@article{2500, author = {{Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, issn = {{0931-8658}}, journal = {{Journal of Economics}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{115--128}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00712-006-0207-5}}, volume = {{89}}, year = {{2006}}, } @article{4159, author = {{Guse, T. and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0048-5829}}, journal = {{Public Choice}}, number = {{3-4}}, pages = {{323--352}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s11127-006-9033-0}}, volume = {{129}}, year = {{2006}}, } @article{4163, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}}, issn = {{0015-2218}}, journal = {{FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{124--148}}, publisher = {{Mohr Siebeck}}, title = {{{When Should the Talented Receive Weaker Incentives? Peer Pressure in Teams}}}, doi = {{10.1628/001522106776667040}}, volume = {{62}}, year = {{2006}}, } @article{2499, abstract = {{We consider a model, in which two agents are engaged in two separate bargaining problems. We introduce a notion of bargaining weights (bargaining power), which is basically given by asymmetric versions of the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution. Thereby, we view bargaining power as ordinary goods that can be traded in an exchange economy.With equal initial endowment of bargaining power there exists aWalrasian equilibrium in this exchange economy such that the utility allocation in equilibrium coincides with the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution of the aggregate bargaining problem. Equilibrium prices are given by the primitives of the two bargaining problems.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Ervig, Ulrike}}, journal = {{Journal of Mathematical Economics}}, number = {{8}}, pages = {{983--993}}, title = {{{Trading bargaining weights}}}, volume = {{41}}, year = {{2005}}, } @article{3297, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, journal = {{Journal of Development Perspective}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{29--62}}, title = {{{Endogenous Formation of Regions in Developing Countries}}}, volume = {{1}}, year = {{2005}}, } @article{3299, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, journal = {{Science Research Management}}, pages = {{145 --151}}, title = {{{International Spill-Over of Technologies and Regional Agglomeration and Development}}}, volume = {{25}}, year = {{2004}}, } @article{3064, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Sievert, Gerhard and Wieneke, Axel}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, pages = {{157--171}}, title = {{{Interbank market frictions, international banks and growth}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-004-0011-z}}, volume = {{1}}, year = {{2004}}, } @article{3065, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Langeleh, Dirk}}, journal = {{Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik }}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{293--311}}, title = {{{Anreizkompatibilität als zentrales Element eines neu gestalteten Gesundheitsmarktes}}}, doi = {{10.1111/j.1468-2516.2004.00154.x}}, volume = {{5}}, year = {{2004}}, } @article{4160, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, W. and Possajennikov, A.}}, issn = {{0176-2680}}, journal = {{European Journal of Political Economy}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{1045--1057}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.09.002}}, volume = {{20}}, year = {{2004}}, } @article{4161, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0219-1989}}, journal = {{International Game Theory Review}}, number = {{03}}, pages = {{249--262}}, publisher = {{World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}}, title = {{{Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model}}}, doi = {{10.1142/s0219198903001045}}, volume = {{05}}, year = {{2003}}, }