---
_id: '42299'
author:
- first_name: N.
full_name: N., N.
last_name: N.
citation:
ama: N. N. Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen Softwaremärkten.
Universität Paderborn; 2020.
apa: N., N. (2020). Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen Softwaremärkten.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N._2020, title={Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen
Softwaremärkten}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2020}
}'
chicago: N., N. Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen Softwaremärkten.
Universität Paderborn, 2020.
ieee: N. N., Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen Softwaremärkten.
Universität Paderborn, 2020.
mla: N., N. Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen Softwaremärkten.
Universität Paderborn, 2020.
short: N. N., Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen Softwaremärkten,
Universität Paderborn, 2020.
date_created: 2023-02-22T11:12:20Z
date_updated: 2023-05-23T12:46:15Z
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Eine ökonomische Analyse der Piraterie in zweiseitigen Softwaremärkten
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '42304'
author:
- first_name: N.
full_name: N., N.
last_name: N.
citation:
ama: N. N. Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen.
Universität Paderborn; 2020.
apa: N., N. (2020). Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen.
Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N._2020, title={Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2020} }'
chicago: N., N. Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen.
Universität Paderborn, 2020.
ieee: N. N., Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen.
Universität Paderborn, 2020.
mla: N., N. Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen.
Universität Paderborn, 2020.
short: N. N., Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen, Universität
Paderborn, 2020.
date_created: 2023-02-22T11:17:53Z
date_updated: 2023-05-23T12:45:34Z
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Kulturelle Unterschiede beim Lösen von Verhandlungsproblemen
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '42298'
author:
- first_name: N.
full_name: N., N.
last_name: N.
citation:
ama: N. N. Productivity Optimization through Project Matching. Universität
Paderborn; 2020.
apa: N., N. (2020). Productivity optimization through project matching. Universität
Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N._2020, title={Productivity optimization through project matching},
publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2020} }'
chicago: N., N. Productivity Optimization through Project Matching. Universität
Paderborn, 2020.
ieee: N. N., Productivity optimization through project matching. Universität
Paderborn, 2020.
mla: N., N. Productivity Optimization through Project Matching. Universität
Paderborn, 2020.
short: N. N., Productivity Optimization through Project Matching, Universität Paderborn,
2020.
date_created: 2023-02-22T11:10:47Z
date_updated: 2023-05-23T12:46:30Z
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Productivity optimization through project matching
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '42306'
author:
- first_name: N.
full_name: N., N.
last_name: N.
citation:
ama: N. N. Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange. Universität Paderborn;
2020.
apa: N., N. (2020). Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N._2020, title={Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2020} }'
chicago: N., N. Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange. Universität Paderborn,
2020.
ieee: N. N., Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange. Universität Paderborn,
2020.
mla: N., N. Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange. Universität Paderborn,
2020.
short: N. N., Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange, Universität Paderborn, 2020.
date_created: 2023-02-22T11:18:47Z
date_updated: 2023-05-23T12:45:27Z
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Matching Mechanisms and Organ Exchange
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '42300'
author:
- first_name: N.
full_name: N., N.
last_name: N.
citation:
ama: N. N. Cartel Fines in the European Union. Universität Paderborn; 2020.
apa: N., N. (2020). Cartel Fines in the European Union. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N._2020, title={Cartel Fines in the European Union}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2020} }'
chicago: N., N. Cartel Fines in the European Union. Universität Paderborn,
2020.
ieee: N. N., Cartel Fines in the European Union. Universität Paderborn, 2020.
mla: N., N. Cartel Fines in the European Union. Universität Paderborn, 2020.
short: N. N., Cartel Fines in the European Union, Universität Paderborn, 2020.
date_created: 2023-02-22T11:13:16Z
date_updated: 2023-05-23T12:46:00Z
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Cartel Fines in the European Union
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '42302'
author:
- first_name: N.
full_name: N., N.
last_name: N.
citation:
ama: N. N. Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn; 2020.
apa: N., N. (2020). Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N._2020, title={Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen}, publisher={Universität
Paderborn}, author={N., N.}, year={2020} }'
chicago: N., N. Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn,
2020.
ieee: N. N., Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn, 2020.
mla: N., N. Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn, 2020.
short: N. N., Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen, Universität Paderborn, 2020.
date_created: 2023-02-22T11:15:31Z
date_updated: 2023-05-23T12:45:52Z
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Anspruchsregeln in Verhandlungen
type: bachelorsthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '42292'
author:
- first_name: N.
full_name: N., N.
last_name: N.
citation:
ama: N. N. Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter
Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn; 2020.
apa: N., N. (2020). Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter
Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N._2020, title={Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel
interdependenter Verhandlungen}, publisher={Universität Paderborn}, author={N.,
N.}, year={2020} }'
chicago: N., N. Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter
Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn, 2020.
ieee: N. N., Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter
Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn, 2020.
mla: N., N. Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter
Verhandlungen. Universität Paderborn, 2020.
short: N. N., Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter
Verhandlungen, Universität Paderborn, 2020.
date_created: 2023-02-22T11:04:42Z
date_updated: 2023-05-23T12:46:58Z
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Die Zusammenstellung eines Sortiments als Beispiel interdependenter Verhandlungen
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '42294'
author:
- first_name: N.
full_name: N., N.
last_name: N.
citation:
ama: N. N. Matching in Netzwerken. Universität Paderborn; 2020.
apa: N., N. (2020). Matching in Netzwerken. Universität Paderborn.
bibtex: '@book{N._2020, title={Matching in Netzwerken}, publisher={Universität Paderborn},
author={N., N.}, year={2020} }'
chicago: N., N. Matching in Netzwerken. Universität Paderborn, 2020.
ieee: N. N., Matching in Netzwerken. Universität Paderborn, 2020.
mla: N., N. Matching in Netzwerken. Universität Paderborn, 2020.
short: N. N., Matching in Netzwerken, Universität Paderborn, 2020.
date_created: 2023-02-22T11:06:52Z
date_updated: 2023-05-23T12:46:44Z
department:
- _id: '204'
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
language:
- iso: ger
project:
- _id: '1'
name: 'SFB 901: SFB 901'
- _id: '2'
name: 'SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A'
- _id: '7'
name: 'SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3'
publisher: Universität Paderborn
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
title: Matching in Netzwerken
type: mastersthesis
user_id: '477'
year: '2020'
...
---
_id: '1139'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms.
Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing
behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information
of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical
evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal
to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands
lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects
even after price increase.
author:
- first_name: Daniel
full_name: Kaimann, Daniel
id: '18949'
last_name: Kaimann
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: 'Kaimann D, Hoyer B. Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox
of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters. 2019;26(1):54-57.
doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141'
apa: 'Kaimann, D., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Price competition and the Bertrand model:
The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters,
26(1), 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141'
bibtex: '@article{Kaimann_Hoyer_2019, title={Price competition and the Bertrand
model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141},
number={1}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, publisher={Taylor and Francis
Online}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={54–57}
}'
chicago: 'Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand
Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics
Letters 26, no. 1 (2019): 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.'
ieee: 'D. Kaimann and B. Hoyer, “Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox
of the German mobile discount market,” Applied Economics Letters, vol.
26, no. 1, pp. 54–57, 2019.'
mla: 'Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model:
The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters,
vol. 26, no. 1, Taylor and Francis Online, 2019, pp. 54–57, doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.'
short: D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters 26 (2019) 54–57.
date_created: 2018-01-31T08:34:35Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:00Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '183'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z
date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z
file_id: '5307'
file_name: KaimannHoyer.pdf
file_size: 625230
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-11-02T15:35:29Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 26'
issue: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141
page: 54-57
project:
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A4
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
publication: Applied Economics Letters
publication_status: epub_ahead
publisher: Taylor and Francis Online
status: public
title: 'Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile
discount market'
type: journal_article
user_id: '18949'
volume: 26
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '2256'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat
members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise
have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information
network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris
paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within
the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto
this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections
model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation
and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external
threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect.
For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network
can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat
whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat,
a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected
networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges."
author:
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
- first_name: Hans
full_name: Haller, Hans
last_name: Haller
citation:
ama: Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation
and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019;162:146-163.
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011
apa: Hoyer, B., & Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic
Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
162, 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011
bibtex: '@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic
Network Formation and Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta
and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }'
chicago: 'Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic
Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
162 (2019): 146–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.'
ieee: B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation
and Disruption,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol.
162, pp. 146–163, 2019.
mla: Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network
Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.
short: B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162
(2019) 146–163.
date_created: 2018-04-06T07:59:01Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:55:36Z
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011
intvolume: ' 162'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824
page: 146-163
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
publication_status: published
status: public
title: The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption
type: journal_article
user_id: '477'
volume: 162
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '80'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential
of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network
formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any
experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally
study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat
by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed
behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer
are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary
who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes,
we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium
network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was
more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness
on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that
while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium
networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment,
predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally,
we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on
whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two
robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify
the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment
observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions
by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013)."
article_type: original
author:
- first_name: Angelika Elfriede
full_name: Endres, Angelika Elfriede
id: '48794'
last_name: Endres
- first_name: Sonja
full_name: Recker, Sonja
last_name: Recker
- first_name: Behnud
full_name: Mir Djawadi, Behnud
id: '26032'
last_name: Mir Djawadi
orcid: 0000-0002-6271-5912
- first_name: Britta
full_name: Hoyer, Britta
id: '42447'
last_name: Hoyer
citation:
ama: 'Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption
- An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization . 2019;157:708-734. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004'
apa: 'Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Network
Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 157, 708–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004'
bibtex: '@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation
and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157},
DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika
Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019},
pages={708–734} }'
chicago: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta
Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks
Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019):
708–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.'
ieee: 'A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation
and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019.'
mla: 'Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment:
Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
, vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.'
short: A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 157 (2019) 708–734.
date_created: 2017-10-17T12:41:07Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:49Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '179'
- _id: '204'
- _id: '475'
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: bhoyer
date_created: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
file_id: '5723'
file_name: Publication Jebo.pdf
file_size: 1569991
relation: main_file
file_date_updated: 2018-11-19T07:39:42Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 157'
language:
- iso: eng
page: 708-734
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3
- _id: '8'
name: SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publication: 'Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization '
publication_status: epub_ahead
status: public
title: 'Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks
too complex?'
type: journal_article
user_id: '42447'
volume: 157
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '8080'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: This thesis investigates approximate pure Nash equilibria in different game-theoretic
models. In such an outcome, no player can improve her objective by more than a
given factor through a deviation to another strategy. In the first part, we investigate
two variants of Congestion Games in which the existence of pure Nash equilibria
is guaranteed through a potential function argument. However, the computation
of such equilibria might be hard. We construct and analyze approximation algorithms
that enable the computation of states with low approximation factors in polynomial
time. To show their guarantees we use sub games among players, bound the potential
function values of arbitrary states and exploit a connection between Shapley and
proportional cost shares. Furthermore, we apply and analyze sampling techniques
for the computation of approximate Shapley values in different settings. In the
second part, we concentrate on the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria
in games in which no pure Nash equilibria exist in general. In the model of Coevolving
Opinion Formation Games, we bound the approximation guarantees for natural states
nearly independent of the specific definition of the players' neighborhoods by
applying a concept of virtual costs. For the special case of only one influential
neighbor, we even show lower approximation factors for a natural strategy. Then,
we investigate a two-sided Facility Location Game among facilities and clients
on a line with an objective function consisting of distance and load. We show
tight bounds on the approximation factor for settings with three facilities and
infinitely many clients. For the general scenario with an arbitrary number of
facilities, we bound the approximation factor for two promising candidates, namely
facilities that are uniformly distributed and which are paired.
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
citation:
ama: Feldotto M. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation
and Facility Location Games. Universität Paderborn; 2019. doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-588
apa: Feldotto, M. (2019). Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion
Formation and Facility Location Games. Universität Paderborn. https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-588
bibtex: '@book{Feldotto_2019, place={Universität Paderborn}, title={Approximate
Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games},
DOI={10.17619/UNIPB/1-588},
author={Feldotto, Matthias}, year={2019} }'
chicago: Feldotto, Matthias. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion,
Opinion Formation and Facility Location Games. Universität Paderborn, 2019.
https://doi.org/10.17619/UNIPB/1-588.
ieee: M. Feldotto, Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation
and Facility Location Games. Universität Paderborn, 2019.
mla: Feldotto, Matthias. Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion
Formation and Facility Location Games. 2019, doi:10.17619/UNIPB/1-588.
short: M. Feldotto, Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation
and Facility Location Games, Universität Paderborn, 2019.
date_created: 2019-02-25T13:03:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:50Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.17619/UNIPB/1-588
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2019-03-28T13:40:51Z
date_updated: 2019-03-28T13:40:51Z
file_id: '8715'
file_name: Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and
Facility Location Games.pdf
file_size: 3116177
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-03-28T13:40:51Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: http://digital.ub.uni-paderborn.de/hs/download/pdf/3005508?originalFilename=true
place: Universität Paderborn
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
status: public
supervisor:
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
title: Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Congestion, Opinion Formation and Facility
Location Games
type: dissertation
user_id: '15415'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '7630'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In this paper, we analyze a credence goods model adjusted to the health care
market with regulated prices and heterogeneous experts. Experts are physicians
and are assumed to differ in their cost of treating a small problem. We investigate
the effects of this heterogeneity on the physicians’ level of fraud and on the
patients’ search for second opinions. We find that introducing a fraction of more
efficient low-cost physicians always increases social welfare, but in some cases
only because of the raised physicians’ surplus. When the low-cost physicians’
cost advantage is small, imposing a share of low-cost physicians does not change
the equilibrium fraud level. When the cost advantage is large, however, different
changes in the fraud level occur depending on the share of generated low-cost
physicians, the search rate and the initial level of fraud.
author:
- first_name: Joachim Maria Josef
full_name: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef
id: '53445'
last_name: Heinzel
citation:
ama: 'Heinzel JMJ. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts. Vol
118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.'
apa: 'Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts
(Vol. 118). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.'
bibtex: '@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper
Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts}, volume={118},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019},
collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }'
chicago: 'Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous
Experts. Vol. 118. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University: CIE Working
Paper Series, 2019.'
ieee: 'J. M. J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts,
vol. 118. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.'
mla: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous
Experts. Vol. 118, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.
short: J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts, CIE Working
Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-02-12T08:18:02Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:03:42Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: jheinzel
date_created: 2019-02-12T08:21:37Z
date_updated: 2019-02-12T08:21:37Z
file_id: '7631'
file_name: WP118.pdf
file_size: 286367
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-02-12T08:21:37Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 118'
jel:
- D82
- I11
- L15
keyword:
- credence goods
- treatment efficiency
- heterogeneous experts
- overcharging
language:
- iso: eng
place: Paderborn University
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series
report_number: 2019-01
series_title: CIE Working Paper Series
status: public
title: Credence Goods Markets with Heterogeneous Experts
type: report
user_id: '477'
volume: 118
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '8873'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We analyze a credence goods market adapted to a health care market with regulated
prices, where physicians are heterogeneous regarding their fairness concerns.
The opportunistic physicians only consider monetary incentives while the fair
physicians, in addition to a monetary payoff, gain an non-monetary utility from
being honest towards patients. We investigate how this heterogeneity affects the
physicians’ equilibrium level of overcharging and the patients’ search for second
opinions (which determines overall welfare). The impact of the heterogeneity on
the fraud level is ambiguous and depends on several factors such as the size of
the fairness utility, the share of fair physicians, the search level and the initial
fraud level. Introducing heterogeneity does not affect the fraud or the search
level when the share of fair physicians is small. However, when social welfare
is not at its maximum, social welfare always increases if we introduce a sufficiently
large share of fair physicians.
author:
- first_name: Joachim Maria Josef
full_name: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef
id: '53445'
last_name: Heinzel
citation:
ama: 'Heinzel JMJ. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts.
Vol 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.'
apa: 'Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic
Experts (Vol. 119). Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.'
bibtex: '@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, series={CIE Working Paper
Series}, title={Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts}, volume={119},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series}, author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019},
collection={CIE Working Paper Series} }'
chicago: 'Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and
Opportunistic Experts. Vol. 119. CIE Working Paper Series. Paderborn University:
CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.'
ieee: 'J. M. J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts,
vol. 119. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.'
mla: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic
Experts. Vol. 119, CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.
short: J.M.J. Heinzel, Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts,
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-04-11T08:13:53Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:04:05Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
- _id: '200'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: jheinzel
date_created: 2019-04-11T08:23:33Z
date_updated: 2019-04-11T08:23:33Z
file_id: '8875'
file_name: WP119.pdf
file_size: 315297
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-04-11T08:23:33Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 119'
jel:
- D82
- I11
- L15
keyword:
- credence goods
- heterogeneous experts
- fairness
- overcharging
language:
- iso: eng
place: Paderborn University
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series
series_title: CIE Working Paper Series
status: public
title: Credence Goods Markets with Fair and Opportunistic Experts
type: report
user_id: '53445'
volume: 119
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '5471'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: "We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC),
strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms
for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single
buyer and a single seller who holds a finite number k of identical items. The
mechanism has to decide how many units of the item are transferred from the seller
to the buyer and how much money is transferred from the buyer to the seller. We
consider two classes of valuation functions for the buyer and seller: Valuations
that are increasing in the number of units in possession, and the more specific
class of valuations that are increasing and submodular. \r\nFurthermore, we present
some approximation results about the performance of certain such mechanisms, in
terms of social welfare: For increasing submodular valuation functions, we show
the existence of a deterministic 2-approximation mechanism and a randomised e/(1-e)
approximation mechanism, matching the best known bounds for the single-item setting."
author:
- first_name: Philip
full_name: Lazos, Philip
last_name: Lazos
- first_name: Paul
full_name: Goldberg, Paul
last_name: Goldberg
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Gerstgrasser, Matthias
last_name: Gerstgrasser
- first_name: Bart
full_name: de Keijzer, Bart
last_name: de Keijzer
citation:
ama: 'Lazos P, Goldberg P, Skopalik A, Gerstgrasser M, de Keijzer B. Multi-unit
Bilateral Trade. In: Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI). ; 2019. doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973'
apa: Lazos, P., Goldberg, P., Skopalik, A., Gerstgrasser, M., & de Keijzer,
B. (2019). Multi-unit Bilateral Trade. Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI). Thirty-Third AAAI Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Honolulu, Hawaii, USA. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Lazos_Goldberg_Skopalik_Gerstgrasser_de Keijzer_2019, title={
Multi-unit Bilateral Trade}, DOI={10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973},
booktitle={Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI)}, author={Lazos, Philip and Goldberg, Paul and Skopalik, Alexander and
Gerstgrasser, Matthias and de Keijzer, Bart}, year={2019} }'
chicago: Lazos, Philip, Paul Goldberg, Alexander Skopalik, Matthias Gerstgrasser,
and Bart de Keijzer. “ Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade.” In Proceedings of the Thirty-Third
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2019. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.
ieee: 'P. Lazos, P. Goldberg, A. Skopalik, M. Gerstgrasser, and B. de Keijzer, “
Multi-unit Bilateral Trade,” presented at the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, 2019, doi: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.'
mla: Lazos, Philip, et al. “ Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade.” Proceedings of the
Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2019, doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.
short: 'P. Lazos, P. Goldberg, A. Skopalik, M. Gerstgrasser, B. de Keijzer, in:
Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI),
2019.'
conference:
end_date: 2019-02-01
location: Honolulu, Hawaii, USA
name: Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)
start_date: 2019-01-27
date_created: 2018-11-12T09:38:16Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T07:01:55Z
ddc:
- '000'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
doi: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: feldi
date_created: 2018-12-06T13:57:51Z
date_updated: 2018-12-06T13:57:51Z
file_id: '6018'
file_name: 1811.05130.pdf
file_size: 315877
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2018-12-06T13:57:51Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI)
publication_status: published
status: public
title: ' Multi-unit Bilateral Trade'
type: conference
user_id: '15415'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '15202'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: In this paper, we analyze the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS)
deploying a standard labor market negotiations model (see McDonald and Solow,
1981; Creedy and McDonald, 1991). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining
problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems such that the (Cartesian)
product of the solutions of these problems replicates the solution of the two-dimensional
problem, if the NBS is applied. However, this decomposition fails for any solution
concept that does not satisfy the axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA axiom). Our decomposition result has significant implications for actual
negotiations, as it allows for the decomposition of a multi-issue bargaining problem
into a set of simpler problems, in particular a set of single-issue bargaining
problems. In this way, the decomposition may help facilitate negotiations in labor
markets and also in other environments.
author:
- first_name: Claus-Jochen
full_name: Haake, Claus-Jochen
id: '20801'
last_name: Haake
- first_name: Thorsten
full_name: Upmann, Thorsten
last_name: Upmann
- first_name: Papatya
full_name: Duman, Papatya
id: '72752'
last_name: Duman
citation:
ama: Haake C-J, Upmann T, Duman P. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
Solution in Labor Markets. Vol 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University;
2019.
apa: Haake, C.-J., Upmann, T., & Duman, P. (2019). The Decomposability of
the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets (Vol. 128). CIE Working Paper
Series, Paderborn University.
bibtex: '@book{Haake_Upmann_Duman_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={The
Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets}, volume={128},
publisher={CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen
and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}, year={2019}, collection={Working Papers
CIE} }'
chicago: Haake, Claus-Jochen, Thorsten Upmann, and Papatya Duman. The Decomposability
of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets. Vol. 128. Working Papers
CIE. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
ieee: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, and P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
Solution in Labor Markets, vol. 128. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2019.
mla: Haake, Claus-Jochen, et al. The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution
in Labor Markets. Vol. 128, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University,
2019.
short: C.-J. Haake, T. Upmann, P. Duman, The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining
Solution in Labor Markets, CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-11-28T09:49:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:16Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
file_id: '15203'
file_name: WP - The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets.pdf
file_size: 1068284
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T09:50:10Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 128'
keyword:
- Labor market negotiations
- Efficient bargains
- Nash bargaining solution
- Sequential bargaining
- Restricted bargaining games
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: The Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Labor Markets
type: working_paper
user_id: '477'
volume: 128
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '15204'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional
TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that
coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games.
We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition
of ecient payo vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality.
3. Via an explicit consideration of \coalition building". 4. Via associating general
TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our
analysis on a modification of aspirations.'
author:
- first_name: Fatma
full_name: Aslan, Fatma
last_name: Aslan
- first_name: Papatya
full_name: Duman, Papatya
last_name: Duman
- first_name: Walter
full_name: Trockel, Walter
last_name: Trockel
citation:
ama: Aslan F, Duman P, Trockel W. Duality for General TU-Games Redefined.
Vol 121. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University; 2019.
apa: Aslan, F., Duman, P., & Trockel, W. (2019). Duality for General TU-games
Redefined (Vol. 121). CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University.
bibtex: '@book{Aslan_Duman_Trockel_2019, series={Working Papers CIE}, title={Duality
for General TU-games Redefined}, volume={121}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University}, author={Aslan, Fatma and Duman, Papatya and Trockel, Walter},
year={2019}, collection={Working Papers CIE} }'
chicago: Aslan, Fatma, Papatya Duman, and Walter Trockel. Duality for General
TU-Games Redefined. Vol. 121. Working Papers CIE. CIE Working Paper Series,
Paderborn University, 2019.
ieee: F. Aslan, P. Duman, and W. Trockel, Duality for General TU-games Redefined,
vol. 121. CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
mla: Aslan, Fatma, et al. Duality for General TU-Games Redefined. Vol. 121,
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
short: F. Aslan, P. Duman, W. Trockel, Duality for General TU-Games Redefined, CIE
Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:00:41Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:52:17Z
ddc:
- '040'
department:
- _id: '205'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: stela
date_created: 2019-11-28T10:01:40Z
date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:01:40Z
file_id: '15205'
file_name: WP - Duality for General TU-games Redefined.pdf
file_size: 369323
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-11-28T10:01:40Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
intvolume: ' 121'
keyword:
- TU-games
- duality
- core
- c-Core
- cohesive games
- complete game efficiency
language:
- iso: eng
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University
series_title: Working Papers CIE
status: public
title: Duality for General TU-games Redefined
type: working_paper
user_id: '65453'
volume: 121
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '13148'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: This paper examines the evolutionary stability of behaviour in contests where
players’ participation can be stochastic. We find, for exogenously given participation
probabilities, players exert more effort under the concept of a finite-population
evolutionarily stable strategy (FPESS) than under Nash equilibrium (NE). We show
that there is ex-ante overdissipation under FPESS for sufficiently large participation
probabilities, if, and only if, the impact function is convex. With costly endogenous
entry, players enter the contest with a higher probability and exert more effort
under FPESS than under NE. Importantly, under endogenous entry, overdissipation
can occur for all (Tullock) contest success functions, in particular those with
concave impact functions.
author:
- first_name: Yiquan
full_name: Gu, Yiquan
last_name: Gu
- first_name: Burkhard
full_name: Hehenkamp, Burkhard
id: '37339'
last_name: Hehenkamp
- first_name: Wolfgang
full_name: Leininger, Wolfgang
last_name: Leininger
citation:
ama: 'Gu Y, Hehenkamp B, Leininger W. Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with
stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization. 2019:469-485. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011'
apa: 'Gu, Y., Hehenkamp, B., & Leininger, W. (2019). Evolutionary equilibrium
in contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 469–485. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011'
bibtex: '@article{Gu_Hehenkamp_Leininger_2019, title={Evolutionary equilibrium in
contests with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Gu, Yiquan
and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}, year={2019}, pages={469–485}
}'
chicago: 'Gu, Yiquan, Burkhard Hehenkamp, and Wolfgang Leininger. “Evolutionary
Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Participation: Entry, Effort and Overdissipation.”
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, 469–85. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011.'
ieee: 'Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, and W. Leininger, “Evolutionary equilibrium in contests
with stochastic participation: Entry, effort and overdissipation,” Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, pp. 469–485, 2019.'
mla: 'Gu, Yiquan, et al. “Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with Stochastic Participation:
Entry, Effort and Overdissipation.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
2019, pp. 469–85, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011.'
short: Y. Gu, B. Hehenkamp, W. Leininger, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
(2019) 469–485.
date_created: 2019-09-06T09:28:46Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:51:29Z
department:
- _id: '280'
doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.06.011
language:
- iso: eng
page: 469-485
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
publication_identifier:
issn:
- 0167-2681
publication_status: published
status: public
title: 'Evolutionary equilibrium in contests with stochastic participation: Entry,
effort and overdissipation'
type: journal_article
user_id: '37953'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '10281'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: 'Competing firms tend to select similar locations for their stores. This phenomenon,
called the principle of minimum differentiation, was captured by Hotelling with
a landmark model of spatial competition but is still the object of an ongoing
scientific debate. Although consistently observed in practice, many more realistic
variants of Hotelling''s model fail to support minimum differentiation or do not
have pure equilibria at all. In particular, it was recently proven for a generalized
model which incorporates negative network externalities and which contains Hotelling''s
model and classical selfish load balancing as special cases, that the unique equilibria
do not adhere to minimum differentiation. Furthermore, it was shown that for a
significant parameter range pure equilibria do not exist. We derive a sharp contrast
to these previous results by investigating Hotelling''s model with negative network
externalities from an entirely new angle: approximate pure subgame perfect equilibria.
This approach allows us to prove analytically and via agent-based simulations
that approximate equilibria having good approximation guarantees and that adhere
to minimum differentiation exist for the full parameter range of the model. Moreover,
we show that the obtained approximate equilibria have high social welfare.'
author:
- first_name: Matthias
full_name: Feldotto, Matthias
id: '14052'
last_name: Feldotto
orcid: 0000-0003-1348-6516
- first_name: 'Pascal '
full_name: 'Lenzner, Pascal '
last_name: Lenzner
- first_name: Louise
full_name: Molitor, Louise
last_name: Molitor
- first_name: Alexander
full_name: Skopalik, Alexander
id: '40384'
last_name: Skopalik
citation:
ama: 'Feldotto M, Lenzner P, Molitor L, Skopalik A. From Hotelling to Load Balancing:
Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation. In: Proceedings
of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems.
International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems; 2019:1949--1951.'
apa: 'Feldotto, M., Lenzner, P., Molitor, L., & Skopalik, A. (2019). From Hotelling
to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation.
In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
MultiAgent Systems (pp. 1949--1951). Montreal QC, Canada: International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.'
bibtex: '@inproceedings{Feldotto_Lenzner_Molitor_Skopalik_2019, title={ From Hotelling
to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation},
booktitle={Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and MultiAgent Systems}, publisher={International Foundation for Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems}, author={Feldotto, Matthias and Lenzner, Pascal and Molitor,
Louise and Skopalik, Alexander}, year={2019}, pages={1949--1951} }'
chicago: 'Feldotto, Matthias, Pascal Lenzner, Louise Molitor, and Alexander Skopalik.
“ From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum
Differentiation.” In Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous
Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 1949--1951. International Foundation for Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019.'
ieee: 'M. Feldotto, P. Lenzner, L. Molitor, and A. Skopalik, “ From Hotelling to
Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation,” in
Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
Systems, Montreal QC, Canada, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.'
mla: 'Feldotto, Matthias, et al. “ From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation
and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation.” Proceedings of the 18th International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, International Foundation
for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.'
short: 'M. Feldotto, P. Lenzner, L. Molitor, A. Skopalik, in: Proceedings of the
18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, International
Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2019, pp. 1949--1951.'
conference:
location: Montreal QC, Canada
name: 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
date_created: 2019-06-20T14:46:08Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:33Z
ddc:
- '004'
department:
- _id: '541'
- _id: '63'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: ups
date_created: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z
date_updated: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z
file_id: '12962'
file_name: 1903.04265.pdf
file_size: 698599
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-08-26T11:10:02Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
language:
- iso: eng
main_file_link:
- url: https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3331973
page: 1949--1951
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publication: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and MultiAgent Systems
publication_status: published
publisher: International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
status: public
title: ' From Hotelling to Load Balancing: Approximation and the Principle of Minimum
Differentiation'
type: conference
user_id: '477'
year: '2019'
...
---
_id: '10332'
abstract:
- lang: eng
text: We analyze the incentives for retail bundling and the welfare effects of retail
bundling in a decentralized distribution channel with two retailers and two monopolistic
manufacturers. One manufacturer exclusively sells his good to one retailer, whereas
the other manufacturer sells his good to both retailers. Thus, one retailer is
a monopolist for one product but competes with the other retailer in the second
product market. The two-product retailer has the option to bundle his goods or
to sell them separately. We find that bundling aggravates the double marginalization
problem for the bundling retailer. Nevertheless, when the retailers compete in
prices, bundling can be more profitable than separate selling for the retailer
as bundling softens the retail competition. The ultimate outcome depends on the
manufacturers’ marginal costs. Given retail quantity competition, however, bundling
is in no case the retailer’s best strategy. Furthermore, we show that profitable
bundling reduces consumer and producer surplus in the equilibrium.
author:
- first_name: Joachim Maria Josef
full_name: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef
id: '53445'
last_name: Heinzel
citation:
ama: 'Heinzel JMJ. Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition.
Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series; 2019.'
apa: 'Heinzel, J. M. J. (2019). Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail
Competition. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series.'
bibtex: '@book{Heinzel_2019, place={Paderborn University}, title={Bundling in a
Distribution Channel with Retail Competition}, publisher={CIE Working Paper Series},
author={Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef}, year={2019} }'
chicago: 'Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Bundling in a Distribution Channel with
Retail Competition. Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.'
ieee: 'J. M. J. Heinzel, Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition.
Paderborn University: CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.'
mla: Heinzel, Joachim Maria Josef. Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail
Competition. CIE Working Paper Series, 2019.
short: J.M.J. Heinzel, Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition,
CIE Working Paper Series, Paderborn University, 2019.
date_created: 2019-06-28T08:42:49Z
date_updated: 2022-01-06T06:50:37Z
ddc:
- '330'
department:
- _id: '280'
- _id: '475'
file:
- access_level: closed
content_type: application/pdf
creator: jheinzel
date_created: 2019-06-28T08:44:52Z
date_updated: 2019-06-28T08:44:52Z
file_id: '10333'
file_name: WP120.pdf
file_size: 375054
relation: main_file
success: 1
file_date_updated: 2019-06-28T08:44:52Z
has_accepted_license: '1'
keyword:
- retail bundling
- leverage theory
- double marginalization
language:
- iso: eng
place: Paderborn University
project:
- _id: '1'
name: SFB 901
- _id: '2'
name: SFB 901 - Project Area A
- _id: '7'
name: SFB 901 - Subproject A3
publisher: CIE Working Paper Series
status: public
title: Bundling in a Distribution Channel with Retail Competition
type: report
user_id: '53445'
year: '2019'
...