@article{2500, author = {{Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, issn = {{0931-8658}}, journal = {{Journal of Economics}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{115--128}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00712-006-0207-5}}, volume = {{89}}, year = {{2006}}, } @article{4159, author = {{Guse, T. and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0048-5829}}, journal = {{Public Choice}}, number = {{3-4}}, pages = {{323--352}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{The strategic advantage of interdependent preferences in rent-seeking contests}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s11127-006-9033-0}}, volume = {{129}}, year = {{2006}}, } @article{4163, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarboe, Oddvar}}, issn = {{0015-2218}}, journal = {{FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{124--148}}, publisher = {{Mohr Siebeck}}, title = {{{When Should the Talented Receive Weaker Incentives? Peer Pressure in Teams}}}, doi = {{10.1628/001522106776667040}}, volume = {{62}}, year = {{2006}}, } @article{2499, abstract = {{We consider a model, in which two agents are engaged in two separate bargaining problems. We introduce a notion of bargaining weights (bargaining power), which is basically given by asymmetric versions of the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution. Thereby, we view bargaining power as ordinary goods that can be traded in an exchange economy.With equal initial endowment of bargaining power there exists aWalrasian equilibrium in this exchange economy such that the utility allocation in equilibrium coincides with the Perles–Maschler bargaining solution of the aggregate bargaining problem. Equilibrium prices are given by the primitives of the two bargaining problems.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Ervig, Ulrike}}, journal = {{Journal of Mathematical Economics}}, number = {{8}}, pages = {{983--993}}, title = {{{Trading bargaining weights}}}, volume = {{41}}, year = {{2005}}, } @article{3297, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, journal = {{Journal of Development Perspective}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{29--62}}, title = {{{Endogenous Formation of Regions in Developing Countries}}}, volume = {{1}}, year = {{2005}}, } @article{3299, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, journal = {{Science Research Management}}, pages = {{145 --151}}, title = {{{International Spill-Over of Technologies and Regional Agglomeration and Development}}}, volume = {{25}}, year = {{2004}}, } @article{3064, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Sievert, Gerhard and Wieneke, Axel}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, pages = {{157--171}}, title = {{{Interbank market frictions, international banks and growth}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-004-0011-z}}, volume = {{1}}, year = {{2004}}, } @article{3065, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Langeleh, Dirk}}, journal = {{Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik }}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{293--311}}, title = {{{Anreizkompatibilität als zentrales Element eines neu gestalteten Gesundheitsmarktes}}}, doi = {{10.1111/j.1468-2516.2004.00154.x}}, volume = {{5}}, year = {{2004}}, } @article{4160, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, W. and Possajennikov, A.}}, issn = {{0176-2680}}, journal = {{European Journal of Political Economy}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{1045--1057}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2003.09.002}}, volume = {{20}}, year = {{2004}}, } @article{4161, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0219-1989}}, journal = {{International Game Theory Review}}, number = {{03}}, pages = {{249--262}}, publisher = {{World Scientific Pub Co Pte Lt}}, title = {{{Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model}}}, doi = {{10.1142/s0219198903001045}}, volume = {{05}}, year = {{2003}}, } @article{2497, abstract = {{We develop a procedure for implementing an efficient and envy-free allocation of m objects among n individuals with the possibility of monetary side-payments,assuming that players have quasi–linear utility functions. The procedure eliminates envy by compensating envious players. It is fully descriptive and says explicitly which compensations should be made,and in what order. Moreover,it is simple enough to be carried out without computer support. We formally characterize the properties of the procedure,show how it establishes envy-freeness with minimal resources,and demonstrate its application to a wide class of fair-division problems.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Raith, Matthias and Su, Francis Edward}}, issn = {{0176-1714}}, journal = {{Social Choice and Welfare}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{723--749}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems}}}, volume = {{19}}, year = {{2002}}, } @article{3066, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, journal = {{South African Journal of Economics}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{273--281}}, title = {{{Catching‐Up, Falling Behind and the Role of FDI:A Model of Endogenous Growth and Development}}}, doi = {{10.1111/j.1813-6982.2002.tb01183.x}}, volume = {{70}}, year = {{2002}}, } @article{4637, author = {{Heiler, Siegfried and Feng, Yuanhua}}, issn = {{0378-3758}}, journal = {{Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{351--363}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Data-driven decomposition of seasonal time series}}}, doi = {{10.1016/s0378-3758(00)00187-7}}, volume = {{91}}, year = {{2002}}, } @article{4162, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0899-8256}}, journal = {{Games and Economic Behavior}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{44--76}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox}}}, doi = {{10.1006/game.2001.0902}}, volume = {{40}}, year = {{2002}}, } @article{3334, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, journal = {{Wirtschaftsdienst 8/2001}}, title = {{{Soziales Marktmodell Europa versus liberales Marktmodell Amerika – gibt es Sieger beim Wettbewerb der Marktwirtschaften?}}}, year = {{2001}}, } @article{3336, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Birk, Angela}}, journal = {{Wirtschaftsdienst}}, title = {{{Die US amerikanische Dienstleistungsgesellschaft – ein Modell für Deutschland}}}, year = {{1999}}, } @article{3337, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Meyer, H.}}, journal = {{International Advances in Economic Research}}, title = {{{Foreign Direct Investments in the Process of Transition}}}, volume = {{5}}, year = {{1999}}, } @article{3410, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Leininger, Wolfgang}}, issn = {{0936-9937}}, journal = {{Journal of Evolutionary Economics}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{367--371}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s001910050087}}, volume = {{9}}, year = {{1999}}, } @article{3417, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Qin, Cheng-Zhong and Stuart, Charles}}, issn = {{0936-9937}}, journal = {{Journal of Evolutionary Economics}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{211--224}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s001910050081}}, volume = {{9}}, year = {{1999}}, } @article{3527, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Birk, Angela}}, journal = {{Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007)}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{99--106}}, title = {{{Amerikanisches Job-Wunder versus deutsches Produktivitätswunder: Ein Vergleich der Arbeitsmarktstrategien}}}, volume = {{77}}, year = {{1997}}, }