@techreport{15207, abstract = {{The purpose of the present study is to experimentally test a version of the classical Chain Store Game (CSG) paradox, proposed by Trockel (1986), and determine whether one of the two theories of Induction and Deterrence, which were originally tested competitively by Selten (1978), may better account for the results. With complete and perfect information, the CSG of Selten (1978) was designed to analyze the role of reputation in repeated market interactions. Its results were discussed in two different ways: one is based on backward induction, and the other is intuitively derived from a deterrence argument. As the two explanations are incompatible, alternative models have been proposed to understand them better. The alternative game proposed by Trockel is an imperfect information version of the CSG in which the order of the two players is changed in each round and the ’Out-Aggressive’ equilibrium is used to build reputation. The existence of more than one equilibrium is the basis for the building of reputation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to experimentally test this alternative game with the same purpose.}}, author = {{Duman, Papatya}}, keywords = {{Chain Store Game, reputation building, entry deterrence, Trockel's game}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Does Informational Equivalence Preserve Strategic Behavior? An Experimental Study on Trockel's Game}}}, volume = {{117}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1029, abstract = {{We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Conflict Resolution}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{502----527}}, publisher = {{SAGE Publications}}, title = {{{Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022002717750450}}, volume = {{63}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1031, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja and Cox, Joe}}, issn = {{0143-6570}}, journal = {{Managerial and Decision Economics}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{354 -- 362}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Variety in the video game industry: An empirical study of the Wundt curve}}}, doi = {{10.1002/mde.2909}}, volume = {{39}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1369, abstract = {{In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE) do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual player.}}, author = {{Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}}, issn = {{1382-6905}}, journal = {{Journal of Combinatorial Optimization}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Pure Nash equilibria in restricted budget games}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10878-018-0269-7}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5963, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Upstream Horizontal Mergers: Contractual Design under Bargaining in Vertically Related Industries}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5962, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Bestimmung von Transferpreisen in vertikal integrierten Supply Chains}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5961, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{School-Choice Mechanismen im Vergleich  Effizienz und Schwachstellen anhand von Beispielen aus Theorie und Praxis}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5958, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Auswirkungen asymmetrischer Information auf Produktqualität - Reputationssysteme als Lösungsansatz}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5959, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Automated Bilateral Multiple-issue negotiation with no information about opponent}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5964, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Spieltheoretischer Verhandlungsansatz in der Sozialwahltheorie}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5960, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Anreize in Bewertungssysteme}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5970, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Facility Location Selection: How to select the optimal facility location ? - The Analytical Hierarchy Process}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5968, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Wie werden elektronische Verhandlungen durch Präferenzen beeinflusst?}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5966, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Bitcoins disruptives Potenzial im elektronischem Zahlungsverkehr}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5969, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Diskriminierung in sozialen Netzwerken durch Versionierung}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{5965, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{School Choice in Theory}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{9924, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Punktesystem für Zuwanderung in Deutschland nach Vorbild von Kanada}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{9926, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Agenda setting in jury decision by sequential majority voting}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{9925, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Verbindung Terrorismusforschung und Spieltheorie}}}, year = {{2018}}, } @misc{37703, author = {{Olemedo Aragon, Karen Elisabeth}}, title = {{{Cartel Cases in the EU Financial Derivatives Market - The Role of Facilitating Factors}}}, year = {{2018}}, }