@techreport{22213,
  author       = {{Lorenz, Johannes and Sureth-Sloane, Caren and Diller, Markus}},
  publisher    = {{Executive Summary}},
  title        = {{{Abweichende steuerliche Verrechnungspreise in der Steuererklärung oder als Ergebnis einer Betriebsprüfung zwischen verschiedenen Staaten}}},
  doi          = {{10.52569/eexu5414}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@misc{21402,
  author       = {{Sureth-Sloane, Caren and Simons, Dirk}},
  booktitle    = {{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}},
  number       = {{Nr. 20}},
  pages        = {{16}},
  title        = {{{Wie kompliziert darf eine Regel sein?}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@techreport{24517,
  author       = {{Harst, Simon and Schanz, Deborah and Siegel, Felix and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  publisher    = {{TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency}},
  title        = {{{2020 Global MNC Tax Complexity Survey}}},
  doi          = {{10.52569/jtln9499}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@misc{29052,
  author       = {{Lagarden, Martin and Schreiber, Ulrich and Simons, Dirk and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  publisher    = {{Schmalenbach IMPULSE}},
  title        = {{{Wem nutzt Public Country-by-Country Reporting?}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@book{29053,
  author       = {{Maßbaum, Alexandra and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  publisher    = {{Neue Wirtschafts-Briefe}},
  title        = {{{Besteuerung und Rechtsformwahl, 8., aktualisierte und erweiterte Auflage}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@misc{29055,
  author       = {{Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  booktitle    = {{Süddeutsche Zeitung}},
  title        = {{{Zur Komplexität des Steuersystems}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@techreport{22923,
  author       = {{Fochmann, Martin and Heile, Vanessa and Huber, Hans-Peter and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{Umfrage: Steuerliche Belastung deutscher Unternehmen – Steuerlast und Verwaltungskosten}}},
  doi          = {{10.52569/xgkv7897}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@techreport{17514,
  abstract     = {{This paper introduces an index that captures the complexity of countries’ corporate income tax systems faced by multinational corporations. It is based on surveys of highly experienced tax consultants of the largest international tax services networks. The index, called the Tax Complexity Index (TCI), is composed of a tax code subindex covering tax regulations and a tax framework subindex covering tax processes and features. For a sample of 100 countries for the year 2016, we find that the level of tax complexity varies considerably across countries, while tax code and framework complexity also vary within countries. From a global perspective, tax complexity is strongly driven by the complexity of both transfer pricing regulations in the tax code and tax audits in the tax framework. When analyzing the associations with other country characteristics, we identify different correlation patterns. For example, tax framework complexity is negatively associated with countries’ governance, suggesting that strongly governed countries tend to have less complex tax frameworks, while tax code complexity is positively associated with the statutory tax rate, indicating that high-tax countries tend to have more complex tax codes. However, none of the observed associa-tions are very strong. We conclude that tax complexity represents a distinct country charac-teristic and propose the use of our TCI and its subindices in future research.}},
  author       = {{Hoppe, Thomas and Schanz, Debora and Sturm, Susann and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{The Tax Complexity Index – A Survey-Based Country Measure of Tax Code and Framework Complexity}}},
  doi          = {{10.2139/ssrn.3469663}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@techreport{24676,
  abstract     = {{This study investigates the effect of mandatory public Country-by-Country Reporting (CbCR) for European banks on their presence in tax and regulatory havens. We find that the number of subsidiaries of European banks in tax havens declines significantly after the introduction of mandatory public CbCR in contrast to insurance firms that need not disclose. We document that this decline is mainly driven by a reduction of subsidiaries in small countries with little economic substance (“dot havens”) and in tax havens that are regulatory havens at the same time, i.e., with high financial secrecy. Further, we find that high exposure to reputational risk is a major amplifier of reorganizational activities. Our results explain prior mixed evidence and document that CbCR effectively curbs tax haven presence only under specific circumstances, i.e., in countries offering both tax shelter and financial secrecy, and more strongly for banks with high reputational risk. These findings suggest that increased tax disclosure on banks does not effectively attenuate tax haven presence per se, but only for a subset of havens and banks. Policymakers need to be aware of these limitations, especially in light of the current decision of extending public CbCR to all large multinationals. }},
  author       = {{Eberhartinger, Eva and Speitmann, Raffael and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{Banks’ tax disclosure, financial secrecy, and tax haven heterogeneitys}}},
  doi          = {{10.2139/ssrn.3523909}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@techreport{24674,
  author       = {{Diller, Markus and Lorenz, Johannes and Schneider, Georg Thomas and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  issn         = {{1556-5068}},
  title        = {{{Is Transfer Pricing Harmonization the Panacea? Reporting Transparency, Standards Consistency, and Tax Avoidance}}},
  doi          = {{10.2139/ssrn.3895611}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@techreport{24661,
  author       = {{Lorenz, Johannes and Diller, Markus and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  issn         = {{1556-5068}},
  title        = {{{The Epidemiology of Tax Avoidance Narratives}}},
  doi          = {{10.2139/ssrn.2992732}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@techreport{49277,
  author       = {{Fochmann, Martin and Heile, Vanessa and Huber, Hans-Peter and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{Tax Burden on German Companies – Income Tax Burden and Administrative Costs}}},
  doi          = {{10.52569/NCAI8648}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@misc{45855,
  author       = {{Asenkerschbaumer, Stefan and Buhl, Hans-Ulrich and Sureth-Sloane, Caren and Weißenberger, Barbara E.}},
  booktitle    = {{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung}},
  number       = {{101}},
  pages        = {{20}},
  title        = {{{Georg Giersberg: die Stimme für die BWL}}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@article{21401,
  author       = {{Bornemann, Tobias and Schipp, Adrian and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  journal      = {{Deutsches Steuerrecht}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{182--190}},
  title        = {{{Was treibt die Komplexität der Ertragsbesteuerung multinationaler Unternehmen? – Ergebnisse einer Befragung in der deutschen Finanzverwaltung}}},
  volume       = {{59}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@techreport{24677,
  author       = {{Eberhartinger, Eva and Safaei, Reyhaneh and Sureth-Sloane, Caren and Wu, Yuchen}},
  issn         = {{1556-5068}},
  title        = {{{Are Risk-based Tax Audit Strategies Rewarded? An Analysis of Corporate Tax Avoidance}}},
  doi          = {{10.2139/ssrn.3911228}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@article{46051,
  author       = {{Asenkerschbaumer, Stefan and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  journal      = {{Schmalenbach IMPULSE}},
  number       = {{1}},
  pages        = {{1--2}},
  title        = {{{Editorial: Schmalenbach IMPULSE: Will etwas in Bewegung setzen}}},
  volume       = {{1}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@article{23400,
  abstract     = {{Die Diskussion über die adäquate Besteuerung von „Reichen“ bzw. „Superreichen“ hat durch die Schulden, die im Zusammenhang mit der Coronakrise zu finanzieren sind, neuen Schwung bekommen. Als ein Instrument der adäquaten „Reichenbesteuerung“ gilt eine jährliche Vermögensteuer. Den fiskalischen und verteilungspolitischen Argumenten zugunsten einer Vermögensbesteuerung stehen negative ökonomische Wirkungen entgegen. In diesem Beitrag soll zur Versachlichung der Debatte ein genauerer Blick auf die zu erwartenden Belastungswirkungen einer Vermögensteuer geworfen werden. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die (Wieder-)Einführung der Vermögensteuer nicht nur ungelöste Probleme der Bewertung von Sachvermögen mit sich bringt, sondern die Steuerbelastungswirkungen in der jetzigen Niedrigzinsphase zu erheblichen Nebenwirkungen führen. Berücksichtigt man eine Inflationsrate von 2 %, liegt die zur unternehmerischen Realkapitalerhaltung erforderliche Mindestrendite vor Steuern selbst bei einer lediglich 1 %igen Vermögensteuer mit 5,63 % weit über der Inflationsrate. Dies verdeutlicht, dass eine Vermögensteuer in Zeiten niedriger Renditen für Unternehmen eine zukunftssichernde Eigenkapitalerhaltung oder gar -bildung und zugleich wichtige Investitionen erheblich erschwert. Dies gilt auch für private Anlagen in Aktien und Immobilien. Darüber hinaus ist die Vermögensteuer auch in Verlustperioden zu bezahlen, so dass diese Steuer krisenverschärfend wirkt. Auch dies dürfte erhebliche negative Investitionswirkungen nach sich ziehen. Zudem ist damit zu rechnen, dass die Vermögensteuer zumindest in Teilen überwälzt wird, so dass letztlich auch Verbraucher, Arbeitnehmer und Mieter diese tragen werden. Diese und weitere Nebenwirkungen einer Vermögensteuer kommen in der Vermögensteuerdebatte oftmals zu kurz.}},
  author       = {{Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  journal      = {{Steuer und Wirtschaft}},
  number       = {{3}},
  pages        = {{201--216}},
  title        = {{{Wiedereinführung der Vermögensteuer – eine ökonomische Analyse}}},
  volume       = {{98}},
  year         = {{2021}},
}

@techreport{21406,
  abstract     = {{Previous accounting research shows that taxes affect decision making by individuals and firms. Most studies assume that agents have an accurate perception regarding their tax burden. However, there is a growing body of literature analyzing whether taxes are indeed perceived correctly. We review 127 studies on the measurement of tax misperception and its behavioral implications. The review reveals that many taxpayers have substantial tax misperceptions that lead to biased decision making. We develop a Behavioral Taxpayer Response Model on the impact of provided tax information on tax perception. Besides individual traits, characteristics of the tax information and the decision environment determine the extent of tax misperception. We discuss opportunities for future research and methodological limitations. While there is much evidence on tax misperception at the individual level, we hardly find any research at the firm level. Little is known about the real effects of managers’ tax misperception and on how tax information is strategically managed to impact stakeholders. This research gap is surprising as a large part of the accounting literature analyzes decision making and disclosure of firms. We recommend a mixed-method approach combining experiments, surveys, and archival data analyses to improve the knowledge on tax misperception and its consequences.}},
  author       = {{Blaufus, Kay and Chirvi, Malte and Huber, Hans-Peter and Maiterth, Ralf and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{Tax Misperception and Its Effects on Decision Making - a Literature Review}}},
  volume       = {{No. 39}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{21410,
  abstract     = {{We analyze the impact of trust on bargaining behavior between auditor and auditee in a tax setting. We study the effect of interpersonal trust and trust in government on both taxpayer and tax auditor. In an experiment with variation in pairwise trust settings, we find evidence that both kinds of trust affect the bargaining behavior, albeit in different ways. While trust in government increases taxpayers’ tax offers, interpersonal trust may lead to more concessionary behavior of tax auditors moderated by trust in government. Our findings help tax authorities to shape programs to enhance compliance in an atmosphere of trust.}},
  author       = {{Eberhartinger, Eva and Speitmann, Raffael and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{How Does Trust Affect Concessionary Behavior in Tax Bargaining?}}},
  volume       = {{No. 41}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@techreport{21411,
  abstract     = {{This study examines the visibility of the GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) in firms’ financial statements as a distinct disclosure choice. Applying a game-theory disclosure model for voluntary disclosure strategies of firms to a tax setting, we argue that firms face a trade-off in their ETR disclosure decisions. On the one hand, firms have an incentive to enhance their ETR disclosure when the ratio offers shareholders “favourable conditions”, for example in terms of higher expected after-tax cash-flows. On the other hand, the disclosure of a favourable low ETR could attract the attention of tax auditors and the public and ultimately result in disclosure costs. We empirically test disclosure behaviour by examining the relation between disclosure visibility and different ETR conditions that reflect different stakeholder specific costs and benefits. While we find that unfavourable ETR conditions are not highlighted, we observe higher disclosure visibility for favourable ETRs (smooth, close to the industry average, decreasing). Additional analyses reveal that this high visibility is characteristic of firm-years with only moderately decreasing ETRs at usual ETR levels, while extreme ETRs are not highlighted. Interestingly and in contrast to our main results, a subsample of family firms do not seem to highlight favourable ETRs.}},
  author       = {{Flagmeier, Vanessa and Müller, Jens and Sureth-Sloane, Caren}},
  title        = {{{When Do Firms Highlight Their Effective Tax Rate?}}},
  volume       = {{No. 37}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}