---
_id: '112'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We study a model of selfish resource allocation that seeks to incorporate
    dependencies among resources as they exist in in modern networked environments.
    Our model is inspired by utility functions with constant elasticity of substitution
    (CES) which is a well-studied model in economics. We consider congestion games
    with different aggregation functions. In particular, we study $L_p$ norms and
    analyze the existence and complexity of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria. Additionally,
    we give an almost tight characterization based on monotonicity properties to describe
    the set of aggregation functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Lennart
  full_name: Leder, Lennart
  last_name: Leder
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Leder L, Skopalik A. Congestion Games with Complementarities.
    In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
    (CIAC)</i>. LNCS. ; 2017:222--233. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19">10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., Leder, L., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2017). Congestion Games with Complementarities.
    In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
    (CIAC)</i> (pp. 222--233). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Leder_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Congestion
    Games with Complementarities}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19">10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and
    Complexity (CIAC)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Leder, Lennart and Skopalik,
    Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={222--233}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Lennart Leder, and Alexander Skopalik. “Congestion
    Games with Complementarities.” In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
    on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC)</i>, 222--233. LNCS, 2017. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto, L. Leder, and A. Skopalik, “Congestion Games with Complementarities,”
    in <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
    (CIAC)</i>, 2017, pp. 222--233.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Congestion Games with Complementarities.” <i>Proceedings
    of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC)</i>,
    2017, pp. 222--233, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19">10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, L. Leder, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Algorithms and Complexity (CIAC), 2017, pp. 222--233.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:13Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:58Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_19
external_id:
  arxiv:
  - '1701.07304'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
  file_id: '1566'
  file_name: 112-FeldottoLederSkopalik2017.pdf
  file_size: 264089
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:05:37Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 222--233
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Algorithms and Complexity
  (CIAC)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Congestion Games with Complementarities
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '113'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value
    (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers
    weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to
    proportional shares) for distributing the total cost of each resource among its
    users. We focus on the interesting subclass of such games with polynomial resource
    cost functions and present an algorithm that computes approximate pure Nash equilibria
    with a polynomial number of strategy updates. Since computing a single strategy
    update is hard, we apply sampling techniques which allow us to achieve polynomial
    running time. The algorithm builds on the algorithmic ideas of [7], however, to
    the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithmic result on computation
    of approximate equilibria using other than proportional shares as player costs
    in this setting. We present a novel relation that approximates the Shapley value
    of a player by her proportional share and vice versa. As side results, we upper
    bound the approximate price of anarchy of such games and significantly improve
    the best known factor for computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted
    congestion games of [7].
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Gairing, Martin
  last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Grammateia
  full_name: Kotsialou, Grammateia
  last_name: Kotsialou
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Gairing M, Kotsialou G, Skopalik A. Computing Approximate Pure
    Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games. In: <i>Proceedings
    of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>.
    ; 2017. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14">10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., Gairing, M., Kotsialou, G., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2017). Computing
    Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games. In
    <i>Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
    (WINE)</i>. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Gairing_Kotsialou_Skopalik_2017, title={Computing
    Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14">10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou,
    Grammateia and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017} }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Martin Gairing, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Alexander
    Skopalik. “Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted
    Congestion Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web
    and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2017. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, and A. Skopalik, “Computing Approximate
    Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games,” in <i>Proceedings
    of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>,
    2017.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley
    Value Weighted Congestion Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 13th International Conference
    on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2017, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14">10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
    13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2017.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:13Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:59Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-71924-5_14
external_id:
  arxiv:
  - '1710.01634'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: feldi
  date_created: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
  file_id: '5231'
  file_name: Feldotto2017_Chapter_ComputingApproximatePureNashEq.pdf
  file_size: 279055
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T17:01:32Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Web and Internet
  Economics (WINE)
status: public
title: Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion
  Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1767'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'Conditional Value-at-Risk, denoted as CVaRα, is becoming the prevailing measure
    of risk over two paramount economic domains: the insurance domain and the financial
    domain; α∈(0,1) is the confidence level. In this work, we study the strategic
    equilibria for an economic system modeled as a game, where risk-averse players
    seek to minimize the Conditional Value-at-Risk of their costs. Concretely, in
    a CVaRα -equilibrium, the mixed strategy of each player is a best-response. We
    establish two significant properties of CVaRα at equilibrium: (1) The Optimal-Value
    property: For any best-response of a player, each mixed strategy in the support
    gives the same cost to the player. This follows directly from the concavity of
    CVaRα in the involved probabilities, which we establish. (2) The Crawford property:
    For every α, there is a 2-player game with no CVaRα-equilibrium. The property
    is established using the Optimal-Value property and a new functional property
    of CVaRα, called Weak-Equilibrium-for- VaRα, we establish. On top of these properties,
    we show, as one of our two main results, that deciding the existence of a CVaRα-equilibrium
    is strongly NP-hard even for 2-player games. As our other main result, we show
    the strong NP-hardness of deciding the existence of a V-equilibrium, over 2-player
    games, for any valuation V with the Optimal-Value and the Crawford properties.
    This result has a rich potential since we prove that the very significant and
    broad class of strictly quasiconcave valuations has the Optimal-Value property.'
author:
- first_name: Marios
  full_name: Mavronicolas, Marios
  last_name: Mavronicolas
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Monien, Burkhard
  last_name: Monien
citation:
  ama: 'Mavronicolas M, Monien B. Conditional Value-at-Risk: Structure and Complexity
    of Equilibria. In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic
    Game Theory (SAGT 2017)</i>. Vol 10504. LNCS. ; 2017:131--143. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_11">10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_11</a>'
  apa: 'Mavronicolas, M., &#38; Monien, B. (2017). Conditional Value-at-Risk: Structure
    and Complexity of Equilibria. In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium
    on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2017)</i> (Vol. 10504, pp. 131--143). L’Aquila,
    Italy. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_11">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_11</a>'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Mavronicolas_Monien_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Conditional
    Value-at-Risk: Structure and Complexity of Equilibria}, volume={10504}, DOI={<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_11">10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_11</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
    Theory (SAGT 2017)}, author={Mavronicolas, Marios and Monien, Burkhard}, year={2017},
    pages={131--143}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: 'Mavronicolas, Marios, and Burkhard Monien. “Conditional Value-at-Risk:
    Structure and Complexity of Equilibria.” In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2017)</i>, 10504:131--143. LNCS, 2017.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_11">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_11</a>.'
  ieee: 'M. Mavronicolas and B. Monien, “Conditional Value-at-Risk: Structure and
    Complexity of Equilibria,” in <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium
    on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2017)</i>, L’Aquila, Italy, 2017, vol. 10504,
    pp. 131--143.'
  mla: 'Mavronicolas, Marios, and Burkhard Monien. “Conditional Value-at-Risk: Structure
    and Complexity of Equilibria.” <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium
    on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2017)</i>, vol. 10504, 2017, pp. 131--143, doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_11">10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_11</a>.'
  short: 'M. Mavronicolas, B. Monien, in: Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium
    on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2017), 2017, pp. 131--143.'
conference:
  end_date: 2017-09-14
  location: L'Aquila, Italy
  name: 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2017)
  start_date: 2017-09-12
date_created: 2018-03-23T13:58:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:53:16Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '7'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-66700-3_11
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: ups
  date_created: 2018-11-02T14:53:56Z
  date_updated: 2018-11-02T14:53:56Z
  file_id: '5287'
  file_name: ConditionalValue-at-RiskStruct.pdf
  file_size: 352365
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T14:53:56Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '     10504'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 131--143
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
  (SAGT 2017)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: 'Conditional Value-at-Risk: Structure and Complexity of Equilibria'
type: conference
user_id: '477'
volume: 10504
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '2269'
author:
- first_name: Ana
  full_name: Mauleon, Ana
  last_name: Mauleon
- first_name: Nils
  full_name: Roehl, Nils
  last_name: Roehl
- first_name: Vincent
  full_name: Vannetelbosch, Vincent
  last_name: Vannetelbosch
citation:
  ama: Mauleon A, Roehl N, Vannetelbosch V. Constitutions and groups. <i>Games and
    Economic Behavior</i>. 2017;107:135-152. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022">10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022</a>
  apa: Mauleon, A., Roehl, N., &#38; Vannetelbosch, V. (2017). Constitutions and groups.
    <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>, <i>107</i>, 135–152. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Mauleon_Roehl_Vannetelbosch_2017, title={Constitutions and groups},
    volume={107}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022">10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022</a>},
    journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Mauleon,
    Ana and Roehl, Nils and Vannetelbosch, Vincent}, year={2017}, pages={135–152}
    }'
  chicago: 'Mauleon, Ana, Nils Roehl, and Vincent Vannetelbosch. “Constitutions and
    Groups.” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i> 107 (2017): 135–52. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022</a>.'
  ieee: A. Mauleon, N. Roehl, and V. Vannetelbosch, “Constitutions and groups,” <i>Games
    and Economic Behavior</i>, vol. 107, pp. 135–152, 2017.
  mla: Mauleon, Ana, et al. “Constitutions and Groups.” <i>Games and Economic Behavior</i>,
    vol. 107, Elsevier, 2017, pp. 135–52, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022">10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022</a>.
  short: A. Mauleon, N. Roehl, V. Vannetelbosch, Games and Economic Behavior 107 (2017)
    135–152.
date_created: 2018-04-09T09:25:05Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:55:38Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.022
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: stela
  date_created: 2018-10-31T08:21:31Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:21:31Z
  file_id: '5122'
  file_name: Constitutions and groups.pdf
  file_size: 577360
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T08:21:31Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       107'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 135-152
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Games and Economic Behavior
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 0899-8256
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: Constitutions and groups
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 107
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '83'
author:
- first_name: Dennis
  full_name: Uden, Dennis
  last_name: Uden
citation:
  ama: Uden D. <i>Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An Analysis on Product Bundeling</i>.
    Universität Paderborn; 2017.
  apa: Uden, D. (2017). <i>Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An analysis on product
    bundeling</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Uden_2017, title={Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An analysis on
    product bundeling}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Uden, Dennis},
    year={2017} }'
  chicago: Uden, Dennis. <i>Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An Analysis on Product
    Bundeling</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  ieee: D. Uden, <i>Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An analysis on product bundeling</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  mla: Uden, Dennis. <i>Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An Analysis on Product Bundeling</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  short: D. Uden, Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An Analysis on Product Bundeling,
    Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:07Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:53Z
department:
- _id: '280'
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Microsoft vs. the EU Commission - An analysis on product bundeling
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '42447'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '59'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We consider a scheduling problem on $m$ identical processors sharing an arbitrarily
    divisible resource. In addition to assigning jobs to processors, the scheduler
    must distribute the resource among the processors (e.g., for three processors
    in shares of 20\%, 15\%, and 65\%) and adjust this distribution over time. Each
    job $j$ comes with a size $p_j \in \mathbb{R}$ and a resource requirement $r_j
    > 0$. Jobs do not benefit when receiving a share larger than $r_j$ of the resource.
    But providing them with a fraction of the resource requirement causes a linear
    decrease in the processing efficiency. We seek a (non-preemptive) job and resource
    assignment minimizing the makespan.Our main result is an efficient approximation
    algorithm which achieves an approximation ratio of $2 + 1/(m-2)$. It can be improved
    to an (asymptotic) ratio of $1 + 1/(m-1)$ if all jobs have unit size. Our algorithms
    also imply new results for a well-known bin packing problem with splittable items
    and a restricted number of allowed item parts per bin.Based upon the above solution,
    we also derive an approximation algorithm with similar guarantees for a setting
    in which we introduce so-called tasks each containing several jobs and where we
    are interested in the average completion time of tasks (a task is completed when
    all its jobs are completed).
author:
- first_name: Peter
  full_name: Kling, Peter
  last_name: Kling
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Mäcker, Alexander
  id: '13536'
  last_name: Mäcker
- first_name: Sören
  full_name: Riechers, Sören
  last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Kling P, Mäcker A, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor
    Scheduling with a Sharable Resource. In: <i>Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium
    on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)</i>. ; 2017:123--132. doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578">10.1145/3087556.3087578</a>'
  apa: 'Kling, P., Mäcker, A., Riechers, S., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2017). Sharing is
    Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource. In <i>Proceedings
    of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)</i>
    (pp. 123--132). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578">https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578</a>'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Kling_Mäcker_Riechers_Skopalik_2017, title={Sharing is Caring:
    Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578">10.1145/3087556.3087578</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms
    and Architectures (SPAA)}, author={Kling, Peter and Mäcker, Alexander and Riechers,
    Sören and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={123--132} }'
  chicago: 'Kling, Peter, Alexander Mäcker, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
    “Sharing Is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource.” In <i>Proceedings
    of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)</i>,
    123--132, 2017. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578">https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578</a>.'
  ieee: 'P. Kling, A. Mäcker, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor
    Scheduling with a Sharable Resource,” in <i>Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium
    on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)</i>, 2017, pp. 123--132.'
  mla: 'Kling, Peter, et al. “Sharing Is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a
    Sharable Resource.” <i>Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in
    Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA)</i>, 2017, pp. 123--132, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1145/3087556.3087578">10.1145/3087556.3087578</a>.'
  short: 'P. Kling, A. Mäcker, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 29th
    ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), 2017, pp.
    123--132.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:46Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1145/3087556.3087578
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
  file_id: '1578'
  file_name: 59-progress.pdf
  file_size: 784867
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-21T13:17:33Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 123--132
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '4'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '16'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 29th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and
  Architectures (SPAA)
status: public
title: 'Sharing is Caring: Multiprocessor Scheduling with a Sharable Resource'
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '5946'
author:
- first_name: Sarah
  full_name: Kühn, Sarah
  last_name: Kühn
citation:
  ama: Kühn S. <i>Outsourcing Und Qualität Im Supply Chain - Eine Gleichgewichtsanalyse</i>.
    Universität Paderborn; 2017.
  apa: Kühn, S. (2017). <i>Outsourcing und Qualität im Supply Chain - Eine Gleichgewichtsanalyse</i>.
    Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Kühn_2017, title={Outsourcing und Qualität im Supply Chain - Eine
    Gleichgewichtsanalyse}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kühn, Sarah},
    year={2017} }'
  chicago: Kühn, Sarah. <i>Outsourcing Und Qualität Im Supply Chain - Eine Gleichgewichtsanalyse</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  ieee: S. Kühn, <i>Outsourcing und Qualität im Supply Chain - Eine Gleichgewichtsanalyse</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  mla: Kühn, Sarah. <i>Outsourcing Und Qualität Im Supply Chain - Eine Gleichgewichtsanalyse</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  short: S. Kühn, Outsourcing Und Qualität Im Supply Chain - Eine Gleichgewichtsanalyse,
    Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2018-11-28T10:55:45Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:48Z
department:
- _id: '205'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
title: Outsourcing und Qualität im Supply Chain - Eine Gleichgewichtsanalyse
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '65453'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '5950'
author:
- first_name: Justine
  full_name: Gunning, Justine
  last_name: Gunning
citation:
  ama: Gunning J. <i>Crowdfunding Plattformen Als Vermittler Auf Zweiseitigen Märkten
    - Eine Mikroökonomische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
  apa: Gunning, J. (2017). <i>Crowdfunding Plattformen als Vermittler auf zweiseitigen
    Märkten - Eine mikroökonomische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Gunning_2017, title={Crowdfunding Plattformen als Vermittler auf
    zweiseitigen Märkten - Eine mikroökonomische Analyse}, publisher={Universität
    Paderborn}, author={Gunning, Justine}, year={2017} }'
  chicago: Gunning, Justine. <i>Crowdfunding Plattformen Als Vermittler Auf Zweiseitigen
    Märkten - Eine Mikroökonomische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  ieee: J. Gunning, <i>Crowdfunding Plattformen als Vermittler auf zweiseitigen Märkten
    - Eine mikroökonomische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  mla: Gunning, Justine. <i>Crowdfunding Plattformen Als Vermittler Auf Zweiseitigen
    Märkten - Eine Mikroökonomische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  short: J. Gunning, Crowdfunding Plattformen Als Vermittler Auf Zweiseitigen Märkten
    - Eine Mikroökonomische Analyse, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2018-11-28T11:29:03Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:48Z
department:
- _id: '205'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
title: Crowdfunding Plattformen als Vermittler auf zweiseitigen Märkten - Eine mikroökonomische
  Analyse
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '65453'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '86'
author:
- first_name: Laura
  full_name: Niggemeyer, Laura
  last_name: Niggemeyer
citation:
  ama: Niggemeyer L. <i>Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische
    Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland</i>. Universität Paderborn;
    2017.
  apa: Niggemeyer, L. (2017). <i>Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen -
    Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland</i>.
    Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Niggemeyer_2017, title={Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen
    - Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland},
    publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Niggemeyer, Laura}, year={2017} }'
  chicago: Niggemeyer, Laura. <i>Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen -
    Eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  ieee: L. Niggemeyer, <i>Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische
    Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland</i>. Universität Paderborn,
    2017.
  mla: Niggemeyer, Laura. <i>Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen - Eine
    wettbewerbspolitische Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  short: L. Niggemeyer, Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische
    Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland, Universität Paderborn,
    2017.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:57Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Kartellabsprachen und vertikale Preisbindungen - Eine wettbewerbspolitische
  Analyse am Bespiel der Lebensmittelindustrie in Deutschland
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '42447'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '5084'
author:
- first_name: Thomas
  full_name: Streck, Thomas
  id: '33041'
  last_name: Streck
citation:
  ama: Streck T. <i>How to Adequately Relocate Asylum Applicants within the European
    Union - An Attempt to Apply Matching Theory in the Current Migration Crisis</i>.
    Universität Paderborn; 2017.
  apa: Streck, T. (2017). <i>How to adequately relocate asylum applicants within the
    European Union - An attempt to apply matching theory in the current migration
    crisis</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Streck_2017, title={How to adequately relocate asylum applicants
    within the European Union - An attempt to apply matching theory in the current
    migration crisis}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Streck, Thomas},
    year={2017} }'
  chicago: Streck, Thomas. <i>How to Adequately Relocate Asylum Applicants within
    the European Union - An Attempt to Apply Matching Theory in the Current Migration
    Crisis</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  ieee: T. Streck, <i>How to adequately relocate asylum applicants within the European
    Union - An attempt to apply matching theory in the current migration crisis</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  mla: Streck, Thomas. <i>How to Adequately Relocate Asylum Applicants within the
    European Union - An Attempt to Apply Matching Theory in the Current Migration
    Crisis</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  short: T. Streck, How to Adequately Relocate Asylum Applicants within the European
    Union - An Attempt to Apply Matching Theory in the Current Migration Crisis, Universität
    Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2018-10-30T14:51:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:37Z
department:
- _id: '205'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
title: How to adequately relocate asylum applicants within the European Union - An
  attempt to apply matching theory in the current migration crisis
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '51'
author:
- first_name: Nikolai
  full_name: Winkelhake, Nikolai
  last_name: Winkelhake
citation:
  ama: Winkelhake N. <i>Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische
    Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
  apa: Winkelhake, N. (2017). <i>Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische
    Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Winkelhake_2017, title={Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten -
    eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Winkelhake,
    Nikolai}, year={2017} }'
  chicago: Winkelhake, Nikolai. <i>Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine
    wettbewerbspolitische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  ieee: N. Winkelhake, <i>Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische
    Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  mla: Winkelhake, Nikolai. <i>Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische
    Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  short: N. Winkelhake, Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische
    Analyse, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:01Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:37Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Tying und Bundling in digitalen Märkten - eine wettbewerbspolitische Analyse
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '42447'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '66'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In budget games, players compete over resources with finite budgets. For every
    resource, a player has a specific demand and as a strategy, he chooses a subset
    of resources. If the total demand on a resource does not exceed its budget, the
    utility of each player who chose that resource equals his demand. Otherwise, the
    budget is shared proportionally. In the general case, pure Nash equilibria (NE)
    do not exist for such games. In this paper, we consider the natural classes of
    singleton and matroid budget games with additional constraints and show that for
    each, pure NE can be guaranteed. In addition, we introduce a lexicographical potential
    function to prove that every matroid budget game has an approximate pure NE which
    depends on the largest ratio between the different demands of each individual
    player.
author:
- first_name: Maximilian
  full_name: Drees, Maximilian
  last_name: Drees
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Sören
  full_name: Riechers, Sören
  last_name: Riechers
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Drees M, Feldotto M, Riechers S, Skopalik A. Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted
    Budget Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics
    Conference (COCOON)</i>. LNCS. ; 2017:175--187. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15">10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15</a>'
  apa: Drees, M., Feldotto, M., Riechers, S., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2017). Pure Nash
    Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 23rd International
    Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON)</i> (pp. 175--187). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Drees_Feldotto_Riechers_Skopalik_2017, series={LNCS}, title={Pure
    Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15">10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
    (COCOON)}, author={Drees, Maximilian and Feldotto, Matthias and Riechers, Sören
    and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2017}, pages={175--187}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: Drees, Maximilian, Matthias Feldotto, Sören Riechers, and Alexander Skopalik.
    “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 23rd
    International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON)</i>, 175--187. LNCS,
    2017. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15</a>.
  ieee: M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, and A. Skopalik, “Pure Nash Equilibria
    in Restricted Budget Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing
    and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON)</i>, 2017, pp. 175--187.
  mla: Drees, Maximilian, et al. “Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games.”
    <i>Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
    (COCOON)</i>, 2017, pp. 175--187, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15">10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15</a>.
  short: 'M. Drees, M. Feldotto, S. Riechers, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
    23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON), 2017, pp.
    175--187.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:04Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:13Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-62389-4_15
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: feldi
  date_created: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
  date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
  file_id: '5228'
  file_name: Drees2017_Chapter_PureNashEquilibriaInRestricted.pdf
  file_size: 346390
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T16:58:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 175--187
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '16'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject C4
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
publication: Proceedings of the 23rd International Computing and Combinatorics Conference
  (COCOON)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Pure Nash Equilibria in Restricted Budget Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1054'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: 'We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision.
    Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from
    patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service.
    Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact
    with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches
    providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired
    direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical
    benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental
    conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit
    from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line
    with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision
    and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics
    and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced
    with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related
    experimental research on price competition. '
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Janet
  full_name: Brosig-Koch, Janet
  last_name: Brosig-Koch
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
- first_name: Johanna
  full_name: Kokot, Johanna
  last_name: Kokot
citation:
  ama: Brosig-Koch J, Hehenkamp B, Kokot J. The effects of competition on medical
    service provision. <i>Health Economics</i>. 2017;26(53):6-20. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3583">10.1002/hec.3583</a>
  apa: Brosig-Koch, J., Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Kokot, J. (2017). The effects of competition
    on medical service provision. <i>Health Economics</i>, <i>26</i>(53), 6–20. <a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3583">https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3583</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Brosig-Koch_Hehenkamp_Kokot_2017, title={The effects of competition
    on medical service provision}, volume={26}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3583">10.1002/hec.3583</a>},
    number={53}, journal={Health Economics}, publisher={Wiley Online Library}, author={Brosig-Koch,
    Janet and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}, year={2017}, pages={6–20} }'
  chicago: 'Brosig-Koch, Janet, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Johanna Kokot. “The Effects
    of Competition on Medical Service Provision.” <i>Health Economics</i> 26, no.
    53 (2017): 6–20. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3583">https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3583</a>.'
  ieee: J. Brosig-Koch, B. Hehenkamp, and J. Kokot, “The effects of competition on
    medical service provision,” <i>Health Economics</i>, vol. 26, no. 53, pp. 6–20,
    2017.
  mla: Brosig-Koch, Janet, et al. “The Effects of Competition on Medical Service Provision.”
    <i>Health Economics</i>, vol. 26, no. 53, Wiley Online Library, 2017, pp. 6–20,
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3583">10.1002/hec.3583</a>.
  short: J. Brosig-Koch, B. Hehenkamp, J. Kokot, Health Economics 26 (2017) 6–20.
date_created: 2017-12-15T11:16:41Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:43Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1002/hec.3583
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: ups
  date_created: 2018-11-02T15:39:01Z
  date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:39:01Z
  file_id: '5309'
  file_name: Brosig-Koch_et_al-2018-Health_Economics.pdf
  file_size: 1116140
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:39:01Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '        26'
issue: '53'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 6-20
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Health Economics
publication_status: published
publisher: Wiley Online Library
quality_controlled: '1'
status: public
title: The effects of competition on medical service provision
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 26
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1055'
author:
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
- first_name: Oddvar
  full_name: Kaarboe, Oddvar
  last_name: Kaarboe
citation:
  ama: Hehenkamp B, Kaarboe O. <i>Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed
    Hospital Markets</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
  apa: Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Kaarboe, O. (2017). <i>Location Choice and Quality Competition
    in Mixed Hospital Markets</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Hehenkamp_Kaarboe_2017, title={Location Choice and Quality Competition
    in Mixed Hospital Markets}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Hehenkamp,
    Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}, year={2017} }'
  chicago: Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Oddvar Kaarboe. <i>Location Choice and Quality
    Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  ieee: B. Hehenkamp and O. Kaarboe, <i>Location Choice and Quality Competition in
    Mixed Hospital Markets</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  mla: Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Oddvar Kaarboe. <i>Location Choice and Quality Competition
    in Mixed Hospital Markets</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  short: B. Hehenkamp, O. Kaarboe, Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed
    Hospital Markets, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-15T11:19:12Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:44Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: bhoyer
  date_created: 2018-11-06T14:01:20Z
  date_updated: 2018-11-06T14:01:20Z
  file_id: '5379'
  file_name: HehenkampKaarboe_20180905.pdf
  file_size: 318340
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-11-06T14:01:20Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets
type: report
user_id: '42447'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1056'
author:
- first_name: Yiguan
  full_name: Gu, Yiguan
  last_name: Gu
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
- first_name: Wolfgang
  full_name: Leininger, Wolfgang
  last_name: Leininger
citation:
  ama: Gu Y, Hehenkamp B, Leininger W. <i>Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests
    - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
  apa: Gu, Y., Hehenkamp, B., &#38; Leininger, W. (2017). <i>Evolutionary Equilibrium
    in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Gu_Hehenkamp_Leininger_2017, title={Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic
    Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation}, publisher={Universität Paderborn},
    author={Gu, Yiguan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}, year={2017}
    }'
  chicago: Gu, Yiguan, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Wolfgang Leininger. <i>Evolutionary
    Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation</i>. Universität
    Paderborn, 2017.
  ieee: Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, and W. Leininger, <i>Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic
    Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  mla: Gu, Yiguan, et al. <i>Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry,
    Effort, and Overdissipation</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  short: Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, W. Leininger, Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic
    Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-15T11:21:34Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:44Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: bhoyer
  date_created: 2018-11-06T14:05:20Z
  date_updated: 2018-11-06T14:05:20Z
  file_id: '5380'
  file_name: ESS_Contest_20181026.pdf
  file_size: 520711
  relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-11-06T14:05:20Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Evolutionary Equilibrium in Stochastic Contests - Entry, Effort, and Overdissipation
type: report
user_id: '42447'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1057'
author:
- first_name: Oktay
  full_name: Sürücü, Oktay
  last_name: Sürücü
- first_name: Behnud
  full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud
  id: '26032'
  last_name: Mir Djawadi
  orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912
- first_name: Sonja
  full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
  last_name: Brangewitz
citation:
  ama: Sürücü O, Mir Djawadi B, Brangewitz S. <i>Asymmetric Dominance Effect with
    Multiple Decoys for Low- and High-Variance Lotteries</i>. Universität Paderborn;
    2017.
  apa: Sürücü, O., Mir Djawadi, B., &#38; Brangewitz, S. (2017). <i>Asymmetric Dominance
    Effect with Multiple Decoys for Low- and High-Variance Lotteries</i>. Universität
    Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Sürücü_Mir Djawadi_Brangewitz_2017, title={Asymmetric Dominance Effect
    with Multiple Decoys for Low- and High-Variance Lotteries}, publisher={Universität
    Paderborn}, author={Sürücü, Oktay and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Brangewitz, Sonja},
    year={2017} }'
  chicago: Sürücü, Oktay, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Sonja Brangewitz. <i>Asymmetric
    Dominance Effect with Multiple Decoys for Low- and High-Variance Lotteries</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  ieee: O. Sürücü, B. Mir Djawadi, and S. Brangewitz, <i>Asymmetric Dominance Effect
    with Multiple Decoys for Low- and High-Variance Lotteries</i>. Universität Paderborn,
    2017.
  mla: Sürücü, Oktay, et al. <i>Asymmetric Dominance Effect with Multiple Decoys for
    Low- and High-Variance Lotteries</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  short: O. Sürücü, B. Mir Djawadi, S. Brangewitz, Asymmetric Dominance Effect with
    Multiple Decoys for Low- and High-Variance Lotteries, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-15T11:24:00Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:44Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '179'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: bhoyer
  date_created: 2018-11-06T15:27:20Z
  date_updated: 2018-11-06T15:27:20Z
  file_id: '5386'
  file_name: SSRN-id2959997.pdf
  file_size: 260633
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-06T15:27:20Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Asymmetric Dominance Effect with Multiple Decoys for Low- and High-Variance
  Lotteries
type: report
user_id: '477'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1069'
author:
- first_name: Henning Cornelius
  full_name: Petersen, Henning Cornelius
  last_name: Petersen
citation:
  ama: Petersen HC. <i>Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und Innovation - Eine
    ökonomische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
  apa: Petersen, H. C. (2017). <i>Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und Innovation
    - Eine ökonomische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Petersen_2017, title={Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und
    Innovation - Eine ökonomische Analyse}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Petersen,
    Henning Cornelius}, year={2017} }'
  chicago: Petersen, Henning Cornelius. <i>Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb
    und Innovation - Eine ökonomische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  ieee: H. C. Petersen, <i>Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und Innovation -
    Eine ökonomische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  mla: Petersen, Henning Cornelius. <i>Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und
    Innovation - Eine ökonomische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  short: H.C. Petersen, Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und Innovation - Eine
    ökonomische Analyse, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T09:47:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:49Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Zu den Wechselwirkungen von Wettbewerb und Innovation - Eine ökonomische Analyse
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '42447'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1070'
author:
- first_name: Alparslan
  full_name: Turan, Alparslan
  last_name: Turan
citation:
  ama: Turan A. <i>Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische
    Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
  apa: Turan, A. (2017). <i>Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische
    Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Turan_2017, title={Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung
    - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Turan,
    Alparslan}, year={2017} }'
  chicago: Turan, Alparslan. <i>Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine
    spieltheoretische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  ieee: A. Turan, <i>Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische
    Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  mla: Turan, Alparslan. <i>Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische
    Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  short: A. Turan, Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische
    Analyse, Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T09:48:58Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Zu den Anreizwirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '42447'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1071'
author:
- first_name: Jerome
  full_name: Iding, Jerome
  last_name: Iding
citation:
  ama: Iding J. <i>Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung -
    Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011)</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2017.
  apa: Iding, J. (2017). <i>Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung
    - Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011)</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Iding_2017, title={Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung
    - Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011)}, publisher={Universität Paderborn},
    author={Iding, Jerome}, year={2017} }'
  chicago: Iding, Jerome. <i>Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung
    - Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011)</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  ieee: J. Iding, <i>Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung
    - Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011)</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  mla: Iding, Jerome. <i>Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung
    - Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011)</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2017.
  short: J. Iding, Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung -
    Das Fallbeispiel des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011), Universität Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T09:50:10Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Zu den Anreiz- und Wohlfahrtswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung - Das Fallbeispiel
  des LKW-Kartells (1997-2011)
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '42447'
year: '2017'
...
---
_id: '1072'
author:
- first_name: Dennis
  full_name: Lütkevedder, Dennis
  last_name: Lütkevedder
citation:
  ama: Lütkevedder D. <i>Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen
    - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking</i>. Universität
    Paderborn; 2017.
  apa: Lütkevedder, D. (2017). <i>Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen
    - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking</i>. Universität
    Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Lütkevedder_2017, title={Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen
    - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking}, publisher={Universität
    Paderborn}, author={Lütkevedder, Dennis}, year={2017} }'
  chicago: Lütkevedder, Dennis. <i>Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen
    - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking</i>. Universität
    Paderborn, 2017.
  ieee: D. Lütkevedder, <i>Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen
    - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking</i>. Universität
    Paderborn, 2017.
  mla: Lütkevedder, Dennis. <i>Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen
    - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking</i>. Universität
    Paderborn, 2017.
  short: D. Lütkevedder, Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen
    - eine ökonomische Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking, Universität
    Paderborn, 2017.
date_created: 2017-12-19T09:56:35Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:50Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Vertikale Wettbewerbsbeschränkung auf Hotelreservierungsportalen - eine ökonomische
  Analyse anhand der Bestpreisklausel von Booking
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '42447'
year: '2017'
...