@article{50719, abstract = {{We propose an indicator for detecting anomalous stock market valuation in real time such that market participants receive timely signals so as to be able to take stabilizing action. Unlike existing approaches, our anomaly indicator introduces three methodological novelties. First, we use an endogenous, purely data-driven, nonparametric trend identification method to separate long-term market movements from more short-term ones. Second, we apply SETAR models that allow for asymmetric expansions and contractions around the long-term trend and find systematic stock price cycles. Third, we implement these findings in our indicator and conduct real-time market forecasts, which have so far been neglected in the literature. Applications of our indicator using monthly S&P 500 stock data from 1970 to the end of 2022 show that short-term anomalous market movements can be identified in real time up to one year ahead. We predict all major anomalies, including the 1987 Bubble and the initial phase of the Financial Crisis that began in 2007. In total, our anomaly indicator identifies more than 80% of all – even minor – anomalous episodes. Thus, smoothing market exaggerations through early signaling seems possible.}}, author = {{Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Wiechers, Lukas}}, issn = {{1469-7688}}, journal = {{Quantitative Finance}}, keywords = {{General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Finance}}, pages = {{1--14}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{An early indicator for anomalous stock market performance}}}, doi = {{10.1080/14697688.2023.2281529}}, year = {{2024}}, } @article{35637, abstract = {{Individual cognitive functioning declines over time. We seek to understand how adverse physical health shocks in older ages contribute to this development. By use of event-study methods and data from the USA, England, and several countries in Continental Europe, we find evidence that health shocks lead to an immediate and persistent decline in cognitive functioning. This robust finding holds in all regions representing different health insurance systems and seems to be independent of underlying individual demographic characteristics such as sex and age. We also ask whether variables that are susceptible to policy action can reduce the negative consequences of a health shock. Our results suggest that neither compulsory education nor retirement regulations moderate the effects, thus emphasizing the importance for cognitive functioning of maintaining good physical health in old age.}}, author = {{Schiele, Valentin and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{European Economic Review}}, title = {{{Understanding cognitive decline in older ages: The role of health shocks}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104320}}, volume = {{151}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{42638, abstract = {{ We propose a new method to estimate and isolate the localization of knowledge spillovers due to the physical presence of a person, using after-application but pre-grant deaths of differently located coinventors of the same patent. The approach estimates the differences in local citations between the deceased and still-living inventors at increasingly distant radii. Patents receive 26 percent fewer citations from within a radius of 20 miles around the deceased, relative to still-living coinventors. Differences attenuate with time and distance, are stronger when still-living coinventors live farther from the deceased, and hold for a subsample of possibly premature deaths. (JEL O31, O33, O34, R32) }}, author = {{Balsmeier, Benjamin and Fleming, Lee and Lück, Sonja}}, issn = {{2640-205X}}, journal = {{American Economic Review: Insights}}, keywords = {{Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law, Geography, Planning and Development}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{21--33}}, publisher = {{American Economic Association}}, title = {{{Isolating Personal Knowledge Spillovers: Coinventor Deaths and Spatial Citation Differentials}}}, doi = {{10.1257/aeri.20210275}}, volume = {{5}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{44092, abstract = {{We study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In our theoretical model, physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients systematically vary with regard to both their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their state of health. We test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory experiment. In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient benefits as long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For those patients, who are not able to choose a physician, competition even decreases the patient benefit compared to a situation without competition. This decrease is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for passive patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients in need of a low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive effects of competition for active patients as well as the negative effects of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our results imply that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that patients’ responsiveness to quality is decisive.}}, author = {{Brosig-Koch, Jeannette and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, keywords = {{physician competition, patient characteristics, heterogeneity in quality responses, fee-for-service, laboratory experiment}}, title = {{{Who benefits from quality competition in health care? A theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.4689}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{34114, abstract = {{Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) enables researchers in international management to better understand how the impact of a single explanatory factor depends on the context of other factors. But the analytical toolbox of QCA does not include a parameter for the explanatory power of a single explanatory factor or “condition”. In this paper, we therefore reinterpret the Banzhaf power index, originally developed in cooperative game theory, to establish a goodness-of-fit parameter in QCA. The relative Banzhaf index we suggest measures the explanatory power of one condition averaged across all sufficient combinations of conditions. The paper argues that the index is especially informative in three situations that are all salient in international management and call for a context-sensitive analysis of single conditions, namely substantial limited diversity in the data, the emergence of strong INUS conditions in the analysis, and theorizing with contingency factors. The paper derives the properties of the relative Banzhaf index in QCA, demonstrates how the index can be computed easily from a rudimentary truth table, and explores its insights by revisiting selected papers in international management that apply fuzzy-set QCA. It finally suggests a three-step procedure for utilizing the relative Banzhaf index when the causal structure involves both contingency effects and configurational causation. }}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Schneider, Martin}}, journal = {{Journal of International Management}}, keywords = {{Qualitative comparative analysis, Banzhaf power index, causality, explanatory power}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Playing games with QCA: Measuring the explanatory power of single conditions with the Banzhaf index}}}, year = {{2023}}, } @article{30341, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Straaten, Dirk}}, issn = {{2214-8043}}, journal = {{Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics}}, keywords = {{General Social Sciences, Economics and Econometrics, Applied Psychology}}, pages = {{101869}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{Anonymity and Self-Expression in Online Rating Systems - An Experimental Analysis}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.socec.2022.101869}}, volume = {{98}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{31881, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, journal = {{International Journal of Game Theory}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Network Disruption and the Common-Enemy Effect}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00182-022-00812-5}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{33221, abstract = {{AbstractNon-pharmaceutical interventions are an effective strategy to prevent and control COVID-19 transmission in the community. However, the timing and stringency to which these measures have been implemented varied between countries and regions. The differences in stringency can only to a limited extent be explained by the number of infections and the prevailing vaccination strategies. Our study aims to shed more light on the lockdown strategies and to identify the determinants underlying the differences between countries on regional, economic, institutional, and political level. Based on daily panel data for 173 countries and the period from January 2020 to October 2021 we find significant regional differences in lockdown strategies. Further, more prosperous countries implemented milder restrictions but responded more quickly, while poorer countries introduced more stringent measures but had a longer response time. Finally, democratic regimes and stronger manifested institutions alleviated and slowed down the introduction of lockdown measures.}}, author = {{Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{0922-680X}}, journal = {{Journal of Regulatory Economics}}, keywords = {{Economics and Econometrics}}, publisher = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}}, title = {{{Differences in NPI strategies against COVID-19}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s11149-022-09452-9}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{33220, abstract = {{AbstractWe provide a partial equilibrium model wherein AI provides abilities combined with human skills to provide an aggregate intermediate service good. We use the model to find that the extent of automation through AI will be greater if (a) the economy is relatively abundant in sophisticated programs and machine abilities compared to human skills; (b) the economy hosts a relatively large number of AI-providing firms and experts; and (c) the task-specific productivity of AI services is relatively high compared to the task-specific productivity of general labor and labor skills. We also illustrate that the contribution of AI to aggregate productive labor service depends not only on the amount of AI services available but on the endogenous number of automated tasks, the relative productivity of standard and IT-related labor, and the substitutability of tasks. These determinants also affect the income distribution between the two kinds of labor. We derive several empirical implications and identify possible future extensions.}}, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Naudé, Wim}}, issn = {{2510-5019}}, journal = {{Journal for Labour Market Research}}, keywords = {{General Medicine}}, number = {{1}}, publisher = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}}, title = {{{Modelling artificial intelligence in economics}}}, doi = {{10.1186/s12651-022-00319-2}}, volume = {{56}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{33219, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Müller, Veronika and Jost, John T.}}, issn = {{1047-840X}}, journal = {{Psychological Inquiry}}, keywords = {{General Psychology}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{65--83}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{The Market for Belief Systems: A Formal Model of Ideological Choice}}}, doi = {{10.1080/1047840x.2022.2065128}}, volume = {{33}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{30940, abstract = {{We analyse the two-dimensional Nash bargaining solution (NBS) by deploying the standard labour market negotiations model of McDonald and Solow (1981). We show that the two-dimensional bargaining problem can be decomposed into two one-dimensional problems, such that the two solutions together replicate the solution of the two-dimensional problem if the NBS is applied. The axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is shown to be crucial for this type of decomposability. This result has significant implications for actual negotiations because it allows for the decomposition of a multi-dimensional bargaining problem into one-dimensional problems---and thus helps to facilitate real-world negotiations.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Upmann, Thorsten and Duman, Papatya}}, issn = {{0347-0520}}, journal = {{Scandinavian Journal of Economics}}, keywords = {{Labour market negotiations, efficient bargains, Nash bargaining solution, sequential bargaining, restricted bargaining games}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{403--440}}, publisher = {{Wiley}}, title = {{{Wage Bargaining and Employment Revisited: Separability and Efficiency in Collective Bargaining}}}, doi = {{https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12518}}, volume = {{125}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{33458, abstract = {{We study the effect of unemployment on cognitive abilities among individuals aged between 50 and 65 in Europe. To this end, we exploit plant closures and use flexible event-study estimations together with an experimentally elicited measure of fluid intelligence, namely word recall. We find that, within a time period of around eight years after the event of unemployment, cognitive abilities only deteriorate marginally — the effects are insignificant both in statistical and economic terms. We do, however, find significant effects of late-career unemployment on the likelihood to leave the labor force, and short-term effects on mental health problems such as depression and sleep problems.}}, author = {{Freise, Diana and Schmitz, Hendrik and Westphal, Matthias}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, title = {{{Late-Career Unemployment and Cognitive Abilities}}}, doi = {{https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102689}}, volume = {{86}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{30235, author = {{Westphal, Matthias and Kamhöfer, Daniel A. and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Economic Journal}}, number = {{646}}, pages = {{2231--2272}}, title = {{{Marginal College Wage Premium under Selection into Employment}}}, doi = {{10.1093/ej/ueac021}}, volume = {{132}}, year = {{2022}}, } @article{15073, abstract = {{ In this paper, we analyze the effect of light conditions on road accidents and estimate the long run consequences of different time regimes for road safety. Identification is based on variation in light conditions induced by differences in sunrise and sunset times across space and time. We estimate that darkness causes annual costs of more than £500 million in Great Britain. By setting daylight saving time year-round 8 percent of these costs could be saved. Thus, focusing solely on the short run costs related to the transition itself underestimates the total costs of the current time regime. }}, author = {{Bünnings, Christian and Schiele, Valentin}}, issn = {{0034-6535}}, journal = {{The Review of Economics and Statistics}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{165--176}}, title = {{{Spring Forward, Don't Fall Back: The Effect of Daylight Saving Time on Road Safety}}}, doi = {{10.1162/rest_a_00873}}, volume = {{103}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{29152, abstract = {{AbstractIn this article we combine Debreu’s (Proc Natl Acad Sci 38(10):886–893, 1952) social system with Hurwicz’s (Econ Design 1(1):1–14, 1994; Am Econ Rev 98(3):577–585, 2008) ideas of embedding a “desired” game form into a “natural” game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is “illegal” according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend Debreu’s concepts of a social system and its social equilibria to a socio-legal system with its Debreu–Hurwicz equilibria. We build on a more general version of social equilibrium due to Shafer and Sonnenschein (J Math Econ 2(3):345–348, 1975) that also generalizes the dc-mechanism of Koray and Yildiz (J Econ Theory 176:479–502, 2018) which relates implementation via mechanisms with implementation via rights structures as introduced by Sertel (Designing rights: invisible hand theorems, covering and membership. Tech. rep. Mimeo, Bogazici University, 2001). In the second part we apply and illustrate these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash’s demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium.}}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}}, issn = {{1434-4742}}, journal = {{Review of Economic Design}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu–Hurwicz equilibrium}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10058-021-00278-z}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{22715, abstract = {{AbstractUsing data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for 1984–2018, we analyze the intergenerational education mobility of immigrants in Germany by identifying the determinants of differences in educational stocks for first- and second-generation immigrants in comparison to individuals without a migration background. Our results show that on average, first-generation immigrants have fewer years of schooling than native-born Germans and have a disproportionate share of lower educational qualifications. This gap is strongly driven by age at immigration, with immigration age and education revealing a nonlinear relationship. While the gap is relatively small among individuals who migrate at a young age, integrating in the school system at secondary school age leads to large disadvantages. Examining the educational mobility of immigrants in Germany, we identify an inter-generational catch-up in education. The gap in education between immigrants and natives is reduced for the second generation. Finally, we find that country of origin differences can account for much of the education gap. While immigrants with an ethnic background closer to the German language and culture show the best education outcomes, immigrants from Turkey, Italy, and other southern European countries and especially the group of war refugees from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and other MENA countries, have the lowest educational attainment.}}, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete and Zehra, Moonum}}, issn = {{1488-3473}}, journal = {{Journal of International Migration and Integration}}, title = {{{Educational Assimilation of First-Generation and Second-Generation Immigrants in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s12134-021-00863-9}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{23594, abstract = {{AbstractUsing time series data for the period 1959–2015, our empirical analysis examines the simultaneous effects of the individual components of the global carbon budget on temperature. Specifically, we explore the possible effects of carbon emissions caused by fossil fuel combustion, cement production, land-use change emissions, and carbon sinks (here in terms of land sink and ocean sink) on climate change. The simultaneous inclusion of carbon emissions and carbon sinks allows us to look at the coexistent and opposing effects of the individual components of the carbon budget and thus provides a holistic perspective from which to explore the relationship between the global carbon budget and global warming. The results reveal a significant positive effect of carbon emissions on temperature for both fossil fuels emissions and emissions from land-use change, confirming previous results concerning carbon dioxide and temperature. Further, while ocean sink does not seem to have a significant effect, we identify a temperature-decreasing effect for land sink.}}, author = {{Redlin, Margarete and Gries, Thomas}}, issn = {{0177-798X}}, journal = {{Theoretical and Applied Climatology}}, title = {{{Anthropogenic climate change: the impact of the global carbon budget}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00704-021-03764-0}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{45640, abstract = {{I study a dynamic variant of the Dixit–Stiglitz (Am Econ Rev 67(3), 1977) model of monopolistic competition by introducing price stickiness à la Fershtman and Kamien (Econometrica 55(5), 1987). The analysis is restricted to bounded quantity and price paths that fulfill the necessary conditions for an open-loop Nash equilibrium. I show that there exists a symmetric steady state and that its stability depends on the degree of product differentiation. When moving from complements to perfect substitutes, the steady state is either a locally asymptotically unstable (spiral) source, a stable (spiral) sink or a saddle point. I further apply the Hopf bifurcation theorem and prove the existence of limit cycles, when passing from a stable to an unstable steady state. Lastly, I provide a numerical example and show that there exists a stable limit cycle.}}, author = {{Hoof, Simon}}, issn = {{1573-2878}}, journal = {{Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications}}, number = {{2}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{Dynamic Monopolistic Competition}}}, volume = {{189}}, year = {{2021}}, } @article{17072, author = {{Feng, Yuanhua and Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon}}, issn = {{1048-5252}}, journal = {{Journal of Nonparametric Statistics}}, pages = {{510--533}}, title = {{{Data-driven local polynomial for the trend and its derivatives in economic time series}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10485252.2020.1759598}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{17074, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}}, issn = {{1363-6669}}, journal = {{Review of Development Economics}}, pages = {{644--667}}, title = {{{Modern sector development: The role of exports and institutions in developing countries}}}, doi = {{10.1111/rode.12663}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{16273, abstract = {{This study examines the gender gap in competitiveness in an educational setting and tests whether this gap depends on the difficulty of the task at hand. For this purpose, we administered a series of experiments during the final exam of a university course. We confronted three cohorts of undergraduate students with a set of bonus questions and the choice between an absolute and a tournament grading scheme for these questions. To test the moderating impact of task difficulty, we (randomly) varied the difficulty of the questions between treatment groups. We find that, on average, women are significantly less likely to select the tournament scheme. However, the results show that the gender gap in tournament entry is sizable when the questions are relative easy, but much smaller and statistical insignificant when the questions are difficult.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and van Huizen, Thomas and Keijzer, Linda and Rezaei, Sarah and Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Westbrock, Bastian }}, journal = {{Labour Economics}}, title = {{{Gender, competitiveness, and task difficulty: Evidence from the field}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2020.101815}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{16334, abstract = {{We analyze the actual behavior of agents in a matching mechanism, using data from a clearinghouse at the Faculty of Business Administration and Economics at a German university, where a variant of the Boston mechanism is used. We supplement this data with data generated in a survey among the students who participated in the clearinghouse. We find that under the current mechanism over 74% of students act strategically by misrepresenting at least one of their preferences. Nevertheless, not all students are able to improve their outcome by doing so. We show that this is mainly due to the incomplete information of students and naiveté. Sophisticated students actually reach significantly better outcomes than naive students. Thus, we find evidence that naive students are exploited by sophisticated students in an incomplete information setting.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Stroh-Maraun, Nadja}}, journal = {{Games and Economic Behavior}}, pages = {{453 -- 481}}, title = {{{Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents under Incomplete Information in a University Clearinghouse}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.006}}, volume = {{121}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{30234, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Stroka‐Wetsch, Magdalena A.}}, issn = {{1057-9230}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, keywords = {{Health Policy}}, number = {{7}}, pages = {{766--777}}, publisher = {{Wiley}}, title = {{{Determinants of nursing home choice: Does reported quality matter?}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.4018}}, volume = {{29}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{31802, abstract = {{ Much work on innovation strategy assumes or theorizes that competition in innovation elicits duplication of research and that disclosure decreases such duplication. We validate this empirically using the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA), three complementary identification strategies, and a new measure of blocked future patent applications. We show that AIPA—intended to reduce duplication, through default disclosure of patent applications 18 months after filing—reduced duplication in the U.S. and European patent systems. The blocking measure provides a clear and micro measure of technological competition that can be aggregated to facilitate the empirical investigation of innovation, firm strategy, and the positive and negative externalities of patenting. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. }}, author = {{Lück, Sonja and Balsmeier, Benjamin and Seliger, Florian and Fleming, Lee}}, issn = {{0025-1909}}, journal = {{Management Science}}, keywords = {{Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{2677--2685}}, publisher = {{Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS)}}, title = {{{Early Disclosure of Invention and Reduced Duplication: An Empirical Test}}}, doi = {{10.1287/mnsc.2019.3521}}, volume = {{66}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{34115, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Trockel, Walter}}, issn = {{0943-0180}}, journal = {{Homo Oeconomicus}}, keywords = {{Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Environmental Engineering}}, number = {{1-2}}, pages = {{1--6}}, publisher = {{Springer Science and Business Media LLC}}, title = {{{Introduction to the Special Issue “Bargaining”}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s41412-020-00104-x}}, volume = {{37}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{17350, abstract = {{Many countries have opened their health care markets to private for-profit providers, aiming to promote quality and choice for patients. The prices are regulated and providers compete in location and quality. We show that whereas opening a public hospital market typically raises quality, the private provider strategically locates towards the corner of the market to avoid costly quality competition. Social welfare depends on the size of the regulator's budget and on the altruism of the public provider. If the budget is large, high quality results and welfare is highest in a duopoly whenever entry is optimal. If the budget is small, quality levels in a duopoly mirror the quality level in a monopoly. It can be optimal for the regulator not to use the full budget.}}, author = {{Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kaarbøe, Odvar M. }}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{641--660}}, title = {{{Location Choice and Quality Competition in Mixed Hospital Markets}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2020.06.026}}, volume = {{177}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{17086, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, pages = {{923--944}}, title = {{{Trade and economic development: global causality and development- and openness-related heterogeneity}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-020-00467-1}}, volume = {{17}}, year = {{2020}}, } @article{2808, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Krieger, Tim and Meyer, Henning}}, journal = {{German Economic Review}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{129--170}}, title = {{{Economic Retirement Age and Lifelong Learning - a theoretical model with heterogeneous labor and biased technical change}}}, doi = {{10.1111/geer.12140}}, volume = {{20}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{1139, abstract = {{We investigate the degree of price competition among telecommunication firms. Underlying a Bertrand model of price competition, we empirically model pricing behaviour in an oligopoly. We analyse panel data of individual pricing information of mobile phone contracts offered between 2011 and 2017. We provide empirical evidence that price differences as well as reputational effects serve as a signal to buyers and significantly affect market demand. Additionally, we find that brands lead to an increase in demand and thus are able to generate spillover effects even after price increase.}}, author = {{Kaimann, Daniel and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Applied Economics Letters}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{54--57}}, publisher = {{Taylor and Francis Online}}, title = {{{Price competition and the Bertrand model: The paradox of the German mobile discount market}}}, doi = {{10.1080/13504851.2018.1436141}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2256, abstract = {{Social psychology studies the "common enemy effect", the phenomenon that members of a group work together when they face an opponent, although they otherwise have little in common. An interesting scenario is the formation of an information network where group members individually sponsor costly links. Suppose that ceteris paribus, an outsider appears who aims to disrupt the information flow within the network by deleting some of the links. The question is how the group responds to this common enemy. We address this question for the homogeneous connections model of strategic network formation, with two-way flow of information and without information decay. For sufficiently low linkage costs, the external threat can lead to a more connected network, a positive common enemy effect. For very high but not prohibitively high linkage costs, the equilibrium network can be minimally connected and efficient in the absence of the external threat whereas it is always empty and ineffi cient in the presence of the external threat, a negative common enemy effect. For intermediate linkage costs, both connected networks and the empty network are Nash for certain cost ranges.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Haller, Hans}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization}}, pages = {{146--163}}, title = {{{The Common Enemy Effect under Strategic Network Formation and Disruption}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.011}}, volume = {{162}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{80, abstract = {{Models on network formation have often been extended to include the potential of network disruption in recent years. Whereas the theoretical research on network formation under the threat of disruption has thus gained prominence, hardly any experimental research exists so far. In this paper, we therefore experimentally study the emergence of networks including the aspect of a known external threat by relating theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. We deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe networks for least costs while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network and investigated whether one of the least cost equilibrium networks was more likely to be reached. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects’ farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not for least costs. Additionally, we find that farsightedness –as measured in our experiment– has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or least cost equilibrium networks. Two robustness settings with a reduced external threat or more liberties to modify the initial networks qualitatively confirm our results. Overall, in this experiment observed behaviour is only partially in line with the theoretical predictions by Dzuibiński and Goyal (2013).}}, author = {{Endres, Angelika Elfriede and Recker, Sonja and Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization }}, pages = {{708--734}}, title = {{{Network Formation and Disruption - An Experiment: Are equilibrium networks too complex?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.004}}, volume = {{157}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{9920, author = {{Fritz, Marlon and Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua}}, issn = {{0165-1765}}, journal = {{Economics Letters}}, pages = {{47--50}}, title = {{{Secular stagnation? Is there statistical evidence of an unprecedented, systematic decline in growth?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.021}}, volume = {{181}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{6734, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Yuanhua, Feng}}, journal = {{Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{62--78}}, title = {{{Growth Trends and Systematic Patterns of Boom and Busts –Testing 200 Years of Business Cycle Dynamics}}}, doi = {{10.1111/obes.12267}}, volume = {{81}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{10090, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, issn = {{0569-4345}}, journal = {{The American Economist}}, title = {{{A New Theory of Demand-Restricted Growth: The Basic Idea}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0569434519846477}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{15075, author = {{Bünnings, Christian and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}}, issn = {{0022-4367}}, journal = {{Journal of Risk and Insurance}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{415--449}}, title = {{{The Role of Prices Relative to Supplemental Benefits and Service Quality in Health Plan Choice}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jori.12219}}, volume = {{86}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2727, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1024-2694}}, journal = {{Defence and Peace Economics}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{309--323}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{Pirates – The Young and the Jobless: The Effect of Youth Bulges and Youth Labor Market Integration on Maritime Piracy}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10242694.2017.1333797}}, volume = {{30}}, year = {{2019}}, } @article{2814, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}}, journal = {{Journal of International Development}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{493--506}}, title = {{{Fertility and Modernization: The Role of Urbanization in Developing Countries}}}, doi = {{10.1002/jid.3104}}, volume = {{30}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{4564, abstract = {{ In our model two divisions negotiate over type-dependent contracts to determine an intrafirm transfer price for an intermediate product. Since the upstream division's (seller's) costs and downstream division's (buyer's) revenues are supposed to be private information, we formally consider cooperative bargaining problems under incomplete information. This means that the two divisions consider allocations of expected utility generated by mechanisms that satisfy (interim) individual rationality, incentive compatibility and/or ex post efficiency. Assuming two possible types for buyer and seller each, we first establish that the bargaining problem is regular, regardless whether or not incentive and/or efficiency constraints are imposed. This allows us to apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution to determine fair transfer payments and transfer quantities. In particular, the generalized Nash bargaining solution tries to balance divisional profits, while incentive constraints are still in place. In that sense a fair profit division is generated. Furthermore, by means of illustrative examples we derive general properties of this solution for the transfer pricing problem and compare the model developed here with the models existing in the literature. We demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between ex post efficiency and fairness. }}, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}}, journal = {{Group Decision and Negotiation}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{905--932}}, publisher = {{Springer}}, title = {{{The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution for Transfer Price Negotiations under Incomplete Information}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10726-018-9592-8}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{4982, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and Rosenkranz, Stephanie}}, journal = {{Games}}, number = {{4}}, publisher = {{MDPI}}, title = {{{ Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation - An Experiment}}}, volume = {{9}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{5330, abstract = {{In Internet transactions, customers and service providers often interact once and anonymously. To prevent deceptive behavior a reputation system is particularly important to reduce information asymmetries about the quality of the offered product or service. In this study we examine the effectiveness of a reputation system to reduce information asymmetries when customers may make mistakes in judging the provided service quality. In our model, a service provider makes strategic quality choices and short-lived customers are asked to evaluate the observed quality by providing ratings to a reputation system. The customer is not able to always evaluate the service quality correctly and possibly submits an erroneous rating according to a predefined probability. Considering reputation profiles of the last three sales, within the theoretical model we derive that the service provider’s dichotomous quality decisions are independent of the reputation profile and depend only on the probabilities of receiving positive and negative ratings when providing low or high quality. Thus, a service provider optimally either maintains a good reputation or completely refrains from any reputation building process. However, when mapping our theoretical model to an experimental design we find that a significant share of subjects in the role of the service provider deviates from optimal behavior and chooses actions which are conditional on the current reputation profile. With respect to these individual quality choices we see that subjects use milking strategies which means that they exploit a good reputation. In particular, if the sales price is high, low quality is delivered until the price drops below a certain threshold, and then high quality is chosen until the price increases again.}}, author = {{Mir Djawadi, Behnud and Fahr, Rene and Haake, Claus-Jochen and Recker, Sonja}}, issn = {{1932-6203}}, journal = {{PLoS ONE}}, number = {{11}}, publisher = {{Public Library of Science}}, title = {{{Maintaining vs. Milking Good Reputation when Customer Feedback is Inaccurate}}}, doi = {{10.1371/journal.pone.0207172}}, volume = {{13}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{1029, abstract = {{We present a game-theoretic model of the repression–dissent nexus, focusing on preemptive repression. A small group of instigating dissidents triggers a protest if each dissident participates. The dissidents face random checks by security forces, and when an individual dissident is caught while preparing to participate, he or she is prevented from doing so. Each dissident can invest in countermeasures, which make checks ineffective. For large benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression in the form of a higher number of checks has a deterrence effect and makes dissidents less prone to invest in countermeasures, decreasing the probability of protest. For small benefits of protest, higher preemptive repression instead has a backfiring effect. Both myopic and farsighted governments avoid the backfiring effect by setting low levels of preemptive repression (velvet-glove strategy). However, only a farsighted government is able to exploit the deterrence effect by maintaining a high level of preemptive repression (iron-fist strategy).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, journal = {{Journal of Conflict Resolution}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{502----527}}, publisher = {{SAGE Publications}}, title = {{{Preemptive Repression: Deterrence, Backfiring, Iron Fists and Velvet Gloves}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022002717750450}}, volume = {{63}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{3081, author = {{Kolodziej, Ingo WK and Reichert, Arndt R and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health services research}}, number = {{4}}, title = {{{New Evidence on Employment Effects of Informal Care Provision in Europe}}}, doi = {{10.111/1475-6773.12840}}, volume = {{53}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{2728, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Redlin, Margarete and Ugarte, Juliette Espinosa}}, issn = {{0177-798X}}, journal = {{Theoretical and Applied Climatology}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Human-induced climate change: the impact of land-use change}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00704-018-2422-8}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{31807, abstract = {{Drawing upon recent advances in machine learning and natural language processing, we introduce new tools that automatically ingest, parse, disambiguate, and build an updated database using U.S. patent data. The tools identify unique inventor, assignee, and location entities mentioned on each granted U.S. patent from 1976 to 2016. We describe data flow, algorithms, user interfaces, descriptive statistics, and a novelty measure based on the first appearance of a word in the patent corpus. We illustrate an automated coinventor network mapping tool and visualize trends in patenting over the last 40 years.}}, author = {{Balsmeier, Benjamin and Assaf, Mohamad and Chesebro, Tyler and Fierro, Gabe and Johnson, Kevin and Johnson, Scott and Li, Guan‐Cheng and Lück, Sonja and O'Reagan, Doug and Yeh, Bill and Zang, Guangzheng and Fleming, Lee}}, issn = {{1058-6407}}, journal = {{Journal of Economics & Management Strategy}}, keywords = {{Management of Technology and Innovation, Strategy and Management, Economics and Econometrics, General Business, Management and Accounting, General Medicine}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{535--553}}, publisher = {{Wiley}}, title = {{{Machine learning and natural language processing on the patent corpus: Data, tools, and new measures}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jems.12259}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2018}}, } @article{3070, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Fritz, Marlon and Feng, Yuanhua}}, journal = {{Review of Economics}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{153--166}}, title = {{{Slow Booms and Deep Busts: 160 Years of Business Cycles in Spain}}}, doi = {{10.1515/roe-2017-0008}}, volume = {{68 }}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{5236, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Schiele, Valentin}}, journal = {{Atlas of Science}}, title = {{{Sick already? Job loss makes it even worse}}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1054, abstract = {{We explore how competition between physicians affects medical service provision. Previous research has shown that, without competition, physicians deviate from patient‐optimal treatment under payment systems like capitation and fee‐for‐service. Although competition might reduce these distortions, physicians usually interact with each other repeatedly over time and only a fraction of patients switches providers at all. Both patterns might prevent competition to work in the desired direction. To analyze the behavioral effects of competition, we develop a theoretical benchmark that is then tested in a controlled laboratory experiment. Experimental conditions vary physician payment and patient characteristics. Real patients benefit from provision decisions made in the experiment. Our results reveal that, in line with the theoretical prediction, introducing competition can reduce overprovision and underprovision, respectively. The observed effects depend on patient characteristics and the payment system, though. Tacit collusion is observed and particularly pronounced with fee‐for‐service payment, but it appears to be less frequent than in related experimental research on price competition. }}, author = {{Brosig-Koch, Janet and Hehenkamp, Burkhard and Kokot, Johanna}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, number = {{53}}, pages = {{6--20}}, publisher = {{Wiley Online Library}}, title = {{{The effects of competition on medical service provision}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3583}}, volume = {{26}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1372, author = {{Gries, T. and Grundmann, R. and Palnau, Irene and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{293--351}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Innovations, growth and participation in advanced economies - a review of major concepts and findings}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-016-0371-1}}, volume = {{14}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{15260, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Ziebarth, Nicolas R.}}, issn = {{0022-166X}}, journal = {{Journal of Human Resources}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{88--127}}, title = {{{Does Price Framing Affect the Consumer Price Sensitivity of Health Plan Choice?}}}, doi = {{10.3368/jhr.52.1.0814-6540r1}}, volume = {{52}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{2635, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Westphal, Matthias}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{1--18}}, title = {{{Informal Care and Long-term Labor Market Outcomes}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.09.002}}, volume = {{56}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{3082, author = {{Büyükdurmus, Tugba and Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik and Tauchmann, Harald}}, journal = {{Health Economics Review}}, number = {{2}}, title = {{{On the interdependence of ambulatory and hospital care in the German health system}}}, doi = {{10.1186/s13561-016-0132-4}}, volume = {{7}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{1371, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, R. and Palnau, Irene and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{215--253}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Technology diffusion, international integration and participation in developing economies - a review of major concepts and findings}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-017-0373-7}}, volume = {{15}}, year = {{2017}}, } @article{2527, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, issn = {{1554-8597}}, journal = {{Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{377 -- 384}}, publisher = {{Walter de Gruyter GmbH}}, title = {{{Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2016-0042}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2540, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Brockhoff, Sarah}}, issn = {{0176-2680}}, journal = {{European Journal of Political Economy}}, pages = {{1--23}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Sustainability of coalitional equilibria within repeated tax competition}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.11.003}}, volume = {{49}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2810, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Kraft, Manfred and Simon, Manuel}}, journal = {{Papers in Regional Science}}, number = {{95}}, pages = {{709--731}}, title = {{{Explaining inter-provincial migration in China}}}, doi = {{10.1111/pirs.12156}}, volume = {{4}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2811, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Haake, Claus-Jochen}}, journal = {{Peace Economics and Peace Science}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{377--384}}, title = {{{Towards an Economic Theory of Destabilization War}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2016-0042}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2813, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Jungblut, Stefan and Naudé, Wim}}, journal = {{International Journal of Economic Theory}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{151--165}}, title = {{{The Entrepreneurship Beveridge Curve}}}, doi = {{10.1111/ijet.12086}}, volume = {{12}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2687, author = {{Kamhöfer, Daniel A. and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, issn = {{0883-7252}}, journal = {{Journal of Applied Econometrics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{912--919}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Reanalyzing Zero Returns to Education in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1002/jae.2461}}, volume = {{31}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{211, abstract = {{On an intermediate goods market with asymmetric production technologies as well as vertical and horizontal product differentiation we analyze the influence of simultaneous competition for resources and customers. The intermediaries face either price or quantity competition on the output market and a monopolistic, strategically acting supplier on the input market. We find that there exist quality and productivity differences such that for quantity competition only one intermediary is willing to procure inputs from the input supplier, while for price competition both intermediaries are willing to purchase inputs. Moreover, the well-known welfare advantage of price competition can in general be no longer confirmed in our model with an endogenous input market and asymmetric intermediaries.}}, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Manegold, Jochen}}, journal = {{Theoretical Economics Letters}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{1341--1362}}, publisher = {{Scientific Research Publishing (SCIRP)}}, title = {{{Competition of Intermediaries in a Differentiated Duopoly}}}, doi = {{10.4236/tel.2016.66124}}, volume = {{6}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{1919, abstract = {{We study a game between a network designer, who uses costly links to connect nodes in a network, and a network disruptor who tries to disrupt the resulting network as much as possible by deleting either nodes or links. For low linking costs networks with all nodes in symmetric positions are a best response of the designer under both link deletion and node deletion. For high linking costs the designer builds a star network under link deletion, but for node deletion excludes some nodes from the network to build a smaller but stronger network. For intermediate linking costs the designer again builds a symmetric network under node deletion but a star‐like network with weak spots under link deletion.}}, author = {{Hoyer, Britta and De Jaegher, Kris}}, issn = {{1097-3923}}, journal = {{Journal of Public Economic Theory}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{802--830}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{Strategic Network Disruption and Defense}}}, doi = {{10.1111/jpet.12168}}, volume = {{18}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{1922, abstract = {{We construct two-player two-strategy game-theoretic models of by-product mutualism, where our focus lies on the way in which the probability of cooperation among players is affected by the degree of adversity facing the players. In our first model, cooperation consists of the production of a public good, and adversity is linked to the degree of complementarity of the players׳ efforts in producing the public good. In our second model, cooperation consists of the defense of a public, and/or a private good with by-product benefits, and adversity is measured by the number of random attacks (e.g., by a predator) facing the players. In both of these models, our analysis confirms the existence of the so-called boomerang effect, which states that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally defect in a situation of joint cooperation. Focusing on such an effect in isolation leads to the "common-enemy" hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity increases the probability of cooperation. Yet, we also find that a sucker effect may simultaneously exist, which says that in a harsh environment, the individual player has few incentives to unilaterally cooperate in a situation of joint defection. Looked at in isolation, the sucker effect leads to the competing hypothesis that a larger degree of adversity decreases the probability of cooperation. Our analysis predicts circumstances in which the "common enemy" hypothesis prevails, and circumstances in which the competing hypothesis prevails.}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, issn = {{0022-5193}}, journal = {{Journal of Theoretical Biology}}, pages = {{82--97}}, publisher = {{Elsevier BV}}, title = {{{By-product mutualism and the ambiguous effects of harsher environments – A game-theoretic model}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.12.034}}, volume = {{393}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2688, author = {{Schiele, Valentin and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{59--69}}, title = {{{Quantile treatment effects of job loss on health}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.06.005}}, volume = {{49}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{3083, author = {{Herr, Annika and Nguyen, Thu-Van and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health Policy}}, number = {{10}}, pages = {{1162--1170}}, title = {{{Public reporting and the quality of care of German nursing homes}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.healthpol.2016.09.004 }}, volume = {{120}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2956, author = {{Göpffarth, Dirk and Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health economics}}, number = {{7}}, pages = {{801--815}}, title = {{{Determinants of regional variation in health expenditures in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3183}}, volume = {{25}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{15259, author = {{Decker, Simon and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, issn = {{0167-6296}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{156--170}}, title = {{{Health shocks and risk aversion}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.09.006}}, volume = {{156-170}}, year = {{2016}}, } @article{2815, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Naudé, Wim and Bilkic, Natascha}}, journal = {{The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance}}, pages = {{1--17}}, title = {{{Playing the Lottery or Dressing Up? A Model of Firm-Level Heterogeneity and the Decision to Export}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.qref.2015.02.010}}, volume = {{58}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2816, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Feng, Yuanhua and Guo, Zhichao}}, journal = {{China Agricultural Economic Review}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{262--279}}, title = {{{Changes of China’s agri-food exports to Germany caused by its accession to WTO and the 2008 financial crisis}}}, doi = {{10.1108/CAER-11-2013-0152}}, volume = {{7}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{3295, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Palnau, Irene}}, journal = {{Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy}}, number = {{ 4}}, pages = {{467 --478}}, title = {{{Sustaining Civil Peace: a configurational comparative analysis}}}, doi = {{10.1515/peps-2015-0020}}, volume = {{21}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{3296, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel and Redlin, Margarete}}, journal = {{Oxford Economic Papers}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{83 -- 103}}, title = {{{Oppressive Governments, Dependence on the United States and Anti-American Terrorism}}}, doi = {{10.1093/oep/gpu038}}, volume = {{67}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{491, abstract = {{In the framework of spatial competition, two or more players strategically choose a locationin order to attract consumers. It is assumed standardly that consumers with the same favorite location fully agree on the ranking of all possible locations. To investigate the necessity of this questionable and restrictive assumption, we model heterogeneity in consumers’ distance perceptions by individual edge lengths of a given graph. A profile of location choices is called a “robust equilibrium” if it is a Nash equilibrium in several games which differ only by the consumers’ perceptions of distances. For a finite number of players and any distribution of consumers, we provide a full characterization of all robust equilibria and derive structural conditions for their existence. Furthermore, we discuss whether the classical observations of minimal differentiation and inefficiency are robust phenomena. Thereby, we find strong support for an old conjecture that in equilibrium firms form local clusters.}}, author = {{Buechel, Berno and Röhl, Nils}}, journal = {{European Journal of Operational Research}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{505--517}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Robust Equilibria in Location Games}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.ejor.2014.07.019}}, volume = {{240}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{5239, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Patient Gesundheitswesen – Mission 2030 Unsere gemeinsame Verantwortung die Zukunft zu gestalten}}, publisher = {{Quintessenz Verlags-GmbH}}, title = {{{Rationalisierung vs. Rationierung Ist die Rationierung unvermeidbar? }}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2957, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Westphal, Matthias}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, pages = {{174--185}}, title = {{{Short-and medium-term effects of informal care provision on female caregivers’ health}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.03.002}}, volume = {{42}}, year = {{2015}}, } @article{2522, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}}, issn = {{0938-2259}}, journal = {{Economic Theory}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{529--554}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7}}, volume = {{57}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2819, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Grundmann, Rainer}}, journal = {{Journal of Population Economics}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{1165--1186}}, title = {{{Trade and fertility in the developing world: the impact of trade and trade structure}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00148-014-0508-x}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2842, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Dung, Ha Van}}, journal = {{Modern Economy}}, pages = {{878--894}}, title = {{{Household Savings and Productive Capital Formation in Rural Vietnam: Insurance vs. Social Network}}}, doi = {{10.4236/me.2014.58081}}, volume = {{5}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2709, abstract = {{This paper studies welfare consequences of consumer-side market transparency with endogenous entry of firms. Different from most studies, we consider the unique symmetric entry equilibrium, which is in mixed strategies. We identify two effects of market transparency on welfare: a competition effect and a novel market-structure effect. We show, surprisingly, that for almost all demand functions the negative market-structure effect eventually dominates the positive competition effect as the market becomes increasingly transparent. Consumer-side market transparency can therefore be socially excessive even without collusion. The only exception among commonly used demand functions is the set of constant demand functions. }}, author = {{Gu, Yiquan and Hehenkamp, Burkhard}}, issn = {{0932-4569}}, journal = {{Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{225--248}}, publisher = {{Mohr Siebeck}}, title = {{{Too Much of a Good Thing? Welfare Consequences of Market Transparency}}}, doi = {{10.1628/093245614x13895979380392}}, volume = {{170}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{1923, abstract = {{How is collective defence by players affected when they face a threat from an intelligent attacker rather than a natural threat? This paper analyses this question using a game-theoretic model. Facing an intelligent attacker has an effect if players move first and visibly set their defence strategies, thereby exposing any players who do not defend, and if the attacker is, moreover, not able to commit to a random attack. Depending on the parameters of the game, the presence of an intelligent attacker either increases the probability that players jointly defend (where such joint defence either does or does not constitute a utilitarian optimum), or decreases the probability that players jointly defend (even though joint defence is a utilitarian optimum).}}, author = {{De Jaegher, Kris and Hoyer, Britta}}, issn = {{1024-2694}}, journal = {{Defence and Peace Economics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{644--664}}, publisher = {{Informa UK Limited}}, title = {{{Collective action and the common enemy effect}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10242694.2014.925676}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{5241, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Augurzky, B. and Roppel, U.}}, journal = {{RWI Position}}, title = {{{Kehrtwende in der Gesundheitspolitik - Unnötige Abkehr von einer erfolgreichen Reform zur Finanzierung der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung}}}, volume = {{59}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2959, author = {{Mayrhofer, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Journal of Population Economics}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{841--856}}, title = {{{Testing the relationship between income inequality and life expectancy: A simple correction for the aggregation effect when using aggregated data}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s00148-013-0483-7}}, volume = {{27}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2960, author = {{Keese, Matthias and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Review of Income and Wealth}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{525--541}}, title = {{{Broke, ill, and obese: is there an effect of household debt on health?}}}, doi = {{10.1111/roiw.12002}}, volume = {{60}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2958, author = {{Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Health Economics}}, number = {{12}}, pages = {{1481--1492}}, title = {{{Regional variation in the utilisation of ambulatory services in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1002/hec.3001}}, volume = {{23}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{31817, author = {{Lück, Sonja}}, issn = {{03427064}}, journal = {{Die Betriebswirtschaft}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{269--282}}, title = {{{Forschung und Lehre: Freund oder Feind?}}}, volume = {{74}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2729, author = {{Dimant, Eugen and Krieger, Tim and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{1465-6485}}, journal = {{German Economic Review}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{464--489}}, publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}}, title = {{{A Crook is a Crook … But is He Still a Crook Abroad? On the Effect of Immigration on Destination-Country Corruption}}}, doi = {{10.1111/geer.12064}}, volume = {{16}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{33087, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel and Redlin, Margarete}}, issn = {{0030-7653}}, journal = {{Oxford Economic Papers}}, keywords = {{Economics and Econometrics}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{83--103}}, publisher = {{Oxford University Press (OUP)}}, title = {{{Oppressive governments, dependence on the USA, and anti-American terrorism}}}, doi = {{10.1093/oep/gpu038}}, volume = {{67}}, year = {{2014}}, } @article{2543, author = {{Brangewitz, Sonja and Gamp, Jan-Philip}}, issn = {{0165-1765}}, journal = {{Economics Letters}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{224--227}}, publisher = {{Elsevier}}, title = {{{Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions and competitive payoffs}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.013}}, volume = {{121}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2843, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Bilkic, Natascha and Carerras Painter, Ben}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{1 -- 45}}, title = {{{Unsustainable Sovereign Debt - Is the Euro Crisis only the Tip of the Iceberg?}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-013-0230-2}}, volume = {{10}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2844, author = {{Gries, Thomas}}, journal = {{Oxford University Press}}, pages = {{293--323}}, title = {{{Global Asymmetries and their Implications for Climate and Industrial Policies, in: Pathways to Industrialization in the Twenty-First Century - New Challenges and Emerging Paradigms}}}, doi = {{10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199667857.001.0001}}, volume = {{ch. 11}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2845, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel}}, journal = {{Economics Letters }}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{321--324}}, title = {{{Do banking crises cause terrorism?}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.009}}, volume = {{119}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2846, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, DAniel}}, journal = {{Journal of Peace Research}}, number = {{1}}, pages = {{91 -- 104}}, title = {{{Causality Between Terrorism and Economic Growth}}}, doi = {{10.1177/0022343312445650}}, volume = {{50}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2961, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Journal of Health Economics}}, number = {{6}}, pages = {{1240--1249}}, title = {{{Practice budgets and the patient mix of physicians-Evaluating the effects of remuneration system reforms on physician behaviour in Germany}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.09.013}}, volume = {{32}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{3084, author = {{Augurzky, Boris and Kopetsch, Thomas and Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{The European Journal of Health Economics}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{615--627}}, title = {{{What accounts for the regional differences in the utilisation of hospitals in Germany?}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10198-012-0407-6}}, volume = {{14}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2962, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Stroka, Magdalena A}}, journal = {{Labour Economics}}, pages = {{305--322}}, title = {{{Health and the double burden of full-time work and informal care provision—Evidence from administrative data}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2013.09.006}}, volume = {{24}}, year = {{2013}}, } @article{2519, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Martini, Jan Thomas}}, issn = {{0926-2644}}, journal = {{Group Decision and Negotiation}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{657--680}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{Negotiating Transfer Prices}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10726-012-9286-6}}, volume = {{22}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{2521, author = {{Haake, Claus-Jochen and Krieger, Tim and Minter, Steffen}}, issn = {{1612-4804}}, journal = {{International Economics and Economic Policy}}, number = {{4}}, pages = {{583--612}}, publisher = {{Springer Nature}}, title = {{{On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border enforcement in the EU}}}, doi = {{10.1007/s10368-012-0226-3}}, volume = {{10}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{2949, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Bilkic, Natascha and Pilichowski, Margarethe}}, journal = {{Labour Economics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{706 -- 717}}, title = {{{Stay in school or start working?- The human capital investment decision under uncertainty and irreversibility}}}, doi = {{10.1016/j.labeco.2012.04.005}}, volume = {{19}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{2951, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Meierrieks, Daniel}}, journal = {{Defence and Peace Economics}}, number = {{5}}, pages = {{447 -- 470}}, title = {{{Economic performance and terrorist activity in Latin America}}}, doi = {{10.1080/10242694.2012.656945}}, volume = {{23}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{2952, author = {{Gries, Thomas and Prior, Ulrich and Sureth, Caren}}, journal = {{Journal of Public Economics Theory}}, number = {{3}}, pages = {{521 -- 545}}, title = {{{A Tax Paradox for Investment Decisions under Uncertainty}}}, doi = {{10.1111/j.1467-9779.2012.01547.x}}, volume = {{14}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{5243, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik and Augurzky, B. and Beivers, A.}}, journal = {{Krankenhaus-Report 2012}}, publisher = {{Schattauer}}, title = {{{Regionale Unterschiede in der stationären Versorgung: Das ländliche Krankenhaus im Fokus}}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{3075, author = {{Schmitz, Hendrik}}, journal = {{Applied Economics}}, number = {{34}}, pages = {{4455--4468}}, title = {{{More health care utilization with more insurance coverage? Evidence from a latent class model with German data}}}, doi = {{10.1080/00036846.2011.591733}}, volume = {{44}}, year = {{2012}}, } @article{31821, author = {{Blum, Mareike and Kraft, Manfred and Lück, Sonja}}, issn = {{1860-3025}}, journal = {{Hochschulmanagement}}, number = {{2}}, pages = {{34--41}}, title = {{{Zufriedenheit der Studierenden mit den Serviceeinrichtungen einer Universität: Ergebnisse einer explorativen multivariaten Analyse}}}, volume = {{7}}, year = {{2012}}, }