@article{1029, abstract = {{We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Conflict Resolution}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{502----527}}, publisher = {{SAGE Publications}}, title = {{{Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022002717750450}}, volume = {{63}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{3081, author = {{Kolodziej, Ingo WK and Reichert, Arndt R and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health services research}}, number = {{4}}, title = {{{New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe}}}, doi = {{10.111/1475-6773.12840}}, volume = {{53}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{2728, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete and Ugarte, Juliette Espinosa}}, issn = {{0177-798X}}, journal = {{Theoretical and Applied Climatology}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Human-induced climate change: the impact of land-use change}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00704-018-2422-8}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{31807, abstract = {{Drawing upon recent advances in machine learning and natural language processing, we introduce new tools that automatically ingest, parse, disambiguate, and build an updated database using U.S. patent data. The tools identify unique inventor, assignee, and location entities mentioned on each granted U.S. patent from 1976 to 2016. We describe data flow, algorithms, user interfaces, descriptive statistics, and a novelty measure based on the first appearance of a word in the patent corpus. We illustrate an automated coinventor network mapping tool and visualize trends in patenting over the last 40 years.}}, author = {{Balsmeier, Benjamin and Assaf, Mohamad and Chesebro, Tyler and Fierro, Gabe and Johnson, Kevin and Johnson, Scott and Li, Guan‐Cheng and Lück, Sonja and O'Reagan, Doug and Yeh, Bill and Zang, Guangzheng and Fleming, Lee}}, issn = {{1058-6407}}, journal = {{Journal of Economics & Management Strategy}}, keywords = {{Management of Technology and Innovation, Strategy and Management, Economics and Econometrics, General Business, Management and Accounting, General Medicine}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{535--553}}, publisher = {{Wiley}}, title = {{{Machine learning and natural language processing on the patent corpus: Data, tools, and new measures}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jems.12259}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{3070, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Feng, Yuanhua}}, journal = {{Review of Economics}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{153--166}}, title = {{{Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of Business Cycles in Spain}}}, doi = {{10.1515/roe-2017-0008}}, volume = {{68 }}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{5236, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Schiele, Valentin}}, journal = {{Atlas of Science}}, title = {{{Sick already? Job loss makes it even worse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1054, abstract = {{We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. }}, author = {{Brosig-Koch, Janet and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, number = {{53}}, pages = {{6--20}}, publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}}, title = {{{The effects of competition on medical service provision}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3583}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1372, author = {{Gries, T. and Grundmann, R. and Palnau, Irene and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{293--351}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Innovations, growth and participation in advanced economies - a review of major concepts and findings}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-016-0371-1}}, volume = {{14}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{15260, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}}, issn = {{0022-166X}}, journal = {{Journal of Human Resources}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{88--127}}, title = {{{Does Price Framing Affect the Consumer Price Sensitivity of Health Plan Choice?}}}, doi = {{10.3368/jhr.52.1.0814-6540r1}}, volume = {{52}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{2635, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Westphal, Matthias}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{1--18}}, title = {{{Informal Care and Long-term Labor Market Outcomes}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.09.002}}, volume = {{56}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{3082, author = {{Büyükdurmus, Tugba and Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald}}, journal = {{Health Economics Review}}, number = {{2}}, title = {{{On the interdependence of ambulatory and hospital care in the German health system}}}, doi = {{10.1186/s13561-016-0132-4}}, volume = {{7}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1371, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, R. and Palnau, Irene and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{215--253}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Technology diffusion, international integration and participation in developing economies - a review of major concepts and findings}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-017-0373-7}}, volume = {{15}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{2527, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, issn = {{1554-8597}}, journal = {{Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{377 -- 384}}, publisher = {{Walter de Gruyter GmbH}}, title = {{{Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2016-0042}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2540, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Brockhoff, Sarah}}, issn = {{0176-2680}}, journal = {{European Journal of Political Economy}}, pages = {{1--23}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.11.003}}, volume = {{49}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2810, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Kraft, Manfred and Simon, Manuel}}, journal = {{Papers in Regional Science}}, number = {{95}}, pages = {{709--731}}, title = {{{Explaining inter-provincial migration in China}}}, doi = {{10.1111/pirs.12156}}, volume = {{4}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2811, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, journal = {{Peace Economics and Peace Science}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{377--384}}, title = {{{Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2016-0042}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2813, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Naudé, Wim}}, journal = {{International Journal of Economic Theory}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{151--165}}, title = {{{The Entrepreneurship Beveridge Curve}}}, doi = {{10.1111/ijet.12086}}, volume = {{12}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2687, author = {{Kamhöfer, Daniel A. and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, issn = {{0883-7252}}, journal = {{Journal of Applied Econometrics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{912--919}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Reanalyzing Zero Returns to Education in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1002/jae.2461}}, volume = {{31}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{211, abstract = {{On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries.}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Manegold, Jochen}}, journal = {{Theoretical Economics Letters}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{1341--1362}}, publisher = {{Scientific Research Publishing (SCIRP)}}, title = {{{Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly}}}, doi = {{10.4236/tel.2016.66124}}, volume = {{6}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{1919, abstract = {{We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, issn = {{1097-3923}}, journal = {{Journal of Public Economic Theory}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{802--830}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Strategic Network Disruption and Defense}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jpet.12168}}, volume = {{18}}, year = {{2016}}, }