[{"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:49Z","project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A3"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subprojekt A4","_id":"8"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"}],"publication_status":"epub_ahead","department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"179"},{"_id":"204"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?","citation":{"bibtex":"@article{Endres_Recker_Mir Djawadi_Hoyer_2019, title={Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}, volume={157}, DOI={10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}, journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }, author={Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}, year={2019}, pages={708–734} }","mla":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, et al. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, 2019, pp. 708–34, doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.","apa":"Endres, A. E., Recker, S., Mir Djawadi, B., & Hoyer, B. (2019). Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 157, 708–734. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","ama":"Endres AE, Recker S, Mir Djawadi B, Hoyer B. Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization . 2019;157:708-734. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004","chicago":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede, Sonja Recker, Behnud Mir Djawadi, and Britta Hoyer. “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are Equilibrium Networks Too Complex?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019): 708–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004.","ieee":"A. E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, and B. Hoyer, “Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , vol. 157, pp. 708–734, 2019.","short":"A.E. Endres, S. Recker, B. Mir Djawadi, B. Hoyer, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 157 (2019) 708–734."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2019","page":"708-734","intvolume":" 157","_id":"80","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2017-10-17T12:41:07Z","volume":157,"file":[{"date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","content_type":"application/pdf","relation":"main_file","file_size":1569991,"file_id":"5723","creator":"bhoyer","access_level":"closed","date_created":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","file_name":"Publication Jebo.pdf"}],"author":[{"id":"48794","last_name":"Endres","full_name":"Endres, Angelika Elfriede","first_name":"Angelika Elfriede"},{"full_name":"Recker, Sonja","first_name":"Sonja","last_name":"Recker"},{"id":"26032","last_name":"Mir Djawadi","orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912","full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud","first_name":"Behnud"},{"first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447"}],"publication":"Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ","file_date_updated":"2018-11-19T07:39:42Z","user_id":"42447","ddc":["330"],"article_type":"original","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":"Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.\r\n\r\nWe find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013)."}]},{"doi":"10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021","intvolume":" 181","_id":"9920","date_updated":"2019-05-31T08:18:38Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"page":"47-50","type":"journal_article","citation":{"ieee":"M. Fritz, T. Gries, and Y. Feng, “Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?,” Economics Letters, vol. 181, pp. 47–50, 2019.","short":"M. Fritz, T. Gries, Y. Feng, Economics Letters 181 (2019) 47–50.","bibtex":"@article{Fritz_Gries_Feng_2019, title={Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?}, volume={181}, DOI={10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021}, journal={Economics Letters}, author={Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua}, year={2019}, pages={47–50} }","mla":"Fritz, Marlon, et al. “Secular Stagnation? Is There Statistical Evidence of an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?” Economics Letters, vol. 181, 2019, pp. 47–50, doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021.","chicago":"Fritz, Marlon, Thomas Gries, and Yuanhua Feng. “Secular Stagnation? Is There Statistical Evidence of an Unprecedented, Systematic Decline in Growth?” Economics Letters 181 (2019): 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021.","apa":"Fritz, M., Gries, T., & Feng, Y. (2019). Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters, 181, 47–50. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021","ama":"Fritz M, Gries T, Feng Y. Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? Economics Letters. 2019;181:47-50. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021"},"year":"2019","user_id":"186","title":"Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?","date_created":"2019-05-23T07:55:48Z","status":"public","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0165-1765"]},"volume":181,"publication_status":"published","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"publication":"Economics Letters","author":[{"first_name":"Marlon","full_name":"Fritz, Marlon","last_name":"Fritz"},{"full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas","id":"186","last_name":"Gries"},{"last_name":"Feng","full_name":"Feng, Yuanhua","first_name":"Yuanhua"}]},{"user_id":"186","title":"Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"publication":"Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics","author":[{"first_name":"Thomas","full_name":"Gries, Thomas","last_name":"Gries","id":"186"},{"last_name":"Fritz","full_name":"Fritz, Marlon","first_name":"Marlon"},{"full_name":"Yuanhua, Feng","first_name":"Feng","last_name":"Yuanhua"}],"date_created":"2019-01-15T11:16:38Z","status":"public","volume":81,"_id":"6734","intvolume":" 81","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:03:17Z","issue":"1","doi":"10.1111/obes.12267","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"page":"62-78","citation":{"mla":"Gries, Thomas, et al. “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, 2019, pp. 62–78, doi:10.1111/obes.12267.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Fritz_Yuanhua_2019, title={Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics}, volume={81}, DOI={10.1111/obes.12267}, number={1}, journal={Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}, author={Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Yuanhua, Feng}, year={2019}, pages={62–78} }","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, Marlon Fritz, and Feng Yuanhua. “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 81, no. 1 (2019): 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267.","ama":"Gries T, Fritz M, Yuanhua F. Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 2019;81(1):62-78. doi:10.1111/obes.12267","apa":"Gries, T., Fritz, M., & Yuanhua, F. (2019). Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 81(1), 62–78. https://doi.org/10.1111/obes.12267","ieee":"T. Gries, M. Fritz, and F. Yuanhua, “Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 62–78, 2019.","short":"T. Gries, M. Fritz, F. Yuanhua, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 81 (2019) 62–78."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2019"},{"doi":"10.1177/0569434519846477","article_number":"056943451984647","_id":"10090","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:50:28Z","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"type":"journal_article","year":"2019","citation":{"ieee":"T. Gries, “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea,” The American Economist, 2019.","short":"T. Gries, The American Economist (2019).","mla":"Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.” The American Economist, 056943451984647, 2019, doi:10.1177/0569434519846477.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_2019, title={A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea}, DOI={10.1177/0569434519846477}, number={056943451984647}, journal={The American Economist}, author={Gries, Thomas}, year={2019} }","chicago":"Gries, Thomas. “A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea.” The American Economist, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477.","ama":"Gries T. A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea. The American Economist. 2019. doi:10.1177/0569434519846477","apa":"Gries, T. (2019). A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea. The American Economist. https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434519846477"},"user_id":"186","title":"A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea","date_created":"2019-06-03T07:46:47Z","status":"public","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0569-4345","2328-1235"]},"publication_status":"published","publication":"The American Economist","department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"author":[{"full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas","id":"186","last_name":"Gries"}]},{"publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"issn":["0022-4367","1539-6975"]},"volume":86,"status":"public","date_created":"2019-11-21T11:57:56Z","author":[{"last_name":"Bünnings","first_name":"Christian","full_name":"Bünnings, Christian"},{"last_name":"Schmitz","id":"48879","first_name":"Hendrik","full_name":"Schmitz, Hendrik"},{"full_name":"Tauchmann, Harald","first_name":"Harald","last_name":"Tauchmann"},{"full_name":"Ziebarth, Nicolas R.","first_name":"Nicolas R.","last_name":"Ziebarth"}],"publication":"Journal of Risk and Insurance","department":[{"_id":"281"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":"The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice","user_id":"53779","citation":{"apa":"Bünnings, C., Schmitz, H., Tauchmann, H., & Ziebarth, N. R. (2019). The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 86(2), 415–449. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12219","ama":"Bünnings C, Schmitz H, Tauchmann H, Ziebarth NR. The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice. Journal of Risk and Insurance. 2019;86(2):415-449. doi:10.1111/jori.12219","chicago":"Bünnings, Christian, Hendrik Schmitz, Harald Tauchmann, and Nicolas R. Ziebarth. “The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 86, no. 2 (2019): 415–49. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12219.","bibtex":"@article{Bünnings_Schmitz_Tauchmann_Ziebarth_2019, title={The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice}, volume={86}, DOI={10.1111/jori.12219}, number={2}, journal={Journal of Risk and Insurance}, author={Bünnings, Christian and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}, year={2019}, pages={415–449} }","mla":"Bünnings, Christian, et al. “The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice.” Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 86, no. 2, 2019, pp. 415–49, doi:10.1111/jori.12219.","short":"C. Bünnings, H. Schmitz, H. Tauchmann, N.R. Ziebarth, Journal of Risk and Insurance 86 (2019) 415–449.","ieee":"C. Bünnings, H. Schmitz, H. Tauchmann, and N. R. Ziebarth, “The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice,” Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 86, no. 2, pp. 415–449, 2019, doi: 10.1111/jori.12219."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2019","page":"415-449","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"doi":"10.1111/jori.12219","issue":"2","_id":"15075","intvolume":" 86","date_updated":"2022-03-10T13:53:25Z"},{"department":[{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"202"}],"publication_identifier":{"issn":["1024-2694","1476-8267"]},"publication_status":"published","title":"Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-08-23T08:25:22Z","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797","author":[{"last_name":"Gries","id":"186","first_name":"Thomas","full_name":"Gries, Thomas"},{"full_name":"Redlin, Margarete","first_name":"Margarete","id":"135","last_name":"Redlin"}],"publisher":"Informa UK Limited","publication":"Defence and Peace Economics","status":"public","date_created":"2018-05-11T10:11:46Z","volume":30,"user_id":"135","type":"journal_article","citation":{"short":"T. Gries, M. Redlin, Defence and Peace Economics 30 (2019) 309–323.","ieee":"T. Gries and M. Redlin, “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy,” Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 309–323, 2019, doi: 10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.","apa":"Gries, T., & Redlin, M. (2019). Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy. Defence and Peace Economics, 30(3), 309–323. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797","ama":"Gries T, Redlin M. Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy. Defence and Peace Economics. 2019;30(3):309-323. doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.” Defence and Peace Economics 30, no. 3 (2019): 309–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.","mla":"Gries, Thomas, and Margarete Redlin. “Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy.” Defence and Peace Economics, vol. 30, no. 3, Informa UK Limited, 2019, pp. 309–23, doi:10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Redlin_2019, title={Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy}, volume={30}, DOI={10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797}, number={3}, journal={Defence and Peace Economics}, publisher={Informa UK Limited}, author={Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}, year={2019}, pages={309–323} }"},"year":"2019","page":"309-323","intvolume":" 30","_id":"2727","issue":"3"},{"citation":{"mla":"Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development, vol. 30, no. 3, 2018, pp. 493–506, doi:10.1002/jid.3104.","bibtex":"@article{Gries_Grundmann_2018, title={Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries}, volume={30}, DOI={10.1002/jid.3104}, number={3}, journal={Journal of International Development}, author={Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}, year={2018}, pages={493–506} }","chicago":"Gries, Thomas, and Rainer Grundmann. “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries.” Journal of International Development 30, no. 3 (2018): 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104.","ama":"Gries T, Grundmann R. Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development. 2018;30(3):493-506. doi:10.1002/jid.3104","apa":"Gries, T., & Grundmann, R. (2018). Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries. Journal of International Development, 30(3), 493–506. https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3104","ieee":"T. Gries and R. Grundmann, “Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries,” Journal of International Development, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 493–506, 2018.","short":"T. Gries, R. Grundmann, Journal of International Development 30 (2018) 493–506."},"type":"journal_article","year":"2018","page":"493-506","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"2814","date_updated":"2022-01-06T06:57:52Z","intvolume":" 30","doi":"10.1002/jid.3104","issue":"3","author":[{"full_name":"Gries, Thomas","first_name":"Thomas","id":"186","last_name":"Gries"},{"full_name":"Grundmann, Rainer","first_name":"Rainer","last_name":"Grundmann"}],"department":[{"_id":"19"},{"_id":"200"},{"_id":"475"},{"_id":"202"}],"publication":"Journal of International Development","volume":30,"status":"public","date_created":"2018-05-18T11:05:19Z","title":"Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries","user_id":"186"},{"year":"2018","citation":{"ama":"Haake C-J, Recker S. The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation. 2018;27(6):905-932. doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","apa":"Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information. Group Decision and Negotiation, 27(6), 905–932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","chicago":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision and Negotiation 27, no. 6 (2018): 905–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.","bibtex":"@article{Haake_Recker_2018, title={The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}, volume={27}, DOI={10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8}, number={6}, journal={Group Decision and Negotiation}, publisher={Springer}, author={Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018}, pages={905–932} }","mla":"Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Sonja Recker. “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information.” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, Springer, 2018, pp. 905–32, doi:10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8.","short":"C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, Group Decision and Negotiation 27 (2018) 905–932.","ieee":"C.-J. Haake and S. Recker, “The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information,” Group Decision and Negotiation, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 905–932, 2018."},"type":"journal_article","page":"905-932","intvolume":" 27","_id":"4564","issue":"6","file":[{"relation":"main_file","success":1,"date_updated":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","content_type":"application/pdf","creator":"stela","file_id":"5107","file_size":636521,"access_level":"closed","file_name":"The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations Under Incomplete Information.pdf","date_created":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z"}],"quality_controlled":"1","publisher":"Springer","author":[{"full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","first_name":"Claus-Jochen","id":"20801","last_name":"Haake"},{"first_name":"Sonja","full_name":"Recker, Sonja","last_name":"Recker"}],"publication":"Group Decision and Negotiation","file_date_updated":"2018-10-31T07:43:31Z","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","date_created":"2018-10-02T07:15:26Z","jel":["C78"],"volume":27,"article_type":"original","abstract":[{"lang":"eng","text":" In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to\r\n determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the\r\n upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)\r\n revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider\r\n cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means\r\n that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by\r\n mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive\r\n compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for\r\n buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is\r\n regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints\r\n are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining\r\n solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer\r\n quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to\r\n balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in\r\n place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by\r\n means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution\r\n for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with\r\n the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a\r\n tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.\r\n"}],"user_id":"477","ddc":["040"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:11Z","doi":"10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3","_id":"7"}],"publication_status":"published","title":"The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information"},{"year":"2018","citation":{"ieee":"B. Hoyer and S. Rosenkranz, “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment,” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 2018.","short":"B. Hoyer, S. Rosenkranz, Games 9 (2018).","bibtex":"@article{Hoyer_Rosenkranz_2018, title={ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}, volume={9}, number={489}, journal={Games}, publisher={MDPI}, author={Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}, year={2018} }","mla":"Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games, vol. 9, no. 4, 89, MDPI, 2018.","chicago":"Hoyer, Britta, and Stephanie Rosenkranz. “ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment.” Games 9, no. 4 (2018).","ama":"Hoyer B, Rosenkranz S. Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games. 2018;9(4).","apa":"Hoyer, B., & Rosenkranz, S. (2018). Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment. Games, 9(4)."},"type":"journal_article","main_file_link":[{"url":"http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/9/4/89/","open_access":"1"}],"article_number":"89","issue":"4","intvolume":" 9","_id":"4982","volume":9,"has_accepted_license":"1","status":"public","date_created":"2018-10-29T10:27:40Z","author":[{"first_name":"Britta","full_name":"Hoyer, Britta","last_name":"Hoyer","id":"42447"},{"last_name":"Rosenkranz","first_name":"Stephanie","full_name":"Rosenkranz, Stephanie"}],"publisher":"MDPI","file_date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","publication":"Games","file":[{"content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","success":1,"relation":"main_file","file_size":492018,"creator":"ups","file_id":"5296","access_level":"closed","date_created":"2018-11-02T15:15:21Z","file_name":"games-09-00089.pdf"}],"ddc":["000"],"user_id":"42447","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"oa":"1","date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:33Z","project":[{"name":"SFB 901","_id":"1"},{"_id":"2","name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A"},{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"}],"department":[{"_id":"280"},{"_id":"475"}],"title":" Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment"},{"funded_apc":"1","year":"2018","type":"journal_article","citation":{"ieee":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, and S. Recker, “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate,” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, 2018.","short":"B. Mir Djawadi, R. Fahr, C.-J. Haake, S. Recker, PLoS ONE 13 (2018).","mla":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, et al. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE, vol. 13, no. 11, e0207172, Public Library of Science, 2018, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.","bibtex":"@article{Mir Djawadi_Fahr_Haake_Recker_2018, title={Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}, volume={13}, DOI={10.1371/journal.pone.0207172}, number={11e0207172}, journal={PLoS ONE}, publisher={Public Library of Science}, author={Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}, year={2018} }","chicago":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud, Rene Fahr, Claus-Jochen Haake, and Sonja Recker. “Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation When Customer Feedback Is Inaccurate.” PLoS ONE 13, no. 11 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172.","ama":"Mir Djawadi B, Fahr R, Haake C-J, Recker S. Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE. 2018;13(11). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0207172","apa":"Mir Djawadi, B., Fahr, R., Haake, C.-J., & Recker, S. (2018). Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate. PLoS ONE, 13(11). https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0207172"},"intvolume":" 13","_id":"5330","issue":"11","article_number":"e0207172","file":[{"file_size":1107189,"file_id":"5542","creator":"cjhaake","content_type":"application/pdf","date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","relation":"main_file","success":1,"date_created":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","file_name":"Maintaining_vs_Milking.pdf","access_level":"closed"}],"file_date_updated":"2018-11-13T20:51:34Z","publication":"PLoS ONE","author":[{"first_name":"Behnud","full_name":"Mir Djawadi, Behnud","orcid":"0000-0002-6271-5912","last_name":"Mir Djawadi","id":"26032"},{"full_name":"Fahr, Rene","first_name":"Rene","id":"111","last_name":"Fahr"},{"first_name":"Claus-Jochen","full_name":"Haake, Claus-Jochen","last_name":"Haake","id":"20801"},{"last_name":"Recker","full_name":"Recker, Sonja","first_name":"Sonja"}],"publisher":"Public Library of Science","date_created":"2018-11-03T11:51:48Z","status":"public","has_accepted_license":"1","volume":13,"abstract":[{"text":"In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.\r\nTo prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to\r\nreduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this\r\nstudy we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries\r\nwhen customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,\r\na service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to\r\nevaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is\r\nnot able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous\r\nrating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three\r\nsales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality\r\ndecisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of\r\nreceiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service\r\nprovider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation\r\nbuilding process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental\r\ndesign we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates\r\nfrom optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation\r\nprofile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking\r\nstrategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price\r\nis high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then\r\nhigh quality is chosen until the price increases again.","lang":"eng"}],"article_type":"review","user_id":"477","ddc":["330"],"language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"date_updated":"2022-01-06T07:01:50Z","doi":"10.1371/journal.pone.0207172","department":[{"_id":"205"},{"_id":"475"}],"project":[{"_id":"7","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A3"},{"_id":"8","name":"SFB 901 - Subproject A4"},{"_id":"1","name":"SFB 901"},{"name":"SFB 901 - Project Area A","_id":"2"}],"publication_status":"published","publication_identifier":{"eissn":["1932-6203"]},"title":"Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate"}]