reporting Quality Change Investors’ Perceptions of Aggressive Non-GAAP Reporting Choices?}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{34635,
  author       = {{Mehring, Oliver and Olsson, Per and Sievers, Sönke and Sofilkanitsch, Christian}},
  title        = {{{Online Appendix to: Co-movement of Price and Intrinsic Value-Does Accounting Information Matter?}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{34638,
  author       = {{Hüther, Niklas and Robinson, David T and Sievers, Sönke and Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas}},
  journal      = {{Management Science}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{1756–1782}},
  publisher    = {{INFORMS}},
  title        = {{{Paying for performance in private equity: Evidence from venture capital partnerships}}},
  volume       = {{66}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{34637,
  author       = {{Schmitz, Alexander and Sievers, Sönke}},
  title        = {{{What are the effects of strategy consultants, financial, and legal M&A advisors on M&A success?}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{20688,
  abstract     = {{We offer the first empirical analysis connecting the timing of general partner (GP) compensation to private equity fund performance. Using detailed information on limited partnership agreements between private equity limited and general partners, we find that “GP-friendly” contracts—agreements that pay general partners on a deal-by-deal basis instead of withholding carried interest until a benchmark return has been earned—are associated with higher returns, both gross and net of fees. This is robust to measures of performance persistence, time period effects, and other contract terms and is related to exit-timing incentives. Timing practices balance GP incentives against limited partner downside protection.}},
  author       = {{Hüther, Niklas and Robinson, David T. and Sievers, Sönke and Hartmann-Wendels, Thomas}},
  issn         = {{0025-1909}},
  journal      = {{Management Science (VHB-JOURQUAL 3 Ranking A+)}},
  keywords     = {{venture capital, compensation, private equity, VC partnership, pay-performance relation}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{1756--1782}},
  title        = {{{Paying for Performance in Private Equity: Evidence from Venture Capital Partnerships}}},
  doi          = {{10.1287/mnsc.2018.3274}},
  volume       = {{66}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{20875,
  author       = {{Sievers, Sönke and Kengelbach, Jens and Keienburg, Georg and Bader, Maximilian and Degen, Dominik and Gell, Jeff and Nielsen, Jesper}},
  publisher    = {{The Boston Consulting Group, Inc., M&A Report}},
  title        = {{{Downturns Are a Better Time For Deal Hunting}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{5411,
  abstract     = {{Öffentlich gelistete Firmen, die die Mehrheit an anderen börsennotierten Unternehmen er-werben und den Kapitalmarkt an den Synergieerwartungen teilhaben lassen, werden mit höheren kumulativen abnormalen Renditen im Ankündigungszeitpunkt belohnt verglichen mit solchen Unternehmen, die diese geheim halten. Des Weiteren ist die empirische Evi-denz konsistent mit der Idee, dass diese Käuferunternehmen ihre Transaktionen besser in-tegrieren, weil auch die industrieadjustierten Ein- und Zweijahresrenditen der ankündigen-den Unternehmen ökonomisch und statistisch signifikant höher sind als die der zurückhal-tenden Käuferfirmen. }},
  author       = {{Mehring, Oliver and Sievers, Sönke and Keienburg, Georg and Kengelbach, Jens}},
  pages        = {{76--84}},
  publisher    = {{Corporate Finance}},
  title        = {{{Wertgenerierung bei M&A Transaktionen durch Bekanntgabe von Synergien?}}},
  volume       = {{3-4}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{13137,
  abstract     = {{Non-GAAP reporting is under debate as managers may opportunistically inflate non-GAAP earnings. By separating firms into groups based on exclusions of recurring expenses before material restatements occur this paper investigates whether market participants are misled based on ex-ante non-GAAP reporting. The results show a decline in cumulative abnormal returns (–11.8% aggressive non-GAAP Reporting vs. –2.7% non-aggressive non-GAAP reporting), reduction in overvaluation (–22.18% vs. no decline) and losses in the earnings response coefficient (–51.8% vs. no significant decline) for firms with prior aggressive non-GAAP reporting. Further, we document that investors are less responsive to aggressively reported non-GAAP earnings ex-post, indicating that increased attention enhances investor’s ability to see through the quality of non-GAAP exclusions. }},
  author       = {{Müller, Jens and Sievers, Sönke and Mehring, Oliver and Sofilkanitsch, Christian}},
  keywords     = {{Keywords: non-GAAP reporting, restatements, information content of earnings, firm value, overvaluation}},
  pages        = {{65}},
  title        = {{{Non-GAAP Reporting and Investor Attention: Are Investors Misled by Exclusions of Recurring Expenses from Non-GAAP Earnings before Restatement Announcements?}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@article{35120,
  author       = {{Kengelbach, Jens and Keienburg, Georg and Gell, Jeff and Nielsen, Jesper and Bader, Maximilian and Degen, Dominik and Sievers, Sönke}},
  journal      = {{The 2019 M&A-Report}},
  publisher    = {{The Boston Consulting Group}},
  title        = {{{Downturns are a better time for deal hunting}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}

@techreport{35116,
  author       = {{Sievers, Sönke and Sofilkanitsch, Christian}},
  title        = {{{Determinants of Financial Misreporting: A Survey of the Financial Restatement Literature}}},
  year         = {{2019}},
}