@phdthesis{20240,
  author       = {{Hoof, Simon}},
  title        = {{{Essays on Cooperation in Differential Games}}},
  doi          = {{	10.17619/UNIPB/1-1047}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@phdthesis{16910,
  author       = {{Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Mechanisms, Preferences, and Heterogeneity in Matching Markets}}},
  doi          = {{10.17619/UNIPB/1-958}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@phdthesis{15824,
  author       = {{Heinzel, Joachim}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Essays on the Theory of Industrial Organization: Credence Goods, Vertical Relations and Product Bundling}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{16334,
  abstract     = {{We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.}},
  author       = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}},
  journal      = {{Games and Economic Behavior}},
  pages        = {{453 -- 481}},
  title        = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}},
  volume       = {{121}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{34115,
  author       = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}},
  issn         = {{0943-0180}},
  journal      = {{Homo Oeconomicus}},
  keywords     = {{Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Environmental Engineering}},
  number       = {{1-2}},
  pages        = {{1--6}},
  publisher    = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}},
  title        = {{{Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x}},
  volume       = {{37}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{13770,
  author       = {{Karl, Holger and Kundisch, Dennis and Meyer auf der Heide, Friedhelm and Wehrheim, Heike}},
  journal      = {{Business & Information Systems Engineering}},
  number       = {{6}},
  pages        = {{467--481}},
  publisher    = {{Springer}},
  title        = {{{A Case for a New IT Ecosystem: On-The-Fly Computing}}},
  doi          = {{10.1007/s12599-019-00627-x}},
  volume       = {{62}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@article{17350,
  abstract     = {{Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.}},
  author       = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }},
  journal      = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}},
  pages        = {{641--660}},
  title        = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}},
  doi          = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}},
  volume       = {{177}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39070,
  author       = {{Niggemeyer, Laura}},
  title        = {{{Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse mit Fallbeispielen von Google, Facebook und Amazon}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39072,
  author       = {{Schlegel, Manuela}},
  title        = {{{Challenges for Competition Policy in Data-Driven Mergers}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39079,
  author       = {{Neibert, Katharina}},
  title        = {{{Marktmissbrauch in digitalen Märkten - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Beispiel von Facebook}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39077,
  author       = {{Naseri, Gitti}},
  title        = {{{Zu den volkswirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen von Marktmacht am Fallbeispiel der Walt Disney Company}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39073,
  author       = {{Laudage, Felix}},
  title        = {{{Preisdifferenzierung im Online-Handel am Beispiel Amazon und Obi}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39081,
  author       = {{Posmetni, Lena}},
  title        = {{{Zuordnung und Anreizkompatibilität - Eine experimentelle Untersuchung}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39346,
  author       = {{Hensel, Jason}},
  title        = {{{Auswirkungen der Preisdiskriminierung im Online Handel - Eine Wohlfahrtsanalyse am Beispiel von Amazon}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{39347,
  author       = {{Multani, Manjinder Singh}},
  title        = {{{Zur Effizienzsteigerung durch Reputationsmechanismen auf digitalen Märkten}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{38098,
  author       = {{Bellouchi, Houda}},
  title        = {{{Information asymmetry and the SEC framework in digital markets - On the role of reputation systems in alleviating buyers' skepticism and inducing their willingness to pay}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42278,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Zuordnungsverfahren für Tauschbörsen}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42307,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Weitsichtigkeit zur Bildung stabiler Koalitionen - eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42308,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Verhandeltes strategisches Verhalten}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}

@misc{42301,
  author       = {{N., N.}},
  publisher    = {{Universität Paderborn}},
  title        = {{{Kronzeugenprogramme zur Aufdeckung von Kartellen - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse}}},
  year         = {{2020}},
}