@misc{5952, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Netzwerkeffekte auf zweiseitigen Märkten - Eine ökonomische Betrachtung der Modelle}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{5953, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Optimale Projektverträge unter Kostenunsicherheit}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @misc{5951, author = {{N, N}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{How do differentiated goods affect coopetition?}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{2540, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Brockhoff, Sarah}}, issn = {{0176-2680}}, journal = {{European Journal of Political Economy}}, pages = {{1--23}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.11.003}}, volume = {{49}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{196, author = {{Aykanat, Cengiz}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Fußwallwunder Leicester City - Auch in der Bundesliga möglich? Ein ökonomischer Vergleich des Wettbewerbs in der Bundesliga mit der englischen Premier League}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @phdthesis{200, author = {{Drees, Maximilian}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Existence and Properties of Pure Nash Equilibria in Budget Games}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @phdthesis{202, author = {{Dimant, Eugen}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Economics of Corruption and Crime: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Behavioral Ethics}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @techreport{2570, abstract = {{On an intermediate goods market we consider vertical and horizontal product differentiation and analyze the impact of simultaneous competition for resources and the demand of customers on the market outcome. Asymmetries between intermediaries may arise due to distinct product qualities as well as by reasons of different production technologies. The intermediaries compete on the output market by choosing production quantities sequentially and for the supplies of a monopolistic input supplier on the input market. It turns out that there exist differences in product quality and productivities such that an intermediary being the Stackelberg leader has no incentive to procure inputs, whereas in the role of the Stackelberg follower will participate in the market. Moreover, we find that given an intermediary is more competitive, his equilibrium output quantity is higher when being the leader than when being the follower. Interestingly, if the intermediary is less competitive and goods are complements, there may exist asymmetries such that an intermediary being in the position of the Stackelberg follower offers higher output quantities in equilibrium than when being in the position of the Stackelberg leader.}}, author = {{Manegold, Jochen}}, keywords = {{Input Market, Product Quality, Quantity Competition, Stackelberg Competition, Product Innovation}}, publisher = {{CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}}, title = {{{Stackelberg Competition among Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product Innovation}}}, volume = {{98}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{210, author = {{Leder, Lennart}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{211, abstract = {{On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries.}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Manegold, Jochen}}, journal = {{Theoretical Economics Letters}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{1341--1362}}, publisher = {{Scientific Research Publishing (SCIRP)}}, title = {{{Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly}}}, doi = {{10.4236/tel.2016.66124}}, volume = {{6}}, year = {{2016}}, } @phdthesis{212, author = {{Manegold, Jochen}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Competition in Markets with Intermediaries}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{178, author = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{On the Design and Defense of Networks - An Experimental Investigation}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{179, author = {{Pehlivan, Muhammet}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{On the abuse of market power - an economic perspective of Microsoft antitrust cases}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @inproceedings{203, abstract = {{We analyse the economic interaction on the market for composed services. Typically, as providers of composed services, intermediaries interact on the sales side with users and on the procurement side with providers of single services. Thus, in how far a user request can be met often crucially depends on the prices and qualities of the different single services used in the composition. We study an intermediary who purchases two complementary single services and combines them. The prices paid to the service providers are determined by simultaneous multilateral Nash bargaining between the intermediary and the respective service provider. By using a function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) to determine the quality of the composed service, we allow for complementary as well as substitutable degrees of the providers' service qualities. We investigate quality investments of service providers and the corresponding evolution of the single service quality within a differential game framework. }}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Hoof, Simon}}, booktitle = {{Service-Oriented and Cloud Computing: 5th IFIP WG 2.14 European Conference, ESOCC 2016, Vienna, Austria, September 5-7, 2016, Proceedings}}, editor = {{Marco Aiello, Einar Broch Johnsen, Schahram Dustdar, and Georgievski, Ilche}}, pages = {{201--215}}, title = {{{Economic Aspects of Service Composition: Price Negotiations and Quality Investments}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-44482-6_13}}, year = {{2016}}, } @inproceedings{209, abstract = {{We study a new class of games which generalizes congestion games and its bottleneck variant. We introduce congestion games with mixed objectives to model network scenarios in which players seek to optimize for latency and bandwidths alike. We characterize the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) and the convergence of improvement dynamics. For games that do not possess PNE we give bounds on the approximation ratio of approximate pure Nash equilibria.}}, author = {{Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik, Alexander}}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (COCOA)}}, pages = {{655----669}}, title = {{{Congestion Games with Mixed Objectives}}}, doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-48749-6_47}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{182, author = {{Kesmen, Belma}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Marktmissbrauch in der Internetökonomie - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{5407, author = {{Koepe, Jörn}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Price-Based Allocation Games}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{1082, author = {{Handirk, Tobias}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Über die Rolle von Informationen in Verkehrsnetzwerken}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @misc{130, author = {{Kaczorkowski, Jessica}}, publisher = {{Universität Paderborn}}, title = {{{Wettbewerb im Internet - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse des E-Commerce}}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{159, abstract = {{Abstract—Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approachto a fair allocation of bandwidth to each of the usersin a network. This allocation can be computed by uniformlyraising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacityconstraints. We consider an extension of these allocations byraising the bandwidth with arbitrary and not necessarily uniformtime-depending velocities (allocation rates). These allocationsare used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, whichwe formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs). We present avariety of results for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these gamespossess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While computation ingeneral is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms forprominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), includingthe case when all users have the same source-destination pair.We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for pure Nashand strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players havedifferent or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, weshow that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possibleto design games with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial resultson polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived.}}, author = {{Harks, Tobias and Höfer, Martin and Schewior, Kevin and Skopalik, Alexander}}, journal = {{IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{2553 -- 2562}}, publisher = {{IEEE}}, title = {{{Routing Games With Progressive Filling}}}, doi = {{10.1109/TNET.2015.2468571}}, year = {{2016}}, }