@misc{15770,
  author       = {{Warner, Daniel}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{On the complexity of local transformations in SDN overlays}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@phdthesis{15824,
  author       = {{Heinzel, Joachim}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Essays on the Theory of Industrial Organization: Credence Goods, Vertical Relations and Product Bundling}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@inproceedings{15169,
  author       = {{Castenow, Jannik and Kolb, Christina and Scheideler, Christian}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Distributed Computing and Networking (ICDCN)}},
  location     = {{Kolkata, Indien}},
  publisher    = {{ACM}},
  title        = {{{A Bounding Box Overlay for Competitive Routing in Hybrid Communication Networks}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@inproceedings{15210,
  author       = {{Seutter, Janina and Neumann, Jürgen and Kundisch, Dennis}},
  booktitle    = {{Tagungsband der 15. Internationalen Tagung Wirtschaftsinformatik 2020 (WI)}},
  location     = {{Potsdam, Germany}},
  title        = {{{Nudging in Judging- Differences in Online Rating Behavior for Utilitarian and Hedonic Service Aspects}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@inproceedings{15225,
  author       = {{Poniatowski, Martin and Neumann, Jürgen}},
  booktitle    = {{Tagungsband der 15. Internationalen Tagung Wirtschaftsinformatik 2020 (WI)}},
  location     = {{Potsdam, Germany}},
  title        = {{{You Write What You Are - Exploring the Relationship between Online Reviewers' Personality Traits and Their Reviewing Behavior}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{16334,
  abstract     = {{We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.}},
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}},
  journal      = {{Games and Economic Behavior}},
  pages        = {{453 -- 481}},
  title        = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}},
  volume       = {{121}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{21260,
  author       = {{Rink, Lukas Max Johannes}},
  title        = {{{Spillover-Effekte der Sharing Economy}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{19766,
  author       = {{Helmert, Manuel Marc}},
  title        = {{{Listen to theier Heart - Ein systematischer Literaturüberblick zur Rolle von Emotionen in nutzergenerierten Inhalten auf digitalen Plattformen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{16571,
  author       = {{Rosenhäger, Tjard Henrik}},
  title        = {{{Nothing comes for free - Ein klassifizierender Überblick zu den Auswirkungen finanzieller Anreize auf digitalen Märkten}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{19651,
  author       = {{Zauke, Simon}},
  title        = {{{Stand der Forschung zu gefälschten Online-Bewertungen - Ein systematischer Literaturüberblick}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{16342,
  author       = {{Droste, Jonas}},
  title        = {{{Digital Nudging - Ein systematischer Literaturüberblick}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{15878,
  author       = {{Wegener, Maik}},
  title        = {{{Q&A for Products - Eine deskriptive Analyse von Fragen und Antworten auf digitalen Marktplätzen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{16849,
  author       = {{Müller, Michelle}},
  title        = {{{Regiert Geld die AirBnb-Welt? Eine ökonometrische Analyse der Preisreaktionen von sozial- und finanziell motivierten AirBnb-Gastgebern auf politische Restriktionen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{19439,
  author       = {{Löer, Christin}},
  title        = {{{Fanden Sie diese Bewertung nützlich? Ein Ansatz zur Vorhersage der Nützlichkeit von Online-Bewertungen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{15719,
  author       = {{Philipp, Schumann}},
  title        = {{{Is Delivery Killing Dine-In Restaurants?" - Eine ökonometrische Analyse von Spillover-Effekten für digitale Plattformen in der Restaurantindustrie}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{16343,
  author       = {{Kittsteiner, Anna Verena}},
  title        = {{{Eine strategische Analyse von Online-Kundenrezensionen zur Identifikation von Begeisterungsfaktoren mittels Latent Dirichlet Allocation}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{34115,
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}},
  issn         = {{0943-0180}},
  journal      = {{Homo Oeconomicus}},
  keywords     = {{Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Environmental Engineering}},
  number       = {{1-2}},
  pages        = {{1--6}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}},
  title        = {{{Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x}},
  volume       = {{37}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{13770,
  author       = {{Karl, Holger and Kundisch, Dennis and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Wehrheim, Heike}},
  journal      = {{Business & Information Systems Engineering}},
  number       = {{6}},
  pages        = {{467--481}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  title        = {{{A Case for a New IT Ecosystem: On-The-Fly Computing}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s12599-019-00627-x}},
  volume       = {{62}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{17350,
  abstract     = {{Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.}},
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}},
  pages        = {{641--660}},
  title        = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}},
  volume       = {{177}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39070,
  author       = {{Niggemeyer, Laura}},
  title        = {{{Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}