[{"publication_status":"epub_ahead","date_created":"2020-03-09T12:35:49Z","status":"public","publication":"Labour Economics","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"author":[{"last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447","first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta"},{"full_name":"van Huizen, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas","last_name":"van Huizen"},{"last_name":"Keijzer","full_name":"Keijzer, Linda ","first_name":"Linda "},{"last_name":"Rezaei","first_name":"Sarah ","full_name":"Rezaei, Sarah "},{"first_name":"Stephanie","full_name":"Rosenkranz, Stephanie","last_name":"Rosenkranz"},{"first_name":"Bastian ","full_name":"Westbrock, Bastian ","last_name":"Westbrock"}],"title":"Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field","user_id":"42447","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting\r\nand tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose,\r\nwe administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university\r\ncourse. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus\r\nquestions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme\r\nfor these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly)\r\nvaried the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on\r\naverage, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However,\r\nthe results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the\r\nquestions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the\r\nquestions are difficult."}],"citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_van Huizen_Keijzer_Rezaei_Rosenkranz_Westbrock_2020, title={Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}, DOI={10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815}, journal={Labour Economics}, author={Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezaei, Sarah and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian }, year={2020} }","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, et al. “Gender, Competitiveness, and Task Difficulty: Evidence from the Field.” Labour Economics, 2020, doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815.","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, Thomas van Huizen, Linda Keijzer, Sarah Rezaei, Stephanie Rosenkranz, and Bastian Westbrock. “Gender, Competitiveness, and Task Difficulty: Evidence from the Field.” Labour Economics, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815.","apa":"Hoyer, B., van Huizen, T., Keijzer, L., Rezaei, S., Rosenkranz, S., & Westbrock, B. (2020). Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field. Labour Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815","ama":"Hoyer B, van Huizen T, Keijzer L, Rezaei S, Rosenkranz S, Westbrock B. Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field. Labour Economics. 2020. doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815","ieee":"B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, S. Rezaei, S. Rosenkranz, and B. Westbrock, “Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field,” Labour Economics, 2020.","short":"B. Hoyer, T. van Huizen, L. Keijzer, S. Rezaei, S. Rosenkranz, B. Westbrock, Labour Economics (2020)."},"year":"2020","type":"journal_article","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:47Z","_id":"16273"},{"abstract":[{"text":"We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.","lang":"eng"}],"article_type":"original","user_id":"42447","publication":"Games and Economic Behavior","author":[{"full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta","id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer"},{"first_name":"Nadja","full_name":"Stroh-Maraun, Nadja","last_name":"Stroh-Maraun","id":"13264"}],"volume":121,"date_created":"2020-03-24T08:05:53Z","status":"public","intvolume":" 121","_id":"16334","page":"453 - 481","citation":{"ieee":"B. Hoyer and N. Stroh-Maraun, “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 121, pp. 453–481, 2020.","short":"B. Hoyer, N. Stroh-Maraun, Games and Economic Behavior 121 (2020) 453–481.","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse.” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 121, 2020, pp. 453–81, doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006.","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Stroh-Maraun_2020, title={Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}, volume={121}, DOI={10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}, journal={Games and Economic Behavior}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}, year={2020}, pages={453–481} }","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Stroh-Maraun, N. (2020). Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Games and Economic Behavior, 121, 453–481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006","ama":"Hoyer B, Stroh-Maraun N. Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse. Games and Economic Behavior. 2020;121:453-481. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Nadja Stroh-Maraun. “Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse.” Games and Economic Behavior 121 (2020): 453–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2020","title":"Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"368"}],"publication_status":"published","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:52:49Z","doi":"10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006","language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"department":[{"_id":"281"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["1057-9230","1099-1050"]},"title":"Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-03-10T14:28:41Z","doi":"10.1002/hec.4018","publisher":"Wiley","author":[{"last_name":"Schmitz","id":"48879","first_name":"Hendrik","full_name":"Schmitz, Hendrik"},{"last_name":"Stroka‐Wetsch","full_name":"Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.","first_name":"Magdalena A."}],"keyword":["Health Policy"],"publication":"Health Economics","volume":29,"status":"public","date_created":"2022-03-10T14:27:58Z","user_id":"53779","type":"journal_article","year":"2020","citation":{"short":"H. Schmitz, M.A. Stroka‐Wetsch, Health Economics 29 (2020) 766–777.","ieee":"H. Schmitz and M. A. Stroka‐Wetsch, “Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?,” Health Economics, vol. 29, no. 7, pp. 766–777, 2020, doi: 10.1002/hec.4018.","apa":"Schmitz, H., & Stroka‐Wetsch, M. A. (2020). Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter? Health Economics, 29(7), 766–777. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4018","ama":"Schmitz H, Stroka‐Wetsch MA. Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter? Health Economics. 2020;29(7):766-777. doi:10.1002/hec.4018","chicago":"Schmitz, Hendrik, and Magdalena A. Stroka‐Wetsch. “Determinants of Nursing Home Choice: Does Reported Quality Matter?” Health Economics 29, no. 7 (2020): 766–77. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4018.","bibtex":"@article{Schmitz_Stroka‐Wetsch_2020, title={Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?}, volume={29}, DOI={10.1002/hec.4018}, number={7}, journal={Health Economics}, publisher={Wiley}, author={Schmitz, Hendrik and Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.}, year={2020}, pages={766–777} }","mla":"Schmitz, Hendrik, and Magdalena A. Stroka‐Wetsch. “Determinants of Nursing Home Choice: Does Reported Quality Matter?” Health Economics, vol. 29, no. 7, Wiley, 2020, pp. 766–77, doi:10.1002/hec.4018."},"page":"766-777","intvolume":" 29","_id":"30234","issue":"7"},{"doi":"10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521","date_updated":"2022-06-08T10:08:11Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test","publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0025-1909","1526-5501"]},"department":[{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"281"},{"_id":"475"}],"issue":"6","intvolume":" 66","_id":"31802","page":"2677-2685","year":"2020","citation":{"short":"S. Lück, B. Balsmeier, F. Seliger, L. Fleming, Management Science 66 (2020) 2677–2685.","ieee":"S. Lück, B. Balsmeier, F. Seliger, and L. Fleming, “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test,” Management Science, vol. 66, no. 6, pp. 2677–2685, 2020, doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521.","apa":"Lück, S., Balsmeier, B., Seliger, F., & Fleming, L. (2020). Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test. Management Science, 66(6), 2677–2685. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521","ama":"Lück S, Balsmeier B, Seliger F, Fleming L. Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test. Management Science. 2020;66(6):2677-2685. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521","chicago":"Lück, Sonja, Benjamin Balsmeier, Florian Seliger, and Lee Fleming. “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test.” Management Science 66, no. 6 (2020): 2677–85. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521.","bibtex":"@article{Lück_Balsmeier_Seliger_Fleming_2020, title={Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test}, volume={66}, DOI={10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521}, number={6}, journal={Management Science}, publisher={Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}, author={Lück, Sonja and Balsmeier, Benjamin and Seliger, Florian and Fleming, Lee}, year={2020}, pages={2677–2685} }","mla":"Lück, Sonja, et al. “Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test.” Management Science, vol. 66, no. 6, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2020, pp. 2677–85, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521."},"type":"journal_article","user_id":"950","abstract":[{"text":" Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. ","lang":"eng"}],"volume":66,"date_created":"2022-06-08T08:29:59Z","status":"public","keyword":["Management Science and Operations Research","Strategy and Management"],"publication":"Management Science","publisher":"Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)","author":[{"first_name":"Sonja","orcid":"0000-0003-0380-1965","full_name":"Lück, Sonja","last_name":"Lück","id":"950"},{"last_name":"Balsmeier","first_name":"Benjamin","full_name":"Balsmeier, Benjamin"},{"last_name":"Seliger","full_name":"Seliger, Florian","first_name":"Florian"},{"last_name":"Fleming","full_name":"Fleming, Lee","first_name":"Lee"}]},{"user_id":"477","status":"public","date_created":"2022-11-19T15:44:21Z","volume":37,"author":[{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","id":"20801","last_name":"Haake"},{"last_name":"Trockel","first_name":"Walter","full_name":"Trockel, Walter"}],"publisher":"Springer Science and Business Media LLC","publication":"Homo Oeconomicus","keyword":["Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering","Environmental Engineering"],"issue":"1-2","intvolume":" 37","_id":"34115","citation":{"short":"C.-J. Haake, W. Trockel, Homo Oeconomicus 37 (2020) 1–6.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and W. Trockel, “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining,’” Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 37, no. 1–2, pp. 1–6, 2020, doi: 10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.","ama":"Haake C-J, Trockel W. Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining.” Homo Oeconomicus. 2020;37(1-2):1-6. doi:10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x","apa":"Haake, C.-J., & Trockel, W. (2020). Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining.” Homo Oeconomicus, 37(1–2), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining.’” Homo Oeconomicus 37, no. 1–2 (2020): 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Walter Trockel. “Introduction to the Special Issue ‘Bargaining.’” Homo Oeconomicus, vol. 37, no. 1–2, Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2020, pp. 1–6, doi:10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x.","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Trockel_2020, title={Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”}, volume={37}, DOI={10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x}, number={1–2}, journal={Homo Oeconomicus}, publisher={Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}, year={2020}, pages={1–6} }"},"type":"journal_article","year":"2020","page":"1-6","title":"Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901: SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A3: SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - A: SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["0943-0180","2366-6161"]},"publication_status":"published","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"doi":"10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x","date_updated":"2022-11-30T13:29:13Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}]},{"date_created":"2020-07-01T07:50:45Z","status":"public","volume":177,"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","author":[{"full_name":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard","first_name":"Burkhard","id":"37339","last_name":"Hehenkamp"},{"first_name":"Odvar M. ","full_name":"Kaarbøe, Odvar M. ","last_name":"Kaarbøe"}],"user_id":"37339","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget."}],"article_type":"original","page":"641-660","type":"journal_article","year":"2020","citation":{"ieee":"B. Hehenkamp and O. M. Kaarbøe, “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 177, pp. 641–660, doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026.","short":"B. Hehenkamp, O.M. Kaarbøe, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 177 (n.d.) 641–660.","mla":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Odvar M. Kaarbøe. “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 177, pp. 641–60, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026.","bibtex":"@article{Hehenkamp_Kaarbøe, title={Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}, volume={177}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }, pages={641–660} }","chicago":"Hehenkamp, Burkhard, and Odvar M. Kaarbøe. “Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 177 (n.d.): 641–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026.","ama":"Hehenkamp B, Kaarbøe OM. Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 177:641-660. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026","apa":"Hehenkamp, B., & Kaarbøe, O. M. (n.d.). Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 177, 641–660. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026"},"intvolume":" 177","_id":"17350","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"publication_identifier":{"unknown":["0167-2681"]},"publication_status":"accepted","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026","date_updated":"2022-01-29T17:04:14Z"},{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1","oa":"1","date_updated":"2022-08-23T08:25:03Z","publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["1612-4804","1612-4812"]},"department":[{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"202"}],"title":"Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity","year":"2020","type":"journal_article","citation":{"mla":"Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Trade and Economic Development: Global Causality and Development- and Openness-Related Heterogeneity.” International Economics and Economic Policy, vol. 17, 2020, pp. 923–44, doi:10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Redlin_2020, title={Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity}, volume={17}, DOI={10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1}, journal={International Economics and Economic Policy}, author={Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}, year={2020}, pages={923–944} }","apa":"Gries, T., & Redlin, M. (2020). Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity. International Economics and Economic Policy, 17, 923–944. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1","ama":"Gries T, Redlin M. Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity. International Economics and Economic Policy. 2020;17:923-944. doi:10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Trade and Economic Development: Global Causality and Development- and Openness-Related Heterogeneity.” International Economics and Economic Policy 17 (2020): 923–44. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1.","ieee":"T. Gries and M. Redlin, “Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity,” International Economics and Economic Policy, vol. 17, pp. 923–944, 2020, doi: 10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1.","short":"T. Gries, M. Redlin, International Economics and Economic Policy 17 (2020) 923–944."},"page":"923-944","main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1"}],"intvolume":" 17","_id":"17086","volume":17,"status":"public","date_created":"2020-06-08T07:05:43Z","author":[{"id":"186","last_name":"Gries","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas"},{"last_name":"Redlin","id":"135","first_name":"Margarete","full_name":"Redlin, Margarete"}],"publication":"International Economics and Economic Policy","user_id":"135","article_type":"original"},{"citation":{"chicago":"Gries, Thomas, Stefan Jungblut, Tim Krieger, and Henning Meyer. “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a Theoretical Model with Heterogeneous Labor and Biased Technical Change.” German Economic Review 20, no. 2 (2019): 129–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12140.","ama":"Gries T, Jungblut S, Krieger T, Meyer H. Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change. German Economic Review. 2019;20(2):129-170. doi:10.1111/geer.12140","apa":"Gries, T., Jungblut, S., Krieger, T., & Meyer, H. (2019). Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change. German Economic Review, 20(2), 129–170. https://doi.org/10.1111/geer.12140","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Jungblut_Krieger_Meyer_2019, title={Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change}, volume={20}, DOI={10.1111/geer.12140}, number={2}, journal={German Economic Review}, author={Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Krieger, Tim and Meyer, Henning}, year={2019}, pages={129–170} }","mla":"Gries, Thomas, et al. “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a Theoretical Model with Heterogeneous Labor and Biased Technical Change.” German Economic Review, vol. 20, no. 2, 2019, pp. 129–70, doi:10.1111/geer.12140.","short":"T. Gries, S. Jungblut, T. Krieger, H. Meyer, German Economic Review 20 (2019) 129–170.","ieee":"T. Gries, S. Jungblut, T. Krieger, and H. Meyer, “Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change,” German Economic Review, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 129–170, 2019."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2019","page":"129-170","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1111/geer.12140","issue":"2","_id":"2808","intvolume":" 20","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:51Z","volume":20,"status":"public","date_created":"2018-05-18T10:27:14Z","author":[{"id":"186","last_name":"Gries","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas"},{"last_name":"Jungblut","first_name":"Stefan","full_name":"Jungblut, Stefan"},{"full_name":"Krieger, Tim","first_name":"Tim","last_name":"Krieger"},{"first_name":"Henning","full_name":"Meyer, Henning","last_name":"Meyer"}],"publication":"German Economic Review","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"title":"Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change","user_id":"186"},{"intvolume":" 26","_id":"1139","issue":"1","main_file_link":[{"url":"http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141"}],"type":"journal_article","citation":{"apa":"Kaimann, D., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters, 26(1), 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","ama":"Kaimann D, Hoyer B. Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market. Applied Economics Letters. 2019;26(1):54-57. doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","chicago":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters 26, no. 1 (2019): 54–57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.","mla":"Kaimann, Daniel, and Britta Hoyer. “Price Competition and the Bertrand Model: The Paradox of the German Mobile Discount Market.” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, Taylor and Francis Online, 2019, pp. 54–57, doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141.","bibtex":"@article{Kaimann_Hoyer_2019, title={Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}, volume={26}, DOI={10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}, number={1}, journal={Applied Economics Letters}, publisher={Taylor and Francis Online}, author={Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={54–57} }","short":"D. Kaimann, B. Hoyer, Applied Economics Letters 26 (2019) 54–57.","ieee":"D. Kaimann and B. Hoyer, “Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market,” Applied Economics Letters, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 54–57, 2019."},"year":"2019","page":"54-57","abstract":[{"text":"We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.","lang":"eng"}],"user_id":"18949","ddc":["000"],"file":[{"file_name":"KaimannHoyer.pdf","date_created":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","access_level":"closed","file_id":"5307","creator":"ups","file_size":625230,"success":1,"relation":"main_file","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z"}],"author":[{"first_name":"Daniel","full_name":"Kaimann, Daniel","last_name":"Kaimann","id":"18949"},{"first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447"}],"publisher":"Taylor and Francis Online","publication":"Applied Economics Letters","file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:35:29Z","has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2018-01-31T08:34:35Z","volume":26,"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:51:00Z","doi":"10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"183"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4","_id":"8"},{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"}],"publication_status":"epub_ahead"},{"date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:55:36Z","doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"title":"The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"publication_status":"published","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"intvolume":" 162","_id":"2256","main_file_link":[{"url":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268119300824"}],"year":"2019","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Haller_2019, title={The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption}, volume={162}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}, year={2019}, pages={146–163} }","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, 2019, pp. 146–63, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.","ama":"Hoyer B, Haller H. The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2019;162:146-163. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Haller, H. (2019). The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 162, 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Hans Haller. “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019): 146–63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011.","ieee":"B. Hoyer and H. Haller, “The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 162, pp. 146–163, 2019.","short":"B. Hoyer, H. Haller, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 162 (2019) 146–163."},"type":"journal_article","page":"146-163","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Social psychology studies the \"common enemy effect\", the phenomenon\r\nthat members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario\r\nis the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider\r\nappears who aims to disrupt the information \r\nflow within the network\r\nby deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds\r\nto this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous\r\nconnections model of strategic network formation, with two-way \r\nflow of\r\ninformation and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage\r\ncosts, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive\r\ncommon enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage\r\ncosts, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient\r\nin the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi\fcient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy\r\neffect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the\r\nempty network are Nash for certain cost ranges."}],"user_id":"477","author":[{"id":"42447","last_name":"Hoyer","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","first_name":"Britta"},{"first_name":"Hans","full_name":"Haller, Hans","last_name":"Haller"}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization","volume":162,"status":"public","date_created":"2018-04-06T07:59:01Z"}]