---
_id: '512'
author:
- first_name: Elvira
full_name: Herzog, Elvira
last_name: Herzog
citation:
ama: Herzog E. Lösungsverfahren für das many-to-one Matching Problem. Universität
Paderborn; 2013.
apa: Herzog, E. (2013). Lösungsverfahren für das many-to-one Matching Problem.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Herzog_2013, title={Lösungsverfahren für das many-to-one Matching
Problem}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Herzog, Elvira}, year={2013}
}'
chicago: Herzog, Elvira. Lösungsverfahren für das many-to-one Matching Problem.
Universität Paderborn, 2013.
ieee: E. Herzog, Lösungsverfahren für das many-to-one Matching Problem. Universität
Paderborn, 2013.
mla: Herzog, Elvira. Lösungsverfahren für das many-to-one Matching Problem.
Universität Paderborn, 2013.
short: E. Herzog, Lösungsverfahren für das many-to-one Matching Problem, Universität
Paderborn, 2013.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:32Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:38Z
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Lösungsverfahren für das many-to-one Matching Problem
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '5146'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In this paper, we analyze a model in which two divisions negotiate over an
intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Formally, we consider bargaining
problems under incomplete information, since the upstream division’s (seller's)
costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private
information. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish
that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether incentive and/or efficiency
constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining
solution to determine transfer payments and transfer probabilities. Furthermore,
we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem
and compare the model developed here with the existing literature for negotiated
transfer pricing under incomplete information. In particular, we focus on the
models presented in Wagenhofer (1994).
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S, Haake C-J. Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete
Information. Vol 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2013.
apa: Brangewitz, S., & Haake, C.-J. (2013). Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
under Incomplete Information (Vol. 64). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University.
bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_Haake_2013, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Cooperative
Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={64}, publisher={CIE
Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja and Haake,
Claus-Jochen}, year={2013}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. Cooperative Transfer Price
Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Vol. 64. Working Papers CIE. CIE
Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.
ieee: S. Brangewitz and C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
under Incomplete Information, vol. 64. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2013.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Claus-Jochen Haake. Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations
under Incomplete Information. Vol. 64, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn
University, 2013.
short: S. Brangewitz, C.-J. Haake, Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under
Incomplete Information, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2013.
date_created: 2018-10-31T09:20:15Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:39Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
file_id: '5148'
file_name: WP - Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.pdf
file_size: 430826
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-10-31T09:22:19Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 64'
keyword:
- Transfer Pricing
- Negotiation
- Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution
- Incomplete Information
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Cooperative Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information
type: working_paper
user_id: '477'
volume: 64
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '523'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In a distributed system with attacks and defenses, both attackers and defenders
are self-interested entities. We assume a reward-sharing scheme among interdependent
defenders; each defender wishes to (locally) maximize her own total fair share
to the attackers extinguished due to her involvement (and possibly due to those
of others). What is the maximum amount of protection achievable by a number of
such defenders against a number of attackers while the system is in a Nash equilibrium?
As a measure of system protection, we adopt the Defense-Ratio (Mavronicolas et
al., 2008)[20], which provides the expected (inverse) proportion of attackers
caught by the defenders. In a Defense-Optimal Nash equilibrium, the Defense-Ratio
matches a simple lower bound.We discover that the existence of Defense-Optimal
Nash equilibria depends in a subtle way on how the number of defenders compares
to two natural graph-theoretic thresholds we identify. In this vein, we obtain,
through a combinatorial analysis of Nash equilibria, a collection of trade-off
results:• When the number of defenders is either sufficiently small or sufficiently
large, Defense-Optimal Nash equilibria may exist. The corresponding decision problem
is computationally tractable for a large number of defenders; the problem becomes
NPNP-complete for a small number of defenders and the intractability is inherited
from a previously unconsidered combinatorial problem in Fractional Graph Theory.•
Perhaps paradoxically, there is a middle range of values for the number of defenders
where Defense-Optimal Nash equilibria do not exist.
author:
- first_name: Marios
full_name: Mavronicolas, Marios
last_name: Mavronicolas
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Monien, Burkhard
last_name: Monien
- first_name: Vicky
full_name: Papadopoulou Lesta, Vicky
last_name: Papadopoulou Lesta
citation:
ama: Mavronicolas M, Monien B, Papadopoulou Lesta V. How many attackers can selfish
defenders catch? Discrete Applied Mathematics. 2013;161(16-17):2563-2586.
doi:10.1016/j.dam.2013.05.022
apa: Mavronicolas, M., Monien, B., & Papadopoulou Lesta, V. (2013). How many
attackers can selfish defenders catch? Discrete Applied Mathematics, 161(16–17),
2563–2586. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2013.05.022
bibtex: '@article{Mavronicolas_Monien_Papadopoulou Lesta_2013, title={How many attackers
can selfish defenders catch?}, volume={161}, DOI={10.1016/j.dam.2013.05.022},
number={16–17}, journal={Discrete Applied Mathematics}, publisher={Elsevier},
author={Mavronicolas, Marios and Monien, Burkhard and Papadopoulou Lesta, Vicky},
year={2013}, pages={2563–2586} }'
chicago: 'Mavronicolas, Marios, Burkhard Monien, and Vicky Papadopoulou Lesta. “How
Many Attackers Can Selfish Defenders Catch?” Discrete Applied Mathematics
161, no. 16–17 (2013): 2563–86. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2013.05.022.'
ieee: M. Mavronicolas, B. Monien, and V. Papadopoulou Lesta, “How many attackers
can selfish defenders catch?,” Discrete Applied Mathematics, vol. 161,
no. 16–17, pp. 2563–2586, 2013.
mla: Mavronicolas, Marios, et al. “How Many Attackers Can Selfish Defenders Catch?”
Discrete Applied Mathematics, vol. 161, no. 16–17, Elsevier, 2013, pp.
2563–86, doi:10.1016/j.dam.2013.05.022.
short: M. Mavronicolas, B. Monien, V. Papadopoulou Lesta, Discrete Applied Mathematics
161 (2013) 2563–2586.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:34Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:47Z
ddc:
- '040'
doi: 10.1016/j.dam.2013.05.022
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-15T10:37:35Z
date_updated: 2018-03-15T10:37:35Z
file_id: '1297'
file_name: 523-MMP13.pdf
file_size: 1127543
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-15T10:37:35Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 161'
issue: 16-17
language:
- iso: eng
page: 2563-2586
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Discrete Applied Mathematics
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: How many attackers can selfish defenders catch?
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 161
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '535'
author:
- first_name: Max
full_name: Reineke, Max
last_name: Reineke
citation:
ama: Reineke M. Effizienzsteigerung durch gewichtete Produktbewertungen.
Universität Paderborn; 2013.
apa: Reineke, M. (2013). Effizienzsteigerung durch gewichtete Produktbewertungen.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Reineke_2013, title={Effizienzsteigerung durch gewichtete Produktbewertungen},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Reineke, Max}, year={2013} }'
chicago: Reineke, Max. Effizienzsteigerung durch gewichtete Produktbewertungen.
Universität Paderborn, 2013.
ieee: M. Reineke, Effizienzsteigerung durch gewichtete Produktbewertungen.
Universität Paderborn, 2013.
mla: Reineke, Max. Effizienzsteigerung durch gewichtete Produktbewertungen.
Universität Paderborn, 2013.
short: M. Reineke, Effizienzsteigerung durch gewichtete Produktbewertungen, Universität
Paderborn, 2013.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:36Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:50Z
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Effizienzsteigerung durch gewichtete Produktbewertungen
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '536'
author:
- first_name: Nadja
full_name: Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
id: '13264'
last_name: Stroh-Maraun
citation:
ama: 'Stroh-Maraun N. Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market Application.
Universität Paderborn; 2013.'
apa: 'Stroh-Maraun, N. (2013). Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job
Market Application. Universität Paderborn.'
bibtex: '@book{Stroh-Maraun_2013, title={Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and
a Job Market Application}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Stroh-Maraun,
Nadja}, year={2013} }'
chicago: 'Stroh-Maraun, Nadja. Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job
Market Application. Universität Paderborn, 2013.'
ieee: 'N. Stroh-Maraun, Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market
Application. Universität Paderborn, 2013.'
mla: 'Stroh-Maraun, Nadja. Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market
Application. Universität Paderborn, 2013.'
short: 'N. Stroh-Maraun, Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market Application,
Universität Paderborn, 2013.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:36Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:50Z
department:
- _id: '205'
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: 'Dynamic One-to-One Matching: Theory and a Job Market Application'
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '13264'
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '539'
author:
- first_name: Tobias
full_name: Kornhoff, Tobias
last_name: Kornhoff
citation:
ama: Kornhoff T. Der Einfluss adaptierter Erwartungen in dynamischen Cournot
Oligopolen. Universität Paderborn; 2013.
apa: Kornhoff, T. (2013). Der Einfluss adaptierter Erwartungen in dynamischen
Cournot Oligopolen. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Kornhoff_2013, title={Der Einfluss adaptierter Erwartungen in dynamischen
Cournot Oligopolen}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kornhoff, Tobias},
year={2013} }'
chicago: Kornhoff, Tobias. Der Einfluss adaptierter Erwartungen in dynamischen
Cournot Oligopolen. Universität Paderborn, 2013.
ieee: T. Kornhoff, Der Einfluss adaptierter Erwartungen in dynamischen Cournot
Oligopolen. Universität Paderborn, 2013.
mla: Kornhoff, Tobias. Der Einfluss adaptierter Erwartungen in dynamischen Cournot
Oligopolen. Universität Paderborn, 2013.
short: T. Kornhoff, Der Einfluss adaptierter Erwartungen in dynamischen Cournot
Oligopolen, Universität Paderborn, 2013.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:37Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:51Z
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Der Einfluss adaptierter Erwartungen in dynamischen Cournot Oligopolen
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '552'
author:
- first_name: Kevin
full_name: Meckenstock, Kevin
last_name: Meckenstock
citation:
ama: Meckenstock K. Auktionen im Beschaffungsmanagement - Eine spieltheoretische
Analyse. Universität Paderborn; 2013.
apa: Meckenstock, K. (2013). Auktionen im Beschaffungsmanagement - Eine spieltheoretische
Analyse. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Meckenstock_2013, title={Auktionen im Beschaffungsmanagement - Eine
spieltheoretische Analyse}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Meckenstock,
Kevin}, year={2013} }'
chicago: Meckenstock, Kevin. Auktionen im Beschaffungsmanagement - Eine spieltheoretische
Analyse. Universität Paderborn, 2013.
ieee: K. Meckenstock, Auktionen im Beschaffungsmanagement - Eine spieltheoretische
Analyse. Universität Paderborn, 2013.
mla: Meckenstock, Kevin. Auktionen im Beschaffungsmanagement - Eine spieltheoretische
Analyse. Universität Paderborn, 2013.
short: K. Meckenstock, Auktionen im Beschaffungsmanagement - Eine spieltheoretische
Analyse, Universität Paderborn, 2013.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:39Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:57Z
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Auktionen im Beschaffungsmanagement - Eine spieltheoretische Analyse
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '554'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We establish a link between cooperative and competitive behavior. For every
possible vector of weights of an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution there exists
a market that has this asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as its unique competitive
payoff vector.
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Jan-Philip
full_name: Gamp, Jan-Philip
last_name: Gamp
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S, Gamp J-P. Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive
payoffs. Economics Letters. 2013;(2):224-227. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013
apa: Brangewitz, S., & Gamp, J.-P. (2013). Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions
and competitive payoffs. Economics Letters, (2), 224–227. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013
bibtex: '@article{Brangewitz_Gamp_2013, title={Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions
and competitive payoffs}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013},
number={2}, journal={Economics Letters}, publisher={Elsevier}, author={Brangewitz,
Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}, year={2013}, pages={224–227} }'
chicago: 'Brangewitz, Sonja, and Jan-Philip Gamp. “Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions
and Competitive Payoffs.” Economics Letters, no. 2 (2013): 224–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013.'
ieee: S. Brangewitz and J.-P. Gamp, “Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive
payoffs,” Economics Letters, no. 2, pp. 224–227, 2013.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Jan-Philip Gamp. “Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions
and Competitive Payoffs.” Economics Letters, no. 2, Elsevier, 2013, pp.
224–27, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013.
short: S. Brangewitz, J.-P. Gamp, Economics Letters (2013) 224–227.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:40Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:58Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-15T10:29:34Z
date_updated: 2018-03-15T10:29:34Z
file_id: '1284'
file_name: 554-Asymmetric_Nash_bargaining_solutions_and_competitive_payoffs.pdf
file_size: 374965
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-15T10:29:34Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
issue: '2'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 224 - 227
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Economics Letters
publisher: Elsevier
status: public
title: Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
year: '2013'
...
---
_id: '2519'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Jan Thomas
full_name: Martini, Jan Thomas
last_name: Martini
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Martini JT. Negotiating Transfer Prices. Group Decision and Negotiation.
2012;22(4):657-680. doi:10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6
apa: Haake, C.-J., & Martini, J. T. (2012). Negotiating Transfer Prices. Group
Decision and Negotiation, 22(4), 657–680. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Martini_2012, title={Negotiating Transfer Prices}, volume={22},
DOI={10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6},
number={4}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer Nature},
author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Martini, Jan Thomas}, year={2012}, pages={657–680}
}'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Jan Thomas Martini. “Negotiating Transfer Prices.”
Group Decision and Negotiation 22, no. 4 (2012): 657–80. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake and J. T. Martini, “Negotiating Transfer Prices,” Group Decision
and Negotiation, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 657–680, 2012.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Jan Thomas Martini. “Negotiating Transfer Prices.”
Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 22, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2012,
pp. 657–80, doi:10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6.
short: C.-J. Haake, J.T. Martini, Group Decision and Negotiation 22 (2012) 657–680.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:49:51Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:54Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T09:59:39Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:59:39Z
file_id: '3870'
file_name: Negotiating Transfer Prices.pdf
file_size: 407410
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T09:59:39Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 22'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 657-680
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Group Decision and Negotiation
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0926-2644
- 1572-9907
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: Negotiating Transfer Prices
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 22
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '2521'
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Tim
full_name: Krieger, Tim
last_name: Krieger
- first_name: Steffen
full_name: Minter, Steffen
last_name: Minter
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Krieger T, Minter S. On the institutional design of burden sharing
when financing external border enforcement in the EU. International Economics
and Economic Policy. 2012;10(4):583-612. doi:10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3
apa: Haake, C.-J., Krieger, T., & Minter, S. (2012). On the institutional design
of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU. International
Economics and Economic Policy, 10(4), 583–612. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3
bibtex: '@article{Haake_Krieger_Minter_2012, title={On the institutional design
of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU}, volume={10},
DOI={10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3},
number={4}, journal={International Economics and Economic Policy}, publisher={Springer
Nature}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Krieger, Tim and Minter, Steffen}, year={2012},
pages={583–612} }'
chicago: 'Haake, Claus-Jochen, Tim Krieger, and Steffen Minter. “On the Institutional
Design of Burden Sharing When Financing External Border Enforcement in the EU.”
International Economics and Economic Policy 10, no. 4 (2012): 583–612.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3.'
ieee: C.-J. Haake, T. Krieger, and S. Minter, “On the institutional design of burden
sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU,” International
Economics and Economic Policy, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 583–612, 2012.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. “On the Institutional Design of Burden Sharing
When Financing External Border Enforcement in the EU.” International Economics
and Economic Policy, vol. 10, no. 4, Springer Nature, 2012, pp. 583–612, doi:10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3.
short: C.-J. Haake, T. Krieger, S. Minter, International Economics and Economic
Policy 10 (2012) 583–612.
date_created: 2018-04-26T10:51:03Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:56:55Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: cjhaake
date_created: 2018-08-09T10:01:16Z
date_updated: 2018-08-09T10:01:16Z
file_id: '3871'
file_name: On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external
border enforcement in the EU.pdf
file_size: 442955
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-08-09T10:01:16Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 10'
issue: '4'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 583-612
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: International Economics and Economic Policy
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 1612-4804
- 1612-4812
publication_status: published
publisher: Springer Nature
status: public
title: On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border
enforcement in the EU
type: journal_article
user_id: '65453'
volume: 10
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '578'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'This paper analyzes the stability of capital tax harmonization agreements
in a stylized model where countries have formed coalitions which set a common
tax rate in order to avoid the inefficient fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
In particular, for a given coalition structure we study to what extend the stability
of tax agreements is affected by the coalitions that have formed. In our set-up,
countries are symmetric, but coalitions can be of arbitrary size. We analyze stability
by means of a repeated game setting employing simple trigger strategies and we
allow a sub-coalition to deviate from the coalitional equilibrium. For a given
form of punishment we are able to rank the stability of different coalition structures
as long as the size of the largest coalition does not change. Our main results
are: (1) singleton regions have the largest incentives to deviate, (2) the stability
of cooperation depends on the degree of cooperative behavior ex-ante.'
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
- first_name: Sarah
full_name: Brockhoff, Sarah
last_name: Brockhoff
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S, Brockhoff S. Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated
Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn; 2012.
apa: Brangewitz, S., & Brockhoff, S. (2012). Stability of Coalitional Equilibria
within Repeated Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_Brockhoff_2012, title={Stability of Coalitional Equilibria
within Repeated Tax Competition}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Brangewitz,
Sonja and Brockhoff, Sarah}, year={2012} }'
chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Sarah Brockhoff. Stability of Coalitional Equilibria
within Repeated Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
ieee: S. Brangewitz and S. Brockhoff, Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within
Repeated Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja, and Sarah Brockhoff. Stability of Coalitional Equilibria
within Repeated Tax Competition. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
short: S. Brangewitz, S. Brockhoff, Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated
Tax Competition, Universität Paderborn, 2012.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:44Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:40Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-15T09:08:24Z
date_updated: 2018-03-15T09:08:24Z
file_id: '1267'
file_name: 578-WP48Brangewitz.pdf
file_size: 876927
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-15T09:08:24Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Stability of Coalitional Equilibria within Repeated Tax Competition
type: report
user_id: '477'
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '583'
author:
- first_name: Julian
full_name: Drücker, Julian
last_name: Drücker
citation:
ama: Drücker J. Revenue-Maximizing Order of Sale in Sequential Auctions.
Universität Paderborn; 2012.
apa: Drücker, J. (2012). Revenue-maximizing Order of Sale in Sequential Auctions.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Drücker_2012, title={Revenue-maximizing Order of Sale in Sequential
Auctions}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Drücker, Julian}, year={2012}
}'
chicago: Drücker, Julian. Revenue-Maximizing Order of Sale in Sequential Auctions.
Universität Paderborn, 2012.
ieee: J. Drücker, Revenue-maximizing Order of Sale in Sequential Auctions.
Universität Paderborn, 2012.
mla: Drücker, Julian. Revenue-Maximizing Order of Sale in Sequential Auctions.
Universität Paderborn, 2012.
short: J. Drücker, Revenue-Maximizing Order of Sale in Sequential Auctions, Universität
Paderborn, 2012.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:45Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:43Z
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Revenue-maximizing Order of Sale in Sequential Auctions
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '15504'
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '592'
author:
- first_name: Aydin
full_name: Celik, Aydin
last_name: Celik
citation:
ama: 'Celik A. Penny Auctions: Design und Strategisches Verhalten. Universität
Paderborn; 2012.'
apa: 'Celik, A. (2012). Penny Auctions: Design und Strategisches Verhalten.
Universität Paderborn.'
bibtex: '@book{Celik_2012, title={Penny Auctions: Design und Strategisches Verhalten},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Celik, Aydin}, year={2012} }'
chicago: 'Celik, Aydin. Penny Auctions: Design und Strategisches Verhalten.
Universität Paderborn, 2012.'
ieee: 'A. Celik, Penny Auctions: Design und Strategisches Verhalten. Universität
Paderborn, 2012.'
mla: 'Celik, Aydin. Penny Auctions: Design und Strategisches Verhalten. Universität
Paderborn, 2012.'
short: 'A. Celik, Penny Auctions: Design und Strategisches Verhalten, Universität
Paderborn, 2012.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:47Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:47Z
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: 'Penny Auctions: Design und Strategisches Verhalten'
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '597'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We consider strategic games in which each player seeks a mixed strategy to
minimize her cost evaluated by a concave valuation V (mapping probability distributions
to reals); such valuations are used to model risk. In contrast to games with expectation-optimizer
players where mixed equilibria always exist [15, 16], a mixed equilibrium for
such games, called a V -equilibrium, may fail to exist, even though pure equilibria
(if any) transfer over. What is the impact of such valuations on the existence,
structure and complexity of mixed equilibria? We address this fundamental question
for a particular concave valuation: expectation plus variance, denoted as RA,
which stands for risk-averse; so, variance enters as a measure of risk and it
is used as an additive adjustment to expectation. We obtain the following results
about RA-equilibria:- A collection of general structural properties of RA-equilibria
connecting to (i) E-equilibria and Var-equilibria, which correspond to the expectation
and variance valuations E and Var, respectively, and to (ii) other weaker or incomparable
equilibrium properties.- A second collection of (i) existence, (ii) equivalence
and separation (with respect to E-equilibria), and (iii) characterization results
for RA-equilibria in the new class of player-specific scheduling games. Using
examples, we provide the first demonstration that going from E to RA may as well
create new mixed (RA-)equilibria.- A purification technique to transform a player-specific
scheduling game on identical links into a player-specific scheduling game so that
all non-pure RA-equilibria are eliminated while new pure equilibria cannot be
created; so, a particular game on two identical links yields one with no RA-equilibrium.
As a by-product, the first-completeness result for the computation of RA-equilibria
follows.'
author:
- first_name: Marios
full_name: Mavronicolas, Marios
last_name: Mavronicolas
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Monien, Burkhard
last_name: Monien
citation:
ama: 'Mavronicolas M, Monien B. Minimizing Expectation Plus Variance. In: Proceedings
of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT). LNCS.
; 2012:239-250. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_21'
apa: Mavronicolas, M., & Monien, B. (2012). Minimizing Expectation Plus Variance.
In Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT) (pp. 239–250). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_21
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Mavronicolas_Monien_2012, series={LNCS}, title={Minimizing
Expectation Plus Variance}, DOI={10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_21},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game
Theory (SAGT)}, author={Mavronicolas, Marios and Monien, Burkhard}, year={2012},
pages={239–250}, collection={LNCS} }'
chicago: Mavronicolas, Marios, and Burkhard Monien. “Minimizing Expectation Plus
Variance.” In Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT), 239–50. LNCS, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_21.
ieee: M. Mavronicolas and B. Monien, “Minimizing Expectation Plus Variance,” in
Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT),
2012, pp. 239–250.
mla: Mavronicolas, Marios, and Burkhard Monien. “Minimizing Expectation Plus Variance.”
Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT),
2012, pp. 239–50, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_21.
short: 'M. Mavronicolas, B. Monien, in: Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium
on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2012, pp. 239–250.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:48Z
ddc:
- '040'
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-33996-7_21
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-15T08:20:53Z
date_updated: 2018-03-15T08:20:53Z
file_id: '1254'
file_name: 597-newtocs_01.pdf
file_size: 345826
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-15T08:20:53Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
page: 239-250
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
(SAGT)
series_title: LNCS
status: public
title: Minimizing Expectation Plus Variance
type: conference
user_id: '15504'
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '598'
author:
- first_name: Fuad
full_name: Mammadov, Fuad
last_name: Mammadov
citation:
ama: Mammadov F. Methoden zur Bestimmung von innerbetrieblichen Verrechnungspreisen.
Universität Paderborn; 2012.
apa: Mammadov, F. (2012). Methoden zur Bestimmung von innerbetrieblichen Verrechnungspreisen.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Mammadov_2012, title={Methoden zur Bestimmung von innerbetrieblichen
Verrechnungspreisen}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Mammadov, Fuad},
year={2012} }'
chicago: Mammadov, Fuad. Methoden zur Bestimmung von innerbetrieblichen Verrechnungspreisen.
Universität Paderborn, 2012.
ieee: F. Mammadov, Methoden zur Bestimmung von innerbetrieblichen Verrechnungspreisen.
Universität Paderborn, 2012.
mla: Mammadov, Fuad. Methoden zur Bestimmung von innerbetrieblichen Verrechnungspreisen.
Universität Paderborn, 2012.
short: F. Mammadov, Methoden zur Bestimmung von innerbetrieblichen Verrechnungspreisen,
Universität Paderborn, 2012.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:48Z
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Methoden zur Bestimmung von innerbetrieblichen Verrechnungspreisen
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '599'
author:
- first_name: Xenia
full_name: Löwen, Xenia
last_name: Löwen
citation:
ama: 'Löwen X. Managerial Delegation and Capacity Choices: An Analysis of the
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium. Universität Paderborn; 2012.'
apa: 'Löwen, X. (2012). Managerial Delegation and Capacity Choices: An Analysis
of the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium. Universität Paderborn.'
bibtex: '@book{Löwen_2012, title={Managerial Delegation and Capacity Choices: An
Analysis of the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium}, publisher={Universität Paderborn},
author={Löwen, Xenia}, year={2012} }'
chicago: 'Löwen, Xenia. Managerial Delegation and Capacity Choices: An Analysis
of the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium. Universität Paderborn, 2012.'
ieee: 'X. Löwen, Managerial Delegation and Capacity Choices: An Analysis of the
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium. Universität Paderborn, 2012.'
mla: 'Löwen, Xenia. Managerial Delegation and Capacity Choices: An Analysis of
the Cournot-Nash Equilibrium. Universität Paderborn, 2012.'
short: 'X. Löwen, Managerial Delegation and Capacity Choices: An Analysis of the
Cournot-Nash Equilibrium, Universität Paderborn, 2012.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:48Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:49Z
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: 'Managerial Delegation and Capacity Choices: An Analysis of the Cournot-Nash
Equilibrium'
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '15504'
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '602'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We study the consequences of dropping the perfect competition assumption
in a standard infinite horizon model with infinitely-lived traders and real collateralized
assets, together with one additional ingredient: information among players is
asymmetric and monitoring is incomplete. The key insight is that trading assets
is not only a way to hedge oneself against uncertainty and to smooth consumption
across time: It also enables learning information. Conversely, defaulting now
becomes strategic: Certain players may manipulate prices so as to provoke a default
in order to prevent their opponents from learning. We focus on learning equilibria,
at the end of which no player has incorrect beliefs — not because those players
with heterogeneous beliefs were eliminated from the market (although default is
possible at equilibrium) but because they have taken time to update their prior
belief. We prove a partial Folk theorem à la Wiseman (2011) of the following form:
For any function that maps each state of the world to a sequence of feasible and
strongly individually rational allocations, and for any degree of precision, there
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which patient players learn the realized
state with this degree of precision and achieve a payoff close to the one specified
for each state.'
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S. Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games
with Default. Universität Paderborn; 2012.
apa: Brangewitz, S. (2012). Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic
Market Games with Default. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_2012, title={Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic
Market Games with Default}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Brangewitz,
Sonja}, year={2012} }'
chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja. Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic
Market Games with Default. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
ieee: S. Brangewitz, Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market
Games with Default. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja. Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market
Games with Default. Universität Paderborn, 2012.
short: S. Brangewitz, Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games
with Default, Universität Paderborn, 2012.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:49Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:51Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2018-03-15T08:16:08Z
date_updated: 2018-03-15T08:16:08Z
file_id: '1251'
file_name: 602-12062_01.pdf
file_size: 1284802
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-03-15T08:16:08Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Default
type: report
user_id: '477'
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '616'
author:
- first_name: Sven
full_name: Kluczniok, Sven
last_name: Kluczniok
citation:
ama: Kluczniok S. Effiziente Paketbildung in mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen.
Universität Paderborn; 2012.
apa: Kluczniok, S. (2012). Effiziente Paketbildung in mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{Kluczniok_2012, title={Effiziente Paketbildung in mehrdimensionalen
Verhandlungsproblemen}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Kluczniok,
Sven}, year={2012} }'
chicago: Kluczniok, Sven. Effiziente Paketbildung in mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen.
Universität Paderborn, 2012.
ieee: S. Kluczniok, Effiziente Paketbildung in mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen.
Universität Paderborn, 2012.
mla: Kluczniok, Sven. Effiziente Paketbildung in mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen.
Universität Paderborn, 2012.
short: S. Kluczniok, Effiziente Paketbildung in mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen,
Universität Paderborn, 2012.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:52Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:02:54Z
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: Effiziente Paketbildung in mehrdimensionalen Verhandlungsproblemen
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '637'
author:
- first_name: Friederike
full_name: Dawirs, Friederike
last_name: Dawirs
citation:
ama: 'Dawirs F. Alternative Berechnung der Machtindizes: Banzhaf und Shapley-Shubik
Index. Universität Paderborn; 2012.'
apa: 'Dawirs, F. (2012). Alternative Berechnung der Machtindizes: Banzhaf und
Shapley-Shubik Index. Universität Paderborn.'
bibtex: '@book{Dawirs_2012, title={Alternative Berechnung der Machtindizes: Banzhaf
und Shapley-Shubik Index}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={Dawirs,
Friederike}, year={2012} }'
chicago: 'Dawirs, Friederike. Alternative Berechnung der Machtindizes: Banzhaf
und Shapley-Shubik Index. Universität Paderborn, 2012.'
ieee: 'F. Dawirs, Alternative Berechnung der Machtindizes: Banzhaf und Shapley-Shubik
Index. Universität Paderborn, 2012.'
mla: 'Dawirs, Friederike. Alternative Berechnung der Machtindizes: Banzhaf und
Shapley-Shubik Index. Universität Paderborn, 2012.'
short: 'F. Dawirs, Alternative Berechnung der Machtindizes: Banzhaf und Shapley-Shubik
Index, Universität Paderborn, 2012.'
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:42:56Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:02Z
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
title: 'Alternative Berechnung der Machtindizes: Banzhaf und Shapley-Shubik Index'
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2012'
...
---
_id: '34169'
author:
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Brangewitz, Sonja
last_name: Brangewitz
citation:
ama: Brangewitz S. Coalitional and Strategic Market Games.; 2012.
apa: Brangewitz, S. (2012). Coalitional and Strategic Market Games.
bibtex: '@book{Brangewitz_2012, place={Universität Bielefeld}, title={Coalitional
and Strategic Market Games}, author={Brangewitz, Sonja}, year={2012} }'
chicago: Brangewitz, Sonja. Coalitional and Strategic Market Games. Universität
Bielefeld, 2012.
ieee: S. Brangewitz, Coalitional and Strategic Market Games. Universität
Bielefeld, 2012.
mla: Brangewitz, Sonja. Coalitional and Strategic Market Games. 2012.
short: S. Brangewitz, Coalitional and Strategic Market Games, Universität Bielefeld,
2012.
date_created: 2022-11-30T14:43:16Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T14:47:46Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '205'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: florida
date_created: 2022-11-30T14:44:47Z
date_updated: 2022-11-30T14:44:47Z
file_id: '34170'
file_name: Dissertation-Brangewitz.pdf
file_size: 1277591
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2022-11-30T14:44:47Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
place: Universität Bielefeld
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Coalitional and Strategic Market Games
type: dissertation
user_id: '477'
year: '2012'
...