@article{3082, author = {{Büyükdurmus, Tugba and Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald}}, journal = {{Health Economics Review}}, number = {{2}}, title = {{{On the interdependence of ambulatory and hospital care in the German health system}}}, doi = {{10.1186/s13561-016-0132-4}}, volume = {{7}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1371, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, R. and Palnau, Irene and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{215--253}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Technology diffusion, international integration and participation in developing economies - a review of major concepts and findings}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-017-0373-7}}, volume = {{15}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{2527, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, issn = {{1554-8597}}, journal = {{Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{377 -- 384}}, publisher = {{Walter de Gruyter GmbH}}, title = {{{Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2016-0042}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2540, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Brockhoff, Sarah}}, issn = {{0176-2680}}, journal = {{European Journal of Political Economy}}, pages = {{1--23}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.11.003}}, volume = {{49}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2810, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Kraft, Manfred and Simon, Manuel}}, journal = {{Papers in Regional Science}}, number = {{95}}, pages = {{709--731}}, title = {{{Explaining inter-provincial migration in China}}}, doi = {{10.1111/pirs.12156}}, volume = {{4}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2811, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, journal = {{Peace Economics and Peace Science}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{377--384}}, title = {{{Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2016-0042}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2813, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Naudé, Wim}}, journal = {{International Journal of Economic Theory}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{151--165}}, title = {{{The Entrepreneurship Beveridge Curve}}}, doi = {{10.1111/ijet.12086}}, volume = {{12}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2687, author = {{Kamhöfer, Daniel A. and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, issn = {{0883-7252}}, journal = {{Journal of Applied Econometrics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{912--919}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Reanalyzing Zero Returns to Education in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1002/jae.2461}}, volume = {{31}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{211, abstract = {{On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries.}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Manegold, Jochen}}, journal = {{Theoretical Economics Letters}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{1341--1362}}, publisher = {{Scientific Research Publishing (SCIRP)}}, title = {{{Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly}}}, doi = {{10.4236/tel.2016.66124}}, volume = {{6}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{1919, abstract = {{We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, issn = {{1097-3923}}, journal = {{Journal of Public Economic Theory}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{802--830}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Strategic Network Disruption and Defense}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jpet.12168}}, volume = {{18}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{1922, abstract = {{We construct two-player two-strategy game-theoretic models of by-product mutualism, where our focus lies on the way in which the probability of cooperation among players is affected by the degree of adversity facing the players. In our first model, cooperation consists of the production of a public good, and adversity is linked to the degree of complementarity of the players׳ efforts in producing the public good. In our second model, cooperation consists of the defense of a public, and/or a private good with by-product benefits, and adversity is measured by the number of random attacks (e.g., by a predator) facing the players. In both of these models, our analysis confirms the existence of the so-called boomerang effect, which states that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally defect in a situation of joint cooperation. Focusing on such an effect in isolation leads to the "common-enemy" hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity increases the probability of cooperation. Yet, we also find that a sucker effect may simultaneously exist, which says that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally cooperate in a situation of joint defection. Looked at in isolation, the sucker effect leads to the competing hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity decreases the probability of cooperation. Our analysis predicts circumstances in which the "common enemy" hypothesis prevails, and circumstances in which the competing hypothesis prevails.}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, issn = {{0022-5193}}, journal = {{Journal of Theoretical Biology}}, pages = {{82--97}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034}}, volume = {{393}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2688, author = {{Schiele, Valentin and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{59--69}}, title = {{{Quantile treatment effects of job loss on health}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.06.005}}, volume = {{49}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{3083, author = {{Herr, Annika and Nguyen, Thu-Van and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health Policy}}, number = {{10}}, pages = {{1162--1170}}, title = {{{Public reporting and the quality of care of German nursing homes}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.09.004 }}, volume = {{120}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2956, author = {{Göpffarth, Dirk and Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health economics}}, number = {{7}}, pages = {{801--815}}, title = {{{Determinants of regional variation in health expenditures in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3183}}, volume = {{25}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{15259, author = {{Decker, Simon and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, issn = {{0167-6296}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{156--170}}, title = {{{Health shocks and risk aversion}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.09.006}}, volume = {{156-170}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2815, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Naudé, Wim and Bilkic, Natascha}}, journal = {{The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance}}, pages = {{1--17}}, title = {{{Playing the Lottery or Dressing Up? A Model of Firm-Level Heterogeneity and the Decision to Export}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.qref.2015.02.010}}, volume = {{58}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2816, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua and Guo, Zhichao}}, journal = {{China Agricultural Economic Review}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{262--279}}, title = {{{Changes of China’s agri-food exports to Germany caused by its accession to WTO and the 2008 financial crisis}}}, doi = {{10.1108/CAER-11-2013-0152}}, volume = {{7}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{3295, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Palnau, Irene}}, journal = {{Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}}, number = {{ 4}}, pages = {{467 --478}}, title = {{{Sustaining Civil Peace: a configurational comparative analysis}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2015-0020}}, volume = {{21}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{3296, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel and Redlin, Margarete}}, journal = {{Oxford Economic Papers}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{83 -- 103}}, title = {{{Oppressive Governments, Dependence on the United States and Anti-American Terrorism}}}, doi = {{10.1093/oep/gpu038}}, volume = {{67}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{491, abstract = {{In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a locationin order to attract consumers. It is assumed standardly that consumers with the same favorite location fully agree on the ranking of all possible locations. To investigate the necessity of this questionable and restrictive assumption, we model heterogeneity in consumers’ distance perceptions by individual edge lengths of a given graph. A profile of location choices is called a “robust equilibrium” if it is a Nash equilibrium in several games which differ only by the consumers’ perceptions of distances. For a finite number of players and any distribution of consumers, we provide a full characterization of all robust equilibria and derive structural conditions for their existence. Furthermore, we discuss whether the classical observations of minimal differentiation and inefficiency are robust phenomena. Thereby, we find strong support for an old conjecture that in equilibrium firms form local clusters.}}, author = {{Buechel, Berno and Röhl, Nils}}, journal = {{European Journal of Operational Research}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{505--517}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Robust Equilibria in Location Games}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejor.2014.07.019}}, volume = {{240}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{5239, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Patient Gesundheitswesen – Mission 2030 Unsere gemeinsame Verantwortung die Zukunft zu gestalten}}, publisher = {{Quintessenz Verlags-GmbH}}, title = {{{Rationalisierung vs. Rationierung Ist die Rationierung unvermeidbar? }}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2957, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Westphal, Matthias}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{174--185}}, title = {{{Short-and medium-term effects of informal care provision on female caregivers’ health}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.03.002}}, volume = {{42}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2522, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}}, issn = {{0938-2259}}, journal = {{Economic Theory}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{529--554}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7}}, volume = {{57}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2819, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}}, journal = {{Journal of Population Economics}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{1165--1186}}, title = {{{Trade and fertility in the developing world: the impact of trade and trade structure}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00148-014-0508-x}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2842, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Dung, Ha Van}}, journal = {{Modern Economy}}, pages = {{878--894}}, title = {{{Household Savings and Productive Capital Formation in Rural Vietnam: Insurance vs. Social Network}}}, doi = {{10.4236/me.2014.58081}}, volume = {{5}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2709, abstract = {{This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer-side market transparency with endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique symmetric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market-structure effect. We show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market-structure effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes increasingly transparent. Consumer-side market transparency can therefore be socially excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand functions is the set of constant demand functions. }}, author = {{Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0932-4569}}, journal = {{Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{225--248}}, publisher = {{Mohr Siebeck}}, title = {{{Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency}}}, doi = {{10.1628/093245614x13895979380392}}, volume = {{170}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{1923, abstract = {{How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, issn = {{1024-2694}}, journal = {{Defence and Peace Economics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{644--664}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{Collective action and the common enemy effect}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10242694.2014.925676}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{5241, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Augurzky, B. and Roppel, U.}}, journal = {{RWI Position}}, title = {{{Kehrtwende in der Gesundheitspolitik - Unnötige Abkehr von einer erfolgreichen Reform zur Finanzierung der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung}}}, volume = {{59}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2959, author = {{Mayrhofer, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Journal of Population Economics}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{841--856}}, title = {{{Testing the relationship between income inequality and life expectancy: A simple correction for the aggregation effect when using aggregated data}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00148-013-0483-7}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2960, author = {{Keese, Matthias and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Review of Income and Wealth}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{525--541}}, title = {{{Broke, ill, and obese: is there an effect of household debt on health?}}}, doi = {{10.1111/roiw.12002}}, volume = {{60}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2958, author = {{Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, number = {{12}}, pages = {{1481--1492}}, title = {{{Regional variation in the utilisation of ambulatory services in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3001}}, volume = {{23}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{31817, author = {{Lück, Sonja}}, issn = {{03427064}}, journal = {{Die Betriebswirtschaft}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{269--282}}, title = {{{Forschung und Lehre: Freund oder Feind?}}}, volume = {{74}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2729, author = {{Dimant, Eugen and Krieger, Tim and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1465-6485}}, journal = {{German Economic Review}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{464--489}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{A Crook is a Crook … But is He Still a Crook Abroad? On the Effect of Immigration on Destination-Country Corruption}}}, doi = {{10.1111/geer.12064}}, volume = {{16}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{33087, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{0030-7653}}, journal = {{Oxford Economic Papers}}, keywords = {{Economics and Econometrics}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{83--103}}, publisher = {{Oxford University Press (OUP)}}, title = {{{Oppressive governments, dependence on the USA, and anti-American terrorism}}}, doi = {{10.1093/oep/gpu038}}, volume = {{67}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2543, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}}, issn = {{0165-1765}}, journal = {{Economics Letters}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{224--227}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013}}, volume = {{121}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2843, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Bilkic, Natascha and Carerras Painter, Ben}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{1 -- 45}}, title = {{{Unsustainable Sovereign Debt - Is the Euro Crisis only the Tip of the Iceberg?}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-013-0230-2}}, volume = {{10}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2844, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, journal = {{Oxford University Press}}, pages = {{293--323}}, title = {{{Global Asymmetries and their Implications for Climate and Industrial Policies, in: Pathways to Industrialization in the Twenty-First Century - New Challenges and Emerging Paradigms}}}, doi = {{10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199667857.001.0001}}, volume = {{ch. 11}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2845, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel}}, journal = {{Economics Letters }}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{321--324}}, title = {{{Do banking crises cause terrorism?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.009}}, volume = {{119}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2846, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, DAniel}}, journal = {{Journal of Peace Research}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{91 -- 104}}, title = {{{Causality Between Terrorism and Economic Growth}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022343312445650}}, volume = {{50}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2961, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{1240--1249}}, title = {{{Practice budgets and the patient mix of physicians-Evaluating the effects of remuneration system reforms on physician behaviour in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.09.013}}, volume = {{32}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{3084, author = {{Augurzky, Boris and Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{The European Journal of Health Economics}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{615--627}}, title = {{{What accounts for the regional differences in the utilisation of hospitals in Germany?}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10198-012-0407-6}}, volume = {{14}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2962, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Stroka, Magdalena A}}, journal = {{Labour Economics}}, pages = {{305--322}}, title = {{{Health and the double burden of full-time work and informal care provision—Evidence from administrative data}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2013.09.006}}, volume = {{24}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2519, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Martini, Jan Thomas}}, issn = {{0926-2644}}, journal = {{Group Decision and Negotiation}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{657--680}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Negotiating Transfer Prices}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{2521, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Krieger, Tim and Minter, Steffen}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{583--612}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3}}, volume = {{10}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{2949, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Bilkic, Natascha and Pilichowski, Margarethe}}, journal = {{Labour Economics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{706 -- 717}}, title = {{{Stay in school or start working?- The human capital investment decision under uncertainty and irreversibility}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2012.04.005}}, volume = {{19}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{2951, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel}}, journal = {{Defence and Peace Economics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{447 -- 470}}, title = {{{Economic performance and terrorist activity in Latin America}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10242694.2012.656945}}, volume = {{23}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{2952, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Prior, Ulrich and Sureth, Caren}}, journal = {{Journal of Public Economics Theory}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{521 -- 545}}, title = {{{A Tax Paradox for Investment Decisions under Uncertainty}}}, doi = {{10.1111/j.1467-9779.2012.01547.x}}, volume = {{14}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{5243, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Augurzky, B. and Beivers, A.}}, journal = {{Krankenhaus-Report 2012}}, publisher = {{Schattauer}}, title = {{{Regionale Unterschiede in der stationären Versorgung: Das ländliche Krankenhaus im Fokus}}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{3075, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Applied Economics}}, number = {{34}}, pages = {{4455--4468}}, title = {{{More health care utilization with more insurance coverage? Evidence from a latent class model with German data}}}, doi = {{10.1080/00036846.2011.591733}}, volume = {{44}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{31821, author = {{Blum, Mareike and Kraft, Manfred and Lück, Sonja}}, issn = {{1860-3025}}, journal = {{Hochschulmanagement}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{34--41}}, title = {{{Zufriedenheit der Studierenden mit den Serviceeinrichtungen einer Universität: Ergebnisse einer explorativen multivariaten Analyse}}}, volume = {{7}}, year = {{2012}}, }