@misc{306,
  author       = {{Kunisch, Christina}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{308,
  author       = {{Reimann, Alina}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Die Wirksamkeit von Zertifikaten als Qualitätssignal}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{309,
  author       = {{Topal, Barlas}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Die Einführung der EU-Merger Guidelines - Effizienz und Wohlfahrtswirkungen}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@techreport{314,
  abstract     = {{On an intermediate goods market we allow for vertical and horizontal product differentiation and analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers on the market outcome. Asymmetries between intermediaries cannot arise just from distinct product qualities, but also from different production technologies. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic input supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Considering product innovation for symmetric productivities we derive equilibrium conditions on the investment costs and compare price and quantity competition. It turns out that on the one hand there exist product qualities and degrees of horizontal product differentiation for complements such that asymmetric investment equilibria fail to exist. On the other hand we find that there also exist product qualities and degrees of horizontal product differentiation for substitutes such that existence can be guaranteed if the investment costs are chosen accordingly.}},
  author       = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Manegold, Jochen}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Competition and Product Innovation of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{316,
  author       = {{Pautz, Jannis}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Budget Games with priced strategies}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@phdthesis{270,
  author       = {{Abshoff, Sebastian}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{On the Complexity of Fundamental Problems in Dynamic Ad-hoc Networks}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@inproceedings{271,
  abstract     = {{In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a limited capacity and if it is exceeded by the total demand, it has to be split between the players. Since these games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve her utility by more than some fixed factor $\alpha$ through unilateral strategy changes. There is a threshold $\alpha_\delta$ (where $\delta$ is a parameter that limits the demand of each player on a specific resource) such that $\alpha$-approximate pure Nash equilibria always exist for $\alpha \geq \alpha_\delta$, but not for $\alpha < \alpha_\delta$. We give both upper and lower bounds on this threshold $\alpha_\delta$ and show that the corresponding decision problem is ${\sf NP}$-hard. We also show that the $\alpha$-approximate price of anarchy for BAGs is $\alpha+1$. For a restricted version of the game, where demands of players only differ slightly from each other (e.g. symmetric games), we show that approximate Nash equilibria can be reached (and thus also be computed) in polynomial time using the best-response dynamic. Finally, we show that a broader class of utility-maximization games (which includes BAGs) converges quickly towards states whose social welfare is close to the optimum.}},
  author       = {{Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}},
  pages        = {{178--189}},
  title        = {{{On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_14}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@inproceedings{275,
  abstract     = {{We investigate a non-cooperative game-theoretic model for the formation of communication networks by selfish agents. Each agent aims for a central position at minimum cost for creating edges. In particular, the general model (Fabrikant et al., PODC'03) became popular for studying the structure of the Internet or social networks. Despite its significance, locality in this game was first studied only recently (Bilò et al., SPAA'14), where a worst case locality model was presented, which came with a high efficiency loss in terms of quality of equilibria. Our main contribution is a new and more optimistic view on locality: agents are limited in their knowledge and actions to their local view ranges, but can probe different strategies and finally choose the best. We study the influence of our locality notion on the hardness of computing best responses, convergence to equilibria, and quality of equilibria. Moreover, we compare the strength of local versus non-local strategy changes. Our results address the gap between the original model and the worst case locality variant. On the bright side, our efficiency results are in line with observations from the original model, yet we have a non-constant lower bound on the Price of Anarchy.}},
  author       = {{Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Lenzner, Pascal}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 40th Conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science (MFCS)}},
  pages        = {{248----260}},
  title        = {{{Network Creation Games: Think Global - Act Local}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-662-48054-0_21}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{276,
  author       = {{Hohenberger, Till}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Network Creation Games with Interest Groups}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{277,
  author       = {{Kothe, Nils}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Multilevel Netzwerk Spiele mit konstanten Entfernungen im Highspeed-Netzwerk}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{278,
  author       = {{Feldmann, Michael}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Monotonic Searchability for distributed sorted Lists and De Bruijn Graphs}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{234,
  author       = {{Menne, Maria Reinhild}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Verkaufsbeschränkungen auf Onlinemarktplätzen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Fallbeispiel der Adidas AG}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{237,
  author       = {{Ochlast, Kerstin}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Trust Me, I am Certified - Wie die Zertifizierung von Produkten und Verkäufern das Vertrauen von Kunden im Onlinehandel beeinflussen}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@inproceedings{240,
  abstract     = {{We consider online leasing problems in which demands arrive over time and need to be served by leasing resources. We introduce a new model for these problems such that a resource can be leased for K different durations each incurring a different cost (longer leases cost less per time unit). Each demand i can be served anytime between its arrival ai and its deadline ai+di by a leased resource. The objective is to meet all deadlines while minimizing the total leasing costs. This model is a natural generalization of Meyerson’s ParkingPermitProblem (FOCS 2005) in which di=0 for all i. We propose an online algorithm that is Θ(K+dmaxlmin)-competitive where dmax and lmin denote the largest di and the shortest available lease length, respectively. We also extend the SetCoverLeasing problem by deadlines and give a competitive online algorithm which also improves on existing solutions for the original SetCoverLeasing problem.}},
  author       = {{Li, Shouwei and Mäcker, Alexander and Markarian, Christine and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Riechers, Sören}},
  booktitle    = {{Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON)}},
  pages        = {{277----288}},
  title        = {{{Towards Flexible Demands in Online Leasing Problems}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/978-3-319-21398-9_22}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{18003,
  author       = {{Götte, Thorsten}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Covering and Bridging im selbstorganisierenden Partikelsystem Amoebabot}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{18005,
  author       = {{Korfmacher, Christian}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Implementierung und Analyse von Cone-DHT}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{18006,
  author       = {{Sundermeier, Jannik}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Implementierung eines selbststabilisierenden verteilten Stacks}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{18024,
  author       = {{Knollmann, Till}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Implementierung einer selbststabilisierenden Datenstruktur für das längste gemeinsame Präfix}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@article{228,
  abstract     = {{We investigate the pervasiveness of lying in professional contexts such as insurance fraud, tax evasion and untrue job applications. We argue that lying in professional contexts share three characterizing features: (1) the gain from the dishonest behavior is uncertain, (2) the harm that lying may cause to the other party is only indirect and (3) lies are more indirect lies by action or written statements. Conducted as a field experiment with a heterogenous group of participants during a University ‘‘Open House Day’’, our ‘‘gumball-machineexperiment’’ provides field evidence on how preferences for lying are shaped in situations typically found in professional contexts which we consider to be particularly prone to lying behavior compared to other contexts. As a key innovation, our experimental design allows measuring exact levels of cheating behavior under anonymous conditions. We find clean evidence that cheating is prevalent across all sub groups and that more than 32% of the population cheats for their own gain. However, an analysis of the cheating rates with respect to highest educational degree and professional status reveals that students cheat more than non-students. This finding warrants a careful interpretation of generalizing laboratory findings with student subjects about the prevalence of cheating in the population.}},
  author       = {{Fahr, Rene and Mir Djawadi, Behnud}},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Psychology}},
  pages        = {{48--59}},
  publisher    = {{Elsevier}},
  title        = {{{“…and they are really lying”: Clean Evidence on the Pervasiveness of Cheating in Professional Contexts from a Field Experiment.}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.joep.2015.03.002}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}

@misc{229,
  author       = {{Schulz, Hannah}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Zur Verbreitung von Informationen in sozialen Netzwerken - eine wirtschaftspolitische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2015}},
}