@misc{5959, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Automated Bilateral Multiple-issue negotiation with no information about opponent}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5964, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5960, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Anreize in Bewertungssysteme}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5970, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Facility Location Selection: How to select the optimal facility location ? - The Analytical Hierarchy Process}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5968, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Wie werden elektronische Verhandlungen durch Präferenzen beeinflusst?}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5966, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Bitcoins disruptives Potenzial im elektronischem Zahlungsverkehr}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5969, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Diskriminierung in sozialen Netzwerken durch Versionierung}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5965, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{School Choice in Theory}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{9924, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Punktesystem für Zuwanderung in Deutschland nach Vorbild von Kanada}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{9926, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Agenda setting in jury decision by sequential majority voting}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{9925, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verbindung Terrorismusforschung und Spieltheorie}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @phdthesis{1209, abstract = {{My dissertation deals with the Gathering problem for swarms of n point-shaped robots on a grid, in which all robots of the swarm are supposed to gather at a previously undefined point. Special attention is paid to the strong limitation of robot capabilities. These include in particular the lack of global control, a global compass, global visibility and (global) communication skills. Furthermore, all robots are identical. The robots are given only local abilities. This includes a constant range of vision. The robots all work completely synchronously. In this work we present and analyze three different Gathering strategies in different robot models. We formally prove correctness and total running time: Chapter 4 focuses on minimizing the available robot capabilities. The underlying strategy completes the gathering in O(n^2) time. For the following Chapters 5 and 6, the aim is to optimize the total running time under using only local robot capabilities: We additionally allow a constant-sized memory and a constant number of locally visible statuses (lights, flags). For the strategies of both chapters we show an asymptotically optimal running time of O(n). Unlike in Chapters 4 and 5, we additionally restrict connectivity and vision to an initially given chain connectivity in Chapter 6, where two chain neighbors must have a distance of 1 from each other. A robot can only see and interact with a constant number of its direct chain neighbors.}}, author = {{Jung, Daniel}}, isbn = {{978-3-942647-99-1}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Local Strategies for Swarm Formations on a Grid}}}, doi = {{10.17619/UNIPB/1-271}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{37703, author = {{Olemedo Aragon, Karen Elisabeth}}, title = {{{Cartel Cases in the EU Financial Derivatives Market - The Role of Facilitating Factors}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inproceedings{2851, author = {{Markarian, Christine}}, booktitle = {{International Conference on Operations Research (OR)}}, location = {{Berlin}}, title = {{{Leasing with Uncertainty}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-89920-6_57}}, year = {{2017}}, } @inproceedings{2696, author = {{Zimmermann, Steffen and Herrmann, Philipp and Kundisch, Dennis and Nault, Barrie}}, booktitle = {{Workshop Theory in Economics of Information Systems (TEIS)}}, location = {{Sonoma, USA}}, title = {{{Decomposing the Variance of Online Consumer Ratings and the Impact on Price and Demand}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{3307, author = {{Frick, Bernd and Kaimann, Daniel}}, journal = {{Applied Economics Letters}}, number = {{17}}, pages = {{1237--1240}}, publisher = {{Taylor & Francis}}, title = {{{The impact of customer reviews and advertisement efforts on the performance of experience goods in electronic markets}}}, doi = {{10.1080/13504851.2016.1270399}}, volume = {{24}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{3312, author = {{Zarindast, Mana}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{The role of eWOM in the movie industry: The effect of online user ratings on box office sales }}}, year = {{2017}}, } @inproceedings{112, abstract = {{We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate dependencies among resources as they exist in in modern networked environments. Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) which is a well-studied model in economics. We consider congestion games with different aggregation functions. In particular, we study $L_p$ norms and analyze the existence and complexity of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria. Additionally, we give an almost tight characterization based on monotonicity properties to describe the set of aggregation functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria.}}, author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC)}}, pages = {{222----233}}, title = {{{Congestion Games with Complementarities}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19}}, year = {{2017}}, } @inproceedings{113, abstract = {{We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to proportional shares) for distributing the total cost of each resource among its users. We focus on the interesting subclass of such games with polynomial resource cost functions and present an algorithm that computes approximate pure Nash equilibria with a polynomial number of strategy updates. Since computing a single strategy update is hard, we apply sampling techniques which allow us to achieve polynomial running time. The algorithm builds on the algorithmic ideas of [7], however, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithmic result on computation of approximate equilibria using other than proportional shares as player costs in this setting. We present a novel relation that approximates the Shapley value of a player by her proportional share and vice versa. As side results, we upper bound the approximate price of anarchy of such games and significantly improve the best known factor for computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games of [7].}}, author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou, Grammateia and Skopalik, Alexander}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)}}, title = {{{Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14}}, year = {{2017}}, } @inproceedings{115, abstract = {{Whenever customers have to decide between different instances of the same product, they are interested in buying the best product. In contrast, companies are interested in reducing the construction effort (and usually as a consequence thereof, the quality) to gain profit. The described setting is widely known as opposed preferences in quality of the product and also applies to the context of service-oriented computing. In general, service-oriented computing emphasizes the construction of large software systems out of existing services, where services are small and self-contained pieces of software that adhere to a specified interface. Several implementations of the same interface are considered as several instances of the same service. Thereby, customers are interested in buying the best service implementation for their service composition wrt. to metrics, such as costs, energy, memory consumption, or execution time. One way to ensure the service quality is to employ certificates, which can come in different kinds: Technical certificates proving correctness can be automatically constructed by the service provider and again be automatically checked by the user. Digital certificates allow proof of the integrity of a product. Other certificates might be rolled out if service providers follow a good software construction principle, which is checked in annual audits. Whereas all of these certificates are handled differently in service markets, what they have in common is that they influence the buying decisions of customers. In this paper, we review state-of-the-art developments in certification with respect to service-oriented computing. We not only discuss how certificates are constructed and handled in service-oriented computing but also review the effects of certificates on the market from an economic perspective.}}, author = {{Jakobs, Marie-Christine and Krämer, Julia and van Straaten, Dirk and Lettmann, Theodor}}, booktitle = {{The Ninth International Conferences on Advanced Service Computing (SERVICE COMPUTATION)}}, editor = {{Marcelo De Barros, Janusz Klink,Tadeus Uhl, Thomas Prinz}}, pages = {{7--12}}, title = {{{Certification Matters for Service Markets}}}, year = {{2017}}, }