TY - JOUR
AB - We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying
the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981).
We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two
one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution
of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type
of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual
negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining
problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world
negotiations.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Upmann, Thorsten
AU - Duman, Papatya
ID - 30940
IS - 2
JF - Scandinavian Journal of Economics
KW - Labour market negotiations
KW - efficient bargains
KW - Nash bargaining solution
KW - sequential bargaining
KW - restricted bargaining games
TI - Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining
VL - 125
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We study the effect of unemployment on cognitive abilities among individuals aged between 50 and 65 in Europe. To this end, we exploit plant closures and use flexible event-study estimations together with an experimentally elicited measure of fluid intelligence, namely word recall. We find that, within a time period of around eight years after the event of unemployment, cognitive abilities only deteriorate marginally — the effects are insignificant both in statistical and economic terms. We do, however, find significant effects of late-career unemployment on the likelihood to leave the labor force, and short-term effects on mental health problems such as depression and sleep problems.
AU - Freise, Diana
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Westphal, Matthias
ID - 33458
JF - Journal of Health Economics
TI - Late-Career Unemployment and Cognitive Abilities
VL - 86
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Westphal, Matthias
AU - Kamhöfer, Daniel A.
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 30235
IS - 646
JF - Economic Journal
TI - Marginal College Wage Premium under Selection into Employment
VL - 132
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In this paper, we analyze the effect of light conditions on road accidents and estimate the long run consequences of different time regimes for road safety. Identification is based on variation in light conditions induced by differences in sunrise and sunset times across space and time. We estimate that darkness causes annual costs of more than £500 million in Great Britain. By setting daylight saving time year-round 8 percent of these costs could be saved. Thus, focusing solely on the short run costs related to the transition itself underestimates the total costs of the current time regime.
AU - Bünnings, Christian
AU - Schiele, Valentin
ID - 15073
IS - 1
JF - The Review of Economics and Statistics
SN - 0034-6535
TI - Spring Forward, Don't Fall Back: The Effect of Daylight Saving Time on Road Safety
VL - 103
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractIn this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Trockel, Walter
ID - 29152
JF - Review of Economic Design
SN - 1434-4742
TI - Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractUsing data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984–2018, we analyze the intergenerational education mobility of immigrants in Germany by identifying the determinants of differences in educational stocks for first- and second-generation immigrants in comparison to individuals without a migration background. Our results show that on average, first-generation immigrants have fewer years of schooling than native-born Germans and have a disproportionate share of lower educational qualifications. This gap is strongly driven by age at immigration, with immigration age and education revealing a nonlinear relationship. While the gap is relatively small among individuals who migrate at a young age, integrating in the school system at secondary school age leads to large disadvantages. Examining the educational mobility of immigrants in Germany, we identify an inter-generational catch-up in education. The gap in education between immigrants and natives is reduced for the second generation. Finally, we find that country of origin differences can account for much of the education gap. While immigrants with an ethnic background closer to the German language and culture show the best education outcomes, immigrants from Turkey, Italy, and other southern European countries and especially the group of war refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other MENA countries, have the lowest educational attainment.
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
AU - Zehra, Moonum
ID - 22715
JF - Journal of International Migration and Integration
SN - 1488-3473
TI - Educational Assimilation of First-Generation and Second-Generation Immigrants in Germany
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - AbstractUsing time series data for the period 1959–2015, our empirical analysis examines the simultaneous effects of the individual components of the global carbon budget on temperature. Specifically, we explore the possible effects of carbon emissions caused by fossil fuel combustion, cement production, land-use change emissions, and carbon sinks (here in terms of land sink and ocean sink) on climate change. The simultaneous inclusion of carbon emissions and carbon sinks allows us to look at the coexistent and opposing effects of the individual components of the carbon budget and thus provides a holistic perspective from which to explore the relationship between the global carbon budget and global warming. The results reveal a significant positive effect of carbon emissions on temperature for both fossil fuels emissions and emissions from land-use change, confirming previous results concerning carbon dioxide and temperature. Further, while ocean sink does not seem to have a significant effect, we identify a temperature-decreasing effect for land sink.
AU - Redlin, Margarete
AU - Gries, Thomas
ID - 23594
JF - Theoretical and Applied Climatology
SN - 0177-798X
TI - Anthropogenic climate change: the impact of the global carbon budget
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - I study a dynamic variant of the DixitâStiglitz (Am Econ Rev 67(3), 1977) model of monopolistic competition by introducing price stickiness à la Fershtman and Kamien (Econometrica 55(5), 1987). The analysis is restricted to bounded quantity and price paths that fulfill the necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash equilibrium. I show that there exists a symmetric steady state and that its stability depends on the degree of product differentiation. When moving from complements to perfect substitutes, the steady state is either a locally asymptotically unstable (spiral) source, a stable (spiral) sink or a saddle point. I further apply the Hopf bifurcation theorem and prove the existence of limit cycles, when passing from a stable to an unstable steady state. Lastly, I provide a numerical example and show that there exists a stable limit cycle.
AU - Hoof, Simon
ID - 45640
IS - 2
JF - Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
SN - 1573-2878
TI - Dynamic Monopolistic Competition
VL - 189
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Feng, Yuanhua
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Fritz, Marlon
ID - 17072
JF - Journal of Nonparametric Statistics
SN - 1048-5252
TI - Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic time series
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Grundmann, Rainer
ID - 17074
JF - Review of Development Economics
SN - 1363-6669
TI - Modern sector development: The role of exports and institutions in developing countries
ER -