@inproceedings{232, abstract = {{We introduce weighted boolean formula games (WBFG) as a new class of succinct games. Each player has a set of boolean formulas she wants to get satisfied; the formulas involve a ground set of boolean variables each of which is controlled by some player. The payoff of a player is a weighted sum of the values of her formulas. We consider both pure equilibria and their refinement of payoff-dominant equilibria [34], where every player is no worse-off than in any other pure equilibrium. We present both structural and complexity results:We consider mutual weighted boolean formula games (MWBFG), a subclass of WBFG making a natural mutuality assumption on the formulas of players. We present a very simple exact potential for MWBFG. We establish a polynomial monomorphism from certain classes of weighted congestion games to subclasses of WBFG and MWBFG, respectively, indicating their rich structure.We present a collection of complexity results about decision (and search) problems for both pure and payoff-dominant equilibria in WBFG. The precise complexities depend crucially on five parameters: (i) the number of players; (ii) the number of variables per player; (iii) the number of formulas per player; (iv) the weights in the payoff functions (whether identical or not), and (v) the syntax of the formulas. These results imply that, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses, decision (and search) problems for payoff-dominant equilibria are harde than for pure equilibria.}}, author = {{Monien, Burkhard and Mavronicolas, Marios and Wagner, Klaus}}, booktitle = {{the ´Festschrift´ Algorithms, Probability, Networks, and Games: Scientific Papers and Essays Dedicated to Paul G. Spirakis on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday}}, pages = {{49--86}}, title = {{{Weighted Boolean Formula Games}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-24024-4_6}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{5930, author = {{Mikroökonomie, Lehrstuhl}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Bilateral matching and bargaining games}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{491, abstract = {{In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a locationin order to attract consumers. It is assumed standardly that consumers with the same favorite location fully agree on the ranking of all possible locations. To investigate the necessity of this questionable and restrictive assumption, we model heterogeneity in consumers’ distance perceptions by individual edge lengths of a given graph. A profile of location choices is called a “robust equilibrium” if it is a Nash equilibrium in several games which differ only by the consumers’ perceptions of distances. For a finite number of players and any distribution of consumers, we provide a full characterization of all robust equilibria and derive structural conditions for their existence. Furthermore, we discuss whether the classical observations of minimal differentiation and inefficiency are robust phenomena. Thereby, we find strong support for an old conjecture that in equilibrium firms form local clusters.}}, author = {{Buechel, Berno and Röhl, Nils}}, journal = {{European Journal of Operational Research}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{505--517}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Robust Equilibria in Location Games}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejor.2014.07.019}}, volume = {{240}}, year = {{2015}}, } @inproceedings{743, author = {{Schwabe, Arne and Karl, Holger}}, booktitle = {{2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications, ICC 2015, London, United Kingdom, June 8-12, 2015}}, pages = {{6122----6127}}, title = {{{Topology model to generate realistic latency for simulations}}}, doi = {{10.1109/ICC.2015.7249298}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{398, abstract = {{We consider strategic games in which each player seeks a mixed strategy to minimize her cost evaluated by a concave valuation V (mapping probability distributions to reals); such valuations are used to model risk. In contrast to games with expectation-optimizer players where mixed equilibria always exist (Nash 1950; Nash Ann. Math. 54, 286–295, 1951), a mixed equilibrium for such games, called a V-equilibrium, may fail to exist, even though pure equilibria (if any) transfer over. What is the exact impact of such valuations on the existence, structure and complexity of mixed equilibria? We address this fundamental question in the context of expectation plus variance, a particular concave valuation denoted as RA, which stands for risk-averse; so, variance enters as a measure of risk and it is used as an additive adjustment to expectation. We obtain the following results about RA-equilibria:A collection of general structural properties of RA-equilibria connecting to (i) E-equilibria and Var-equilibria, which correspond to the expectation and variance valuations E and Var, respectively, and to (ii) other weaker or incomparable properties such as Weak Equilibrium and Strong Equilibrium. Some of these structural properties imply quantitative constraints on the existence of mixed RA-equilibria.A second collection of (i) existence, (ii) equivalence and separation (with respect to E-equilibria), and (iii) characterization results for RA-equilibria in the new class of player-specific scheduling games. We provide suitable examples with a mixed RA-equilibrium that is not an E-equilibrium and vice versa.A purification technique to transform a player-specific scheduling game on two identical links into a player-specific scheduling game on two links so that all non-pure RA-equilibria are eliminated while no new pure equilibria are created; so, a particular player-specific scheduling game on two identical links with no pure equilibrium yields a player-specific scheduling game with no RA-equilibrium (whether mixed or pure). As a by-product, the first PLS-completeness result for the computation of RA-equilibria follows.}}, author = {{Monien, Burkhard and Mavronicolas, Marios}}, journal = {{Theory of Computing Systems}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{617--654}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Minimizing Expectation Plus Variance}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00224-014-9542-z}}, volume = {{57}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{5090, author = {{Streck, Thomas}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Praktikabilität des Adjusted Winner Verfahrens bei variablem Status Quo- Punkt und exogenen Einflüssen}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{694, author = {{Stilow, Georg}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Mobile Agenten in Netzwerken: Analyse von Hotspots}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{5927, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Simultane bilaterale Verhandlungen - Zur Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{5928, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Cournot-Nash-Bertrand Wettbewerb im serviceorientierten Internet}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{5929, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Multilaterale Verhandlungen aus Produzentensicht}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{5925, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Produktdifferenzierung und Verhandlungsposition im duopolistischen Wettbewerb}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{5923, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Aggregating Online Reputation Feedback}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @misc{5926, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verhandlungserfolg durch Reduktion von Verhandlungsasymmetrien - eine Analyse mit dem Adjusted-Winner-Verfahren}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @inproceedings{307, author = {{Herrmann, Philipp and Kundisch, Dennis and Zimmermann, Steffen and Nault, Barry}}, location = {{Philadelphia, USA}}, title = {{{Different Sources of the Variance of Online Consumer Ratings and their Impact on Price and Demand}}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2522, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}}, issn = {{0938-2259}}, journal = {{Economic Theory}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{529--554}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7}}, volume = {{57}}, year = {{2014}}, } @inproceedings{329, abstract = {{Network emulations are widely used for testing novel network protocols and routing algorithms in realistic scenarios. Up to now, there is no emulation tool that is able to emulate large software-defined data center networks that consist of several thousand nodes. Mininet is the most common tool to emulate Software-Defined Networks of several hundred nodes. We extend Mininet to span an emulated network over several physical machines, making it possible to emulate networks of several thousand nodes on just a handful of physical machines. This enables us to emulate, e.g., large data center networks. To test this approach, we additionally introduce a traffic generator for data center traffic. Since there are no data center traffic traces publicly available we use the results of two recent traffic studies to create synthetic traffic. We show the design and discuss some challenges we had in building our traffic generator. As a showcase for our work we emulated a data center consisting of 3200 hosts on a cluster of only 12 physical machines. We show the resulting workloads and the trade-offs involved.}}, author = {{Wette, Philip and Dräxler, Martin and Schwabe, Arne and Wallaschek, Felix and Zahraee, Mohammad Hassan and Karl, Holger}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 2014 IFIP Networking Conference (Networking 2014)}}, pages = {{1--9}}, title = {{{MaxiNet: Distributed Emulation of Software-Defined Networks}}}, doi = {{10.1109/IFIPNetworking.2014.6857078}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{330, author = {{Drigalsky, Liesa}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zur Ausbreitung und Behinderung von Epidemien - Eine Netzwerkanalyse}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{332, author = {{Lange, Maximilian}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Was tun um Kunden von der Qualität seiner Produkte zu überzeugen - Möglichkeiten der Zertifizierung und von Reputationssystemen auf Onlinemärkten}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{337, author = {{Berkemeier, Christopher}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verhandlungen vs Auktionen im Beschäftigungsmanagement}}}, year = {{2014}}, } @misc{338, author = {{Beck, Henri}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verhandlungen bei variablem status quo: Eine Modifikation des Adjustet Winner Verfahrens}}}, year = {{2014}}, }