@article{3082, author = {{Büyükdurmus, Tugba and Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald}}, journal = {{Health Economics Review}}, number = {{2}}, title = {{{On the interdependence of ambulatory and hospital care in the German health system}}}, doi = {{10.1186/s13561-016-0132-4}}, volume = {{7}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1371, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, R. and Palnau, Irene and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{215--253}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Technology diffusion, international integration and participation in developing economies - a review of major concepts and findings}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-017-0373-7}}, volume = {{15}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{2527, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, issn = {{1554-8597}}, journal = {{Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{377 -- 384}}, publisher = {{Walter de Gruyter GmbH}}, title = {{{Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2016-0042}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2540, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Brockhoff, Sarah}}, issn = {{0176-2680}}, journal = {{European Journal of Political Economy}}, pages = {{1--23}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.11.003}}, volume = {{49}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2810, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Kraft, Manfred and Simon, Manuel}}, journal = {{Papers in Regional Science}}, number = {{95}}, pages = {{709--731}}, title = {{{Explaining inter-provincial migration in China}}}, doi = {{10.1111/pirs.12156}}, volume = {{4}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2811, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, journal = {{Peace Economics and Peace Science}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{377--384}}, title = {{{Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2016-0042}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2813, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Naudé, Wim}}, journal = {{International Journal of Economic Theory}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{151--165}}, title = {{{The Entrepreneurship Beveridge Curve}}}, doi = {{10.1111/ijet.12086}}, volume = {{12}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2687, author = {{Kamhöfer, Daniel A. and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, issn = {{0883-7252}}, journal = {{Journal of Applied Econometrics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{912--919}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Reanalyzing Zero Returns to Education in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1002/jae.2461}}, volume = {{31}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{211, abstract = {{On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries.}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Manegold, Jochen}}, journal = {{Theoretical Economics Letters}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{1341--1362}}, publisher = {{Scientific Research Publishing (SCIRP)}}, title = {{{Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly}}}, doi = {{10.4236/tel.2016.66124}}, volume = {{6}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{1919, abstract = {{We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, issn = {{1097-3923}}, journal = {{Journal of Public Economic Theory}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{802--830}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Strategic Network Disruption and Defense}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jpet.12168}}, volume = {{18}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{1922, abstract = {{We construct two-player two-strategy game-theoretic models of by-product mutualism, where our focus lies on the way in which the probability of cooperation among players is affected by the degree of adversity facing the players. In our first model, cooperation consists of the production of a public good, and adversity is linked to the degree of complementarity of the players׳ efforts in producing the public good. In our second model, cooperation consists of the defense of a public, and/or a private good with by-product benefits, and adversity is measured by the number of random attacks (e.g., by a predator) facing the players. In both of these models, our analysis confirms the existence of the so-called boomerang effect, which states that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally defect in a situation of joint cooperation. Focusing on such an effect in isolation leads to the "common-enemy" hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity increases the probability of cooperation. Yet, we also find that a sucker effect may simultaneously exist, which says that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally cooperate in a situation of joint defection. Looked at in isolation, the sucker effect leads to the competing hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity decreases the probability of cooperation. Our analysis predicts circumstances in which the "common enemy" hypothesis prevails, and circumstances in which the competing hypothesis prevails.}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, issn = {{0022-5193}}, journal = {{Journal of Theoretical Biology}}, pages = {{82--97}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034}}, volume = {{393}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2688, author = {{Schiele, Valentin and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{59--69}}, title = {{{Quantile treatment effects of job loss on health}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.06.005}}, volume = {{49}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{3083, author = {{Herr, Annika and Nguyen, Thu-Van and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health Policy}}, number = {{10}}, pages = {{1162--1170}}, title = {{{Public reporting and the quality of care of German nursing homes}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.09.004 }}, volume = {{120}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2956, author = {{Göpffarth, Dirk and Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health economics}}, number = {{7}}, pages = {{801--815}}, title = {{{Determinants of regional variation in health expenditures in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3183}}, volume = {{25}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{15259, author = {{Decker, Simon and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, issn = {{0167-6296}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{156--170}}, title = {{{Health shocks and risk aversion}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.09.006}}, volume = {{156-170}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2815, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Naudé, Wim and Bilkic, Natascha}}, journal = {{The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance}}, pages = {{1--17}}, title = {{{Playing the Lottery or Dressing Up? A Model of Firm-Level Heterogeneity and the Decision to Export}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.qref.2015.02.010}}, volume = {{58}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2816, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua and Guo, Zhichao}}, journal = {{China Agricultural Economic Review}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{262--279}}, title = {{{Changes of China’s agri-food exports to Germany caused by its accession to WTO and the 2008 financial crisis}}}, doi = {{10.1108/CAER-11-2013-0152}}, volume = {{7}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{3295, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Palnau, Irene}}, journal = {{Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}}, number = {{ 4}}, pages = {{467 --478}}, title = {{{Sustaining Civil Peace: a configurational comparative analysis}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2015-0020}}, volume = {{21}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{3296, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel and Redlin, Margarete}}, journal = {{Oxford Economic Papers}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{83 -- 103}}, title = {{{Oppressive Governments, Dependence on the United States and Anti-American Terrorism}}}, doi = {{10.1093/oep/gpu038}}, volume = {{67}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{491, abstract = {{In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a locationin order to attract consumers. It is assumed standardly that consumers with the same favorite location fully agree on the ranking of all possible locations. To investigate the necessity of this questionable and restrictive assumption, we model heterogeneity in consumers’ distance perceptions by individual edge lengths of a given graph. A profile of location choices is called a “robust equilibrium” if it is a Nash equilibrium in several games which differ only by the consumers’ perceptions of distances. For a finite number of players and any distribution of consumers, we provide a full characterization of all robust equilibria and derive structural conditions for their existence. Furthermore, we discuss whether the classical observations of minimal differentiation and inefficiency are robust phenomena. Thereby, we find strong support for an old conjecture that in equilibrium firms form local clusters.}}, author = {{Buechel, Berno and Röhl, Nils}}, journal = {{European Journal of Operational Research}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{505--517}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Robust Equilibria in Location Games}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejor.2014.07.019}}, volume = {{240}}, year = {{2015}}, }