TY - JOUR
AB - This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting
and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose,
we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university
course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus
questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme
for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly)
varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on
average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However,
the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the
questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the
questions are difficult.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - van Huizen, Thomas
AU - Keijzer, Linda
AU - Rezaei, Sarah
AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie
AU - Westbrock, Bastian
ID - 16273
JF - Labour Economics
TI - Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Stroh-Maraun, Nadja
ID - 16334
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
TI - Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse
VL - 121
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.
ID - 30234
IS - 7
JF - Health Economics
KW - Health Policy
SN - 1057-9230
TI - Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?
VL - 29
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
AU - Lück, Sonja
AU - Balsmeier, Benjamin
AU - Seliger, Florian
AU - Fleming, Lee
ID - 31802
IS - 6
JF - Management Science
KW - Management Science and Operations Research
KW - Strategy and Management
SN - 0025-1909
TI - Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test
VL - 66
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Trockel, Walter
ID - 34115
IS - 1-2
JF - Homo Oeconomicus
KW - Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
KW - Environmental Engineering
SN - 0943-0180
TI - Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”
VL - 37
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
AU - Kaarbøe, Odvar M.
ID - 17350
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
TI - Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets
VL - 177
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 17086
JF - International Economics and Economic Policy
SN - 1612-4804
TI - Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity
VL - 17
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Jungblut, Stefan
AU - Krieger, Tim
AU - Meyer, Henning
ID - 2808
IS - 2
JF - German Economic Review
TI - Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change
VL - 20
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.
AU - Kaimann, Daniel
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 1139
IS - 1
JF - Applied Economics Letters
TI - Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market
VL - 26
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon
that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario
is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider
appears who aims to disrupt the information
flow within the network
by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds
to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous
connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way
flow of
information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage
costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive
common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage
costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient
in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and inefficient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy
effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the
empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Haller, Hans
ID - 2256
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
TI - The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption
VL - 162
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed.
We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).
AU - Endres, Angelika Elfriede
AU - Recker, Sonja
AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 80
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
TI - Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?
VL - 157
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Fritz, Marlon
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Feng, Yuanhua
ID - 9920
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
TI - Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?
VL - 181
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Fritz, Marlon
AU - Yuanhua, Feng
ID - 6734
IS - 1
JF - Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics
TI - Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics
VL - 81
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
ID - 10090
JF - The American Economist
SN - 0569-4345
TI - A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Bünnings, Christian
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Tauchmann, Harald
AU - Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
ID - 15075
IS - 2
JF - Journal of Risk and Insurance
SN - 0022-4367
TI - The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice
VL - 86
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 2727
IS - 3
JF - Defence and Peace Economics
SN - 1024-2694
TI - Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy
VL - 30
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Grundmann, Rainer
ID - 2814
IS - 3
JF - Journal of International Development
TI - Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries
VL - 30
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to
determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the
upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's)
revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider
cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means
that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by
mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive
compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for
buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is
regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints
are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining
solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer
quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to
balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in
place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by
means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution
for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with
the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a
tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness.
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Recker, Sonja
ID - 4564
IS - 6
JF - Group Decision and Negotiation
TI - The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information
VL - 27
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie
ID - 4982
IS - 4
JF - Games
TI - Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment
VL - 9
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously.
To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to
reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this
study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries
when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model,
a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to
evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is
not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous
rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three
sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality
decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of
receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service
provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation
building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental
design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates
from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation
profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking
strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price
is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then
high quality is chosen until the price increases again.
AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud
AU - Fahr, Rene
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Recker, Sonja
ID - 5330
IS - 11
JF - PLoS ONE
TI - Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate
VL - 13
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).
AU - De Jaegher, Kris
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 1029
IS - 2
JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution
TI - Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves
VL - 63
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Kolodziej, Ingo WK
AU - Reichert, Arndt R
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 3081
IS - 4
JF - Health services research
TI - New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe
VL - 53
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
AU - Ugarte, Juliette Espinosa
ID - 2728
JF - Theoretical and Applied Climatology
SN - 0177-798X
TI - Human-induced climate change: the impact of land-use change
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - Drawing upon recent advances in machine learning and natural language processing, we introduce new tools that automatically ingest, parse, disambiguate, and build an updated database using U.S. patent data. The tools identify unique inventor, assignee, and location entities mentioned on each granted U.S. patent from 1976 to 2016. We describe data flow, algorithms, user interfaces, descriptive statistics, and a novelty measure based on the first appearance of a word in the patent corpus. We illustrate an automated coinventor network mapping tool and visualize trends in patenting over the last 40 years.
AU - Balsmeier, Benjamin
AU - Assaf, Mohamad
AU - Chesebro, Tyler
AU - Fierro, Gabe
AU - Johnson, Kevin
AU - Johnson, Scott
AU - Li, Guan‐Cheng
AU - Lück, Sonja
AU - O'Reagan, Doug
AU - Yeh, Bill
AU - Zang, Guangzheng
AU - Fleming, Lee
ID - 31807
IS - 3
JF - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
KW - Management of Technology and Innovation
KW - Strategy and Management
KW - Economics and Econometrics
KW - General Business
KW - Management and Accounting
KW - General Medicine
SN - 1058-6407
TI - Machine learning and natural language processing on the patent corpus: Data, tools, and new measures
VL - 27
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Fritz, Marlon
AU - Feng, Yuanhua
ID - 3070
IS - 2
JF - Review of Economics
TI - Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of Business Cycles in Spain
VL - 68
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Schiele, Valentin
ID - 5236
JF - Atlas of Science
TI - Sick already? Job loss makes it even worse
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition.
AU - Brosig-Koch, Janet
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
AU - Kokot, Johanna
ID - 1054
IS - 53
JF - Health Economics
TI - The effects of competition on medical service provision
VL - 26
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, T.
AU - Grundmann, R.
AU - Palnau, Irene
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 1372
IS - 2
JF - International Economics and Economic Policy
SN - 1612-4804
TI - Innovations, growth and participation in advanced economies - a review of major concepts and findings
VL - 14
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
ID - 15260
IS - 1
JF - Journal of Human Resources
SN - 0022-166X
TI - Does Price Framing Affect the Consumer Price Sensitivity of Health Plan Choice?
VL - 52
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Westphal, Matthias
ID - 2635
JF - Journal of Health Economics
TI - Informal Care and Long-term Labor Market Outcomes
VL - 56
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Büyükdurmus, Tugba
AU - Kopetsch, Thomas
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Tauchmann, Harald
ID - 3082
IS - 2
JF - Health Economics Review
TI - On the interdependence of ambulatory and hospital care in the German health system
VL - 7
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Grundmann, R.
AU - Palnau, Irene
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 1371
IS - 1
JF - International Economics and Economic Policy
SN - 1612-4804
TI - Technology diffusion, international integration and participation in developing economies - a review of major concepts and findings
VL - 15
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
ID - 2527
IS - 4
JF - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
SN - 1554-8597
TI - Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War
VL - 22
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Brangewitz, Sonja
AU - Brockhoff, Sarah
ID - 2540
JF - European Journal of Political Economy
SN - 0176-2680
TI - Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition
VL - 49
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Kraft, Manfred
AU - Simon, Manuel
ID - 2810
IS - 95
JF - Papers in Regional Science
TI - Explaining inter-provincial migration in China
VL - 4
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
ID - 2811
IS - 4
JF - Peace Economics and Peace Science
TI - Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War
VL - 22
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Jungblut, Stefan
AU - Naudé, Wim
ID - 2813
IS - 2
JF - International Journal of Economic Theory
TI - The Entrepreneurship Beveridge Curve
VL - 12
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Kamhöfer, Daniel A.
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 2687
IS - 5
JF - Journal of Applied Econometrics
SN - 0883-7252
TI - Reanalyzing Zero Returns to Education in Germany
VL - 31
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries.
AU - Brangewitz, Sonja
AU - Manegold, Jochen
ID - 211
IS - 6
JF - Theoretical Economics Letters
TI - Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly
VL - 6
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion.
AU - Hoyer, Britta
AU - De Jaegher, Kris
ID - 1919
IS - 5
JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory
SN - 1097-3923
TI - Strategic Network Disruption and Defense
VL - 18
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - We construct two-player two-strategy game-theoretic models of by-product mutualism, where our focus lies on the way in which the probability of cooperation among players is affected by the degree of adversity facing the players. In our first model, cooperation consists of the production of a public good, and adversity is linked to the degree of complementarity of the players׳ efforts in producing the public good. In our second model, cooperation consists of the defense of a public, and/or a private good with by-product benefits, and adversity is measured by the number of random attacks (e.g., by a predator) facing the players. In both of these models, our analysis confirms the existence of the so-called boomerang effect, which states that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally defect in a situation of joint cooperation. Focusing on such an effect in isolation leads to the "common-enemy" hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity increases the probability of cooperation. Yet, we also find that a sucker effect may simultaneously exist, which says that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally cooperate in a situation of joint defection. Looked at in isolation, the sucker effect leads to the competing hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity decreases the probability of cooperation. Our analysis predicts circumstances in which the "common enemy" hypothesis prevails, and circumstances in which the competing hypothesis prevails.
AU - De Jaegher, Kris
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 1922
JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology
SN - 0022-5193
TI - By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model
VL - 393
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schiele, Valentin
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 2688
JF - Journal of Health Economics
TI - Quantile treatment effects of job loss on health
VL - 49
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Herr, Annika
AU - Nguyen, Thu-Van
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 3083
IS - 10
JF - Health Policy
TI - Public reporting and the quality of care of German nursing homes
VL - 120
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Göpffarth, Dirk
AU - Kopetsch, Thomas
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 2956
IS - 7
JF - Health economics
TI - Determinants of regional variation in health expenditures in Germany
VL - 25
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Decker, Simon
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 15259
JF - Journal of Health Economics
SN - 0167-6296
TI - Health shocks and risk aversion
VL - 156-170
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Naudé, Wim
AU - Bilkic, Natascha
ID - 2815
JF - The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
TI - Playing the Lottery or Dressing Up? A Model of Firm-Level Heterogeneity and the Decision to Export
VL - 58
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Feng, Yuanhua
AU - Guo, Zhichao
ID - 2816
IS - 2
JF - China Agricultural Economic Review
TI - Changes of China’s agri-food exports to Germany caused by its accession to WTO and the 2008 financial crisis
VL - 7
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Palnau, Irene
ID - 3295
IS - 4
JF - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
TI - Sustaining Civil Peace: a configurational comparative analysis
VL - 21
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Meierrieks, Daniel
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 3296
IS - 1
JF - Oxford Economic Papers
TI - Oppressive Governments, Dependence on the United States and Anti-American Terrorism
VL - 67
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a locationin order to attract consumers. It is assumed standardly that consumers with the same favorite location fully agree on the ranking of all possible locations. To investigate the necessity of this questionable and restrictive assumption, we model heterogeneity in consumers’ distance perceptions by individual edge lengths of a given graph. A profile of location choices is called a “robust equilibrium” if it is a Nash equilibrium in several games which differ only by the consumers’ perceptions of distances. For a finite number of players and any distribution of consumers, we provide a full characterization of all robust equilibria and derive structural conditions for their existence. Furthermore, we discuss whether the classical observations of minimal differentiation and inefficiency are robust phenomena. Thereby, we find strong support for an old conjecture that in equilibrium firms form local clusters.
AU - Buechel, Berno
AU - Röhl, Nils
ID - 491
IS - 2
JF - European Journal of Operational Research
TI - Robust Equilibria in Location Games
VL - 240
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 5239
JF - Patient Gesundheitswesen – Mission 2030 Unsere gemeinsame Verantwortung die Zukunft zu gestalten
TI - Rationalisierung vs. Rationierung Ist die Rationierung unvermeidbar?
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Westphal, Matthias
ID - 2957
JF - Journal of Health Economics
TI - Short-and medium-term effects of informal care provision on female caregivers’ health
VL - 42
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Brangewitz, Sonja
AU - Gamp, Jan-Philip
ID - 2522
IS - 3
JF - Economic Theory
SN - 0938-2259
TI - Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games
VL - 57
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Grundmann, Rainer
ID - 2819
IS - 4
JF - Journal of Population Economics
TI - Trade and fertility in the developing world: the impact of trade and trade structure
VL - 27
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Dung, Ha Van
ID - 2842
JF - Modern Economy
TI - Household Savings and Productive Capital Formation in Rural Vietnam: Insurance vs. Social Network
VL - 5
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer-side market transparency with endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique symmetric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market-structure effect. We show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market-structure effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes increasingly transparent. Consumer-side market transparency can therefore be socially excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand functions is the set of constant demand functions.
AU - Gu, Yiquan
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
ID - 2709
IS - 2
JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE
SN - 0932-4569
TI - Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency
VL - 170
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).
AU - De Jaegher, Kris
AU - Hoyer, Britta
ID - 1923
IS - 5
JF - Defence and Peace Economics
SN - 1024-2694
TI - Collective action and the common enemy effect
VL - 27
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Augurzky, B.
AU - Roppel, U.
ID - 5241
JF - RWI Position
TI - Kehrtwende in der Gesundheitspolitik - Unnötige Abkehr von einer erfolgreichen Reform zur Finanzierung der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung
VL - 59
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Mayrhofer, Thomas
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 2959
IS - 3
JF - Journal of Population Economics
TI - Testing the relationship between income inequality and life expectancy: A simple correction for the aggregation effect when using aggregated data
VL - 27
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Keese, Matthias
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 2960
IS - 3
JF - Review of Income and Wealth
TI - Broke, ill, and obese: is there an effect of household debt on health?
VL - 60
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Kopetsch, Thomas
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 2958
IS - 12
JF - Health Economics
TI - Regional variation in the utilisation of ambulatory services in Germany
VL - 23
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Lück, Sonja
ID - 31817
IS - 5
JF - Die Betriebswirtschaft
SN - 03427064
TI - Forschung und Lehre: Freund oder Feind?
VL - 74
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Dimant, Eugen
AU - Krieger, Tim
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 2729
IS - 4
JF - German Economic Review
SN - 1465-6485
TI - A Crook is a Crook … But is He Still a Crook Abroad? On the Effect of Immigration on Destination-Country Corruption
VL - 16
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Meierrieks, Daniel
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 33087
IS - 1
JF - Oxford Economic Papers
KW - Economics and Econometrics
SN - 0030-7653
TI - Oppressive governments, dependence on the USA, and anti-American terrorism
VL - 67
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Brangewitz, Sonja
AU - Gamp, Jan-Philip
ID - 2543
IS - 2
JF - Economics Letters
SN - 0165-1765
TI - Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs
VL - 121
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Bilkic, Natascha
AU - Carerras Painter, Ben
ID - 2843
IS - 1
JF - International Economics and Economic Policy
TI - Unsustainable Sovereign Debt - Is the Euro Crisis only the Tip of the Iceberg?
VL - 10
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
ID - 2844
JF - Oxford University Press
TI - Global Asymmetries and their Implications for Climate and Industrial Policies, in: Pathways to Industrialization in the Twenty-First Century - New Challenges and Emerging Paradigms
VL - ch. 11
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Meierrieks, Daniel
ID - 2845
IS - 3
JF - Economics Letters
TI - Do banking crises cause terrorism?
VL - 119
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Meierrieks, DAniel
ID - 2846
IS - 1
JF - Journal of Peace Research
TI - Causality Between Terrorism and Economic Growth
VL - 50
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 2961
IS - 6
JF - Journal of Health Economics
TI - Practice budgets and the patient mix of physicians-Evaluating the effects of remuneration system reforms on physician behaviour in Germany
VL - 32
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Augurzky, Boris
AU - Kopetsch, Thomas
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 3084
IS - 4
JF - The European Journal of Health Economics
TI - What accounts for the regional differences in the utilisation of hospitals in Germany?
VL - 14
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Stroka, Magdalena A
ID - 2962
JF - Labour Economics
TI - Health and the double burden of full-time work and informal care provision—Evidence from administrative data
VL - 24
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Martini, Jan Thomas
ID - 2519
IS - 4
JF - Group Decision and Negotiation
SN - 0926-2644
TI - Negotiating Transfer Prices
VL - 22
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Krieger, Tim
AU - Minter, Steffen
ID - 2521
IS - 4
JF - International Economics and Economic Policy
SN - 1612-4804
TI - On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU
VL - 10
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Bilkic, Natascha
AU - Pilichowski, Margarethe
ID - 2949
IS - 5
JF - Labour Economics
TI - Stay in school or start working?- The human capital investment decision under uncertainty and irreversibility
VL - 19
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Meierrieks, Daniel
ID - 2951
IS - 5
JF - Defence and Peace Economics
TI - Economic performance and terrorist activity in Latin America
VL - 23
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Prior, Ulrich
AU - Sureth, Caren
ID - 2952
IS - 3
JF - Journal of Public Economics Theory
TI - A Tax Paradox for Investment Decisions under Uncertainty
VL - 14
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Augurzky, B.
AU - Beivers, A.
ID - 5243
JF - Krankenhaus-Report 2012
TI - Regionale Unterschiede in der stationären Versorgung: Das ländliche Krankenhaus im Fokus
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 3075
IS - 34
JF - Applied Economics
TI - More health care utilization with more insurance coverage? Evidence from a latent class model with German data
VL - 44
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Blum, Mareike
AU - Kraft, Manfred
AU - Lück, Sonja
ID - 31821
IS - 2
JF - Hochschulmanagement
SN - 1860-3025
TI - Zufriedenheit der Studierenden mit den Serviceeinrichtungen einer Universität: Ergebnisse einer explorativen multivariaten Analyse
VL - 7
ER -
TY - JOUR
AB - In this paper we introduce the concept of an overall power function that is meant
to combine two sources of a party’s power in a parliament. The first source is based
on the possibilities for the party to be part of a majority coalition and it is typically
modeled using a cooperative simple game. The second source takes into account
parties’ asymmetries outside the cooperative game and it is displayed by a vector
of exogenously given weights. We adopt a normative point of view and provide an
axiomatic characterization of a specific overall power function, in which the weights
enter in a proportional fashion.
AU - Dimitrov, Dinko
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
ID - 2512
IS - 2
JF - International Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 1742-7355
TI - Proportionality and the power of unequal parties
VL - 7
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Naudé, Wim
ID - 2953
IS - 3-4
JF - Journal of Public Economics
TI - Entrepreneurship and human development - A capability approach
VL - 95
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Naudé, Wim
ID - 2954
IS - 3
JF - Entrepreneurship Research Journal
TI - Entrepreneurship, Structural Change and a Global Economic Crisis
VL - 1
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Wieneke, Axel
ID - 2955
IS - 2
JF - Journal of Comparative Economics
TI - SME performance in transition economies: The financial regulation and firm level corruption nexus
VL - 39
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Gravemeyer, Stefan
AU - Xue, Jinjun
ID - 3052
IS - 7
JF - Urban Studies
TI - Income Determination and Income Discrimination in Shenzhen
VL - 48
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Kraft, Manfred
AU - Meierrieks, Daniel
ID - 3053
IS - 30
JF - Applied Economics
TI - Financial Deepening, Trade Openness and Economic Growth in Latin America and the Caribbean
VL - 43
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Krieger, Tim
AU - Meierrieks, Daniel
ID - 3054
IS - 5
JF - Defence and Peace Economics
TI - Causal Linkages Between Domestic Terrorism and Economic Growth
VL - 22
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Kraft, Manfred
AU - Piek, Christina
ID - 3058
IS - 3
JF - The Annals of Regional Science
TI - Interregional Migration, Self-selection and the Returns to Education in Brazil
VL - 46
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
AU - Kaarboe, Oddvar
ID - 4157
IS - 1
JF - Economic Analysis and Policy
SN - 0313-5926
TI - Paying for Performance in Hospitals
VL - 41
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Wübker, Ansgar
ID - 3076
IS - 11
JF - Health Economics
TI - What determines influenza vaccination take-up of elderly Europeans?
VL - 20
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 3077
IS - 2
JF - Economics Letters
TI - Direct evidence of risk aversion as a source of advantageous selection in health insurance
VL - 113
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
ID - 3078
IS - 1
JF - Labour Economics
TI - Why are the unemployed in worse health? The causal effect of unemployment on health
VL - 18
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Herr, Annika
AU - Schmitz, Hendrik
AU - Augurzky, Boris
ID - 3079
IS - 6
JF - Health Economics
TI - Profit efficiency and ownership of German hospitals
VL - 20
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Redlin, Margarete
ID - 2725
IS - 1-2
JF - Economic Change and Restructuring
SN - 1573-9414
TI - International integration and the determinants of regional development in China
VL - 44
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU - Klaus, Bettina
ID - 2510
IS - 4
JF - Theory and Decision
SN - 0040-5833
TI - Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
VL - 69
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
AU - Wambach, Achim
ID - 3418
IS - 3
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
TI - Survival at the center—the stability of minimum differentiation
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Gries, Thomas
AU - Naudé, Wim
ID - 3055
IS - 1
JF - Small Business Economics
TI - Entrepreneurship and Structural Economic Transformation
VL - 34
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
AU - Possajennikov, Alex
AU - Guse, Tobias
ID - 4154
IS - 2
JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
SN - 0167-2681
TI - On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations
VL - 73
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Angerhausen, Julia
AU - Bayer, Christian
AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard
ID - 4155
IS - 3
JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)
TI - Strategic Unemployment
VL - 166
ER -
TY - JOUR
AU - Lück, Sonja
ID - 31819
IS - 3
JF - Hochschulmanagement
SN - 1860-3025
TI - Hochschulforscher oder Hochschullehrer? Eine Panel-Daten-Analyse wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Bachelor- und Masterkurse
VL - 5
ER -