@misc{42285, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verhandlungen mit Intermediären in IT-Märkten: eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42281, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{A bargaining model for relative profit and market share delegation contracts}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{41926, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Wettbewerb in Märkten für Dienstleitungen mit uninformierten Kunden}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42277, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Der Shapley-Wert als Index für phylogenetische Diversität}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @misc{42283, author = {{N., N.}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Student's school matching mechanisms in the US}}}, year = {{2019}}, } @inproceedings{2484, abstract = {{We study the classic bin packing problem in a fully-dynamic setting, where new items can arrive and old items may depart. We want algorithms with low asymptotic competitive ratio while repacking items sparingly between updates. Formally, each item i has a movement cost c_i >= 0, and we want to use alpha * OPT bins and incur a movement cost gamma * c_i, either in the worst case, or in an amortized sense, for alpha, gamma as small as possible. We call gamma the recourse of the algorithm. This is motivated by cloud storage applications, where fully-dynamic bin packing models the problem of data backup to minimize the number of disks used, as well as communication incurred in moving file backups between disks. Since the set of files changes over time, we could recompute a solution periodically from scratch, but this would give a high number of disk rewrites, incurring a high energy cost and possible wear and tear of the disks. In this work, we present optimal tradeoffs between number of bins used and number of items repacked, as well as natural extensions of the latter measure.}}, author = {{Feldkord, Björn and Feldotto, Matthias and Gupta, Anupam and Guruganesh, Guru and Kumar, Amit and Riechers, Sören and Wajc, David}}, booktitle = {{45th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2018)}}, editor = {{Chatzigiannakis, Ioannis and Kaklamanis, Christos and Marx, Dániel and Sannella, Donald}}, isbn = {{978-3-95977-076-7}}, issn = {{1868-8969}}, location = {{Prag}}, pages = {{51:1--51:24}}, publisher = {{Schloss Dagstuhl--Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik}}, title = {{{Fully-Dynamic Bin Packing with Little Repacking}}}, doi = {{10.4230/LIPIcs.ICALP.2018.51}}, volume = {{107}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inproceedings{2831, abstract = {{We consider a market where final products or services are compositions of a number of basic services. Users are asked to evaluate the quality of the composed product after purchase. The quality of the basic service influences the performance of the composed services but cannot be observed directly. The question we pose is whether it is possible to use user evaluations on composed services to assess the quality of basic services. We discuss how to combine aggregation of evaluations across users and disaggregation of information on composed services to derive valuations for the single components. As a solution we propose to use the (weighted) average as aggregation device in connection with the Shapley value as disaggregation method, since this combination fulfills natural requirements in our context. In addition, we address some occurring computational issues: We give an approximate solution concept using only a limited number of evaluations which guarantees nearly optimal results with reduced running time. Lastly, we show that a slightly modified Shapley value and the weighted average are still applicable if the evaluation profiles are incomplete.}}, author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Skopalik, Alexander and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation (NetEcon 2018)}}, isbn = {{978-1-4503-5916-0}}, location = {{Irvine, California, USA}}, pages = {{5:1--5:6}}, title = {{{Disaggregating User Evaluations Using the Shapley Value}}}, doi = {{10.1145/3230654.3230659}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{2565, abstract = {{This note deals with agreeability in nontransferable utility (NTU) differential games. We introduce state feedback Pareto weights to enrich the set of efficient cooperative solutions. The framework is particularly useful if constant weights fail to support agreeability, but cooperation is desired nonetheless. The concept is applied to an adverting differential game.}}, author = {{Hoof, Simon}}, keywords = {{NTU differential games, variable Pareto weights, agreeability}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Feedback Pareto weights in cooperative NTU differential games}}}, volume = {{112}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{2566, abstract = {{We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, journal = {{Economics Letters}}, pages = {{39 -- 41}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Outcome Equivalence in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.033}}, volume = {{170}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inbook{3742, author = {{Hoof, Simon}}, booktitle = {{Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications}}, isbn = {{9783319929873}}, issn = {{2363-8516}}, pages = {{13--23}}, publisher = {{Springer International Publishing}}, title = {{{Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-92988-0_2}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{3851, author = {{Koop, Samuel}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Congestion Games mit gewichteten Strategien}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{2933, abstract = {{We establish axioms under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the CES function and is unique up to specification of the distribution and elasticity parameters. This solution is referred to as the CES solution which includes the NASH and egalitarian solutions as special cases. Next, we consider a normalization of the CES function and establish axioms, under which a bargaining solution can be found by the maximization of the normalized CES and is unique up to the specifications of the distribution and its substitution parameters. We refer to this solution as the normalized CES solution, which includes the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions as special cases. Our paper contributes to bargaining theory by establishing unified characterizations of existing as well as a great variety of new bargaining solutions.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Qin, Cheng-Zhong}}, keywords = {{Bargaining problem, CES Function, Normalized CES Function, Nash solution, Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution, Egalitarian Solution.}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{On unification of solutions to the bargaining problem}}}, volume = {{113}}, year = {{2018}}, } @inbook{3098, abstract = {{One of the fundamental problems in applications of methods and results from mechanism design and implementation theory is the effective enforcement of theoretically established equilibria by which social choice rules are implemented. Hurwicz (2008) and Myerson (2009) introduce different concepts of formalizing enforcement of institutional rules via the introduction of legal and illegal games. In this note the relation of their concepts with that of a social system defined inDebreu (1952) is analyzed and its potential of being instrumental for modelling institution design is discussed. The existence proof for such a system, also known as generalized game or abstract economy had been the basis for the existence proof of a competitive equilibrium of an economy.}}, author = {{Trockel, Walter and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, booktitle = {{Studies in Economic Design}}, editor = {{Laslier, Jean-Francois and Moulin, Herve and Sanver, Remzi and Zwicker, William}}, issn = {{2510-3970}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Thoughts on Social Design}}}, volume = {{(n.d.)}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{8074, author = {{Aykanat, Cengiz}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Sharing Economy - Chancen und Risiken aus ökonomischer Sicht}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{8075, author = {{Suvorina, Tatiana}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Heterogeneity in Contests, Sources and Implicants}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5967, author = {{Koch, Alexander}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Reduzierung des Energieverlustes im Smart Grid mittels Koalitionsbildung}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{4564, abstract = {{ In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness. }}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}}, journal = {{Group Decision and Negotiation}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{905--932}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2018}}, } @phdthesis{4797, author = {{Wu, Xing}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Essays on Competition in Health Care Markets}}}, doi = {{10.17619/UNIPB/1-358}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4802, author = {{Akcay, Yasemen}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Entrepreneurship - Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Innovation und Wettbewerb}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4804, author = {{Görken, Emre}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Neurowissenschaftliche und verhaltensökonomische Determinaten von Nachfrageverhalten bei Such-, Erfahrungs- und Vertrauensgütern}}}, year = {{2018}}, }