@misc{3311, author = {{Amedick, Michaela}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Informationsasymmetrien auf dem Spendenmarkt und Möglichkeiten ihrer Reduktion: Eine Prinzipal-Agenten-Perspektive von Online Spenden}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{3318, author = {{Melnikov, Vitalik and Hüllermeier, Eyke and Kaimann, Daniel and Frick, Bernd and Gupta, Pritha }}, issn = {{2083-8476}}, journal = {{Schedae Informaticae}}, publisher = {{Uniwersytet Jagiellonski - Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellonskiego}}, title = {{{Pairwise versus Pointwise Ranking: A Case Study}}}, doi = {{10.4467/20838476si.16.006.6187}}, volume = {{25}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{210, author = {{Leder, Lennart}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{211, abstract = {{On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries.}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Manegold, Jochen}}, journal = {{Theoretical Economics Letters}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{1341--1362}}, publisher = {{Scientific Research Publishing (SCIRP)}}, title = {{{Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly}}}, doi = {{10.4236/tel.2016.66124}}, volume = {{6}}, year = {{2016}}, } @phdthesis{212, author = {{Manegold, Jochen}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Competition in Markets with Intermediaries}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @inproceedings{216, abstract = {{We empirically investigate the impact of successful goal achievement on future effort to attain the next goal in a recurring goal framework. We use data from a popular German Question & Answer community where goals are represented in the form of badges. In particular, our analysis of this data hinges on the fact, that in this Question & Answer community, badges in a hierarchical badge system are in-creasingly challenging to attain up to a certain badge. After this certain badge, the difficulty level sud-denly drops and remains constant throughout up to the last badge in the hierarchy. Our findings indi-cate that after successful badge achievement users increase their subsequent effort to attain the next badge, but only as long as badges represent a challenge to the user. According to our analysis, we identify self-learning to be the key driver of this behavior.}}, author = {{von Rechenberg, Tobias and Gutt, Dominik}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 24th Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Istanbul}}, location = {{Istanbul, Turkey}}, title = {{{Challenge Accepted! - The Impcat of Goal Achievement on Subsequent User Effort and Implications of a Goal's Difficulty}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @inproceedings{177, abstract = {{Efficiently parallelizable parameterized problems have been classified as being either in the class FPP (fixed-parameter parallelizable) or the class PNC (parameterized analog of NC), which contains FPP as a subclass. In this paper, we propose a more restrictive class of parallelizable parameterized problems called fixed-parameter parallel-tractable (FPPT). For a problem to be in FPPT, it should possess an efficient parallel algorithm not only from a theoretical standpoint but in practice as well. The primary distinction between FPPT and FPP is the parallel processor utilization, which is bounded by a polynomial function in the case of FPPT. We initiate the study of FPPT with the well-known k-vertex cover problem. In particular, we present a parallel algorithm that outperforms the best known parallel algorithm for this problem: using O(m) instead of O(n2) parallel processors, the running time improves from 4logn+O(kk) to O(k⋅log3n), where m is the number of edges, n is the number of vertices of the input graph, and k is an upper bound of the size of the sought vertex cover. We also note that a few P-complete problems fall into FPPT including the monotone circuit value problem (MCV) when the underlying graphs are bounded by a constant Euler genus.}}, author = {{Abu-Khzam, Faisal N. and Li, Shouwei and Markarian, Christine and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Podlipyan, Pavel}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}}, pages = {{477--488}}, title = {{{On the Parameterized Parallel Complexity and the Vertex Cover Problem}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_35}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{178, author = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{On the Design and Defense of Networks - An Experimental Investigation}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{179, author = {{Pehlivan, Muhammet}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{On the abuse of market power - an economic perspective of Microsoft antitrust cases}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{187, booktitle = {{Transactions on Parallel Computing (TOPC)}}, editor = {{Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{1}}, title = {{{Introduction to the Special Issue on SPAA 2014}}}, doi = {{10.1145/2936716}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{193, abstract = {{Heath et al. (1999) propose a prospect theory model for goal behavior. Their analytical model is based on the assumption that goals inherit the main properties of the prospect theory value function, i.e., reference point dependence, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity. We investigate whether these main properties transfer to goal behavior in the field. We take user activity data from a gamified Question & Answer community and analyze how users adjust their contribution behavior in the days surrounding goal achievement, where goals are represented by badges. We find that users gradually increase their performance in the days prior to earning a badge, with performance peaking on the day of the promotion. In subsequent days, user performance gradually diminishes again, with the decline being strongest on the day immediately following the badge achievement. These findings reflect the characteristic S-shape of the prospect theory value function which is convex below the reference point and concave above it. Employing the target-based approach, we can interpret the value function as a cumulative density function of a unimodal probability distribution. Our results suggest that it is more likely that active members of the community focus on the next badge relative to the status already achieved, as their next goal and are less likely to focus on more remote (higher-ranked) badges. Our results thus support the transferability of the main properties of the prospect theory value function to goal behavior in the field and suggest a distinct shape of the value function around goals.}}, author = {{von Rechenberg, Tobias and Gutt, Dominik and Kundisch, Dennis}}, journal = {{Decision Analysis}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{153----171}}, publisher = {{INFORMS}}, title = {{{Goals as Reference Points: Empirical Evidence from a Virtual Reward System}}}, doi = {{10.1287/deca.2016.0331}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{194, author = {{Sassenberg, Tristan}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Gefälschte Online Bewertungen - Literaturüberblick}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @inproceedings{203, abstract = {{We analyse the economic interaction on the market for composed services. Typically, as providers of composed services, intermediaries interact on the sales side with users and on the procurement side with providers of single services. Thus, in how far a user request can be met often crucially depends on the prices and qualities of the different single services used in the composition. We study an intermediary who purchases two complementary single services and combines them. The prices paid to the service providers are determined by simultaneous multilateral Nash bargaining between the intermediary and the respective service provider. By using a function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) to determine the quality of the composed service, we allow for complementary as well as substitutable degrees of the providers' service qualities. We investigate quality investments of service providers and the corresponding evolution of the single service quality within a differential game framework. }}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Hoof, Simon}}, booktitle = {{Service-Oriented and Cloud Computing: 5th IFIP WG 2.14 European Conference, ESOCC 2016, Vienna, Austria, September 5-7, 2016, Proceedings}}, editor = {{Marco Aiello, Einar Broch Johnsen, Schahram Dustdar, and Georgievski, Ilche}}, pages = {{201--215}}, title = {{{Economic Aspects of Service Composition: Price Negotiations and Quality Investments}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-44482-6_13}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{204, author = {{Funke, Julia}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Wirkung von monetären Incentives auf das Bewertungsverhalten von Kunden am Beispiel von meineLinse.de}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @inproceedings{205, author = {{Herrmann, Philipp and Gutt, Dominik and Rahman, Mohammad}}, booktitle = {{INFORMS Annual Meeting}}, location = {{Nashville, USA}}, title = {{{Crowd-Driven Competitive Intelligence: Understanding the Relationship between Local Market Structure and Online Rating Distributions}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @inproceedings{206, author = {{Herrmann, Philipp and Gutt, Dominik and Rahman, Mohammad}}, booktitle = {{NBER Summer Institute on the Economics of Information Technology and Digitization}}, location = {{Cambridge, MA, USA}}, title = {{{Crowd-Driven Competitive Intelligence: Understanding the Relationship between Local Market Structure and Online Rating Distributions}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @inproceedings{209, abstract = {{We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike. We characterize the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) and the convergence of improvement dynamics. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.}}, author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}}, pages = {{655----669}}, title = {{{Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47}}, year = {{2016}}, } @inproceedings{180, abstract = {{Recent literature reports concerns about implausibly high Overall ratings in the sharing economy, which undermines the credibility of this rating as a quality signal. This study empirically investigates the relationship between quality and price, commonly captured by the Value dimension in multidimensional rating systems, to reveal whether reviewers form a perception of quality that they then express in the Value dimension, rather than in the Overall rating. We test our hypotheses on a comprehensive panel dataset for 14,859 Airbnb listings in New York. Our preliminary empirical findings show that an increase in price leads to a significant and substantial decrease in the Value rating, suggesting that Value ratings can offer a valuable source of information for potential buyers in addition to the supposedly inflated Overall rating. Moreover, this mechanism has substantial implications for potential buyers who seek to evaluate a listing’s quality and for a seller’s price setting. }}, author = {{Gutt, Dominik and Kundisch, Dennis}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS), Dublin, Ireland}}, location = {{Dublin, Ireland}}, title = {{{Money Talks (Even) in the Sharing Economy: Empirical Evidence for Price Effects in Online Ratings as Quality Signals}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{182, author = {{Kesmen, Belma}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktmissbrauch in der Internetökonomie - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{183, author = {{Jubrail, Ari}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Literaturüberblick zur Varianz in Kundenbewertungen auf Online Plattformen}}}, year = {{2016}}, }