TY - JOUR AB - Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013). AU - Endres, Angelika Elfriede AU - Recker, Sonja AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 80 JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization TI - Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex? VL - 157 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Fritz, Marlon AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Feng, Yuanhua ID - 9920 JF - Economics Letters SN - 0165-1765 TI - Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth? VL - 181 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Fritz, Marlon AU - Yuanhua, Feng ID - 6734 IS - 1 JF - Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics TI - Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics VL - 81 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas ID - 10090 JF - The American Economist SN - 0569-4345 TI - A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea ER - TY - JOUR AU - Bünnings, Christian AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Tauchmann, Harald AU - Ziebarth, Nicolas R. ID - 15075 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Risk and Insurance SN - 0022-4367 TI - The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice VL - 86 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Redlin, Margarete ID - 2727 IS - 3 JF - Defence and Peace Economics SN - 1024-2694 TI - Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy VL - 30 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Grundmann, Rainer ID - 2814 IS - 3 JF - Journal of International Development TI - Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries VL - 30 ER - TY - JOUR AB - In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness. AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Recker, Sonja ID - 4564 IS - 6 JF - Group Decision and Negotiation TI - The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information VL - 27 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - Rosenkranz, Stephanie ID - 4982 IS - 4 JF - Games TI - Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment VL - 9 ER - TY - JOUR AB - In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously. To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model, a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then high quality is chosen until the price increases again. AU - Mir Djawadi, Behnud AU - Fahr, Rene AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen AU - Recker, Sonja ID - 5330 IS - 11 JF - PLoS ONE TI - Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate VL - 13 ER - TY - JOUR AB - We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy). AU - De Jaegher, Kris AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1029 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Conflict Resolution TI - Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves VL - 63 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kolodziej, Ingo WK AU - Reichert, Arndt R AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 3081 IS - 4 JF - Health services research TI - New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe VL - 53 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Redlin, Margarete AU - Ugarte, Juliette Espinosa ID - 2728 JF - Theoretical and Applied Climatology SN - 0177-798X TI - Human-induced climate change: the impact of land-use change ER - TY - JOUR AB - Drawing upon recent advances in machine learning and natural language processing, we introduce new tools that automatically ingest, parse, disambiguate, and build an updated database using U.S. patent data. The tools identify unique inventor, assignee, and location entities mentioned on each granted U.S. patent from 1976 to 2016. We describe data flow, algorithms, user interfaces, descriptive statistics, and a novelty measure based on the first appearance of a word in the patent corpus. We illustrate an automated coinventor network mapping tool and visualize trends in patenting over the last 40 years. AU - Balsmeier, Benjamin AU - Assaf, Mohamad AU - Chesebro, Tyler AU - Fierro, Gabe AU - Johnson, Kevin AU - Johnson, Scott AU - Li, Guan‐Cheng AU - Lück, Sonja AU - O'Reagan, Doug AU - Yeh, Bill AU - Zang, Guangzheng AU - Fleming, Lee ID - 31807 IS - 3 JF - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy KW - Management of Technology and Innovation KW - Strategy and Management KW - Economics and Econometrics KW - General Business KW - Management and Accounting KW - General Medicine SN - 1058-6407 TI - Machine learning and natural language processing on the patent corpus: Data, tools, and new measures VL - 27 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Fritz, Marlon AU - Feng, Yuanhua ID - 3070 IS - 2 JF - Review of Economics TI - Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of Business Cycles in Spain VL - 68 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Schiele, Valentin ID - 5236 JF - Atlas of Science TI - Sick already? Job loss makes it even worse ER - TY - JOUR AB - We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. AU - Brosig-Koch, Janet AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard AU - Kokot, Johanna ID - 1054 IS - 53 JF - Health Economics TI - The effects of competition on medical service provision VL - 26 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, T. AU - Grundmann, R. AU - Palnau, Irene AU - Redlin, Margarete ID - 1372 IS - 2 JF - International Economics and Economic Policy SN - 1612-4804 TI - Innovations, growth and participation in advanced economies - a review of major concepts and findings VL - 14 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Ziebarth, Nicolas R. ID - 15260 IS - 1 JF - Journal of Human Resources SN - 0022-166X TI - Does Price Framing Affect the Consumer Price Sensitivity of Health Plan Choice? VL - 52 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Westphal, Matthias ID - 2635 JF - Journal of Health Economics TI - Informal Care and Long-term Labor Market Outcomes VL - 56 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Büyükdurmus, Tugba AU - Kopetsch, Thomas AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Tauchmann, Harald ID - 3082 IS - 2 JF - Health Economics Review TI - On the interdependence of ambulatory and hospital care in the German health system VL - 7 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Grundmann, R. AU - Palnau, Irene AU - Redlin, Margarete ID - 1371 IS - 1 JF - International Economics and Economic Policy SN - 1612-4804 TI - Technology diffusion, international integration and participation in developing economies - a review of major concepts and findings VL - 15 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen ID - 2527 IS - 4 JF - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy SN - 1554-8597 TI - Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War VL - 22 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Brangewitz, Sonja AU - Brockhoff, Sarah ID - 2540 JF - European Journal of Political Economy SN - 0176-2680 TI - Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition VL - 49 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Kraft, Manfred AU - Simon, Manuel ID - 2810 IS - 95 JF - Papers in Regional Science TI - Explaining inter-provincial migration in China VL - 4 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen ID - 2811 IS - 4 JF - Peace Economics and Peace Science TI - Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War VL - 22 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Jungblut, Stefan AU - Naudé, Wim ID - 2813 IS - 2 JF - International Journal of Economic Theory TI - The Entrepreneurship Beveridge Curve VL - 12 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kamhöfer, Daniel A. AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 2687 IS - 5 JF - Journal of Applied Econometrics SN - 0883-7252 TI - Reanalyzing Zero Returns to Education in Germany VL - 31 ER - TY - JOUR AB - On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries. AU - Brangewitz, Sonja AU - Manegold, Jochen ID - 211 IS - 6 JF - Theoretical Economics Letters TI - Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly VL - 6 ER - TY - JOUR AB - We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion. AU - Hoyer, Britta AU - De Jaegher, Kris ID - 1919 IS - 5 JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory SN - 1097-3923 TI - Strategic Network Disruption and Defense VL - 18 ER - TY - JOUR AB - We construct two-player two-strategy game-theoretic models of by-product mutualism, where our focus lies on the way in which the probability of cooperation among players is affected by the degree of adversity facing the players. In our first model, cooperation consists of the production of a public good, and adversity is linked to the degree of complementarity of the players׳ efforts in producing the public good. In our second model, cooperation consists of the defense of a public, and/or a private good with by-product benefits, and adversity is measured by the number of random attacks (e.g., by a predator) facing the players. In both of these models, our analysis confirms the existence of the so-called boomerang effect, which states that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally defect in a situation of joint cooperation. Focusing on such an effect in isolation leads to the "common-enemy" hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity increases the probability of cooperation. Yet, we also find that a sucker effect may simultaneously exist, which says that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally cooperate in a situation of joint defection. Looked at in isolation, the sucker effect leads to the competing hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity decreases the probability of cooperation. Our analysis predicts circumstances in which the "common enemy" hypothesis prevails, and circumstances in which the competing hypothesis prevails. AU - De Jaegher, Kris AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1922 JF - Journal of Theoretical Biology SN - 0022-5193 TI - By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model VL - 393 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schiele, Valentin AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 2688 JF - Journal of Health Economics TI - Quantile treatment effects of job loss on health VL - 49 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Herr, Annika AU - Nguyen, Thu-Van AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 3083 IS - 10 JF - Health Policy TI - Public reporting and the quality of care of German nursing homes VL - 120 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Göpffarth, Dirk AU - Kopetsch, Thomas AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 2956 IS - 7 JF - Health economics TI - Determinants of regional variation in health expenditures in Germany VL - 25 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Decker, Simon AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 15259 JF - Journal of Health Economics SN - 0167-6296 TI - Health shocks and risk aversion VL - 156-170 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Naudé, Wim AU - Bilkic, Natascha ID - 2815 JF - The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance TI - Playing the Lottery or Dressing Up? A Model of Firm-Level Heterogeneity and the Decision to Export VL - 58 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Feng, Yuanhua AU - Guo, Zhichao ID - 2816 IS - 2 JF - China Agricultural Economic Review TI - Changes of China’s agri-food exports to Germany caused by its accession to WTO and the 2008 financial crisis VL - 7 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Palnau, Irene ID - 3295 IS - 4 JF - Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy TI - Sustaining Civil Peace: a configurational comparative analysis VL - 21 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Meierrieks, Daniel AU - Redlin, Margarete ID - 3296 IS - 1 JF - Oxford Economic Papers TI - Oppressive Governments, Dependence on the United States and Anti-American Terrorism VL - 67 ER - TY - JOUR AB - In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a locationin order to attract consumers. It is assumed standardly that consumers with the same favorite location fully agree on the ranking of all possible locations. To investigate the necessity of this questionable and restrictive assumption, we model heterogeneity in consumers’ distance perceptions by individual edge lengths of a given graph. A profile of location choices is called a “robust equilibrium” if it is a Nash equilibrium in several games which differ only by the consumers’ perceptions of distances. For a finite number of players and any distribution of consumers, we provide a full characterization of all robust equilibria and derive structural conditions for their existence. Furthermore, we discuss whether the classical observations of minimal differentiation and inefficiency are robust phenomena. Thereby, we find strong support for an old conjecture that in equilibrium firms form local clusters. AU - Buechel, Berno AU - Röhl, Nils ID - 491 IS - 2 JF - European Journal of Operational Research TI - Robust Equilibria in Location Games VL - 240 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 5239 JF - Patient Gesundheitswesen – Mission 2030 Unsere gemeinsame Verantwortung die Zukunft zu gestalten TI - Rationalisierung vs. Rationierung Ist die Rationierung unvermeidbar? ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Westphal, Matthias ID - 2957 JF - Journal of Health Economics TI - Short-and medium-term effects of informal care provision on female caregivers’ health VL - 42 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Brangewitz, Sonja AU - Gamp, Jan-Philip ID - 2522 IS - 3 JF - Economic Theory SN - 0938-2259 TI - Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games VL - 57 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Grundmann, Rainer ID - 2819 IS - 4 JF - Journal of Population Economics TI - Trade and fertility in the developing world: the impact of trade and trade structure VL - 27 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gries, Thomas AU - Dung, Ha Van ID - 2842 JF - Modern Economy TI - Household Savings and Productive Capital Formation in Rural Vietnam: Insurance vs. Social Network VL - 5 ER - TY - JOUR AB - This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer-side market transparency with endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique symmetric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market-structure effect. We show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market-structure effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes increasingly transparent. Consumer-side market transparency can therefore be socially excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand functions is the set of constant demand functions. AU - Gu, Yiquan AU - Hehenkamp, Burkhard ID - 2709 IS - 2 JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE SN - 0932-4569 TI - Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency VL - 170 ER - TY - JOUR AB - How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum). AU - De Jaegher, Kris AU - Hoyer, Britta ID - 1923 IS - 5 JF - Defence and Peace Economics SN - 1024-2694 TI - Collective action and the common enemy effect VL - 27 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmitz, Hendrik AU - Augurzky, B. AU - Roppel, U. ID - 5241 JF - RWI Position TI - Kehrtwende in der Gesundheitspolitik - Unnötige Abkehr von einer erfolgreichen Reform zur Finanzierung der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung VL - 59 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Mayrhofer, Thomas AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 2959 IS - 3 JF - Journal of Population Economics TI - Testing the relationship between income inequality and life expectancy: A simple correction for the aggregation effect when using aggregated data VL - 27 ER - TY - JOUR AU - Keese, Matthias AU - Schmitz, Hendrik ID - 2960 IS - 3 JF - Review of Income and Wealth TI - Broke, ill, and obese: is there an effect of household debt on health? VL - 60 ER -