---
_id: '64566'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Censorship is employed by many governments and ISPs worldwide, with an increasing
    trend in recent years. One of the most censored protocols is DNS: censors target
    unencrypted and encrypted DNS to prevent clients from resolving the domain name
    of unwanted websites. Despite much research on DNS censorship, only a few tools
    can circumvent it.To support users affected by DNS censorship, we present DPYProxy-DNS,
    a DNS resolver that automatically detects and employs a working DNS censorship
    circumvention. We demonstrate the effectiveness of DPYProxy-DNS by automatically
    circumventing DNS censorship in China and Iran and analyzing DNS censorship mechanisms
    in these countries. Our analyses re veal that DNS censorship in Iran is ineffective
    against encrypted DNS. In China, DPYProxy-DNS revealed two consistently working
    circumvention techniques for unencrypted DNS: TCP segmentation for DNS over TCP
    and ignoring DNS responses injected by the Great Firewall of China (GFW). Our
    findings reveal varying levels of DNS censorship across different countries, underscoring
    the importance of the automated circumvention approach we provide with DPYProxy-DNS.'
author:
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Niklas
  full_name: Niere, Niklas
  id: '63563'
  last_name: Niere
- first_name: Juraj
  full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
  id: '83504'
  last_name: Somorovsky
  orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
citation:
  ama: 'Lange F, Niere N, Somorovsky J. Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention.
    In: ; 2026.'
  apa: Lange, F., Niere, N., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2026). <i>Towards Automated DNS
    Censorship Circumvention</i>. Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Virtual.
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Lange_Niere_Somorovsky_2026, title={Towards Automated DNS
    Censorship Circumvention}, author={Lange, Felix and Niere, Niklas and Somorovsky,
    Juraj}, year={2026} }'
  chicago: Lange, Felix, Niklas Niere, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Towards Automated DNS
    Censorship Circumvention,” 2026.
  ieee: F. Lange, N. Niere, and J. Somorovsky, “Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention,”
    presented at the Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Virtual, 2026.
  mla: Lange, Felix, et al. <i>Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention</i>.
    2026.
  short: 'F. Lange, N. Niere, J. Somorovsky, in: 2026.'
conference:
  end_date: 2026-02-19
  location: Virtual
  name: Free and Open Communications on the Internet
  start_date: 2026-02-19
date_created: 2026-02-20T14:35:34Z
date_updated: 2026-02-21T10:20:16Z
ddc:
- '006'
file:
- access_level: open_access
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: nniklas
  date_created: 2026-02-20T14:34:05Z
  date_updated: 2026-02-21T10:20:16Z
  file_id: '64568'
  file_name: foci-2026-0001.pdf
  file_size: 775133
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2026-02-21T10:20:16Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2026/foci-2026-0001.pdf
oa: '1'
status: public
title: Towards Automated DNS Censorship Circumvention
type: conference
user_id: '63563'
year: '2026'
...
---
_id: '58801'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Iran employs one of the most prominent Internet censors in the world. An important
    part of Iran’s censorship apparatus is its analysis of unencrypted protocols such
    as HTTP and DNS. During routine evaluations of Iran’s HTTP and DNS censorship,
    we noticed several properties we believe to be unknown today. For instance, we
    found injections of correct static IPs for some domains such as google.com on
    the DNS level, unclear HTTP version parsing, and correlations between DNS and
    HTTP censorship. In this paper, we present our findings to the community and discuss
    possible takeaways for affected people and the censorship circumvention community.
    As some of our findings left us bewildered, we hope to ignite a discussion about
    Iran’s censorship behavior. We aim to use the discussion of our work to execute
    a thorough analysis and explanation of Iran’s censorship behavior in the future.
author:
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Niklas
  full_name: Niere, Niklas
  id: '63563'
  last_name: Niere
- first_name: Jonathan
  full_name: von Niessen, Jonathan
  last_name: von Niessen
- first_name: Dennis
  full_name: Suermann, Dennis
  last_name: Suermann
- first_name: Nico
  full_name: Heitmann, Nico
  id: '74619'
  last_name: Heitmann
  orcid: 0009-0003-7687-7044
- first_name: Juraj
  full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
  id: '83504'
  last_name: Somorovsky
  orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
citation:
  ama: 'Lange F, Niere N, von Niessen J, Suermann D, Heitmann N, Somorovsky J. I(ra)nconsistencies:
    Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship. In: <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing
    Technologies</i>. ; 2025.'
  apa: 'Lange, F., Niere, N., von Niessen, J., Suermann, D., Heitmann, N., &#38; Somorovsky,
    J. (2025). I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship. <i>Proceedings
    on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>. Free and Open Communications on the Internet,
    Virtual.'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Lange_Niere_von Niessen_Suermann_Heitmann_Somorovsky_2025,
    title={I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship}, booktitle={Proceedings
    on Privacy Enhancing Technologies}, author={Lange, Felix and Niere, Niklas and
    von Niessen, Jonathan and Suermann, Dennis and Heitmann, Nico and Somorovsky,
    Juraj}, year={2025} }'
  chicago: 'Lange, Felix, Niklas Niere, Jonathan von Niessen, Dennis Suermann, Nico
    Heitmann, and Juraj Somorovsky. “I(Ra)Nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s
    Censorship.” In <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>, 2025.'
  ieee: 'F. Lange, N. Niere, J. von Niessen, D. Suermann, N. Heitmann, and J. Somorovsky,
    “I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship,” presented at the
    Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Virtual, 2025.'
  mla: 'Lange, Felix, et al. “I(Ra)Nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship.”
    <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>, 2025.'
  short: 'F. Lange, N. Niere, J. von Niessen, D. Suermann, N. Heitmann, J. Somorovsky,
    in: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2025.'
conference:
  end_date: 2025-02-20
  location: Virtual
  name: Free and Open Communications on the Internet
  start_date: 2025-02-20
date_created: 2025-02-24T08:09:56Z
date_updated: 2025-05-06T13:48:32Z
ddc:
- '006'
department:
- _id: '632'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: flange
  date_created: 2025-02-24T08:07:59Z
  date_updated: 2025-02-24T08:07:59Z
  file_id: '58802'
  file_name: foci-2025-0002.pdf
  file_size: 535700
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2025-02-24T08:07:59Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2025/foci-2025-0002.pdf
oa: '1'
publication: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'I(ra)nconsistencies: Novel Insights into Iran’s Censorship'
type: conference
user_id: '63563'
year: '2025'
...
---
_id: '59824'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "HTTPS composes large parts of today’s Internet traffic and has long been
    subject to censorship efforts in different countries. While censors analyze the
    Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to block encrypted HTTP traffic, censorship
    circumvention efforts have primarily focused on other protocols such as TCP. In
    this paper, we hypothesize that the TLS protocol offers previously unseen opportunities
    for censorship circumvention techniques. We tested our hypothesis by proposing
    possible censorship circumvention techniques that act on the TLS protocol. To
    validate the effectiveness of these techniques, we evaluate their acceptance by
    popular TLS servers and successfully demonstrate that these techniques can circumvent
    censors in China and Iran. In our evaluations, we discovered 38—partially standard-compliant—distinct
    censorship circumvention techniques, which we could group into 11 unique categories.
    Additionally, we provide novel insights into how China censors TLS traffic by
    presenting evidence of at least three distinct censorship appliances. We suspect
    that other parts of China’s censorship apparatus and other censors exhibit similar
    structures and advocate future censorship research to anticipate them. With this
    work, we hope to aid people affected by censorship and stimulate further\r\nresearch
    into censorship circumvention using cryptographic protocols."
author:
- first_name: Niklas
  full_name: Niere, Niklas
  id: '63563'
  last_name: Niere
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Robert
  full_name: Merget, Robert
  last_name: Merget
- first_name: Juraj
  full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
  id: '83504'
  last_name: Somorovsky
  orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
citation:
  ama: 'Niere N, Lange F, Merget R, Somorovsky J. Transport Layer Obscurity: Circumventing
    SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer. In: <i>2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
    (SP)</i>. ; 2025. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151">10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>'
  apa: 'Niere, N., Lange, F., Merget, R., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2025). Transport Layer
    Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer. <i>2025 IEEE Symposium
    on Security and Privacy (SP)</i>. 46th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
    San Francisco. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151">https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Niere_Lange_Merget_Somorovsky_2025, title={Transport Layer
    Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151">10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>},
    booktitle={2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)}, author={Niere, Niklas
    and Lange, Felix and Merget, Robert and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2025} }'
  chicago: 'Niere, Niklas, Felix Lange, Robert Merget, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Transport
    Layer Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer.” In <i>2025 IEEE
    Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)</i>, 2025. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151">https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>.'
  ieee: 'N. Niere, F. Lange, R. Merget, and J. Somorovsky, “Transport Layer Obscurity:
    Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer,” presented at the 46th IEEE Symposium
    on Security and Privacy, San Francisco, 2025, doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151">10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>.'
  mla: 'Niere, Niklas, et al. “Transport Layer Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship
    on the TLS-Layer.” <i>2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)</i>, 2025,
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151">10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151</a>.'
  short: 'N. Niere, F. Lange, R. Merget, J. Somorovsky, in: 2025 IEEE Symposium on
    Security and Privacy (SP), 2025.'
conference:
  end_date: 2025-05-14
  location: San Francisco
  name: 46th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
  start_date: 2025-05-12
date_created: 2025-05-06T13:40:50Z
date_updated: 2025-06-02T12:03:51Z
ddc:
- '006'
department:
- _id: '632'
doi: 10.1109/SP61157.2025.00151
file:
- access_level: open_access
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: nniklas
  date_created: 2025-05-06T13:49:35Z
  date_updated: 2025-05-06T13:51:45Z
  file_id: '59826'
  file_name: TLS_Obscurity.pdf
  file_size: 463431
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2025-05-06T13:51:45Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
oa: '1'
publication: 2025 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
status: public
title: 'Transport Layer Obscurity: Circumventing SNI Censorship on the TLS-Layer'
type: conference
user_id: '63563'
year: '2025'
...
---
_id: '60503'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Censors have long censored Transport Layer Security (TLS) traffic by inspecting
    the domain name in the unencrypted Server Name Indication (SNI) extension. By
    encrypting the SNI extension, the Encrypted ClientHello (ECH) prevents censors
    from blocking TLS traffic to certain domains. Despite this promising outlook,
    ECH’s current capability to contest TLS censorship is unclear; for instance, Russia
    has started censoring ECH connections successfully. This paper clarifies ECH’s
    current role for TLS censorship. To this end, we evaluate servers’ support for
    ECH and its analysis and subsequent blocking by censors. We determine Cloudflare
    as the only major provider supporting ECH. Additionally, we affirm previously
    known ECH censorship in Russia and uncover indirect censorship of ECH through
    encrypted DNS censorship in China and Iran. Our findings suggest that ECH’s contribution
    to censorship circumvention is currently limited: we consider ECH’s dependence
    on encrypted DNS especially challenging for ECH’s capability to circumvent censorship.
    We stress the importance of censorship-resistant ECH to solve the long-known problem
    of SNI-based TLS censorship.'
author:
- first_name: Niklas
  full_name: Niere, Niklas
  id: '63563'
  last_name: Niere
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Nico
  full_name: Heitmann, Nico
  id: '74619'
  last_name: Heitmann
  orcid: 0009-0003-7687-7044
- first_name: Juraj
  full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
  id: '83504'
  last_name: Somorovsky
  orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
citation:
  ama: 'Niere N, Lange F, Heitmann N, Somorovsky J. Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) in
    Censorship Circumvention. In: ; 2025.'
  apa: Niere, N., Lange, F., Heitmann, N., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2025). <i>Encrypted
    Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention</i>. Free and Open Communications
    on the Internet, Washington, D.C.
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Niere_Lange_Heitmann_Somorovsky_2025, title={Encrypted Client
    Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention}, author={Niere, Niklas and Lange, Felix
    and Heitmann, Nico and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2025} }'
  chicago: Niere, Niklas, Felix Lange, Nico Heitmann, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Encrypted
    Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention,” 2025.
  ieee: N. Niere, F. Lange, N. Heitmann, and J. Somorovsky, “Encrypted Client Hello
    (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention,” presented at the Free and Open Communications
    on the Internet, Washington, D.C., 2025.
  mla: Niere, Niklas, et al. <i>Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention</i>.
    2025.
  short: 'N. Niere, F. Lange, N. Heitmann, J. Somorovsky, in: 2025.'
conference:
  end_date: 2025-07-14
  location: Washington, D.C.
  name: Free and Open Communications on the Internet
  start_date: 2025-07-14
date_created: 2025-07-03T07:14:00Z
date_updated: 2025-10-23T14:26:38Z
ddc:
- '006'
file:
- access_level: open_access
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: nniklas
  date_created: 2025-07-03T07:11:14Z
  date_updated: 2025-10-23T14:26:38Z
  file_id: '60505'
  file_name: foci-2025-0016.pdf
  file_size: 755171
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2025-10-23T14:26:38Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- censorship
- circumvention
- ECH
- TLS
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2025/foci-2025-0016.pdf
oa: '1'
status: public
title: Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) in Censorship Circumvention
type: conference
user_id: '63563'
year: '2025'
...
---
_id: '55137'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Many countries limit their residents' access to various websites. As a substantial
    number of these websites do not support TLS encryption, censorship of unencrypted
    HTTP requests remains prevalent. Accordingly, circumvention techniques can and
    have been found for the HTTP protocol. In this paper, we infer novel circumvention
    techniques on the HTTP layer from a web security vulnerability by utilizing HTTP
    request smuggling (HRS). To demonstrate the viability of our techniques, we collected
    various test vectors from previous work about HRS and evaluated them on popular
    web servers and censors in China, Russia, and Iran. Our findings show that HRS
    can be successfully employed as a censorship circumvention technique against multiple
    censors and web servers. We also discover a standard-compliant circumvention technique
    in Russia, unusually inconsistent censorship in China, and an implementation bug
    in Iran. The results of this work imply that censorship circumvention techniques
    can successfully be constructed from existing vulnerabilities. We conjecture that
    this implication provides insights to the censorship circumvention community beyond
    the viability of specific techniques presented in this work.
author:
- first_name: Philipp
  full_name: Müller, Philipp
  last_name: Müller
- first_name: Niklas
  full_name: Niere, Niklas
  id: '63563'
  last_name: Niere
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Juraj
  full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
  id: '83504'
  last_name: Somorovsky
  orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
citation:
  ama: 'Müller P, Niere N, Lange F, Somorovsky J. Turning Attacks into Advantages:
    Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling. In: <i>Proceedings on Privacy
    Enhancing Technologies</i>. ; 2024.'
  apa: 'Müller, P., Niere, N., Lange, F., &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2024). Turning Attacks
    into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling. <i>Proceedings
    on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>. Free and Open Communications on the Internet
    2024 , Bristol.'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Müller_Niere_Lange_Somorovsky_2024, place={Bristol}, title={Turning
    Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling},
    booktitle={Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies}, author={Müller, Philipp
    and Niere, Niklas and Lange, Felix and Somorovsky, Juraj}, year={2024} }'
  chicago: 'Müller, Philipp, Niklas Niere, Felix Lange, and Juraj Somorovsky. “Turning
    Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling.”
    In <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>. Bristol, 2024.'
  ieee: 'P. Müller, N. Niere, F. Lange, and J. Somorovsky, “Turning Attacks into Advantages:
    Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request Smuggling,” presented at the Free and
    Open Communications on the Internet 2024 , Bristol, 2024.'
  mla: 'Müller, Philipp, et al. “Turning Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship
    with HTTP Request Smuggling.” <i>Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies</i>,
    2024.'
  short: 'P. Müller, N. Niere, F. Lange, J. Somorovsky, in: Proceedings on Privacy
    Enhancing Technologies, Bristol, 2024.'
conference:
  end_date: 2024-07-15
  location: Bristol
  name: 'Free and Open Communications on the Internet 2024 '
  start_date: 2024-07-15
date_created: 2024-07-09T07:49:37Z
date_updated: 2024-07-09T07:49:59Z
ddc:
- '006'
department:
- _id: '632'
file:
- access_level: open_access
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: flange
  date_created: 2024-07-09T07:42:54Z
  date_updated: 2024-07-09T07:42:54Z
  file_id: '55139'
  file_name: Turning Attacks into Advantages_ Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request
    Smuggling - foci-2024-0012.pdf
  file_size: 189676
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2024-07-09T07:42:54Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- censorship
- censorship circumvention
- http
- http request smuggling
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- open_access: '1'
  url: https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2024/foci-2024-0012.pdf
oa: '1'
place: Bristol
publication: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
publication_status: published
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'Turning Attacks into Advantages: Evading HTTP Censorship with HTTP Request
  Smuggling'
type: conference
user_id: '67893'
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '57816'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: "TLS-Attacker is an open-source framework for analyzing Transport\r\nLayer
    Security (TLS) implementations. The framework allows users\r\nto specify custom
    protocol flows and provides modification hooks to\r\nmanipulate message contents.
    Since its initial publication in 2016 by\r\nJuraj Somorovsky, TLS-Attacker has
    been used in numerous studies\r\npublished at well-established conferences and
    helped to identify\r\nvulnerabilities in well-known open-source TLS libraries.
    To enable\r\nautomated analyses, TLS-Attacker has grown into a suite of projects,\r\neach
    designed as a building block that can be applied to facilitate\r\nvarious analysis
    methodologies. The framework still undergoes\r\ncontinuous improvements with feature
    extensions, such as DTLS\r\n1.3 or the addition of new dialects such as QUIC,
    to continue its\r\neffectiveness and relevancy as a security analysis framework."
author:
- first_name: Fabian
  full_name: Bäumer, Fabian
  last_name: Bäumer
- first_name: Marcus
  full_name: Brinkmann, Marcus
  last_name: Brinkmann
- first_name: Nurullah
  full_name: Erinola, Nurullah
  last_name: Erinola
- first_name: Sven Niclas
  full_name: Hebrok, Sven Niclas
  id: '55616'
  last_name: Hebrok
  orcid: 0009-0006-1172-1665
- first_name: Nico
  full_name: Heitmann, Nico
  id: '74619'
  last_name: Heitmann
  orcid: 0009-0003-7687-7044
- first_name: Felix
  full_name: Lange, Felix
  id: '67893'
  last_name: Lange
- first_name: Marcel
  full_name: Maehren, Marcel
  last_name: Maehren
- first_name: Robert
  full_name: Merget, Robert
  last_name: Merget
- first_name: Niklas
  full_name: Niere, Niklas
  id: '63563'
  last_name: Niere
- first_name: Maximilian Manfred
  full_name: Radoy, Maximilian Manfred
  id: '68826'
  last_name: Radoy
  orcid: 0009-0005-3059-6823
- first_name: Conrad
  full_name: Schmidt, Conrad
  last_name: Schmidt
- first_name: Jörg
  full_name: Schwenk, Jörg
  last_name: Schwenk
- first_name: Juraj
  full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
  id: '83504'
  last_name: Somorovsky
  orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
citation:
  ama: 'Bäumer F, Brinkmann M, Erinola N, et al. TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework
    for Analyzing TLS Implementations. In: <i>Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts
    Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC ’24)</i>. ; 2024.'
  apa: 'Bäumer, F., Brinkmann, M., Erinola, N., Hebrok, S. N., Heitmann, N., Lange,
    F., Maehren, M., Merget, R., Niere, N., Radoy, M. M., Schmidt, C., Schwenk, J.,
    &#38; Somorovsky, J. (2024). TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS
    Implementations. <i>Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact
    Award (ACSAC ’24)</i>. Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, Hawaii.'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Bäumer_Brinkmann_Erinola_Hebrok_Heitmann_Lange_Maehren_Merget_Niere_Radoy_et
    al._2024, title={TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS Implementations},
    booktitle={Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award
    (ACSAC ’24)}, author={Bäumer, Fabian and Brinkmann, Marcus and Erinola, Nurullah
    and Hebrok, Sven Niclas and Heitmann, Nico and Lange, Felix and Maehren, Marcel
    and Merget, Robert and Niere, Niklas and Radoy, Maximilian Manfred and et al.},
    year={2024} }'
  chicago: 'Bäumer, Fabian, Marcus Brinkmann, Nurullah Erinola, Sven Niclas Hebrok,
    Nico Heitmann, Felix Lange, Marcel Maehren, et al. “TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework
    for Analyzing TLS Implementations.” In <i>Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts
    Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC ’24)</i>, 2024.'
  ieee: 'F. Bäumer <i>et al.</i>, “TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing
    TLS Implementations,” presented at the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference,
    Hawaii, 2024.'
  mla: 'Bäumer, Fabian, et al. “TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS
    Implementations.” <i>Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact
    Award (ACSAC ’24)</i>, 2024.'
  short: 'F. Bäumer, M. Brinkmann, N. Erinola, S.N. Hebrok, N. Heitmann, F. Lange,
    M. Maehren, R. Merget, N. Niere, M.M. Radoy, C. Schmidt, J. Schwenk, J. Somorovsky,
    in: Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC
    ’24), 2024.'
conference:
  end_date: 2024-12-13
  location: Hawaii
  name: Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
  start_date: 2024-12-09
date_created: 2024-12-17T11:25:14Z
date_updated: 2025-02-27T08:02:30Z
department:
- _id: '632'
keyword:
- SSL
- TLS
- DTLS
- Protocol State Fuzzing
- Planning Based
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Proceedings of Cybersecurity Artifacts Competition and Impact Award (ACSAC
  ’24)
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: 'TLS-Attacker: A Dynamic Framework for Analyzing TLS Implementations'
type: conference
user_id: '67893'
year: '2024'
...
---
_id: '49654'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: State actors around the world censor the HTTPS protocol to block access to
    certain websites. While many circumvention strategies utilize the TCP layer only
    little emphasis has been placed on the analysis of TLS-a complex protocol and
    integral building block of HTTPS. In contrast to the TCP layer, circumvention
    methods on the TLS layer do not require root privileges since TLS operates on
    the application layer. With this proposal, we want to motivate a deeper analysis
    of TLS in regard to censorship circumvention techniques. To prove the existence
    of such techniques, we present TLS record fragmentation as a novel circumvention
    technique and circumvent the Great Firewall of China (GFW) using this technique.
    We hope that our research fosters collaboration between censorship and TLS researchers.
author:
- first_name: Niklas
  full_name: Niere, Niklas
  id: '63563'
  last_name: Niere
- first_name: Sven Niclas
  full_name: Hebrok, Sven Niclas
  id: '55616'
  last_name: Hebrok
  orcid: 0009-0006-1172-1665
- first_name: Juraj
  full_name: Somorovsky, Juraj
  id: '83504'
  last_name: Somorovsky
  orcid: 0000-0002-3593-7720
- first_name: Robert
  full_name: Merget, Robert
  last_name: Merget
citation:
  ama: 'Niere N, Hebrok SN, Somorovsky J, Merget R. Poster: Circumventing the GFW
    with TLS Record Fragmentation. In: <i>Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference
    on Computer and Communications Security</i>. ACM; 2023. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3624372">10.1145/3576915.3624372</a>'
  apa: 'Niere, N., Hebrok, S. N., Somorovsky, J., &#38; Merget, R. (2023). Poster:
    Circumventing the GFW with TLS Record Fragmentation. <i>Proceedings of the 2023
    ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security</i>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3624372">https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3624372</a>'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Niere_Hebrok_Somorovsky_Merget_2023, title={Poster: Circumventing
    the GFW with TLS Record Fragmentation}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3624372">10.1145/3576915.3624372</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
    Security}, publisher={ACM}, author={Niere, Niklas and Hebrok, Sven Niclas and
    Somorovsky, Juraj and Merget, Robert}, year={2023} }'
  chicago: 'Niere, Niklas, Sven Niclas Hebrok, Juraj Somorovsky, and Robert Merget.
    “Poster: Circumventing the GFW with TLS Record Fragmentation.” In <i>Proceedings
    of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security</i>.
    ACM, 2023. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3624372">https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3624372</a>.'
  ieee: 'N. Niere, S. N. Hebrok, J. Somorovsky, and R. Merget, “Poster: Circumventing
    the GFW with TLS Record Fragmentation,” 2023, doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3624372">10.1145/3576915.3624372</a>.'
  mla: 'Niere, Niklas, et al. “Poster: Circumventing the GFW with TLS Record Fragmentation.”
    <i>Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
    Security</i>, ACM, 2023, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3624372">10.1145/3576915.3624372</a>.'
  short: 'N. Niere, S.N. Hebrok, J. Somorovsky, R. Merget, in: Proceedings of the
    2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ACM, 2023.'
date_created: 2023-12-15T07:34:24Z
date_updated: 2024-04-02T12:17:18Z
department:
- _id: '632'
doi: 10.1145/3576915.3624372
language:
- iso: eng
publication: Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
  Security
publication_status: published
publisher: ACM
status: public
title: 'Poster: Circumventing the GFW with TLS Record Fragmentation'
type: conference
user_id: '83504'
year: '2023'
...