@inproceedings{1183, abstract = {{As our world grows in complexity, companies and employees alike need, more than ever before, solutions tailored to their exact needs. Since such tools cannot always be purchased off-the-shelf and need to be designed from the ground up, developers rely on software requirements. In this paper, we present our vision of a syntactic rule-based extraction tool for software requirements specification documents. In contrast to other methods, our tool will allow stakeholders to express their needs and wishes in unfiltered natural language, which we believe is essential for non-expert users.}}, author = {{Caron, Matthew and Bäumer, Frederik Simon and Geierhos, Michaela}}, booktitle = {{Joint Proceedings of REFSQ-2018 Workshops, Doctoral Symposium, Live Studies Track, and Poster Track co-located with the 23rd International Conference on Requirements Engineering: Foundation for Software Quality (REFSQ 2018)}}, editor = {{Schmid, Klaus and Spoletini, Paola and Ben Charrada, Eya and Chisik, Yoram and Dalpiaz, Fabiano and Ferrari, Alessio and Forbrig, Peter and Franch, Xavier and Kirikova, Marite and Madhavji, Nazim and Palomares, Cristina and Ralyté, Jolita and Sabetzadeh, Mehrdad and Sawyer, Pete and van der Linden, Dirk and Zamansky, Anna}}, issn = {{1613-0073}}, location = {{Utrecht, The Netherlands}}, publisher = {{CEUR-WS.org}}, title = {{{Back to Basics: Extracting Software Requirements with a Syntactic Approach}}}, volume = {{2075}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1186, author = {{Kemper, Arne}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential Functions}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1187, author = {{Nachtigall, Marcel}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player Composition Game Model}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1188, author = {{Kempf, Jérôme}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @phdthesis{1208, author = {{Schwabe, Arne}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Data-Centre Traffic Optimisation using Software-Defined Networks}}}, doi = {{10.17619/UNIPB/1-287}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{15206, abstract = {{We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}}}, volume = {{111}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{15207, abstract = {{The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose.}}, author = {{Duman, Papatya}}, keywords = {{Chain Store Game, reputation building, entry deterrence, Trockel's game}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game}}}, volume = {{117}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1029, abstract = {{We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Conflict Resolution}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{502----527}}, publisher = {{SAGE Publications}}, title = {{{Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022002717750450}}, volume = {{63}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1031, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Cox, Joe}}, issn = {{0143-6570}}, journal = {{Managerial and Decision Economics}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{354 -- 362}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve}}}, doi = {{10.1002/mde.2909}}, volume = {{39}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1369, abstract = {{In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE) do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual player.}}, author = {{Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}}, issn = {{1382-6905}}, journal = {{Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5141, author = {{Reger, Alexander}}, title = {{{Wenn Marketing mobil wird - Ein Überblick zum Einfluss mobiler Geräte auf digitale Märkte}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5539, author = {{Tran, Viet Huy}}, title = {{{Höhere Verkaufszahlen durch gute Online-Bewertungen - Ein Literaturüberblick}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5150, author = {{Mues, Raphael}}, title = {{{Eine experimentelle Untersuchung der Wahrnehmung professioneller Online Bewertungen}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5432, author = {{Dierkes, Johannes}}, title = {{{Sharing is Caring - Ein Literaturüberblick über die Sharing Economy}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5470, author = {{Hoffmeister, Jiajia}}, title = {{{Evaluation von Taxonomien: Ein Literaturüberblick}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4764, author = {{Valentin, Andreas}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zweiseitige Märkte und Plattformökonomie in der Information Systems-Forschung - Ein klassifizierender Literaturüberblick}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4395, author = {{Heukrodt, René}}, title = {{{Anwendung von verhaltenspsychologischen Theorien zur Steigerung rechtskonformer Einverständniserklärungen im E-Mail Marketing unter Berücksichtigung der neuen DSGVO-Richtlinien}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{3932, author = {{Werning, Christian}}, title = {{{Gap Theory of Curiosity - Darstellung des aktuellen Forschungsstands und Untersuchung des Einflusses von Neugierde auf Job Performance auf einer Crowdsourcing-Plattform}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4795, author = {{Werner, Timur Andreas Eduard Wolfgang}}, title = {{{Was bewegt Kunden auf Online-Plattformen? - Eine semantische Analyse von Online-Bewertungen mittels Latent Dirichlet Allocation}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4560, author = {{Jongen, Marvin Alexander}}, title = {{{Zu Hause ist es am schönsten? Eine deskriptive Analyse des Online-Bewertungsverhaltens von Einheimischen und Reisenden}}}, year = {{2018}}, }