---
_id: '452'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Today's networks, like the Internet, do not consist of one but a mixture of
    several interconnected networks. Each has individual qualities and hence the performance
    of a network node results from the networks' interplay.We introduce a new game
    theoretic model capturing the interplay between a high-speed backbone network
    and a low-speed general purpose network. In our model, n nodes are connected by
    a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway node.
    A gateway node pays a fixed price for its connection to the high-speed network,
    but can utilize the high-speed network to gain communication distance 0 to all
    other gateways. Communication distances in the low-speed network are given by
    the hop distances. The effective communication distance between any two nodes
    then is given by the shortest path, which is possibly improved by using gateways
    as shortcuts.Every node v has the objective to minimize its communication costs,
    given by the sum (SUM-game) or maximum (MAX-game) of the effective communication
    distances from v to all other nodes plus a fixed price \alpha > 0, if it decides
    to be a gateway. For both games and different ranges of \alpha, we study the existence
    of equilibria, the price of anarchy, and convergence properties of best-response
    dynamics.
author:
- first_name: Sebastian
  full_name: Abshoff, Sebastian
  last_name: Abshoff
- first_name: Andreas
  full_name: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas
  last_name: Cord-Landwehr
- first_name: Daniel
  full_name: Jung, Daniel
  id: '37827'
  last_name: Jung
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Abshoff S, Cord-Landwehr A, Jung D, Skopalik A. Brief Announcement: A Model
    for Multilevel Network Games. In: Lavi R, ed. <i>Proceedings of the 7th International
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>. LNCS. ; 2014:294.'
  apa: 'Abshoff, S., Cord-Landwehr, A., Jung, D., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Brief
    Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games. In R. Lavi (Ed.), <i>Proceedings
    of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i> (p. 294).'
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Abshoff_Cord-Landwehr_Jung_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS},
    title={Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games}, booktitle={Proceedings
    of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)}, author={Abshoff,
    Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung, Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander},
    editor={Lavi, RonEditor}, year={2014}, pages={294}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: 'Abshoff, Sebastian, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and Alexander
    Skopalik. “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games.” In <i>Proceedings
    of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>, edited
    by Ron Lavi, 294. LNCS, 2014.'
  ieee: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, and A. Skopalik, “Brief Announcement:
    A Model for Multilevel Network Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 7th International
    Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)</i>, 2014, p. 294.'
  mla: 'Abshoff, Sebastian, et al. “Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network
    Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
    Theory (SAGT)</i>, edited by Ron Lavi, 2014, p. 294.'
  short: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, A. Skopalik, in: R. Lavi (Ed.), Proceedings
    of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2014, p.
    294.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:08Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
editor:
- first_name: Ron
  full_name: Lavi, Ron
  last_name: Lavi
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z
  file_id: '1343'
  file_name: 452-title_multilevel-sagt.pdf
  file_size: 84783
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:40Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: '294'
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '5'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A1
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
  (SAGT)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: 'Brief Announcement: A Model for Multilevel Network Games'
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '453'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: In this paper we study the potential function in congestion games. We consider
    both games with non-decreasing cost functions as well as games with non-increasing
    utility functions. We show that the value of the potential function $\Phi(\sf
    s)$ of any outcome $\sf s$ of a congestion game approximates the optimum potential
    value $\Phi(\sf s^*)$ by a factor $\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$ which only depends on the
    set of cost/utility functions $\mathcal{F}$, and an additive term which is bounded
    by the sum of the total possible improvements of the players in the outcome $\sf
    s$. The significance of this result is twofold. On the one hand it provides \emph{Price-of-Anarchy}-like
    results with respect to the potential function. On the other hand, we show that
    these approximations can be used to compute $(1+\varepsilon)\cdot\Psi_{\mathcal{F}}$-approximate
    pure Nash equilibria for congestion games with non-decreasing cost functions.
    For the special case of polynomial cost functions, this significantly improves
    the guarantees from Caragiannis et al. [FOCS 2011]. Moreover, our machinery provides
    the first guarantees for general latency functions.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Gairing, Martin
  last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Gairing M, Skopalik A. Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion
    Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>. LNCS. ; 2014:30-43. doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., Gairing, M., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Bounding the Potential
    Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria. In <i>Proceedings
    of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>
    (pp. 30–43). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Gairing_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Bounding
    the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Gairing, Martin and Skopalik,
    Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={30–43}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, Martin Gairing, and Alexander Skopalik. “Bounding the
    Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.”
    In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
    (WINE)</i>, 30–43. LNCS, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, and A. Skopalik, “Bounding the Potential Function
    in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria,” in <i>Proceedings of
    the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014,
    pp. 30–43.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games
    and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria.” <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 30–43, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, M. Gairing, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 30–43.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_3
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
  file_id: '1342'
  file_name: 453-WINE14FGS.pdf
  file_size: 324307
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:24:11Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 30-43
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
  Economics (WINE)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash
  Equilibria
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '455'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion
    games and develop techniques to obtain approximate potential functions that prove
    the existence of alpha-approximate pure Nash equilibria and the convergence of
    alpha-improvement steps. Specifically, we show how to obtain upper bounds for
    approximation factor alpha for a given class of cost functions. For example for
    concave cost functions the factor is at most 3/2, for quadratic cost functions
    it is at most 4/3, and for polynomial cost functions of maximal degree d it is
    at at most d + 1. For games with two players we obtain tight bounds which are
    as small as for example 1.054 in the case of quadratic cost functions.
author:
- first_name: Christoph
  full_name: Hansknecht, Christoph
  last_name: Hansknecht
- first_name: Max
  full_name: Klimm, Max
  last_name: Klimm
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Hansknecht C, Klimm M, Skopalik A. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted
    congestion games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation
    Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)</i>. LIPIcs. ; 2014:242-257.
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242">10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242</a>'
  apa: Hansknecht, C., Klimm, M., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Approximate pure Nash
    equilibria in weighted congestion games. In <i>Proceedings of the 17th. International
    Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)</i>
    (pp. 242–257). <a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242">https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Hansknecht_Klimm_Skopalik_2014, series={LIPIcs}, title={Approximate
    pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242">10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms
    for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)}, author={Hansknecht, Christoph
    and Klimm, Max and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={242–257}, collection={LIPIcs}
    }'
  chicago: Hansknecht, Christoph, Max Klimm, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate
    Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted Congestion Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 17th.
    International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization
    Problems (APPROX)</i>, 242–57. LIPIcs, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242">https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242</a>.
  ieee: C. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate pure Nash equilibria
    in weighted congestion games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop
    on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)</i>,
    2014, pp. 242–257.
  mla: Hansknecht, Christoph, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Weighted
    Congestion Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation
    Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)</i>, 2014, pp. 242–57,
    doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242">10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242</a>.
  short: 'C. Hansknecht, M. Klimm, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 17th. International
    Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX),
    2014, pp. 242–257.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:20Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:09Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.4230/LIPIcs.APPROX-RANDOM.2014.242
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z
  file_id: '1341'
  file_name: 455-HKS14.pdf
  file_size: 512712
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:23:40Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 242 - 257
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 17th. International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms
  for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX)
series_title: LIPIcs
status: public
title: Approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '456'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibriain social context
    congestion games. For any given set of allowed costfunctions F, we provide a threshold
    value μ(F), and show that for theclass of social context congestion games with
    cost functions from F, α-Nash dynamics are guaranteed to converge to α-approximate
    pure Nashequilibrium if and only if α > μ(F).Interestingly, μ(F) is related and
    always upper bounded by Roughgarden’sanarchy value [19].
author:
- first_name: Martin
  full_name: Gairing, Martin
  last_name: Gairing
- first_name: Grammateia
  full_name: Kotsialou, Grammateia
  last_name: Kotsialou
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Gairing M, Kotsialou G, Skopalik A. Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social
    Context Congestion Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
    on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>. LNCS. ; 2014:480-485. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>'
  apa: Gairing, M., Kotsialou, G., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Approximate pure Nash
    equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i> (pp. 480–485). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Gairing_Kotsialou_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS}, title={Approximate
    pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)}, author={Gairing, Martin and Kotsialou, Grammateia and Skopalik,
    Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={480–485}, collection={LNCS} }'
  chicago: Gairing, Martin, Grammateia Kotsialou, and Alexander Skopalik. “Approximate
    Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games.” In <i>Proceedings of
    the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 480–85.
    LNCS, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>.
  ieee: M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, and A. Skopalik, “Approximate pure Nash equilibria
    in Social Context Congestion Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 480–485.
  mla: Gairing, Martin, et al. “Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context
    Congestion Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web
    and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 480–85, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43</a>.
  short: 'M. Gairing, G. Kotsialou, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 10th International
    Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp. 480–485.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:21Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:10Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z
  file_id: '1340'
  file_name: 456-WINE14final.pdf
  file_size: 377378
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:22:57Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 480 - 485
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
  Economics (WINE)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Approximate pure Nash equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '462'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We discuss a technique to analyze complex infinitely repeated games using
    techniques from the fields of game theory and simulations. Our research is motivated
    by the analysis of electronic markets with thousands of participants and possibly
    complex strategic behavior. We consider an example of a global market of composed
    IT services to demonstrate the use of our simulation technique. We present our
    current work in this area and we want to discuss further approaches for the future.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
  full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
  id: '14052'
  last_name: Feldotto
  orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Feldotto M, Skopalik A. A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely
    Repeated Games. In: <i>Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation
    and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)</i>.
    ; 2014:625-630. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">10.5220/0005110406250630</a>'
  apa: Feldotto, M., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). A Simulation Framework for Analyzing
    Complex Infinitely Repeated Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 4th International
    Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications
    (SIMULTECH 2014)</i> (pp. 625–630). <a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Skopalik_2014, title={A Simulation Framework for
    Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">10.5220/0005110406250630</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling
    Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)}, author={Feldotto,
    Matthias and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={625–630} }'
  chicago: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for
    Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 4th International
    Conference on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications
    (SIMULTECH 2014)</i>, 625–30, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630</a>.
  ieee: M. Feldotto and A. Skopalik, “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex
    Infinitely Repeated Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
    on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
    2014)</i>, 2014, pp. 625–630.
  mla: Feldotto, Matthias, and Alexander Skopalik. “A Simulation Framework for Analyzing
    Complex Infinitely Repeated Games.” <i>Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
    on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
    2014)</i>, 2014, pp. 625–30, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.5220/0005110406250630">10.5220/0005110406250630</a>.
  short: 'M. Feldotto, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference
    on Simulation and Modeling Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH
    2014), 2014, pp. 625–630.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:22Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:15Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.5220/0005110406250630
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
  file_id: '1337'
  file_name: 462-FS2014SIMULTECH.pdf
  file_size: 993721
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:21:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 625-630
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Teilprojekt A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
publication: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Simulation and Modeling
  Methodologies, Technologies and Applications (SIMULTECH 2014)
status: public
title: A Simulation Framework for Analyzing Complex Infinitely Repeated Games
type: conference
user_id: '14052'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '392'
author:
- first_name: NinaMadeleine
  full_name: Brummel, NinaMadeleine
  last_name: Brummel
citation:
  ama: 'Brummel N. <i>On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of
    Energy Industry</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2014.'
  apa: 'Brummel, N. (2014). <i>On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The
    Case of Energy Industry</i>. Universität Paderborn.'
  bibtex: '@book{Brummel_2014, title={On the Relation between Innovation and Competion:
    The Case of Energy Industry}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Brummel,
    NinaMadeleine}, year={2014} }'
  chicago: 'Brummel, NinaMadeleine. <i>On the Relation between Innovation and Competion:
    The Case of Energy Industry</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
  ieee: 'N. Brummel, <i>On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case
    of Energy Industry</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
  mla: 'Brummel, NinaMadeleine. <i>On the Relation between Innovation and Competion:
    The Case of Energy Industry</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
  short: 'N. Brummel, On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of
    Energy Industry, Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:54Z
department:
- _id: '280'
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
title: 'On the Relation between Innovation and Competion: The Case of Energy Industry'
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '42447'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '395'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improvetheir communication
    costs by connecting to a high-speed network.The n nodes are connected by a static
    network and each node can decideindividually to become a gateway to the high-speed
    network. The goalof a node v is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game)
    ormaximum (MAX-game) of communication distances from v to all othernodes plus
    a fixed price α > 0 if it decides to be a gateway. Between gatewaysthe communication
    distance is 0, and gateways also improve othernodes’ distances by behaving as
    shortcuts. For the SUM-game, we showthat for α ≤ n − 1, the price of anarchy is
    Θ (n/√α) and in this rangeequilibria always exist. In range α ∈ (n−1, n(n−1))
    the price of anarchyis Θ(√α), and for α ≥ n(n − 1) it is constant. For the MAX-game,
    weshow that the price of anarchy is either Θ (1 + n/√α), for α ≥ 1, orelse 1.
    Given a graph with girth of at least 4α, equilibria always exist.Concerning the
    dynamics, both games are not potential games. For theSUM-game, we even show that
    it is not weakly acyclic.
author:
- first_name: Sebastian
  full_name: Abshoff, Sebastian
  last_name: Abshoff
- first_name: Andreas
  full_name: Cord-Landwehr, Andreas
  last_name: Cord-Landwehr
- first_name: Daniel
  full_name: Jung, Daniel
  id: '37827'
  last_name: Jung
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
  id: '40384'
  last_name: Skopalik
citation:
  ama: 'Abshoff S, Cord-Landwehr A, Jung D, Skopalik A. Multilevel Network Games.
    In: <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics
    (WINE)</i>. LNCS. ; 2014:435-440. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>'
  apa: Abshoff, S., Cord-Landwehr, A., Jung, D., &#38; Skopalik, A. (2014). Multilevel
    Network Games. In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and
    Internet Economics (WINE)</i> (pp. 435–440). <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>
  bibtex: '@inproceedings{Abshoff_Cord-Landwehr_Jung_Skopalik_2014, series={LNCS},
    title={Multilevel Network Games}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)}, author={Abshoff, Sebastian and Cord-Landwehr, Andreas and Jung,
    Daniel and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2014}, pages={435–440}, collection={LNCS}
    }'
  chicago: Abshoff, Sebastian, Andreas Cord-Landwehr, Daniel Jung, and Alexander Skopalik.
    “Multilevel Network Games.” In <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
    on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 435–40. LNCS, 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>.
  ieee: S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, and A. Skopalik, “Multilevel Network
    Games,” in <i>Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
    Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014, pp. 435–440.
  mla: Abshoff, Sebastian, et al. “Multilevel Network Games.” <i>Proceedings of the
    10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)</i>, 2014,
    pp. 435–40, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36">10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36</a>.
  short: 'S. Abshoff, A. Cord-Landwehr, D. Jung, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
    10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2014, pp.
    435–440.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:09Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:59:59Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '63'
- _id: '541'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_36
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z
  file_id: '1382'
  file_name: 395-WINE2014ACJS.pdf
  file_size: 161479
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-20T06:59:20Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 435-440
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '5'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A1
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet
  Economics (WINE)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Multilevel Network Games
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '403'
author:
- first_name: Tobias
  full_name: Martin Lohre, Tobias
  last_name: Martin Lohre
citation:
  ama: Martin Lohre T. <i>Machtverteilungen von Koalitionen im Fokus der politischen
    Realität</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2014.
  apa: Martin Lohre, T. (2014). <i>Machtverteilungen von Koalitionen im Fokus der
    politischen Realität</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Martin Lohre_2014, title={Machtverteilungen von Koalitionen im Fokus
    der politischen Realität}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Martin Lohre,
    Tobias}, year={2014} }'
  chicago: Martin Lohre, Tobias. <i>Machtverteilungen von Koalitionen im Fokus der
    politischen Realität</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  ieee: T. Martin Lohre, <i>Machtverteilungen von Koalitionen im Fokus der politischen
    Realität</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  mla: Martin Lohre, Tobias. <i>Machtverteilungen von Koalitionen im Fokus der politischen
    Realität</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  short: T. Martin Lohre, Machtverteilungen von Koalitionen im Fokus der politischen
    Realität, Universität Paderborn, 2014.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:10Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:00:08Z
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Machtverteilungen von Koalitionen im Fokus der politischen Realität
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '404'
author:
- first_name: Dirk
  full_name: van Straaten, Dirk
  id: '10311'
  last_name: van Straaten
citation:
  ama: van Straaten D. <i>Kooperative Verhandlungen im duopolistischen Wettbewerb
    - eine spieltheoretische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2014.
  apa: van Straaten, D. (2014). <i>Kooperative Verhandlungen im duopolistischen Wettbewerb
    - eine spieltheoretische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{van Straaten_2014, title={Kooperative Verhandlungen im duopolistischen
    Wettbewerb - eine spieltheoretische Analyse}, publisher={Universität Paderborn},
    author={van Straaten, Dirk}, year={2014} }'
  chicago: Straaten, Dirk van. <i>Kooperative Verhandlungen im duopolistischen Wettbewerb
    - eine spieltheoretische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  ieee: D. van Straaten, <i>Kooperative Verhandlungen im duopolistischen Wettbewerb
    - eine spieltheoretische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  mla: van Straaten, Dirk. <i>Kooperative Verhandlungen im duopolistischen Wettbewerb
    - eine spieltheoretische Analyse</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  short: D. van Straaten, Kooperative Verhandlungen im duopolistischen Wettbewerb
    - eine spieltheoretische Analyse, Universität Paderborn, 2014.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:10Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:00:08Z
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Kooperative Verhandlungen im duopolistischen Wettbewerb - eine spieltheoretische
  Analyse
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '405'
author:
- first_name: Olga
  full_name: Degraf, Olga
  last_name: Degraf
citation:
  ama: Degraf O. <i>Koalitionsbildung bei mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen</i>.
    Universität Paderborn; 2014.
  apa: Degraf, O. (2014). <i>Koalitionsbildung bei mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen</i>.
    Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Degraf_2014, title={Koalitionsbildung bei mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen},
    publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Degraf, Olga}, year={2014} }'
  chicago: Degraf, Olga. <i>Koalitionsbildung bei mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  ieee: O. Degraf, <i>Koalitionsbildung bei mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  mla: Degraf, Olga. <i>Koalitionsbildung bei mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  short: O. Degraf, Koalitionsbildung bei mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen,
    Universität Paderborn, 2014.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:10Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:00:10Z
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Koalitionsbildung bei mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '410'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: One goal of service-oriented computing is to realize future markets of composed
    services. In such markets, service providers offer services that can be flexibly
    combined with each other. However, although crucial for decision-making, market
    participants are usually not able to individually estimate the quality of traded
    services in advance. To overcome this problem, we present a conceptual design
    for a reputation system that collects and processes user feedback on transactions,
    and provides this information as a signal for quality to participants in the market.
    Based on our proposed concept, we describe the incorporation of reputation information
    into distinct decision-making processes that are crucial in such service markets.
    In this context, we present a fuzzy service matching approach that takes reputation
    information into account. Furthermore, we introduce an adaptive service composition
    approach, and investigate the impact of exchanging immediate user feedback by
    reputation information. Last but not least, we describe the importance of reputation
    information for economic decisions of different market participants. The overall
    output of this paper is a comprehensive view on managing and exploiting reputation
    information in markets of composed services using the example of On-The-Fly Computing.
author:
- first_name: Alexander
  full_name: Jungmann, Alexander
  last_name: Jungmann
- first_name: Sonja
  full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
  last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Ronald
  full_name: Petrlic, Ronald
  last_name: Petrlic
- first_name: Marie Christin
  full_name: Platenius, Marie Christin
  last_name: Platenius
citation:
  ama: Jungmann A, Brangewitz S, Petrlic R, Platenius MC. Incorporating Reputation
    Information into Decision-Making Processes in Markets of Composed Services. <i>International
    Journal On Advances in Intelligent Systems (IntSys)</i>. 2014;7(3&#38;4):572--594.
  apa: Jungmann, A., Brangewitz, S., Petrlic, R., &#38; Platenius, M. C. (2014). Incorporating
    Reputation Information into Decision-Making Processes in Markets of Composed Services.
    <i>International Journal On Advances in Intelligent Systems (IntSys)</i>, <i>7</i>(3&#38;4),
    572--594.
  bibtex: '@article{Jungmann_Brangewitz_Petrlic_Platenius_2014, title={Incorporating
    Reputation Information into Decision-Making Processes in Markets of Composed Services},
    volume={7}, number={3&#38;4}, journal={International Journal On Advances in Intelligent
    Systems (IntSys)}, publisher={IARIA}, author={Jungmann, Alexander and Brangewitz,
    Sonja and Petrlic, Ronald and Platenius, Marie Christin}, year={2014}, pages={572--594}
    }'
  chicago: 'Jungmann, Alexander, Sonja Brangewitz, Ronald Petrlic, and Marie Christin
    Platenius. “Incorporating Reputation Information into Decision-Making Processes
    in Markets of Composed Services.” <i>International Journal On Advances in Intelligent
    Systems (IntSys)</i> 7, no. 3&#38;4 (2014): 572--594.'
  ieee: A. Jungmann, S. Brangewitz, R. Petrlic, and M. C. Platenius, “Incorporating
    Reputation Information into Decision-Making Processes in Markets of Composed Services,”
    <i>International Journal On Advances in Intelligent Systems (IntSys)</i>, vol.
    7, no. 3&#38;4, pp. 572--594, 2014.
  mla: Jungmann, Alexander, et al. “Incorporating Reputation Information into Decision-Making
    Processes in Markets of Composed Services.” <i>International Journal On Advances
    in Intelligent Systems (IntSys)</i>, vol. 7, no. 3&#38;4, IARIA, 2014, pp. 572--594.
  short: A. Jungmann, S. Brangewitz, R. Petrlic, M.C. Platenius, International Journal
    On Advances in Intelligent Systems (IntSys) 7 (2014) 572--594.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:11Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:00:17Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:34:28Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:34:28Z
  file_id: '1362'
  file_name: 410-intsys_v7_n34_2014_18.pdf
  file_size: 2590608
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:34:28Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '         7'
issue: 3&4
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://www.iariajournals.org/intelligent_systems/intsys_v7_n34_2014_paged.pdf
page: 572--594
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '10'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt B2
- _id: '13'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt C1
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '4'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area C
- _id: '3'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area B
publication: International Journal On Advances in Intelligent Systems (IntSys)
publisher: IARIA
status: public
title: Incorporating Reputation Information into Decision-Making Processes in Markets
  of Composed Services
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 7
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '413'
author:
- first_name: Fabian
  full_name: Eusterholz, Fabian
  last_name: Eusterholz
citation:
  ama: 'Eusterholz F. <i>Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier
    Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2014.'
  apa: 'Eusterholz, F. (2014). <i>Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel
    zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes</i>. Universität Paderborn.'
  bibtex: '@book{Eusterholz_2014, title={Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis
    am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes}, publisher={Universität
    Paderborn}, author={Eusterholz, Fabian}, year={2014} }'
  chicago: 'Eusterholz, Fabian. <i>Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel
    zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
  ieee: 'F. Eusterholz, <i>Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier
    Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
  mla: 'Eusterholz, Fabian. <i>Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel
    zweier Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
  short: 'F. Eusterholz, Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier
    Entscheidungen des Bundeskartellamtes, Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:12Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:00:22Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
title: 'Horizontale Fusionen: Theorie und Praxis am Beispiel zweier Entscheidungen
  des Bundeskartellamtes'
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '42447'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '419'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: The present thesis investigates the prevalence of and the reasons for hiring
    discrimination against women and ethnic Turks in the German labor market. Subsequent
    to a discussion of how to reveal discrimination, the literature on wage and employment
    differences inside and outside the German labor market is reviewed. Afterwards,
    different (economic) theories explaining inequalities in labor markets are presented.
    In the empirical analyses a field experiment - the so called correspondence testing
    - is conducted where matched pairs of (fictitious) male and female as well as
    German-named and Turkish-named applicants respond to, respectively, 656 and 608
    (real) apprenticeship offers in predominantly male-dominated jobs. Descriptive
    results and econometric analyses using probit regressions on various model specifications
    indicate that the female applicant has a 19 percent lower callback probability
    compared to her male counterpart. However, differential treatment is both job-
    and firm-type driven. While callback rates are not statistically different from
    zero in female-dominated and “gender-neutral” occupations, they prevail in jobs
    where men are overrepresented. Furthermore, discrimination is restricted to late
    recruiters, i.e., companies that advertise their vacancies right before the apprenticeship
    is supposed to start. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the study investigating
    ethnic discrimination. The 32 percent lower callback probability of the Turkish-named
    applicant decreases if early rather than late recruiters are addressed. Apart
    from that, comparing response and callback rates to the candidates using different
    experimental designs, i.e., sending out single versus pairs of applications, yields
    no statistically significant differences demonstrating the unbiasedness of the
    correspondence approach.
author:
- first_name: Andre
  full_name: Kolle, Andre
  last_name: Kolle
citation:
  ama: 'Kolle A. <i>Gender and Ethnic Discrimination in Hiring : Evidence from Field
    Experiments in the German Labor Market</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2014.'
  apa: 'Kolle, A. (2014). <i>Gender and ethnic discrimination in hiring : evidence
    from field experiments in the German labor market</i>. Universität Paderborn.'
  bibtex: '@book{Kolle_2014, title={Gender and ethnic discrimination in hiring : evidence
    from field experiments in the German labor market}, publisher={Universität Paderborn},
    author={Kolle, Andre}, year={2014} }'
  chicago: 'Kolle, Andre. <i>Gender and Ethnic Discrimination in Hiring : Evidence
    from Field Experiments in the German Labor Market</i>. Universität Paderborn,
    2014.'
  ieee: 'A. Kolle, <i>Gender and ethnic discrimination in hiring : evidence from field
    experiments in the German labor market</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
  mla: 'Kolle, Andre. <i>Gender and Ethnic Discrimination in Hiring : Evidence from
    Field Experiments in the German Labor Market</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
  short: 'A. Kolle, Gender and Ethnic Discrimination in Hiring : Evidence from Field
    Experiments in the German Labor Market, Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:13Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:00:32Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '183'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:33:05Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:33:05Z
  file_id: '1359'
  file_name: 419-Dissertation_Veroeffentlichung_Andre_Kolle_30032014.pdf
  file_size: 3036379
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:33:05Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Bernd
  full_name: Frick, Bernd
  last_name: Frick
title: 'Gender and ethnic discrimination in hiring : evidence from field experiments
  in the German labor market'
type: dissertation
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '437'
author:
- first_name: Vanessa
  full_name: Wemhöner, Vanessa
  last_name: Wemhöner
citation:
  ama: Wemhöner V. <i>Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel
    des Kaffeerösterkartells</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2014.
  apa: Wemhöner, V. (2014). <i>Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung
    am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Wemhöner_2014, title={Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung
    am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Wemhöner,
    Vanessa}, year={2014} }'
  chicago: Wemhöner, Vanessa. <i>Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung
    am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  ieee: V. Wemhöner, <i>Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel
    des Kaffeerösterkartells</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  mla: Wemhöner, Vanessa. <i>Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung
    am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2014.
  short: V. Wemhöner, Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel
    des Kaffeerösterkartells, Universität Paderborn, 2014.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:17Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:00:59Z
department:
- _id: '280'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Burkhard
  full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
  id: '37339'
  last_name: Hehenkamp
title: Die ökonomischen Auswirkungen der Kronzeugenregelung am Beispiel des Kaffeerösterkartells
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '42447'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '440'
author:
- first_name: Daniel
  full_name: Kaimann, Daniel
  id: '18949'
  last_name: Kaimann
citation:
  ama: 'Kaimann D. <i>Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets for
    Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions</i>.
    Universität Paderborn; 2014.'
  apa: 'Kaimann, D. (2014). <i>Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets
    for Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions</i>.
    Universität Paderborn.'
  bibtex: '@book{Kaimann_2014, title={Decision Making under Asymmetric Information
    in Markets for Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer
    Perceptions}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kaimann, Daniel}, year={2014}
    }'
  chicago: 'Kaimann, Daniel. <i>Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets
    for Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
  ieee: 'D. Kaimann, <i>Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets for
    Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
  mla: 'Kaimann, Daniel. <i>Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets
    for Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions</i>.
    Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
  short: 'D. Kaimann, Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets for
    Experience Goods: Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions,
    Universität Paderborn, 2014.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:17Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:01Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '19'
- _id: '200'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '183'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: dkaimann
  date_created: 2018-11-08T09:29:04Z
  date_updated: 2018-11-08T09:29:04Z
  file_id: '5424'
  file_name: Dissertation_2014_Kaimann.pdf
  file_size: 531139
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-08T09:29:04Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
  full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
  id: '20801'
  last_name: Haake
- first_name: Bernd
  full_name: Frick, Bernd
  last_name: Frick
title: 'Decision Making under Asymmetric Information in Markets for Experience Goods:
  Empirical Evidence of Signaling Effects on Consumer Perceptions'
type: dissertation
user_id: '477'
year: '2014'
...
---
_id: '2543'
author:
- first_name: Sonja
  full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
  last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Jan-Philip
  full_name: Gamp, Jan-Philip
  last_name: Gamp
citation:
  ama: Brangewitz S, Gamp J-P. Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive
    payoffs. <i>Economics Letters</i>. 2013;121(2):224-227. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013">10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013</a>
  apa: Brangewitz, S., &#38; Gamp, J.-P. (2013). Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions
    and competitive payoffs. <i>Economics Letters</i>, <i>121</i>(2), 224–227. <a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013</a>
  bibtex: '@article{Brangewitz_Gamp_2013, title={Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions
    and competitive payoffs}, volume={121}, DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013">10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013</a>},
    number={2}, journal={Economics Letters}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Brangewitz,
    Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}, year={2013}, pages={224–227} }'
  chicago: 'Brangewitz, Sonja, and Jan-Philip Gamp. “Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions
    and Competitive Payoffs.” <i>Economics Letters</i> 121, no. 2 (2013): 224–27.
    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013</a>.'
  ieee: S. Brangewitz and J.-P. Gamp, “Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive
    payoffs,” <i>Economics Letters</i>, vol. 121, no. 2, pp. 224–227, 2013.
  mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Jan-Philip Gamp. “Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions
    and Competitive Payoffs.” <i>Economics Letters</i>, vol. 121, no. 2, Elsevier,
    2013, pp. 224–27, doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013">10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013</a>.
  short: S. Brangewitz, J.-P. Gamp, Economics Letters 121 (2013) 224–227.
date_created: 2018-04-26T11:29:16Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:57:04Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: cjhaake
  date_created: 2018-08-09T09:49:34Z
  date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:49:34Z
  file_id: '3869'
  file_name: Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs.pdf
  file_size: 374977
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:49:34Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '       121'
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 224-227
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Economics Letters
publication_identifier:
  issn:
  - 0165-1765
publication_status: published
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 121
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '474'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Suppose some individuals are allowed to engage in different groups at the
    same time and they generate a certain welfare by cooperation. Finding appropriate
    ways for distributing this welfare is a non-trivial issue. The purpose of this
    work is to analyze two-stage allocation procedures where first each group receives
    a share of the welfare which is then, subsequently, distributed among the corresponding
    members. To study these procedures in a structured way, cooperative games and
    network games are combined in a general framework by using mathematical hypergraphs.
    Moreover, several convincing requirements on allocation procedures are discussed
    and formalized. Thereby it will be shown, for example, that the Position Value
    and iteratively applying the Myerson Value can be characterized by similar axiomatizations.
author:
- first_name: Nils
  full_name: Röhl, Nils
  last_name: Röhl
citation:
  ama: Röhl N. <i>Two-Stage Allocation Procedures</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2013.
  apa: Röhl, N. (2013). <i>Two-Stage Allocation Procedures</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Röhl_2013, title={Two-Stage Allocation Procedures}, publisher={Universität
    Paderborn}, author={Röhl, Nils}, year={2013} }'
  chicago: Röhl, Nils. <i>Two-Stage Allocation Procedures</i>. Universität Paderborn,
    2013.
  ieee: N. Röhl, <i>Two-Stage Allocation Procedures</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2013.
  mla: Röhl, Nils. <i>Two-Stage Allocation Procedures</i>. Universität Paderborn,
    2013.
  short: N. Röhl, Two-Stage Allocation Procedures, Universität Paderborn, 2013.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:24Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:20Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-16T11:16:59Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:16:59Z
  file_id: '1329'
  file_name: 474-WP73.pdf
  file_size: 424301
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-16T11:16:59Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Two-Stage Allocation Procedures
type: report
user_id: '477'
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '480'
abstract:
- lang: eng
  text: Although of considerable practical importance, the separate impact of individual
    and collective reputation on firm performance (e.g. product prices) has not yet
    been convincingly demonstrated. We use a sample of some 70 different wineries
    offering more than 1,300 different Riesling wines from the Mosel valley to isolate
    the returns to individual reputation (measured by expert ratings in a highly respected
    wine guide) from the returns to collective reputation (measured by membership
    in two different professional associations where members are assumed to monitor
    each other very closely). We find that both effects are statistically significant
    and economically relevant with the latter being more important in quantitative
    terms than the former.
author:
- first_name: Bernd
  full_name: Frick, Bernd
  last_name: Frick
- first_name: Robert
  full_name: Simmons, Robert
  last_name: Simmons
citation:
  ama: 'Frick B, Simmons R. The Impact of Individual and Collective Reputation on
    Wine Prices: Empirical Evidence from the Mosel Valley. <i>Journal of Business
    Economics</i>. 2013;83(2):101-119. doi:<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-013-0652-x">10.1007/s11573-013-0652-x</a>'
  apa: 'Frick, B., &#38; Simmons, R. (2013). The Impact of Individual and Collective
    Reputation on Wine Prices: Empirical Evidence from the Mosel Valley. <i>Journal
    of Business Economics</i>, <i>83</i>(2), 101–119. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-013-0652-x">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-013-0652-x</a>'
  bibtex: '@article{Frick_Simmons_2013, title={The Impact of Individual and Collective
    Reputation on Wine Prices: Empirical Evidence from the Mosel Valley}, volume={83},
    DOI={<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-013-0652-x">10.1007/s11573-013-0652-x</a>},
    number={2}, journal={Journal of Business Economics}, publisher={Springer}, author={Frick,
    Bernd and Simmons, Robert}, year={2013}, pages={101–119} }'
  chicago: 'Frick, Bernd, and Robert Simmons. “The Impact of Individual and Collective
    Reputation on Wine Prices: Empirical Evidence from the Mosel Valley.” <i>Journal
    of Business Economics</i> 83, no. 2 (2013): 101–19. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-013-0652-x">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-013-0652-x</a>.'
  ieee: 'B. Frick and R. Simmons, “The Impact of Individual and Collective Reputation
    on Wine Prices: Empirical Evidence from the Mosel Valley,” <i>Journal of Business
    Economics</i>, vol. 83, no. 2, pp. 101–119, 2013.'
  mla: 'Frick, Bernd, and Robert Simmons. “The Impact of Individual and Collective
    Reputation on Wine Prices: Empirical Evidence from the Mosel Valley.” <i>Journal
    of Business Economics</i>, vol. 83, no. 2, Springer, 2013, pp. 101–19, doi:<a
    href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11573-013-0652-x">10.1007/s11573-013-0652-x</a>.'
  short: B. Frick, R. Simmons, Journal of Business Economics 83 (2013) 101–119.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:25Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:24Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '183'
doi: 10.1007/s11573-013-0652-x
file:
- access_level: closed
  content_type: application/pdf
  creator: florida
  date_created: 2018-03-15T14:02:36Z
  date_updated: 2018-03-15T14:02:36Z
  file_id: '1322'
  file_name: 480-Frick.pdf
  file_size: 371437
  relation: main_file
  success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-15T14:02:36Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: '        83'
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 101-119
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '8'
  name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Journal of Business Economics
publisher: Springer
status: public
title: 'The Impact of Individual and Collective Reputation on Wine Prices: Empirical
  Evidence from the Mosel Valley'
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 83
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '493'
author:
- first_name: Artjom
  full_name: Terentjew, Artjom
  last_name: Terentjew
citation:
  ama: Terentjew A. <i>Reputationssysteme und Gerichtsverfahren als Wekzeuge zur Sicherstellung
    von Qualitätsstandards in Transaktionen</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2013.
  apa: Terentjew, A. (2013). <i>Reputationssysteme und Gerichtsverfahren als Wekzeuge
    zur Sicherstellung von Qualitätsstandards in Transaktionen</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Terentjew_2013, title={Reputationssysteme und Gerichtsverfahren als
    Wekzeuge zur Sicherstellung von Qualitätsstandards in Transaktionen}, publisher={Universität
    Paderborn}, author={Terentjew, Artjom}, year={2013} }'
  chicago: Terentjew, Artjom. <i>Reputationssysteme und Gerichtsverfahren als Wekzeuge
    zur Sicherstellung von Qualitätsstandards in Transaktionen</i>. Universität Paderborn,
    2013.
  ieee: A. Terentjew, <i>Reputationssysteme und Gerichtsverfahren als Wekzeuge zur
    Sicherstellung von Qualitätsstandards in Transaktionen</i>. Universität Paderborn,
    2013.
  mla: Terentjew, Artjom. <i>Reputationssysteme und Gerichtsverfahren als Wekzeuge
    zur Sicherstellung von Qualitätsstandards in Transaktionen</i>. Universität Paderborn,
    2013.
  short: A. Terentjew, Reputationssysteme und Gerichtsverfahren als Wekzeuge zur Sicherstellung
    von Qualitätsstandards in Transaktionen, Universität Paderborn, 2013.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:28Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:29Z
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Reputationssysteme und Gerichtsverfahren als Wekzeuge zur Sicherstellung von
  Qualitätsstandards in Transaktionen
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '500'
author:
- first_name: Margarita
  full_name: Staschewski, Margarita
  last_name: Staschewski
citation:
  ama: Staschewski M. <i>Price Formation in the Restaurant Industry - An Empirical
    Analysis</i>. Universität Paderborn; 2013.
  apa: Staschewski, M. (2013). <i>Price Formation in the Restaurant Industry - An
    Empirical Analysis</i>. Universität Paderborn.
  bibtex: '@book{Staschewski_2013, title={Price Formation in the Restaurant Industry
    - An Empirical Analysis}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Staschewski,
    Margarita}, year={2013} }'
  chicago: Staschewski, Margarita. <i>Price Formation in the Restaurant Industry -
    An Empirical Analysis</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2013.
  ieee: M. Staschewski, <i>Price Formation in the Restaurant Industry - An Empirical
    Analysis</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2013.
  mla: Staschewski, Margarita. <i>Price Formation in the Restaurant Industry - An
    Empirical Analysis</i>. Universität Paderborn, 2013.
  short: M. Staschewski, Price Formation in the Restaurant Industry - An Empirical
    Analysis, Universität Paderborn, 2013.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:30Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:34Z
project:
- _id: '1'
  name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
  name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
  name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Price Formation in the Restaurant Industry - An Empirical Analysis
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '15504'
year: '2013'
...