@misc{4805, author = {{Dalkiran, Alpaslan}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Bitcoin - Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede im Vergleich mit anderen Währungen}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4806, author = {{Gräper, Gerrit}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{The Suitability of Equilibrium Concepts to evaluate competitive behaviour}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4807, author = {{Hammo, Hüssein}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Sharing Economy und ihre Bedeutung für die deutsche Wirtschaft}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4821, author = {{Brachmann, Jessica}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Chancen und Risiken vertikaler Zusammenschlüsse - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4822, author = {{Förstenberg, Niklas}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktmissbrauch im Fall Germania Fluggesellschaft mbH versus Deutsche Lufthansa AG - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4827, author = {{Khan, Zohaib Ahmad}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{How can choice sets be architectured to nudge People into certain decisions?}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{4828, author = {{Kusch, Thomas}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zum Einfluss von Krankenhauswettbewerb auf den Patienten - eine ökonomische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{4982, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}}, journal = {{Games}}, number = {{4}}, publisher = {{MDPI}}, title = {{{ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}}}, volume = {{9}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{5330, abstract = {{In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously. To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model, a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then high quality is chosen until the price increases again.}}, author = {{Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}}, issn = {{1932-6203}}, journal = {{PLoS ONE}}, number = {{11}}, publisher = {{Public Library of Science}}, title = {{{Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}}}, doi = {{10.1371/journal.pone.0207172}}, volume = {{13}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{669, abstract = {{We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games andits bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to modelnetwork scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike.We characterize the (non-)existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE), the convergenceof improvement dynamics, the quality of equilibria and show the complexity of thedecision problem. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approx-imation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.}}, author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander}}, issn = {{1382-6905}}, journal = {{Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{1145--1167}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Congestion games with mixed objectives}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10878-017-0189-y}}, volume = {{36}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1063, author = {{Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Kaimann, Daniel and Cox, Joe}}, journal = {{Entertainment Computing}}, pages = {{26--36}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{More than skills: A novel matching proposal for multiplayer video games}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.entcom.2017.12.002}}, volume = {{25}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1064, author = {{Rumert, Luis}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse des Bierkartells}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1066, author = {{Arfeen, Muhammad Fahad}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{How effective are leniency programs in cartel deterrence - An overview of the empirical and experimental literature}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1067, author = {{Kersting, Florian}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Die Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH - ein Syndikat? Die Zentralvermarktung der Live-TV-Übertragungsrechte aus wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1068, author = {{Beichl, Philipp}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Das Zusammenschlussvorhaben der REWE Markt GmbH und Coop eG - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1173, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Cox, Joe}}, journal = {{Journal of Consumer Behaviour}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{290 -- 301}}, publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}}, title = {{{A Duration Model Analysis of Consumer Preferences and Determinants of Video Game Consumption}}}, doi = {{10.1002/cb.1711}}, volume = {{17}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1186, author = {{Kemper, Arne}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Pure Nash Equilibria in Robust Congestion Games via Potential Functions}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1187, author = {{Nachtigall, Marcel}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Scenario-driven Strategy Analysis in a n-player Composition Game Model}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{1188, author = {{Kempf, Jérôme}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Learning deterministic bandit behaviour form compositions}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @techreport{15206, abstract = {{We show that the Boston school choice mechanism (BM), the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) and the top trading cycles algorithm (TTC) generate the same outcome when the colleges’ priorities are modified according to students’ preferences in a “first preferences first” manner. This outcome coincides with the BM outcome under original priorities. As a result, the DA and TTC mechanism that are non-manipulable under original priorities become vulnerable to strategic behavior.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{A Note on Manipulability in School Choice with Reciprocal Preferences}}}, volume = {{111}}, year = {{2018}}, }