@article{1063, author = {{Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Kaimann, Daniel and Cox, Joe}}, journal = {{Entertainment Computing}}, pages = {{26--36}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002}}, volume = {{25}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1064, author = {{Rumert, Luis}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse des Bierkartells}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1066, author = {{Arfeen, Muhammad Fahad}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{How effective are leniency programs in cartel deterrence - An overview of the empirical and experimental literature}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1067, author = {{Kersting, Florian}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH - ein Syndikat? Die Zentralvermarktung der Live-TV-Übertragungsrechte aus wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1068, author = {{Beichl, Philipp}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben der REWE Markt GmbH und Coop eG - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{107, abstract = {{Consumer ratings play a decisive role in purchases by online shoppers. Although the effect of the average and the number of consumer ratings on future product pricing and demand have been studied with some conclusive results, the effects of the variance of these ratings are less well understood. We develop a model which considers durable goods that are characterized by three types of attributes: search attributes, experience attributes, and transformed attributes the latter are conventional experience attributes that are transformed by consumer ratings into attributes that can be searched. Using informed search attributes to refer to the combination of search attributes and transformed attributes, we consider two sources of variance of consumer ratings: taste differences about informed search attributes and quality differences in the form of product failure representing experience attributes. We find that (i) optimal price increases and demand decreases in variance caused by informed search attributes, (ii) optimal price and demand decrease in variance caused by experience attributes, and (iii) by holding the average rating as well as the total variance constant, for products with low total variance price and demand increase in the relative share of variance caused by informed search attributes. Counter to intuition, we demonstrate that risk averse consumers may prefer a higher priced product with a higher variance in ratings when deciding between two similar products with the same average rating. Finally, our model provides a theoretical explanation for the empirically observed j-shaped distribution of consumer ratings in e-commerce that differs from established explanations.}}, author = {{Zimmermann , Steffen and Herrmann, Philipp and Kundisch, Dennis and Nault, Barry}}, journal = {{Information Systems Research}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{984--1002}}, publisher = {{INFORMS}}, title = {{{Decomposing the Variance of Consumer Ratings and the Impact on Price and Demand}}}, doi = {{10.1287/isre.2017.0764}}, volume = {{29}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inproceedings{1171, author = {{Müller, Michelle and Gutt, Dominik and Neumann, Jürgen}}, booktitle = {{Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik (MKWI) 2018}}, location = {{Lüneburg}}, title = {{{Beschreib mir deine Wohnung und ich sag dir wer du bist - Eine explorative Analyse von Gastgeberpersönlichkeiten auf Airbnb}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1173, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Cox, Joe}}, journal = {{Journal of Consumer Behaviour}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{290 -- 301}}, publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}}, title = {{{A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption}}}, doi = {{10.1002/cb.1711}}, volume = {{17}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1186, author = {{Kemper, Arne}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential Functions}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1187, author = {{Nachtigall, Marcel}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player Composition Game Model}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1188, author = {{Kempf, Jérôme}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @phdthesis{1208, author = {{Schwabe, Arne}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Data-Centre Traffic Optimisation using Software-Defined Networks}}}, doi = {{10.17619/UNIPB/1-287}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{15206, abstract = {{We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}}}, volume = {{111}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{15207, abstract = {{The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose.}}, author = {{Duman, Papatya}}, keywords = {{Chain Store Game, reputation building, entry deterrence, Trockel's game}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game}}}, volume = {{117}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1029, abstract = {{We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Conflict Resolution}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{502----527}}, publisher = {{SAGE Publications}}, title = {{{Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022002717750450}}, volume = {{63}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1031, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Cox, Joe}}, issn = {{0143-6570}}, journal = {{Managerial and Decision Economics}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{354 -- 362}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve}}}, doi = {{10.1002/mde.2909}}, volume = {{39}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1369, abstract = {{In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE) do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual player.}}, author = {{Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}}, issn = {{1382-6905}}, journal = {{Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5141, author = {{Reger, Alexander}}, title = {{{Wenn Marketing mobil wird - Ein Überblick zum Einfluss mobiler Geräte auf digitale Märkte}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5539, author = {{Tran, Viet Huy}}, title = {{{Höhere Verkaufszahlen durch gute Online-Bewertungen - Ein Literaturüberblick}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5150, author = {{Mues, Raphael}}, title = {{{Eine experimentelle Untersuchung der Wahrnehmung professioneller Online Bewertungen}}}, year = {{2018}}, }