@article{1062,
  author       = {{Frick, Bernd and Gergaud, Olivier and Winter, Petra}},
  journal      = {{Gastronomy and Tourism}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{259--271(13)}},
  publisher    = {{Cognizant Communication Corporation}},
  title        = {{{The revenue potential of product differentiation: Empirical evidence fro the Croation restaurant industry}}},
  doi          = {{10.3727/216929717X15046207899410}},
  volume       = {{2}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1069,
  author       = {{Petersen, Henning Cornelius}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und Innovation - Eine ökonomische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1070,
  author       = {{Turan, Alparslan}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1071,
  author       = {{Iding, Jerome}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011)}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1072,
  author       = {{Lütkevedder, Dennis}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1073,
  author       = {{Nachtigall, Simon}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Sortieren dynamischer Daten}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1074,
  author       = {{Pukrop, Simon}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Robuste Optimierung in Congestion Games}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1075,
  author       = {{Laudage, Felix}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Open Innovation - Eine ökonimische Perspektive}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1076,
  author       = {{Goebel, Marion}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Marktmacht in zweiseitigen Online-Märkten - Probleme der Bestimmung einer marktbeherrschenden Stellung am Beispiel von eBay}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1077,
  author       = {{Wagemeyer, Marleen}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Marktabgrenzung in der Internetökonomie - Ein Fallbeispiel zum Fusionsantrag von Immowelt und Immonet}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1078,
  author       = {{Shabani, Albana}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Die Fusion von AOL und Time Warner - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1079,
  author       = {{Hamacher, Dustin Stefan}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben von Edeka und Kaiser's Tengelmann - eine ökonomische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1080,
  author       = {{Bürmann, Jan}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Complexity of Signalling in Routing Games under Uncertainty}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{1081,
  author       = {{Vijayalakshmi, Vipin Ravindran}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in Congestion Games under Taxation}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@techreport{1083,
  abstract     = {{In actual school choice applications the theoretical underpinnings of the Boston School Choice Mechanism (BM) (complete information and rationality of the agents) are often not given. We analyze the actual behavior of agents in such a matching mechanism, using data from the matching mechanism currently used in a clearinghouse at a faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the BM is used, and supplement this data with data generated in a survey among students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 70% of students act strategically. Controlling for students' limited information, we find that they do act rationally in their decision to act strategically. While students thus seem to react to the incentives to act strategically under the BM, they do not seem to be able to use this to their own advantage. However, those students acting in line with their beliefs manage a significantly better personal outcome than those who do not. We also run simulations by using a variant of the deferred acceptance algorithm, adapted to our situation, to show that the use of a different algorithm may be to the students' advantage.}},
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}},
  publisher    = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}},
  title        = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}},
  volume       = {{110}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@inproceedings{121,
  abstract     = {{Research on ad copy design is well-studied in the context of offline marketing. However, researchers have only recently started to investigate ad copies in the context of paid search, and have not yet explored the potential of information cues to enhance customers’ search process. In this paper we analyze the impact of an information cue on user behavior in ad copies. Contrary to prevalent advice, results suggest that reducing the number of words in an ad is not always beneficial. Users act quite differently (and unexpectedly) in response to an information cue depending on their search phrases. In turn, practitioners could leverage the observed moderating effect of an information cue to enhance paid search success. Furthermore, having detected deviating user behavior in terms of clicks and conversions, we provide first indicative evidence of a self-selection mechanism at play when paid search users respond to differently phrased ad copies.}},
  author       = {{Schlangenotto, Darius and Kundisch, Dennis}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 50th annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS), Waikoloa Village, HI, USA}},
  title        = {{{Achieving more by saying less? On the Moderating Effect of Information Cues in Paid Search}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@inproceedings{122,
  abstract     = {{Current research on paid search highlights its ability to enhance both online and offline conversions. Yet, research investigating the impact of placing paid search ads on less prominent positions on subsequent consumer behavior is limited to the online environment. This paper presents a field experiment using differences-in-differences analysis to investigate whether the targeting of a less prominent ad position can be beneficial for bricks-and-mortar retailers. Results indicate that paid search advertising budgets could be allocated more efficiently by targeting less prominent ad positions, thus allowing bricks-and-mortar retailers with a limited marketing budget to increase the reach of their marketing campaign, attract more consumers to their website and achieve an overall increase in conversions. Furthermore, the pay-per-click billing mechanism allows advertisers to increase their marketing reach at no additional cost. Consequently, bricks-and-mortar retailers should consider targeting less prominent ad positions to reduce advertising costs while simultaneously enhancing advertising benefits.}},
  author       = {{Schlangenotto, Darius and Kundisch, Dennis and Gutt, Dominik}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), Seoul, South Korea}},
  location     = {{Seoul, South Korea}},
  title        = {{{Achieving More by Paying Less? How Bricks-and-Mortar Retailers Can Benefit by Bidding Less Aggressively in Paid Search}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@inproceedings{125,
  abstract     = {{Searching for other participants is one of the most important operations in a distributed system.We are interested in topologies in which it is possible to route a packet in a fixed number of hops until it arrives at its destination.Given a constant $d$, this paper introduces a new self-stabilizing protocol for the $q$-ary $d$-dimensional de Bruijn graph ($q = \sqrt[d]{n}$) that is able to route any search request in at most $d$ hops w.h.p., while significantly lowering the node degree compared to the clique: We require nodes to have a degree of $\mathcal O(\sqrt[d]{n})$, which is asymptotically optimal for a fixed diameter $d$.The protocol keeps the expected amount of edge redirections per node in $\mathcal O(\sqrt[d]{n})$, when the number of nodes in the system increases by factor $2^d$.The number of messages that are periodically sent out by nodes is constant.}},
  author       = {{Feldmann, Michael and Scheideler, Christian}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 19th International Symposium on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems (SSS)}},
  isbn         = {{978-3-319-69083-4}},
  pages        = {{250--264 }},
  publisher    = {{Springer, Cham}},
  title        = {{{A Self-Stabilizing General De Bruijn Graph}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-319-69084-1_17}},
  volume       = {{10616}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@inproceedings{126,
  abstract     = {{Optimal price setting in peer-to-peer markets featuring online ratings requires incorporating interactions between prices and ratings. Additionally, recent literature reports that online ratings in peer-to-peer markets tend to be inflated overall, undermining the reliability of online ratings as a quality signal. This study proposes a two-period model for optimal price setting that takes (potentially inflated) ratings into account. Our theoretical findings suggest that sellers in the medium-quality segment have an incentive to lower first-period prices to monetize on increased second-period ratings and that the possibility on monetizing on second-period ratings depends on the reliability of the rating system. Additionally, we find that total profits and prices increase with online ratings and additional quality signals. Empirically, conducting Difference-in-Difference regressions on a comprehensive panel data set from Airbnb, we can validate that price increases lead to lower ratings, and we find empirical support for the prediction that additional quality signals increase prices. Our work comes with substantial implications for sellers in peer-to-peer markets looking for an optimal price setting strategy. Moreover, we argue that our theoretical finding on the weights between online ratings and additional quality signals translates to conventional online markets.}},
  author       = {{Neumann, Jürgen and Gutt, Dominik}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Information Systems (ECIS)}},
  location     = {{Guimaraes, Portugal}},
  title        = {{{A Homeowner’s Guide to Airbnb: Theory and Empirical Evidence for Optimal Pricing Conditional on Online Ratings}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}

@misc{5954,
  author       = {{N, N}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Multi-Dimensional Bargaining Problem and Nash Solution - A procedural approach}}},
  year         = {{2017}},
}