@inproceedings{70,
  author       = {{Feldkord, Björn and Markarian, Christine and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}},
  pages        = {{17 -- 31}},
  title        = {{{Price Fluctuations in Online Leasing}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-319-71147-8_2}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{700,
  author       = {{Knollmann, Till}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{A Self-Stabilizing Protocol for Graphs of Diameter Two}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{701,
  author       = {{Götte, Thorsten}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Self-Stabilizing Spanners for Tree Metrics}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{86,
  author       = {{Niggemeyer, Laura}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{50,
  author       = {{Hamdeev, Erna}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Verzerrte Online-Produktbewertungen - Literaturüberblick}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{5084,
  author       = {{Streck, Thomas}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{How to adequately relocate asylum applicants within the European Union - An attempt to apply matching theory in the current migration crisis}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{51,
  author       = {{Winkelhake, Nikolai}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@inproceedings{53,
  abstract     = {{Amongst the growing body of literature on the drivers of online ratings, the influence of
customers’ local offline environment on their ratings has largely been neglected. This
study examines the relationship between ratings made outside of a customer’s home area
and the magnitude of online ratings. We employ a data-driven identification of a
customer’s geographic home area and use variation in this variable to identify the
consequences for the magnitude of ratings. In line with our theory, we find that customers
who rate while traveling give, on average, higher ratings than locals. However, this
relationship is moderated by the posting time of a review relative to consumption, as
travelers post more negative ratings during or shortly after consumption. These
relationships are most pronounced for customers who travel and rate less frequently. Our
results come with substantial implications for a business’s average rating and for
customer decision making. }},
  author       = {{Neumann, Jürgen and Gutt, Dominik and Kundisch, Dennis}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS)}},
  location     = {{Seoul, South Korea}},
  title        = {{{The Traveling Reviewer Problem – Exploring the Relationship Between Offline Locations and Online Rating Behavior}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@inproceedings{54,
  author       = {{Neumann, Jürgen and Gutt, Dominik and Kundisch, Dennis}},
  booktitle    = {{INFORMS Annual Meeting}},
  location     = {{Houston, USA}},
  title        = {{{The Traveling Reviewer Problem – Exploring the Relationship between Offline Locations and Online Rating Behavior}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@inproceedings{55,
  abstract     = {{We introduce the mobile server problem, inspired by current trends to move computational tasks from cloud structures to multiple devices close to the end user. An example for this are embedded systems in autonomous cars that communicate in order to coordinate their actions. Our model is a variant of the classical Page Migration Problem. Moreformally, we consider a mobile server holding a data page.The server can move in the Euclidean space (of arbitrary dimension). In every round, requests for data items from the page pop up at arbitrary points in the space. The requests are served, each at a cost of the distance from the requesting point and the server, and the mobile server may move, at a cost D times the distance traveled for some constant D . We assume a maximum distance m the server is allowed to move per round. We show that no online algorithm can achieve a competitive ratio independent of the length of the input sequence in this setting. Hence we augment the maximum movement distance of the online algorithms to ( 1 + δ) times the maximum distance of the offline solution. We provide a deterministic algorithm which is simple to describe and works for multiple variants of our problem. The algorithm achieves almost tight competitive ratios independent of the length of the input sequence.}},
  author       = {{Feldkord, Björn and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)}},
  pages        = {{313--319}},
  title        = {{{The Mobile Server Problem}}},
  doi          = {{10.1145/3087556.3087575}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@inproceedings{66,
  abstract     = {{In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE) do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual player.}},
  author       = {{Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON)}},
  pages        = {{175----187}},
  title        = {{{Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{696,
  author       = {{Wachowiak, Lennart}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Das Mobile Server Problem in Netzwerken}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{697,
  author       = {{Burkhardt, Michel}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Untersuchungen zum Cone-Hashing}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1048,
  author       = {{Schenk, Andreas}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Monotone Suchbarkeit in mehrdimensionalen verteilten Datenstrukturen}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1049,
  author       = {{Beckendorfer, Björn}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Visualisierung zu Algorithmen verteilter Netzwerksysteme}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@inproceedings{105,
  abstract     = {{We initiate the study of network monitoring algorithms in a class of hybrid networks in which the nodes are connected by an external network and an internal network (as a short form for externally and internally controlled network). While the external network lies outside of the control of the nodes (or in our case, the monitoring protocol running in them) and might be exposed to continuous changes, the internal network is fully under the control of the nodes. As an example, consider a group of users with mobile devices having access to the cell phone infrastructure. While the network formed by the WiFi connections of the devices is an external network (as its structure is not necessarily under the control of the monitoring protocol), the connections between the devices via the cell phone infrastructure represent an internal network (as it can be controlled by the monitoring protocol). Our goal is to continuously monitor properties of the external network with the help of the internal network. We present scalable distributed algorithms that efficiently monitor the number of edges, the average node degree, the clustering coefficient, the bipartiteness, and the weight of a minimum spanning tree. Their performance bounds demonstrate that monitoring the external network state with the help of an internal network can be done much more efficiently than just using the external network, as is usually done in the literature.}},
  author       = {{Gmyr, Robert and Hinnenthal, Kristian and Scheideler, Christian and Sohler, Christian}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP)}},
  pages        = {{137:1----137:15}},
  title        = {{{Distributed Monitoring of Network Properties: The Power of Hybrid Networks}}},
  doi          = {{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2017.137}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@article{1054,
  abstract     = {{We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. }},
  author       = {{Brosig-Koch, Janet and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}},
  journal      = {{Health Economics}},
  number       = {{53}},
  pages        = {{6--20}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley Online Library}},
  title        = {{{The effects of competition on medical service provision}}},
  doi          = {{10.1002/hec.3583}},
  volume       = {{26}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@techreport{1055,
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@techreport{1056,
  author       = {{Gu, Yiguan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@techreport{1057,
  author       = {{Sürücü, Oktay and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Brangewitz, Sonja}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Asymmetric Dominance Effect with Multiple Decoys for Low- and High-Variance Lotteries}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}