@article{34114, abstract = {{Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) enables researchers in international management to better understand how the impact of a single explanatory factor depends on the context of other factors. But the analytical toolbox of QCA does not include a parameter for the explanatory power of a single explanatory factor or “condition”. In this paper, we therefore reinterpret the Banzhaf power index, originally developed in cooperative game theory, to establish a goodness-of-fit parameter in QCA. The relative Banzhaf index we suggest measures the explanatory power of one condition averaged across all sufficient combinations of conditions. The paper argues that the index is especially informative in three situations that are all salient in international management and call for a context-sensitive analysis of single conditions, namely substantial limited diversity in the data, the emergence of strong INUS conditions in the analysis, and theorizing with contingency factors. The paper derives the properties of the relative Banzhaf index in QCA, demonstrates how the index can be computed easily from a rudimentary truth table, and explores its insights by revisiting selected papers in international management that apply fuzzy-set QCA. It finally suggests a three-step procedure for utilizing the relative Banzhaf index when the causal structure involves both contingency effects and configurational causation. }}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Schneider, Martin}}, journal = {{Journal of International Management}}, keywords = {{Qualitative comparative analysis, Banzhaf power index, causality, explanatory power}}, number = {{2}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index}}}, volume = {{30}}, year = {{2024}}, } @article{56420, abstract = {{There are a number of school choice problems in which students are heterogeneous according to the number of seats they occupy at the school they are assigned to. We propose a weighted school choice problem by assigning each student a so-called weight and formulate the weighted top trading cycles algorithm (WTTC) to find a matching. The WTTC is strategy-proof and results in a Pareto efficient matching. While the WTTC is a robust extension of the TTC when weights are introduced, it is no longer guaranteed that each student gets a seat at a school even if the overall capacity exceeds the sum of weights. Additionally, the WTTC introduces a trade-off between weights and priorities as a student with a higher weight has a disadvantage to be matched to a particular school compared to a student with the same schools’ priorities but a smaller weight.}}, author = {{Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, issn = {{0165-4896}}, journal = {{Mathematical Social Sciences}}, keywords = {{Matching, School choice, College admission problems, Top trading cycles, Pareto efficiency, Strategy-proofness}}, pages = {{49--56}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001}}, volume = {{132}}, year = {{2024}}, } @book{45863, abstract = {{In the proposal for our CRC in 2011, we formulated a vision of markets for IT services that describes an approach to the provision of such services that was novel at that time and, to a large extent, remains so today: „Our vision of on-the-fly computing is that of IT services individually and automatically configured and brought to execution from flexibly combinable services traded on markets. At the same time, we aim at organizing markets whose participants maintain a lively market of services through appropriate entrepreneurial actions.“ Over the last 12 years, we have developed methods and techniques to address problems critical to the convenient, efficient, and secure use of on-the-fly computing. Among other things, we have made the description of services more convenient by allowing natural language input, increased the quality of configured services through (natural language) interaction and more efficient configuration processes and analysis procedures, made the quality of (the products of) providers in the marketplace transparent through reputation systems, and increased the resource efficiency of execution through reconfigurable heterogeneous computing nodes and an integrated treatment of service description and configuration. We have also developed network infrastructures that have a high degree of adaptivity, scalability, efficiency, and reliability, and provide cryptographic guarantees of anonymity and security for market participants and their products and services. To demonstrate the pervasiveness of the OTF computing approach, we have implemented a proof-of-concept for OTF computing that can run typical scenarios of an OTF market. We illustrated the approach using a cutting-edge application scenario – automated machine learning (AutoML). Finally, we have been pushing our work for the perpetuation of On-The-Fly Computing beyond the SFB and sharing the expertise gained in the SFB in events with industry partners as well as transfer projects. This work required a broad spectrum of expertise. Computer scientists and economists with research interests such as computer networks and distributed algorithms, security and cryptography, software engineering and verification, configuration and machine learning, computer engineering and HPC, microeconomics and game theory, business informatics and management have successfully collaborated here.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Platzner, Marco and Wachsmuth, Henning and Wehrheim, Heike}}, pages = {{247}}, publisher = {{Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets}}}, doi = {{10.17619/UNIPB/1-1797}}, volume = {{412}}, year = {{2023}}, } @misc{43058, author = {{Tiessen, Michelle}}, title = {{{Zur Effektivität des europäischen Kronzeugenprogramms - Der Fall des LKW-Kartells}}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{44092, abstract = {{We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In our theoretical model, physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients systematically vary with regard to both their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their state of health. We test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory experiment. In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient benefits as long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For those patients, who are not able to choose a physician, competition even decreases the patient benefit compared to a situation without competition. This decrease is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for passive patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients in need of a low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive effects of competition for active patients as well as the negative effects of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our results imply that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that patients’ responsiveness to quality is decisive.}}, author = {{Brosig-Koch, Jeannette and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, keywords = {{physician competition, patient characteristics, heterogeneity in quality responses, fee-for-service, laboratory experiment}}, title = {{{Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.4689}}, year = {{2023}}, } @techreport{44093, abstract = {{We consider a model where for-profit providers compete in quality in a price-regulated market that has been opened to competition, and where the incumbent is located at the center of the market, facing high costs of relocation. The model is relevant in markets such as public health care, education and schooling, or postal services. We find that, when the regulated price is low or intermediate, the entrant strategically locates towards the corner of the market to keep the incumbent at the low monopoly quality level. For a high price, the entrant locates at the corner of the market and both providers implement higher quality compared to a monopoly. In any case, the entrant implements higher quality than the incumbent provider. Social welfare is always higher in a duopoly if the cost of quality is low. For higher cost levels welfare is non-monotonic in the price and it can be optimal to the regulator not to use its entire budget. Therefore, the welfare effect of entry depends on the price and the size of the entry cost, and the regulator should condition the decision to allow entry on an assessment of the entry cost.}}, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Oddvar M.}}, keywords = {{Quality competition, Price regulation, Location choice, Product differentiation}}, title = {{{Price Regulation, Quality Competition and Location Choice with Costly Relocation}}}, year = {{2023}}, } @inbook{45878, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Polevoy, Gleb}}, booktitle = {{On-The-Fly Computing -- Individualized IT-services in dynamic markets}}, editor = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Platzner, Marco and Wachsmuth, Henning and Wehrheim, Heike}}, pages = {{21--44}}, publisher = {{Heinz Nixdorf Institut, Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{The Market for Services: Incentives, Algorithms, Implementation}}}, doi = {{10.5281/zenodo.8068414}}, volume = {{412}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{30341, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Straaten, Dirk}}, issn = {{2214-8043}}, journal = {{Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics}}, keywords = {{General Social Sciences, Economics and Econometrics, Applied Psychology}}, pages = {{101869}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869}}, volume = {{98}}, year = {{2022}}, } @techreport{32106, abstract = {{We study the consequences of modeling asymmetric bargaining power in two-person bargaining problems. Comparing application of an asymmetric version of a bargaining solution to an upfront modification of the disagreement point, the resulting distortion crucially depends on the bargaining solution concept. While for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution weaker players benefit from modifying the disagreement point, the situation is reversed for the Nash bargaining solution. There, weaker players are better off in the asymmetric bargaining solution. When comparing application of the asymmetric versions of the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, we demonstrate that there is an upper bound for the weight of a player, so that she is better off with the Nash bargaining solution. This threshold is ultimately determined by the relative utilitarian bargaining solution. From a mechanism design perspective, our results provide valuable information for a social planner, when implementing a bargaining solution for unequally powerful players.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Streck, Thomas}}, keywords = {{Asymmetric bargaining power, Nash bargaining solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution}}, pages = {{17}}, title = {{{Distortion through modeling asymmetric bargaining power}}}, volume = {{148}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{31881, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, journal = {{International Journal of Game Theory}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5}}, year = {{2022}}, } @phdthesis{32856, author = {{Endres-Fröhlich, Angelika Elfriede}}, title = {{{Essays on Industrial Organization and Networks: Retail Bundling, Exclusive Dealing, and Network Disruption}}}, doi = {{10.17619/UNIPB/1-1581}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{39963, author = {{Bas, Sahin}}, title = {{{Die Luftfahrt zwischen Liberalisierung und Konsolidierung - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse von Low-Cost- und Networkairlines}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{40464, author = {{Erdogan, Yeliz}}, title = {{{Unternehmenszusammenschlüsse von Supermärkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Edeka und Kaiser's Tengelmann}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{40468, author = {{Perampalam, Abirame}}, title = {{{Zum Potenzial von Kryptowährungen. Eine ökonomische Analyse zu den Chancen und Risiken digitaler Währungen}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{40467, author = {{Nassar, Hamza}}, title = {{{Mergers on digital markets - An economic analysis}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{40469, author = {{Sarsar, Abdelmajid}}, title = {{{Monopolbildung im Zuge der Globalisierung und Digitalisierung der GAFA-Unternehmen (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{40474, author = {{Bas, Mikail}}, title = {{{Kartelle und technischen Absprachen zur Forschung und Entwicklung - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse anhand der Automobilindustrie}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{40472, author = {{Vikue, Baribuma Lucy}}, title = {{{Blockchain Technology and the Internet of Thing-Risks and Chances for Supply Chains}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{40471, author = {{Taskin, Ibrahim}}, title = {{{Die Fusion von Kaiser's Tengelmann und EDEKA - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2022}}, } @misc{42525, author = {{Dubbert, Annika}}, title = {{{Marktmissbrauch in Online-Märkten und die Herausforderungen für die Wettbewerbsbehörden - eine wettbewerbspolitische Betrachtung}}}, year = {{2022}}, }